Adair Verna Vs Trotter Tynaja

Case Number: 22STCV29612 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 22STCV29612 MOTION Motion to Continue Trial MOVING PARTIES Defendant City of Los Angeles OPPOSING PARTY Unopposed MOTION Defendant City of Los Angeles (Defendant) moves to continue trial. No opposition has been filed. BACKGROUND The complaint was filed on September 12, 2022. Trial was initially set for March 11, 2024. Defendants answer was filed on November 15, 2022. On February 8, 2024, pursuant to stipulation, the Court continued trial and all related dates to September 17, 2024. On May 29, 2024, Defendant filed and electronically served a motion for summary judgment. The hearing for summary judgment is currently scheduled for September 24, 2024. ANALYSIS Legal Standard Continuances are granted only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring a continuance. ( In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) A trial court has broad discretion in considering a request for a trial continuance. ( Pham v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 11, 13-18.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 sets forth factors for the Court to consider in ruling on a motion to continue trial. To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) A party seeking a continuance of the date set for trial, whether contested or uncontested or stipulated to by the parties, must make the request for a continuance by a noticed motion or an ex parte application under the rules in chapter 4 of this division, with supporting declarations. The party must make the motion or application as soon as reasonably practical once the necessity for the continuance is discovered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b).) Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. Circumstances that may indicate good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new partys involvement in the case; (6) A partys excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination. These may include: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested ; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The courts calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) A party may move for summary judgment at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)¿ Notice of the motion and supporting papers must be served on all other parties at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing.¿ ( Id. , subd. (a)(2).)¿ The motion must be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.¿ ( Id. , subd. (a)(3).)¿¿¿ Discussion Defendant requests the Court continue trial in this case to at least 30 days after the September 24, 2024 summary judgment hearing. A party that timely files a motion for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c has a right to have their motion heard before the start of trial. ( Cole v. Superior Court (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 84, 88.) If served electronically, a motion for summary judgment must be made at least 105 days before trial, plus two court days. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(2), (3).) Therefore, a motion for summary judgment in this case needed to be filed by May 31, 2024. Defendant timely served its motion for summary judgment on May 29, 2024. Defendant argues that the summary judgment hearing could not be reserved until September 24, 2024. (Lee Decl. ¶ 2.) Since that date is after trial, Defendant requests that the Court continue the trial date to allow for the motion for summary judgment to be heard. Therefore, since Defendant has filed a timely summary judgment motion, and seeing no opposition, the Court finds good cause to continue trial. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to continue trial. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court GRANTS Defendants motion to continue trial. The Final Status Conference is continued to October 17, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Trial is continued to October 31, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. All discovery and pre-trial motion cut-off dates shall be in accordance with the new trial date. Defendant shall give notice of this order, and file a proof of service of such.

NOLAN VS. BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL, INC. Case Number: 22CV-0199470 Tentative Ruling on Petition to Approve Minor Compromise: This matter is on calendar for further proceedings on a Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim for Minor Cordelia Nolan. The Petition was filed January 31, 2024, by Guardian Ad Litem/Father Ivan Case. The Court has since been informed that a replacement Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) must be appointed due to the unavailability of the current GAL. In the late afternoon of July 12, 2024, the Court received extensive pleadings, filed on July 12, 2024, which include an Amended Petion and Status Report. The Court has obviously not had time to review any of this material. This matter, and the 9:00 Review Hearing are continued to August 12, 2024 at 8:30 a.m and 9:00 a.m., respectively, in in Dept. 64. Petitioner is to serve notice of these continued hearings and file a proof of service of having done so no later than five days prior to the continued date. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24PSCV00115 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Otto Beasley v. Guy Shih, et al. Plaintiffs Motion to Quash and/or Modify Defendants Deposition Subpoenas of Plaintiffs Medical Records and Request for Monetary Sanctions TENTATIVE RULING The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to quash and/or modify Defendants deposition subpoenas of Plaintiffs medical records, and hereby QUASHES all 29 deposition subpoenas, without prejudice to Defendants issuing more narrowly framed, more precisely tailored subpoenas which do not improperly impinge on protected information. The Court further GRANTS Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $2,760.00. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is an auto accident case. On January 10, 2024, plaintiff Otto Beasley (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Guy Shih, Jocelyn Shih, Shawn Tang (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence. On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff moved to quash and/or modify Defendants 29 deposition subpoenas for Plaintiffs medical records. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) PRELIMINARY ISSUES Rule 3.1345, subdivision (a)(5), of the California Rules of Court requires a separate statement to be submitted with a motion to quash a subpoena for production of documents at a deposition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, subd. (a)(5).) Plaintiff did not provide a separate statement with this motion, which renders the motion defective. (See Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 892.) Nevertheless, the Court exercises its discretion to still consider Plaintiffs motion, but admonishes Plaintiff to comply with the requirements of the California Rules of Court going forward. (See Id. , at p. 893.) DISCUSSION Meet and Confer Although the moving party is not required to meet and confer before bringing a motion to quash a deposition subpoena, (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1), the Court appreciates Plaintiffs efforts to do so (Lu Decl., ¶¶ 4-7). Analysis Plaintiff seeks to quash or modify the 29 deposition subpoenas defendants served on various hospitals and health care providers. (See Lu Decl., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff contends the subpoenas improperly seek disclosure of medical records unrelated to this action, such as records that predate the accident, and otherwise violate Plaintiffs privacy rights. Plaintiff contends the records requested are irrelevant to this action, improperly burden Plaintiff, are harassing, and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff contends these subpoenas are overbroad and seek Plaintiffs entire medical history, including before the accident, and are therefore not narrowly tailored to the relevant issues. Plaintiff indicates having agreed to produce medical and billing records related to Plaintiffs spine treatment and left shoulder dating back ten years from the date of the accident, and that such production should be enough for Defendants, but received no response. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks to modify the subpoenas to be limited medical records involving those parts that were injured in the accident and go back only ten years. The Court finds Plaintiffs motion to be well taken. The language in the subpoenas reads as follows: Complete records, including but not limited to, intake forms, forms filled out by the patient, emails to and from the patient, emails to and from the patients attorney, correspondence between your office and the patients attorney, correspondence between your office and the patient, correspondence and emails between your office and any Payor (payor means any person or organization which pays, in whole or part, for the services rendered to the patient), emails concerning the patient, log entries, post-it notes, memos, internal notations, attorney liens and letters of credit, payment information, records concerning or relating to scheduling, records from other health care providers, correspondence, medical records, nursing records, physician assistant records, charts, chart notes, treatment records, lab reports, cardiology reports, radiology reports, MRI reports, x-ray and CAT scan reports, fluoroscopy images, physical therapy records, case history, emergency records, diagnosis, prognosis, admit and discharge records, disability slips, prescriptions, phone call notes and logs, photographs, sign-in and sign-out sheets, documents which document if records have been checked out or provided to the patient or others, all billing records showing all charges, payments, write-offs, emails and correspondence related to billings or collections, emails and correspondence related to when payment will be made, all documents concerning any payments, all contracts between your office and anyone who has purchased your accounts receivable concerning the patient referenced in this subpoena, documents establishing your right to payment, plus true and complete copies of all medical imaging, x-rays, fluoroscopy and MRJ scans, including metadata. This subpoena applies all records from the date of the first visit to the present, and includes electronic records and physical paper records, including those located in storage. **Prior to duplication of medical imaging, please provide a breakdown of all medical imaging in your possession, custody, or control. Medical imaging which can be produced electronically, like modern x-rays, CT scans, and MRI scans must be produced in electronic format on a DVD or flash drive. (Lu Decl., Ex. 1.) The Court finds this language is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is effectively a shotgun discovery request, which is improper. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; W. Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct. In & For Los Angeles Cnty. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 419.) This language contains no time limitation, and seeks irrelevant information predating the subject accident. ( See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Moreover, the fact Defendants served this same subpoena on 29 different hospitals and medical service providers further underscores that this is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and also appears intended to harass Plaintiff. (See Id. ; Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Superior Ct. In & For City & Cnty. of San Francisco (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 779.) Furthermore, the documents requested clearly implicate Plaintiffs privacy rights, as they involve medical information. ( Davis v. Superior Ct. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1019 [It has been held that a person's medical profile is an area of privacy which cannot be compromised except upon good cause. [Citation.] We may also safely conclude that the right of privacy extends to the details of one's personal life. [Citation. ]; see also Hallendorf v. Superior Court (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 553, 556-557 [mere filing of a personal injury lawsuit does not open up all of a plaintiffs past medical history to scrutiny. [Citation.]) Finally, the Court further notes that Defendants did not oppose this motion, which undermines their subpoenas because they have not demonstrated good cause for seeking Plaintiffs past medical records. (See Davis v. Superior Ct., supra, 7 Cal.App.4 th at p. 1019.) The Court also construes it as a tacit admission that Plaintiffs arguments are meritorious. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410; C. Opposing the Motionand Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.) Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion and hereby quashes all 29 deposition subpoenas. With respect to monetary sanctions, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs request in the reduced amount of $2,760, comprised of 4.5 hours preparing the motion and appearing at the hearing on the motion, multiplied by the hourly rate of $600.00, plus the $60.00 filing fee. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to quash and/or modify Defendants deposition subpoenas of Plaintiffs medical records, and hereby QUASHES all 29 deposition subpoenas, without prejudice to Defendants issuing more narrowly framed, more precisely tailored subpoenas which do not improperly impinge on protected information. The Court further GRANTS Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $2,760.00. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.

Parties to appear in person or remotely. Department 10C is open for in person appearances. Should counsel/parties prefer to appear remotely, follow the instructions below. There is a dedicated conference bridge lines for Dept 10C. Call into dedicated conference bridge line at the time set for the hearing. To attend the remote hearing in Dept 10C: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6937 and Pin # 6822.

Case Number: 23STCV11541 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV11541 MOTIONS : Motion to Compel Defendants Deposition MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Tamera Pinelo OPPOSING PARTY: Defendant Jorge Carlos Castro BACKGROUND Plaintiff Tamera Pinelo (Plaintiff) moves to compel Defendant Jorge Carlos Castros (Defendant) deposition. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions. Defendant opposes. No reply has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action . . . , without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document . . . described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document . . . described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) A motion under subdivision (a) [above] shall comply with both of the following: 1. The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. 2. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b).) If a motion is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction in favor of that party unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450 (g).) MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Sayeh M. Dayen, Plaintiffs counsel, shows an effort to coordinate Defendants deposition with Defendants counsel since November 2023. DISCUSSION On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff asked for available dates for Defendants deposition but received no response. (Dayen Decl. ¶ 34.) On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff served a deposition notice set for January 8, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 4, Exh. C.) Defendant objected on December 29, 2023 because the date was unilaterally set. ( Id. , Exh. D.) On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff served a second deposition notice set for March 4, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 4, Exh. E.) On February 26, 2024, Defendant objected to the second deposition notice and informed Plaintiff he was available for various dates in March via teleconference. Plaintiff then asked for the basis for the teleconference deposition but received no response. ( Id. ¶ 7, Exh. G.) In opposition, Defendant contends that the motion is moot since he has agreed to appear for an in-person deposition on August 13, 2024. (Renaud Decl. ¶ 15, Exh. K.) Defendant also seeks monetary sanctions. No reply has been filed. Based on the information above, because Defendant served timely objections, and has now agreed to appear at a noticed deposition, the motion to compel is denied. The Court declines to award monetary sanctions to Defendant since he has not shown a statutory basis under section 2025.450. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants deposition is DENIED. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file a proof of service of such.

AL. Case Number: 22CV-0201012 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. A Notice of Settlement was filed on April 15, 2024 which indicates that the case would be dismissed within 45 days. No dismissal is on file. The Court intends to dismiss this case pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1385(b) unless the parties appear at today’s hearing and show good cause why the case should not be dismissed.

Case Number: 23SMCV01089 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The demurrer is OVERRULED. While defendants statement of law is correct in that it is hard to see who the individual is that is alleged to be specifically responsible, there is enough here for pleading purposes. The specifics can be fleshed out in discovery and for now there are allegations, albeit general, as to the defendants acting together. In short, these issues are better raised by way of a summary judgment motion or at trial. The court is also having trouble understanding how the demurrer is timely. The court notes three discovery motions on file. That does not bode well this early in the case. The court has not worked up those motions, but for the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confers, and IDCs. The court encourages IDCs where both parties would like to resolve the matter informally and in good faith, and often the failure to participate in an IDC can have an impact on the recovery or propriety of any sanctions request. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The Court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The Court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the Court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the Court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First , General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second , the Court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the Courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the Court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The Court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous must set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party must so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log must accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third , if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth , for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth , the Court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the Court believes it appropriate to set forth how the Court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the Courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. ( Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a] rgument is not the same as informal negotiation ( id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways ( id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Id. at p. 1439.) ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point, before impasse is reached the process must include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there must be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal then and there. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the Court is not interested in the back and forth, the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally will encourage an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five Court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in an adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the Court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.

Case Number: 24NWCV00022 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: C ZHOIE PEREZ v. SANDRA NGAYAN, et al. CASE NO .: 24NWCV00022 HEARING : 7/17/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #6 TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Sandra Ngayan and Francisco Alejandro Ngayans demurrer to Plaintiffs first amended complaint is CONTINUED to July 23, 2024 at 9:30 A.M. in Dept. SE-C. Moving Party to give NOTICE. The motion is unopposed as of July 15, 2024. This is a status hearing. At the June 12, 2024 hearing, the Court learned that Plaintiff was incarcerated. According to Court records, it appears Plaintiff is held without bail in People v. Zhoie Perez , Case No. PA098371-01. Her Probation and Sentencing Hearing on June 26, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in San Fernando Courthouse, Dept. 1 was continued October 9, 2024. Plaintiff remains in custody for the criminal case. The Court has been in contact with Rosemary Chavez, new counsel for Plaintiff in the criminal matter, and has invited her to make a limited appearance in this case and to update the Court on the criminal matter.