Ostrow Electrical Company Inc V Francis Harvey & Sons Inc Et Al

RG20072409: Walsh VS Premium Property Management Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Confirm Settlement in Department 23 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Michael Markman The Hearing on Motion to Confirm Settlement scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 08/15/2024 at 03:00 PM in Department 23 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Finn Walsh, Jack Ronan, Timothy Walsh, and Katherine Walsh brought class claims against defendants Premium Property Management & Development, Inc., Haste Partners, LLC, Sam Sorokin, Craig Beckerman, and Maria DiBlasi alleging alleged claims against Defendants for unlawful landlord practices and brought causes of action for breach of contract, bad faith retention of security deposit in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1950.5, conversion, breach of the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law and Berkeley’s Municipal Code, a common count for money had and received, and negligence. The parties have agreed to settle the claims for a gross settlement amount of $ 640,000.00, which includes up to $ 390,000.00 in attorney’s fees; up to $40,000.00 in litigation costs and expenses incurred by counsel; an enhancement of $7,500.00 for plaintiff; and settlement administration costs of up to $15,000.00. The remaining amount is to be distributed among participating members of the three settlement classes: the lease renewal class, the lease fee class, and the security deposit class. LEGAL STANDARD To prevent “fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class, the settlement or dismissal of a class action requires court approval.” (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800.) A court “must determine the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (Id. at p. 1801.) “The well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement agreement include ‘the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.’” (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 [quoting Dunk, supra, at p. 1801].) PRELIMINARY APPROVAL Plaintiffs’ counsel investigated, obtained written discovery, and took depositions. (See Marron Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5, 10.) The parties then participated in multiple mediations and negotiated a settlement at arm’s length. (See id., ¶¶ 8, 9, 14.) Plaintiff’s counsel, however, has not provided an adequate Kullar analysis. While counsel indicates that he obtained sufficient information to evaluate the case, counsel fails to provide a reasonable estimate of the number of class members, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20072409: Walsh VS Premium Property Management Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Confirm Settlement in Department 23 the total estimated possible recovery, and an explanation why the settlement was reasonable in light thereof. (See id., ¶ 10.) The analysis must be provided before preliminary approval. The agreement must also be revised to clarify that objections may, but need not, be made in writing. (See Marron Decl., Ex. 1 [Settlement Agreement, §§ 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, Notice at pp. 1, 4].) The court will entertain any objections from participating class members at the final approval hearing. Section 10 of the proposed notice should also include the following language: The pleadings and other records in this litigation may be examined online on the Alameda County Superior Court’s website, known as “eCourt Public Portal,” at https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov. After arriving at the website, click the “Search” tab at the top of the page, then select the Document Downloads link, enter the case number and click “Submit.” Images of every document filed in the case may be viewed at a minimal charge. You may also view images of every document filed in the case free of charge by using one of the computer terminal kiosks available at each court location that has a facility for civil filings. SERVICE AWARD, FEES, & COSTS The court will not rule on a service award for the representative plaintiff, fees, or costs until final approval but provides the following preliminary guidance: Any incentive or service award must be supported with “quantification of time and effort expended on the litigation, and in the form of reasoned explanation of financial or other risks incurred by the named plaintiffs.” (Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 807.) The settlement agreement authorizes counsel to seek fees of more than half of the gross settlement amount. This court’s benchmark for the percentage of recovery approach is 30%. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 495; Schulz v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1175; Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557 fn 13; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 fn 11.) A “court approving a settlement that includes a negotiated fee [] is required to decide if the fee negotiated by the parties closely approximates the value of the attorneys’ work.” (Robbins v. Alibrandi, 127 Cal.App.4th 438, 452.) Counsel must address the value of the attorneys’ work, as well as the justification for any deviation from this court’s benchmark, in the fee application. Ten percent of the attorney’s fee award must be kept in the administrator’s trust fund until the completion of the distribution process and court approval of a final accounting. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20072409: Walsh VS Premium Property Management Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Confirm Settlement in Department 23 The settlement agreement authorizes reimbursement of litigation costs. Counsel must provide evidentiary support for the actual costs incurred at the time of final approval. The court’s preference is for Plaintiffs to move for final approval, for attorneys’ fees and costs, and for plaintiff’s enhancement payment in a single motion. ORDER Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is CONTINUED to August 15, 2024 at 10:00 am in Department 23. At least five (5) court days before the continued hearing, counsel must submit a revised proposed order and declaration addressing the issues noted above. To the extent the settlement agreement and/or notice are revised, counsel should submit the revised documents as fully executed versions and in redline.

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 20STCV40731 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING SHAWN B. AZIZZADEH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALBERTO SANCHEZ, Defendant. Case No: 20STCV40731 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Calendar Number: 13 Plaintiff Bedford Law Group, APC (Plaintiff) seeks default judgment against Defendant Alberto Sanchez (Defendant) on Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiff requests: (1) money judgment in the amount of $18,652.35, consisting of: (a) damages in the amount of $15,000.00; (b) interest in the amount of $1,717.81; and (c) costs in the amount of $1,934.54. The Court CONTINUES Plaintiffs request for default judgment. Plaintiff must provide competent evidence of its damages. Plaintiff must remove its request for Misc. costs in the amount of $279.50, which the Court DENIES. Background This is an action for the recovery of attorneys fees. Plaintiff is a law firm. On October 6, 2015, Defendant executed a written fee agreement (the Agreement) pursuant to which Defendant retained Plaintiff to represent Defendant in connection with Defendants claims resulting from a 2015 motor vehicle incident. Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendant agreed to pay attorneys fees, costs, and expenses that Plaintiff incurred on Defendants behalf in connection with the representation. Plaintiff performed legal services for Defendant from October 6, 2015 to November 30, 2016. On November 30, 2016, the Law Offices of Guy Frank Candelaria substituted in as Defendants counsel for the representation in question. On December 12, 2019, Defendant settled his claims arising from the motor vehicle incident. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff's attorneys fees, costs, and expenses under the Agreement. Neither Defendant nor the Law Officers of Guy Frank Candelaria have paid any of the amounts owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Shawn B. Azizzadeh filed this case on October 23, 2020. The First Amended Complaint is now the operative complaint. Azzizadeh was removed as a plaintiff as of the FAC. The FAC raises claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) quantum meruit; and (3) accounting. Default was entered against Defendant on December 18, 2023. Plaintiff filed an application for default judgment on February 1, 2024. The Court continued the request because (1) Plaintiff did not provide competent evidence of its damages; (2) Plaintiff sought interest that was not demanded in the complaint; and (3) Plaintiffs memorandum of costs included an item in the amount of $279.50 labeled Attorney Appearance that should have been requested as attorneys fees. Legal Standard CCP § 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant has failed to timely answer after being properly served. A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Form CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) Proof of service of the complaint and summons; (2) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought (including Doe defendants) or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(7)); (3) A declaration of non-military status as to the defendant (typically included in Form CIV-100) (CRC 3.1800(a)(5)); (4) A brief summary of the case (CRC 3.1800(a)(1)); (5) Admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested ( Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362); (6) Interest computations as necessary (CRC 3.1800(a)(3)); (7) A memorandum of costs and disbursements (typically included in Form CIV-100 (CRC 3.1800(a)(4)); (8) A request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties (CRC 3.1800(a)(9)), accompanied by a declaration stating that the fees were calculated in accordance with the fee schedule as per Local Rule 3.214. Where a request for attorney fees is based on a contractual provision the specific provision must be cited; (Local Rule 3.207); and (9) A proposed form of judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(6)); (10) Where an application for default judgment is based upon a written obligation to pay money, the original written agreement should be submitted for cancellation (CRC 3.1806). A trial court may exercise its discretion to accept a copy where the original document was lost or destroyed by ordering the clerk to cancel the copy instead ( Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124); (11) Where the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or wrongful death, they must serve a statement of damages on the defendant in the same manner as a summons (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.11, subd. (c), (d)). (California Rules of Court rule 3.1800.) Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(1), items are allowable as costs under Section 1032 if they are filing, motion, and jury fees. A party who defaults only admits facts well pleaded in the complaint or cross-complaint. ( Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1154.) Thus, the complaint must state a claim for the requested relief. Discussion Service of the Complaint and Summons Pursuant to the Courts July 21, 2022 order, Plaintiff served Defendant by publication in La Opinión on November 13, 20, and 27, 2023. Dismissal of Other Parties The Doe defendants were dismissed from the action on February 6, 2024, pursuant to Plaintiffs request. Non-Military Status Vahan Gabrielyan avers to Defendants non-military status. Summary of the Case Plaintiff provides a brief summary of the case in the Declaration of Vahan Gabrielyan. Plaintiff adequately pleads its causes of action in FAC. Evidence of Damages Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint. ( Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 286.) Moreover, a statement of damages cannot be relied upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal injury or wrongful death. ( Ibid .) In all other cases, when recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages specified in the complaint. ( Ibid .) Moreover, there is a need for admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested ( Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362 The Court previously continued Plaintiffs application for default judgment because Plaintiff did not provide evidence proving the amount of damages owed. Plaintiff must provide competent evidence proving up its damages. Plaintiff has not cured this defect. Vahan Gabrielyan attaches the underlying fee agreement in his declaration. (Gabrielyan Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Gabrielyan declares that Defendant agreed to pay 33.3% any pre-complaint recovery and 40% of any recovery once a complaint was filed in court or arbitration. (Gabrielyan Decl. ¶ 3.) Gabrielyan provides a copy of the letter by which Plaintiff was substituted out as counsel for Defendant. (Gabrielyan Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Gabrielyan states that Defendant breached the fee agreement by failing to pay Plaintiffs attorneys fees, costs, and expenses under the fee agreement. (Gabrielyan Decl. ¶ 6.) Critically, however, Gabrielyan does not make a declaration as to the actual amount that Defendant owes Plaintiff under the fee agreement. Gabrielyan only states that the demand of the Complaint is $15,000.00. (Gabrielyan Decl. ¶ 18.) The damages pled are not evidence of the damages owed a plaintiff must in fact show a prima facie case for the amount of damages that the plaintiff is entitled to. ( Johnson v. Stanhiser , supra , 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361-362.) As the Court stated in its previous order, Plaintiff must provide evidence supporting its damages. Interest Plaintiff does not seek interest. Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements When Plaintiff previously sought default judgment, it requested $1,934.54 in costs, $279.50 of which was for an Attorney Appearance. The Court continued the hearing on Plaintiffs application because attorneys fees are not generally allowable as costs unless authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Plaintiffs memorandum of costs, signed by Vahan Gabrielyan, states that Plaintiff expended $1,934.54 in costs, the same amount as in Plaintiffs previous request. $279.50 of this amount labelled as Misc. This is not an item of costs made expressly allowable by statute. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a).) The Court therefore has discretion to allow or deny it. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).) The Court exercises its discretion to deny this cost. The Court further notes that there is a strong appearance that Plaintiff has improperly sought to include its attorneys fees in its request for costs, and that this would form a sufficient alternate basis for the Courts denial of this item of costs. Proposed Form of Judgment Plaintiff has submitted a proposed form of judgment, but it will likely require revisions for the reasons stated above. Submission of the Written Agreement California Rule of Court 3.1806 states that unless otherwise ordered judgment upon a written obligation to pay money requires a clerks note across the face of the writing that there has been a judgment. Here, Plaintiff has not submitted the original documents. The Court does not discern any practical need for such a clerks note on the written obligation in the current case and therefore orders that it need not be included. If this causes any issues for any party or non-party they are authorized to bring the matter to the Courts attention.

Case Number: 21STCV47364 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 57 The Court is granting in part the motion of Plaintiff Michael Pircher ("Pircher") to quash the business records deposition subpoena ("the Subpoena") issued by Defendants Kevin Wheaton ("Wheaton") and Believable Bluff, LLC to third party Bergkivst Bergkvist & Carter, LLP ("BBC"). BBC was Pircher's counsel in connection with a financial transaction between Pircher, on the one hand, and Believable Bluff and one its two members, Michael Chandler, on the other hand. Wheaton was the other member of Believable Bluff. Pircher seeks to quash the Subpoena on the ground that the information sought from BBC constitutes communications between Pircher and BBC that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Wheaton and Believable Bluff argue that Pircher has waived the attorney-client privilege. According to Wheaton and Believable Bluff, the waiver occurred during Pircher's deposition earlier this year during which, in response to a a question from counsel for Wheaton and Believable Bluff, Pircher stated that his attorney Paul Carter ("Carter") of BBC advised him that Wheaton's signature probably was needed on a Pledge and Security Agreement ("PSA") that was part of the financial transaction referenced above. Pircher's current counsel objected on attorney-client privilege grounds at the deposition immediately after Pircher's response to the question about Carter's advice regarding the need for Wheaton's signature on the PSA. The objection was too late to protect the disclosure of that specific communication: the privilege was waived under Evidence Code Section 912 by Pircher's response to the question. Section 912 provides that the attorney-client privilege is waived with respect to a protected communication if any holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses a significant part of the communication." Here, Pircher, as holder of the privilege, voluntarily disclosed a significant part of the communication from Carter regarding the need for Wheaton's signature on the PSA. Wheaton and Believable Bluff may use that disclosure in their defense of Pircher's claims against them. This does not mean, however, that Pircher has waived the attorney-client privilege as to every single communication between himself and BBC that is manifested in the records sought in the Subpoena. Wheaton and Believable Bluff cite no precedent to support that notion, and the Court is unaware of any. In short, Pircher's assertion of the attorney-client privilege to protect from disclosure other communications that he had with BBC is not too late to block the Subpoena. Wheaton and Believable Bluff also argue that Pircher implicity waived the attorney-client privilege by "tendering" (meaning placing) his communications with BBC at issue through his claims related to the PSA. The Court disagrees. The precedent dealing with tendering of privileged communications so as to waive the privilege establishes a very narrow window through which the privilege can be waived. Wheaton and Believable Bluff's invocation of that exception here is misplaced. Because Pircher has not waived the attorney-client privilege beyond the disclosure of the one communication between himself and Carter to which he testified at his deposition, his motion to quash the Subpoena is granted to the extent the motion seeks to shield other communications between Pircher and BBC from disclosure. The Court is denying the motion to the extent it seeks an order imposing sanctions against Wheaton and Believable Bluff, for having issued the Subpoena, in the form of the attorney's fees and costs Pircher incurred in connection with the motion. In the Court's view, the issuance of the Subpoena was not sanctionable. Wheaton and Believable Bluff had a reasonable basis for issuing it.

MEMBERS 1ST VS. ESTATE OF SMITH, ET AL. Case Number: CVG21-0000494 This matter is on calendar for review of the case. The Court notes that the matter is on calendar on Monday, July 22, 2024 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 23 for hearing on a Motion to Approve Stipulation for Judgment Entered in Civil Case and Approval of Motion to Affix Attorney’s Fees as an Element of Costs in Civil Judgment. The July 22, 2024 hearing is confirmed. A future review hearing will be calendared on July 22, 2024. Today’s review hearing is dropped from calendar. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 23STCV25671 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 26 07/16/24 Dept. 26 Rolf Treu, Judge presiding DTLB LOFTS ASSOCIATION V. TERRANCE LAWRENCE, et al. ( 23STCV25671 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/moving party: Steven A. Roseman, Sean D. Allen, and Andrew M. Jun (Roseman Law, APC) Counsel for Defendant/opposing party: N/A REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT ( filed 05/07/24) TENTATIVE RULING The Court grants entry of default judgment. Discussion On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff DTLB Lofts Association (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Terrance Lawrence (Lawrence) and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Foreclosure of Lien; (2) Breach of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and (3) Common CountsAccount Stated. This action arises from Defendants failure to pay homeowners association assessments and related charges as to real property located at 433 Pine Avenue, Unit 304, Long Beach, CA 90802. On March 27, 2024, default was entered against Defendant. Now, Plaintiff moves for entry of default judgment against Defendant. ANALYSIS I. CRC 3.1800 1. Use of JC Form CIV-100 YES 2. Dismissal or judgment of non-parties to the judgment YES 3. Declaration of non-military status for each defendant YES 4. Summary of the case YES 5. 585(d) declarations/admissible evidence in support YES 6. Exhibits (as necessary) YES 7. Interest computation (as necessary) YES 8. Cost memorandum YES 9. Request for attorney fees (Local Rule 3.214) YES 10. Proposed Judgment YES DAMAGES REQUESTED: $17,877.17 (Consistent with complaint.) INTEREST: $0.00 ATTORNEY FEES: $9,700.50 COSTS: $2,159.79 TOTAL: $29,737.46 Plaintiff has complied with all CRC requirements. The court grants the request for entry of default judgment against Defendant Terrance Lawrence.

CV-22-002020 – SHERMAN, CHARLES EDWARD IV vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment Alternatively, for Summary Adjudication – HEARING REQUIRED. Based on Plaintiff’s Counsel Siyun Yang’s supporting declaration herein, the Court is inclined to find that good cause exists to continue this motion for Plaintiff to obtain the required evidence to justify its opposition herein. (Code of Civil Procedure Code § 437c(h); Braganza v. Albertson's LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App. 5th 144). However, trial is currently set in this matter for August 20, 2024.  The parties should be prepared to discuss rescheduling the trial.

JONES, ET AL. VS. TAYLOR Case Number: 22CV-0201290 This matter is on calendar trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan III case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. Plaintiffs have posted jury fees but Defendant has not. Defendant is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.