Minneapolis Public Housing Authority Vs William Robinson

S-CV-0051219 Suter, Robert T vs. Cole, Frank W ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): The testate and intestate successors of Frank W. Cole; The testate and intestate successors of E. L. Spencer; The testate and intestate successors of Clara C. Schultz; The testate and intestate successors of Consolidated Exploration and Mining; The testate and intestate successors of K. R. Nutting; The testate and intestate successors of Ida Van Petten; The testate and intestate successors of John R. Powers; The testate and intestate successors of Gertrude I. Heaney; The testate and intestate successors of Cecil Graham; All Persons Unknown, Claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiffs’ title, or any cloud on Plaintiffs’ title thereto

20CV01220 CALIFORNIA OPEN LANDS V. BUTTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS EVENT: Plaintiff’s Motion for Appellate Attorneys’ Fees Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted. The Court finds that the amounts of time claimed are not facially excessive or unreasonable, except for the following: 2.1 hours [as set forth in the Opposition at Defendant’s Table 3] for administrative tasks, and 1.4 hours [as set forth in the Opposition at Defendant’s Table 1] for timekeeping/inconsistent errors. The Court therefore awards the following attorneys’ fees: Mr. Packard: 24.9 hours x $825/hour = $20,542.50 Mr. Acree: 183.7 hours x $750/hour = $137,775.00 Mr. Carlon: 108.0 hours x $400/hour = $43,200.00 Total = $201,517.50 Counsel for the Plaintiff shall submit a form of order consistent with this ruling within two weeks.

Case Number: 23AHCV00325 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 26 7/18/24 Dept. 26 Rolf Treu, Judge presiding Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al. (21STCV09634) DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE CROSS-COMPLAINT (Filed by Cross-Defendants Maggie Ly Sien and Real Estate Elite Corporation on February 14, 2024) Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al. ( 23AHCV00325 ) DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Filed by Defendants Maggie Ly Sien and Real Estate Elite Corporation on April 2, 2024) Counsel for Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant Zhenya He (Opposing Party): Charles Pok, Esq. (Law Office of Charles Pok & Associates) Counsel for Defendants/Cross-Defendants Maggie Ly Sien aka Maggie Chan, Real Estate Elite Corporation (Moving/Demurring Parties): Fredric W. Trester, Linna Loangkote (Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP) TENTATIVE RULING Cross-Defendants demurrer to the cross-complaint in Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al., 21STCV09634, filed February 14, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. Defendants demurrer to the complaint in Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al., 23AHCV00325 , filed April 2, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. The motions to strike are denied as moot. Background On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff/Defendant/Cross-Defendant Zhenya He (He or Plaintiff) filed her complaint in case number 23AHCV00325, He v. Chen . She filed her operative second amended complaint (SAC) on January 10, 2024. On November 28, 2023, He filed a cross-complaint in a related suit, Ku v. He , case number 21STCV09634. The cross-complaint in Ku v. He is functionally identical to the complaint in He v. Chen . Defendants/cross-defendants Maggie Ly Sien (Ly) and Real Estate Elite Corporation (REEC) (together, Defendants) now challenge the functionally identical SAC and cross-complaint, each on the same grounds. Plaintiff alleges as follows in her 2024 SAC and her 2023 cross-complaint, accepted as true for purposes of demurrer and motion to strike (paragraph citations to the SAC unless otherwise noted): Plaintiff purchased the property located at 1400 Circle Drive, San Marino 91108 (the Property) around May 19, 2015. (¶ 17.) In June 2019, Plaintiff registered an LLC, Le Sky Group LLC, and transferred ownership of the Property to the newly-formed LLC. (¶¶ 19, 21.) Plaintiff had loaned defendant Ying Chen a large sum of money in 2017. (¶ 24.) Chen failed to promptly pay her back, and Plaintiff and Chen reached an agreement that Chen would pay the mortgage on the Property until Chen could repay the whole loan to Plaintiff. (¶¶ 24-26.) In December 2020, Chen informed Plaintiff she had repaid the mortgage and suggested to Plaintiff she could help Plaintiff sell the Property if she wanted. (¶ 27, edits to capitalization.) In late 2021, Plaintiff was in China. (¶ 29.) Her real estate agent informed her that the Property had been transferred unbeknownst to [Plaintiff] and Chen was somehow involved with the alleged transfer. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff contacted Chen, who informed her the Property had been transferred to a friend and Plaintiff would be paid full market value for it. ( Ibid .) The structure on the Property was subsequently torn down, and Plaintiff was never paid. (¶ 30.) As to defendants Maggie Ly Sien (Ly) and Real Estate Elite Corporation (REEC), the moving parties here: according to the SAC, around September and October 2020 defendant Ly, among others, inquired with a representative of Chicago Title Company regarding what documents would be needed in order for Chen to be able to authorize the sale and transfer of Plaintiffs [P]roperty. (¶ 34.) Ly and several of her co-defendants then instigated the creation and filing of a fraudulent Statement of Information as to Le Sky Group LLC, which added Chen as a Manager of the LLC, changed the agent for service of process, and changed the service address. (¶¶ 35-36.) They then created an Operating Agreement for Le Sky Group LLC and forged Plaintiffs signature. (¶ 38.) With their fraudulently-obtained authority over Le Sky Group LLC, the owner of the Property, Ly and her co-defendants then transferred title to the Property without Plaintiffs consent. (¶¶ 39-40.) On February 14, 2024, Ly and REEC demurred to and moved to strike portions of Hes cross-complaint in Ku v. He. Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and Ly and REEC no reply. On April 2, 2024, Ly and REEC demurred to and moved to strike portions from Plaintiffs SAC in He v. Chen . Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and Ly and REEC no reply. The demurrers and motions now come before the Court concurrently in the two related cases. The pleadings and motions are substantially identical, and the Court discusses them all together. Discussion In support of their demurrer, Ly and REEC argue: · The third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, only challenged in the demurrer to the SAC, not to the cross-complaint (one assumes erroneously) , fails because Plaintiff has not pled Ly or REEC was her agent, and therefore owed her any fiduciary duty. · The fourth cause of action for slander of title fails because o (1) Plaintiff does not allege Ly or REEC recorded a deed, nor did they, nor can anyone infer they did based on Plaintiffs allegations, because a real estate agent/company does not have a duty to record a deed related to a transaction; and o (2) Plaintiff does not allege any false deed was recorded, even if she alleges the underlying transaction was fraudulent; · The fifth cause of action for conversion fails because it only applies to personal property; and · The seventh cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants received any stolen property. The demurrer is sustained, so the motion to strike is moot. ANALYSIS A. Timeliness ; Meeting and Conference A demurrer or motion to strike must be filed within 30 days of being served with a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.40, 435 (b)(1).) Each must be accompanied by the moving partys declaration attesting to a good-faith effort to meet and confer prior to filing. ( Id. , §§ 430.41, 435.5.) Counsel confirms via declaration that the parties conferred about a timeline for challenging the related pleadings in each case. The demurrer and motion to strike are timely based on the parties agreement, and the parties met and conferred regarding their dispute. (See Loangkote Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.) B. Legal Standard for Demurrer Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) C. Analysis Third Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendants challenge Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in their demurrer to her SAC in He v. Chen , but not their demurrer to her cross-complaint in Ku v. He. The Court assumes this was administrative error; the ruling applies equally to both pleadings. To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty a plaintiff must plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach. ( Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) Plaintiff does not plead that Ly or REEC owed her a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary relationship is any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. ( Wolf v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 25, 29.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants owed a duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs based on their profession. The Court is not aware of authority stating that real estate professionals owe a fiduciary duty to the public writ large. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition citing any. Plaintiff has not pled facts showing Defendants owed a duty specifically to her , so she has not stated a claim against them for breach of fiduciary duty. Fourth Cause of Action for Slander of Title The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are (1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. ( Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051.) Defendants argue it is not the responsibility of a real estate agent to record or cause to be recorded title relating to real property ... . (MPA, 9:3-4.) The relevance of this argument is unclear. Whether or not it was Defendants responsibility to record a deed has no bearing on whether they actually did so, or whether the deed was true or false. Defendants also argue Plaintiff did not allege Defendants published anything false. On this point, the Court agrees. The general background facts in the SAC and cross-complaint do not contain a specific allegation that Ly or REEC made any publication. The allegations beneath the cause of action itself state generally that Defendants published a false statement. When the joint liability of multiple defendants is unclear, but a complaint fails to distinguish between them, the complaint may fail for uncertainty. (See Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 Cal.3d 901, 909.) Plaintiffs complaint fails for this reason. Without differentiating the nine (9) defendants and their purported involvement with the alleged false deed, none of the defendants can ascertain what she accuses them of, specifically. Plaintiffs claim for slander of title is fatally uncertain as to Ly and REEC. Fifth Cause of Action for Conversion Conversion is generally described as the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. [Citation.] The basic elements of the tort are (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant's disposition of the property in a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's property rights; and ( 3 ) resulting damages . [Citation.] ( Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 ( Fremont ).) Plaintiff does not allege Defendants disposed of any of her personal property. Her conversion claim fails. Seventh Cause of Action for Civil Theft To plead a cause of action for civil theft under Penal Code section 496, a plaintiff must allege three elements: (1) property stolen or obtained by theft or fraud; (2) defendants knowledge that it was so obtained; and (3) defendants receipt or possession of the property. ( Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 126.) Plaintiff accuses Ly and REEC, collectively with their co-defendants, of engaging in a scheme to take her property. The SAC implies that Defendants somehow profited from the scheme. But it does not allege Defendants actually received any stolen property. As a result, Plaintiff has not stated a claim. Defendants demurrer is sustained. D. Leave to Amend Where the complaint is defective, [i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his [or her] complaint&However, if the plaintiff's causes of action is [sic] not viable, leave to amend should not be granted if there is no basis for the court to conclude further amendment would cure the defects. ( Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 211, internal quotations omitted.) If the demurrer is sustained, plaintiff has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment. ( Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 173, citing Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79). Plaintiff filed no opposition to either demurrer. As a result, she made no effort to demonstrate she can cure her pleading by amendment. She has also amended her complaint twice already, but still fails to state claims against Ly or REEC. It is Plaintiffs burden to show she can amend her complaint to state a claim, and she has not done so. The Court must sustain both demurrers without leave to amend. E. Conclusion Cross-Defendants demurrer to the cross-complaint in Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al., 21STCV09634, filed February 14, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. Defendants demurrer to the complaint in Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al., 23AHCV00325 , filed April 2, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. The motions to strike are denied as moot.

Case Number: 21STCV39199 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Case Name: Nolasco, et al. v. Farnad, et al. Case No.: 21STCV39199 Matter: Motions to be Relieved as Counsel (2x) Moving Party: Jeffrey A. Asidi, counsel for Plaintiffs Juan Manuel Quiroz Canchola and Marco Solis Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motions are granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jeffrey A. Asidi seeks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs Juan Manuel Quiroz Canchola and Marco Solis. The Motions are granted because they meet all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362. Moving party to give notice. Attorney is relieved as counsel of record for client effective upon the filing of the proof of service for the Court order (form MC-053) upon the client. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 18, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT ACRYLIC TECHNOLOGIES, INC. MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD is OFF CALENDAR. Re-noticed for July 30, 2024. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

WAGNER VS. LLOYD Case Number: CVCV21-0198602 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.

22CV-03537 Carlos Avila v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, et al. Demurrer by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation to third Amended Complaint and to each cause of action stated therein for failure to state a cause of action against Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation The unopposed Demurrer by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and to each cause of action stated therein for failure to state a cause of action against Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation Is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff has failed to plead around the defects in the complaint despite being given three opportunities to do so, and has not provided any indication that a further grant of leave to amend would not be futile.

Case Number: 23STCV17316 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING LESBIA LUCRECIA MONTOYA, Plaintiff, v. HORACIO F. MONTOYA; et al., Defendants. Case No: 23STCV17316 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Calendar Number: 3 Defendant Horacio F. Montoya moves for relief from the Courts November 16, 2023 order for the partition of the property located at 854-645 1/2 East 50th Street, Los Angeles, California 90011 (the Property), which Defendant and Plaintiff Lesbia Lucrecia Montoya (Plaintiff) own as joint tenants. The Court DENIES Defendants motion. Background Plaintiff and Defendant each own a 50 percent share of the Property as joint tenants. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, stating claims for (1) partition; (2) accounting; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) unjust enrichment. The complaint was verified. On November 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for partition of the Property pursuant to the stipulation of the parties (the November 16 Order). On January 24, 2024, the Court entered an interlocutory judgment of partition of the Property and appointed Blake C. Alsbrook (the Referee) as referee to complete the partition sale of the Property. On June 28, 2024, the Court granted the Referees ex parte application for an order directing the Clerk of the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Referee and against Defendant and all occupants residing at the Property (the June 28 Order). On June 25, 2024, Defendant filed this motion, which is styled as an appeal and seeks relief from the November 26 Order. Discussion Defendants motion is called in different parts of the motion an appeal and as a motion to strike the sale of the Property. The motion states that it seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure, section 904.1 the statute governing grounds for appeal on the basis that the Courts November 16 Order was wrong. To the Courts knowledge, Defendant has not followed the procedures for filing an appeal and in any event, the Court is not able to consider appeals of its own judgments. Defendants motion could be characterized as a motion for reconsideration, and the Court will consider it as such. Within ten days of service of an order, a party may move for reconsideration based on new facts, circumstances, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); see also Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.) The moving party shall state by affidavit what application was made before, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd .(a).) [T]he party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time. ( Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.) The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. ( Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) If those requirements have been met to the satisfaction of the court but the court is not persuaded the earlier ruling was erroneous, the proper course is to grant reconsideration and to reaffirm the earlier ruling. ( Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).) Defendant argues that the November 16 was wrong because (1) the property has many repairs to be made which would increase its market value if completed; (2) the property has a mortgage of $497,840.00, for which Defendant is solely responsible; and (3) the property has been on the market for more than three months and has not sold. None of these arguments provide a basis for reconsideration. Knowledge of the mortgage was available to Defendant at the time of the order in fact, Defendant first informed the referee of the mortgage shortly after the order and refused to provide the Referee with financial information about it. (Alsbrook Declaration in Support of Ex Parte Application for Writ of Possession (Alsbrook Decl.) ¶ 9.) The Referee also learned shortly after his appointment that Defendant was occupying the Property which would give him access to knowledge of any defects in need of repair. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 4.) Finally, the Referee has received an offer to buy the Property. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 12.) The Referee represented in his ex parte brief that the offer was for a purchase price of $660,000.00. (Ex Parte Application for Writ of Possession at p. 2:19-25.) The Referee declared that it was Defendants continued residence at the Property that was delaying the sale. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants first two arguments could have been presented at the original hearing for the motion, and are therefore not new facts. The delay in the sale of the Property appears to be a result of Defendants own conduct, and not a result of an inability to find a buyer. The Court therefore denies Defendants motion.