Hopkins Housing Lp Vs Waltkelona Barber, John Doe, Jane Doe

RG20064740: Bautista VS Mecias 07/10/2024 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Dismissal (CCP 473) filed by Sophia Marie Palafox (Plaintiff) in Department 19 Tentative Ruling - 07/03/2024 Joscelyn Jones The Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Dismissal (CCP 473) filed by Sophia Marie Palafox (Plaintiff) scheduled for 07/10/2024 is continued to 08/07/2024 at 03:00 PM in Department 19 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . Plaintiff Sofia Palafox’s “Motion to Set Aside Default in Accordance with CCP 473(b)” is CONTINUED to August 7, 2024 at 3:00 p.m. in Department 19. Plaintiff did not file proof of service of this motion on Defendant. By no later than July 12, Plaintiff shall serve Defendant with a Renotice of Motion, indicating the continued August 7, 2024 hearing date, along with all the moving papers. Along with the moving papers, Plaintiff shall serve an appendix containing any proposed order(s) that Plaintiff still needs the Court to sign in order to fully resolve this case. Plaintiff shall file the Renotice of Motion and the appendix of proposed order(s), along with the proof of service on Defendant, by July 15, 2024.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 9, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT JUSTIN LUU, XIAO WU DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action as to the moving defendants. Plaintiff must also allege tender or facts supporting an exception from the tender rule. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 12, 2024 line 3. PLAINTIFF TING LO MOTION / Notice Of Motion And Motion is denied as to the portions of the motion seeking monetary sanctions, a partition order and an order for fees and costs. No sanctions is awarded against defendant Vivian Yuk Yung Lo because plaintiff has not shown that Ms. Lo failed to comply with any applicable rules, which is required for sanctions per CRC 2.30. The portions of the motion seeking a partition order and an order for fees and costs are not available on a pre-trial motion absent the parties' stipulation. The statement in Ms. Lo's CMC statement that "All parties agree to sell the property" is insufficient to support any of the relief sought by this motion because it does not address the necessary terms and logistics of the sale, the disposition of the proceeds of the sale, or payment of fees and costs. The portion of the motion seeking a meet and confer is misguided because CRC 3.724 is intended to require meet and confer regarding case management issues before the initial case management conference. However, review of the parties filings shows that the parties appear to desire and clearly need the assistance of a person experienced in assisting parties reach a settlement and thus the Court treats the portion of the motion regarding meet and confer as a request for a mandatory settlement conference and grants that request. The parties are required to participate in a mandatory settlement conference before the Honorable Jeffrey Ross. To facilitate the scheduling of that conference, no later than July 15 counsel for each side must send an email to Judge Ross at jross@sftc.org stating the name and number of this case, who they represent, and their cell phone numbers. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23AHCV00004 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 11, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Victoria Lynet v. Jamie Lynn Raymond et al. CASE NO.: 23AHCV00004 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants: (1) Jamie Lynn Raymond a/k/a Jamie Lynn Mills (2) Paul Raymond RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Victoria Lynet SERVICE: OK / Unopposed OPPOSITION: OK / Unopposed REPLY: OK / Unopposed RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants demur to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. BACKGROUND This is a tenant harassment and habitability case. Plaintiff Victoria Lynet sued defendants Jamie Lynn Raymond a/k/a Jamie Lynn Mills and Paul Raymond on January 3, 2023. Plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (FAC) as a matter of right on July 24, 2023, asserting causes of action for: 1. Unlawful Actions to Influence a Tenant to Vacate (Civ. Code, § 1940.2), 2. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, 3. Unfair Business Practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), 4. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 5. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 6. General Negligence, 7. Gross Negligence, 8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 9. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability [duplicative]. (The Court adopts the causes of action as they are labeled in the body of the FAC, rather than the caption; for the fourth and ninth causes of action, the two lists do not match.) On September 14, 2023, Defendants each demurred separately to the FAC. On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On May 7, 2024, Defendants replied. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants demurrers are sustained in their entirety, with leave to amend granted as to all except the seventh and ninth causes of action. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE N/A. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE N/A. LEGAL STANDARD Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) DISCUSSION 1. The FAC Fails to State Any Claim Plaintiffs FAC does not satisfy fact pleading standards. A complaint, with certain exceptions, need only contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1)) ... . ( Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn.3.) Notwithstanding that forgiving standard, [t]o survive demurrer, a plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. (See Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.) Here, the only factual allegations in the FAC appear in paragraphs sixteen (16) and seventeen (17). These paragraphs state the address of Plaintiffs unit and the date when Defendants tortious conduct allegedly began. Otherwise they only list several ways in which the unit is uninhabitable and accuse Defendants of [m]aking a false report to an animal humane society about Defendants dog, [r]epeatedly surveilling and intimidating Plaintiff, and [p]ressuring Plaintiff to vacate and serving notices to vacate that do not satisfy legal requirements. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Without further specifics, Defendants cannot prepare a defense to these allegations. The FAC is fatally uncertain and fails to state any claim. The FAC is sufficiently specific to persuade the Court that Plaintiff can supply more details upon amendment. The Court grants leave for Plaintiff to do so, as to all except her seventh and ninth causes of action, discussed below. 2. Seventh Cause of Action for Gross Negligence Although gross negligence commonly has relevance in tort actions where defendants raise assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, it is not a standalone cause of action under California law. (See id. at pp. 779-780, citing Continental Ins. Co. v. American Protection Industries (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 322; see also Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 546, 552, fn.3 [California does not recognize a distinct common law cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence.].) Defendants demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. 3. Ninth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Plaintiffs fifth and ninth causes of action are both described in the body of the FAC as claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. (The FACs caption describes them as claims under the Los Angeles Municipal Code and a cause of action for punitive damages, but the body of the complaint makes no reference to the Municipal Code under the relevant heading, and punitive damages is not a cause of action.) Because the claims are plainly duplicative, the demurrer to the latter is sustained without leave to amend. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrers are sustained in their entirety, with leave to amend granted as to all except the seventh and ninth causes of action. Plaintiff is ordered to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of this order. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 11, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

Case Number: 23BBCV02207 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 12, 2024 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV02207 MP: The People of the State of California acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Plaintiff) RP: Apex Development, Inc. & Anthony Nowaid (Defendants) [No Response Rendered] NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: On September 25, 2023, The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) brought this action against Apex Development, Inc. (Apex), Anthony Nowaid (Nowaid), Eriks Towing, The Habibi Shack, Challenger Trucking Express, Stone Concrete Mix, and Valley Green Tree Services. This was an unlawful detainer matter in which Caltrans sought possession from Apex and Nowaid (Defendants) of the property located at 12398 Sheldon Street, Sun Valley, CA 91352 (Subject Property). On May 30, 2024, the parties stipulated to the entry of judgment as against Apex. The stipulated judgment was for possession of the property and for $189,853.44 in damages assessed against Apex. The stipulation did not include a judgment of damages as against Nowaid. Caltrans now moves for an award of attorneys fees based on a corresponding provision of the parties written lease agreement. Apex has submitted no opposition to the motion. LEGAL STANDARD: The prevailing party in any action on a contract shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees incurred to enforce that contract where the contract specifically provides for attorney's fees. (Civ. Code § 1717(a).) The Court begins the attorney fee inquiry with the lodestar, i.e. , the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ( PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. ( Id .) Relevant multiplier factors include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) No specific findings reflecting the courts calculations for attorneys fees are required; the record need only show that the attorneys fees were awarded according to the lodestar or touchstone approach. ( Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349.) A trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees in an amount that is less than the lodestar amount and, to discourage claimants from making an unreasonable demand, may deny altogether a fee request that appears unreasonably inflated. ( Id . at 1321-1322; see Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.) The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records. ( Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal. ( Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) MERITS: Caltrans moves for attorneys fees to be awarded in the amount of $42,075.00. This amount reflects a total of 153.8 hours of attorney work at a rate of $250 per hour. Caltrans requests that this amount, in addition to $12,198.55 of undisputed costs (reflected in a separately filed Memorandum of Costs) be added to the judgment. As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Caltrans is the prevailing party in the matter. C.C.P. § 1032(a)(4) defines a prevailing party as one with a net monetary recovery. There is no doubt that Caltrans is the prevailing party in this litigation under that definition. The Court also finds that the written lease agreement between the parties allows Caltrans to seek attorneys fees in this unlawful detainer matter. The attorney fees provision of the lease agreement is as follows: If Tenant or Landlord shall bring any action for any relief against the other, declaratory or otherwise, arising out of this Lease, including any suit by Landlord for the recovery of rent or possession of the premises, the losing party shall pay the successful party a reasonable sum for attorneys fees which shall be deemed to have accrued on the commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. Should Landlord, without fault on Landlords part, be made a party to any litigation instituted by Tenant or by any third party against Tenant, or by or against any person holding under or using the premises by license of Tenant, or for the foreclosure of any lien for labor or materials furnished to or for Tenant or any such other person or otherwise arising out of or resulting from any act or transaction of Tenant or of any such other person, Tenant shall save and hold Landlord harmless from any judgment rendered against Landlord or the premises or any part thereof, and all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, incurred by Landlord in connection with such litigation. (Choi Decl. ¶ 39, Ex. 1 at Article 19.5, p. 40.) Given this suit was for the recovery of possession and past due rent, the attorneys fee provision is clearly triggered. As concerns the amount of fees requested, the Court finds them to be reasonable. [T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous. ( Horsford, supra at 396; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785.) The underlying matter was vigorously contested which resulted in significant litigation. Here, Caltrans presents uncontested records as to the number of hours spent on the case. The billable hours timesheets, submitted as Exhibits 6 and 7 to the declaration of Daniel Choi (Choi), reflect a total of 153.8 hours spent litigating this matter. In the Courts experience this number of hours is commensurate with the complexity of a commercial unlawful detainer case. Further, the Court does not find anything about the billable hours entries to be clearly erroneous. In short, the number of hours billed is reasonably supported by Caltrans uncontested declarations and documentary evidence. As concerns the rate of Caltrans attorneys, the Court finds this to is reasonable. Caltrans states that, although it does not bill hourly, it could reasonably bill $250 per hour. (Choi Decl. ¶ 45.) Choi states that he is a practicing attorney with roughly eleven years of experience and that his rate in private practice prior to joining Caltrans was $400 an hour. (Choi Decl. ¶¶ 41, 42.) Choi additionally supports his rate by providing copies of the United States Attorneys Office Fee Matrix and the Laffey Matrix. (Choi Decl. Exhs. 4, 5.) Both matrices indicate a rate higher than $250 per hour for an attorney of Chois experience. As such, the Court finds Chois rates reasonable. The Court notes that Caltrans does not request a multiplier of the lodestar amount. The Court also notes that there is a slight discrepancy in Caltrans accounting and their requested fee amount. Although Caltrans requests fees of $42,075, their billing entries show a total of $41,075 (38,450 + 2,625 = 41,075). (See Choi Decl. Exh. 6, 7.) The Court finds that $41,075 is the proper amount supported by Caltrans declaration and evidence. As concerns Caltrans memorandum of costs, the Court finds it too is appropriate. If items on their face appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Here, Caltrans submitted a separate Memorandum of Costs within 15 days of entry of judgment as required by Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1). Upon review the Court finds the charges to be proper. Further, Apex did not bring a corresponding motion to tax any of these costs within the 15-day time limit proscribed by Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(1). As such, the cost award of $12,198.55 is appropriate. In sum, the Court finds Caltrans has shown it is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount of $41,075 and costs in the amount of $12,198.55. Caltrans has adequately demonstrated the reasonableness of these fees and costs, while Apex has submitted no opposition. Accordingly, Caltrans motion for attorneys fees is GRANTED. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER The People of the State of California acting by and through the Department of Transportation s Motion for Attorneys Fees came on regularly for hearing on July 12, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION IS GRANTED. ATTORNEYS FEES ARE AWARDED IN THE AMOUNT OF $41,075. COSTS ARE AWARDED IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,198.55. UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, CALTRANS TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 12, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Case Number: 22SMCV01065 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: DM Properties LLC, v. Robertson, et al. CASE NO.: 22SMCV01065 MOTION: Motion for Terminating Sanctions HEARING DATE: 7/11/2024 Legal Standard If a party fails to obey a court order compelling it to provide a discovery response, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction . . .. In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction . . .. (CCP §§ 2030.290(c), 2030.300(e), 2031.300(c), 2031.320(c).) Misuse of the discovery process, which includes disobeying a court order to provide discovery, is conduct subject to sanctions. (CCP § 2023.010(g).) Possible sanctions are: (a) [A] monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct . . .. (b) [A]n issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. (c) [A]n evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. (d) [A] terminating sanction by one of the following orders: (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. (e) [A] contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of court. (CCP § 2023.030.) The party seeking to impose sanctions need only show the failure to obey earlier discovery orders. ( Puritan Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 877, 884 [interpreting former statute dealing with refusal to comply].) However, numerous cases hold that severe sanctions (i.e., terminating or evidentiary sanctions) for failure to comply with a court order are allowed only where the failure was willful. ( R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495; Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545; Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) The burden of proof then shifts to the party seeking to avoid sanctions to establish a satisfactory excuse for his or her conduct. ( Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201.) Analysis Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant DM Properties LLC moves for an order imposing terminating sanctions against Defendant/Cross Complainant Daryll Robertson. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has violated this Court's April 11, 2024, Order compelling Defendant's deposition and production of documents. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,200.00. Plaintiff argues that terminating sanctions are justified because Defendant failed to appear for his deposition and provide substantive responses to the records requests, despite the prior court order. On April 11, 2024, following a duly noticed motion by Plaintiff, the Court ordered Defendant to appear for deposition and produce responsive documents within 10 days. (Kakoian Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.) The Court also ordered Defendant to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,200.00 to Plaintiff within 30 days. (Id.) Plaintiff promptly served Defendant with notice of the Court-ordered deposition on April 12, 2024, setting it for April 19, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. via Zoom. (Kakoian Decl., ¶3, Ex. B.) Plaintiff worked with a deposition officer to ensure Defendant received notice. The deposition officer, Jorge Fernandez of Veritext, called Defendant and left a voicemail requesting his email address to send the Zoom link. (Kakoian Decl., ¶4, Ex. C.) Plaintiff's counsel also mailed Defendant a letter with the deposition Zoom link and Mr. Fernandez's contact information on April 12, 2024. (Id. at ¶5, Ex. B.) Despite these efforts, Defendant failed to appear for his duly noticed deposition on April 19, 2024. (Kakoian Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has shown that Defendant refuses to cooperate with the Courts discovery orders. As Defendant has notice of these proceedings and order, the Court can only interpret this as a willful refusal of the order. The burden is therefore on Defendant to demonstrate a satisfactory excuse for his failure. Defendant has failed to oppose, and therefore failed to demonstrate such an excuse. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. The Court strikes Defendants answer and enters his default. Defendants cross-complaint is also dismissed by the Court with prejudice. Plaintiff to prepare a default judgment package. In light of these sanctions, the Court does not impose any additional monetary sanctions against Defendant.

GLADSTONE, ET AL. VS. MEISSNER, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV21-0197823 This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’s order dated April 18, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exempt from case disposition time standards. It appears that neither side has posted jury fees, which as previously noted in the Court’s October 23, 2023 Order, is deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates. J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF

Case Number: 22BBCV00006 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 07/12/2024 8:30am Case No. 22BBCV00006 Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: TRACEY L BAUMERT v. BANK OF AMERICA, et al. 2 TENTATIVE RULINGS MOTION TO WITHDRAW DEEMED ADMISSIONS AND MJOP RELIEF REQUESTED ¿ Plaintiff TRACEY BAUMERT (Plaintiff) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order, pursuant to C.C.P. § 2033.300, permitting withdrawal of her admission of Defendant HSBC Banks Requests for Admission on the grounds that the admissions were the result of her mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that Defendant will not be substantially prejudiced in its defense of this action on the merits[.] This motion is and will be based on this Notice, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Tracey Baumert attached hereto, the pleadings and records on file herein, such matters as the court may take judicial notice of and on such other argument and evidence as may be presented at the time of or in connection with the hearing. (Mot. p. 1-2.) Procedural Moving Party: Plaintiff, Tracey Baumert Responding Party: Defendants, HSBC Bank USA National Association, As Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-OA3 (HSBC) and National Default Servicing Corporation (National Default) Moving Papers: Notice/Motion Opposition Papers: Opposition; Dailey Declaration Reply: Reply 16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Yes/No Plaintiff served this motion via email. The email address that Plaintiff used for Defendants counsel does not match Defendants counsels email address provided on eCourt. However, Defendant submitted an Opposition; therefore, Defendant received this motion. ANALYSIS On 9/15/2023, the Court granted HSBCs motion deeming admitted the truth of the matters specified in requests for admission, set one, propounded on Tracey L. Baumert because Plaintiff did not provide responses to the RFAs. On March 22, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiffs motion to set aside/vacate the dismissal. Now, Plaintiff seeks withdrawal of her admissions that were deemed admitted on September 15, 2023. CCP § 2033.300 A party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties. (CCP § 2033.300(a).) The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. (CCP § 2033.300(b).) Baumert Declaration Plaintiff argues that failing to respond to the RFAs, and thus the motion to deem admitted being granted, was a result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Plaintiffs provides the declaration of Tracey Baumert which states in relevant part: 2. From on or about September 15, 2022 to February 28, 2024, I was representing myself, in pro per in this action and/or attorney Mark Goodfriend has represented me on one or more occasions under a Notice of Limited Scope Representation. Because of illness and unemployment (see below) and because I am not familiar with or knowledgeable about the law or legal procedures, even with Mr. Goodfriends assistance to a limited extent until he substituted in on February 28, 2024, which he mostly provided and is providing to me without charge, Defendants requests for admission were admitted. 3. Although I apparently received Defendants Requests for Admission in or about April 2023 and Defendants Motion that Requests for Admission be deemed admitted in or about July 2023, I did not understand that I needed to respond to them or how to do so. 4. Starting in June 2023 and continuing for several months, I was in and out of the hospital and suffered and have continued to suffer from serious health issues, including bleeding ulcers, gallstones, liver issues that might require a liver transplant as soon as early 2024, breathing issues, jaundice and my losing about 60 pounds over about 2 months (about a third of my body weight). In addition to debilitating health issues, I have been unemployed and have had substantially no income since at least about April of last year due to strikes by writers and actors I work in the entertainment industry which has multiplied the stress I have been under. Although the strikes ended in or about November 2023, I have still not been able to return to work. Also, in or about early December 2023, I got Covid for the first time, and did not recover quickly. 5. I also had been sick starting on or about August 31, 2023, and was hospitalized from September 8 to 15, 2023 (as reflected by Exhibit 1 hereto), the date of the hearing where the court granted Defendants Motion that Requests for Admission be deemed admitted. I did not attend that hearing both because I was hospitalized and because I was not even aware of it. 6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 are verified responses to Defendants Requests for Admission that I request that the Court allow me to use in this action. (Baumert Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.) Dailey Declaration In Opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Defendants submit the declaration of its counsel, Steven M. Dailey. In relevant part, the Dailey declaration states: 2. On April 12, 2023, on behalf of HSBC, my office served written discovery including First Sets of Requests for Production, Special Interrogatories, Form Interrogatories and Requests for Admission upon Plaintiff TRACEY L. BAUMERT and Plaintiffs counsel, Mark E. Goodfriend, who has appeared for her on a limited basis at various times in this case. 3. Plaintiffs responses to the discovery were due on May 15, 2023. Plaintiff did not provide responses by that date. 4. On May 30, 2023, I provided an extension for Plaintiff to respond to the outstanding discovery up until and including June 14, 2023. 5. On June 21, 2023, I sent correspondence via email to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel, Mark E. Goodfriend, requesting the responses, without objections, and all requested documents, no later than June 28, 2023. 6. Despite these efforts, my office did not receive the discovery responses or responses to the Requests for Admissions. On July 12, 2023, I caused Motions to Compel/Deem Requests Admitted to be filed and served relating to the deficient discovery. The hearing on the Motions to Compel/Deem Requests Admitted was scheduled for September 15, 2023. 7. Loan Defendants also filed an Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial to be heard on September 15, 2023, requesting a continuance of the February 20, 2024 trial date. 8. On September 15, 2023, the Court granted Defendants Motions to Compel and attendant requests for monetary sanctions. The Court vacated certain dates, including the then-scheduled February 20, 2024 trial date. The Court set a hearing on an Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal for Plaintiffs failure to prosecute for October 9, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. in Department E of the above-captioned Court. The Court ruled that if Plaintiff fails to appear at the October 9, 2023 hearing, the Court may dismiss the matter. On September 19, 2023, I caused a Notice of Ruling on Motions to Compel/Deem Requests Admitted and Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial to be filed and served on Plaintiff and her counsel Mark E. Goodfriend. 9. Plaintiff did not appear at the October 9, 2023 hearing that the Court scheduled on September 15, 2023. At the October 9, 2023 hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint dismissed, without prejudice. 10. On December 21, 2023, HSBC filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint, Case No. 23STUD16481 seeking possession of the Property. 11. On March 22, 2024, the Court set aside the October 9, 2023 dismissal. 12. On March 28, 2024, a Judgment was entered in favor of HSBC and against Plaintiff TRACEY BAUMERT in the unlawful detainer case. 13. On April 1, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel Mark Goodfriend and I met and conferred about the case, including the outstanding discovery. Mr. Goodfriend represented that he would provide answers, without objection, to the Special Interrogatories, Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production and produce all responsive documents no later than April 17, 2024. 14. More than two months after the dismissal was set aside, on May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant Motion for Withdrawal of Deemed Admissions and served the proposed Responses. 15. To date, Plaintiff has not served the remaining discovery responses despite Mr. Goodfriends representation that they would be provided by April 17, 2024. 16. The Property at issue in this case sold at a trustees sale on October 4, 2019, reverting to HSBC. 17. Plaintiffs disregard of the discovery rules impedes HSBCs rights in this case. It has been unable to obtain Plaintiffs substantive responses and documents relating to the facts she claim support her causes of action. It is unable to frame a summary judgment motion or prepare for trial absent responsive discovery. 18. Plaintiffs dilatory inaction has been prejudicial and costly to HSBC. Because of the non-responses, HSBC has filed the Motions to Compel, met and conferred, had many communications and provided extensions, all incurring substantial costs and fees relating to discovery served in April 2023. (Dailey Decl. ¶ 18.) TENTATIVE RULING The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. (CCP § 2033.300(b).) Section 2033.300 eliminates undeserved windfalls obtained through requests for admission and furthers the policy favoring the resolution of lawsuits on the merits. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418.) Further: The statutory language mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect (§ 2033.300, subd. (b)) is identical to some of the language used in section 473, subdivision (b). Section 473, subdivision (b) states that a court may *1419 relieve a party ... from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The use of identical terms in two different statutes serving similar purposes suggests that the Legislature intended those terms to have the same meaning in both statutes. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418-1419.) Additionally: The trial court's discretion in ruling on a motion to withdraw or amend an admission is not unlimited, but must be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner that serves the interests of justice. Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 2033.300 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. Accordingly, the court's discretion to deny a motion under the statute is limited to circumstances where it is clear that the mistake, inadvertence, or * 1421 neglect was inexcusable, or where it is clear that the withdrawal or amendment would substantially prejudice the party who obtained the admission in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420-1421.) The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect Here, the Court does not find that Plaintiff demonstrated the admissions were the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The Courts primary concern is the apparent unjustifiable delay in the Plaintiff seeking this relief. Party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits Here, the Court does not find that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. Overall Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs motion to withdraw admissions of Defendant HSBC Banks Requests for Admissions is DENIED. The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. (CCP § 2033.300(b).) TENTATIVE RULING MJOP On 1/9/2023 a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) was filed. Although the caption of the TAC indicates there are three causes of action: (1) Wrongful Foreclosure, (2) Recission/Cancellation, and (3) Declaratory Relief, the body of the TAC alleges a fourth cause of action titled Fourth Cause of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure. On 3/17/2023, the Court ruled on Defendants demurrer to the TAC. The Court overruled the demurrer as to the first and third causes of action. The Court sustained with leave to amend the second cause of action, but Plaintiff never filed a fourth amended complaint. Further, as to the fourth cause of action in the TAC, the Court explained how the Defendants did not demur to the fourth cause of action, and that the Court considers the allegations of the fourth cause of action to be part of the first cause of action. Moving Defendants here, the same Defendants that Opposed the motion to withdraw admissions, now move for judgment on the pleadings to the remaining causes of action in the TAC, the first, third, and fourth causes of action. The Court will hear argument.