Landry V Tremblay

C23-02650 CASE NAME: SIMARJIT KHANNA VS. ANURADHA BATRA *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT FILED BY PLAINTIFFS FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Before the Court is Plaintiffs Samarjit Khanna and Anjuli Khanna Papineau’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6. (“Motion”). Factual Background Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on October 19, 2023. A First Amended Complaint was filed on October 25, 2023. Defendant Anuradha Batra filed her answer to the FAC on January 31, 2024. A First Amended Answer was filed on February 8, 2024. The Court held a Case Management Conference on February 20, 2024. The minutes from the CMC indicate that counsel appeared for each party. It then states: “Matter settled,” and notes that the Court sets a further CMC for status. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiffs’ filed the instant motion to enforce SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: DANIELLE K DOUGLAS HEARING DATE: 07/12/2024 the Parties’ purported settlement agreement. Overview of Section 664.6 Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 664.6: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., §664.6(a).) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by either the party or an attorney who represents the party. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 (b).) California courts have interpreted section 664.6 as creating “a summary, expedited procedure to enforce settlement agreements when certain requirements that decrease the likelihood of misunderstandings are met.” (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1429). “A court ruling on a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182 numerous citations omitted.) “The court ruling on the motion may consider the parties’ declarations and other evidence in deciding what terms the parties agreed to….” (Ibid.) “If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Ibid.) “The statutory language makes clear, however, that a party moving for the entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 need not establish a breach of contract to support relief under the statute.” (Hines, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1185.) Instead, the Court is authorized to “enter a judgment pursuant to the settlement regardless of whether [a party’s] nonperformance of [their] settlement obligations [were] excused.” (Ibid.) Analysis As stated by Plaintiff’s own authority, under section 664.6 a “trial court may enforce a settlement agreement made during pending litigation if the parties entered into the agreement [1] orally before the court or [2] in writing outside the presence of the court.” (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1424.) Here, neither of those options occurred. For many years, section 664.6, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, required the signature of the parties to the agreement – and did not allow for the signature of their attorneys. (See Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 585-86.) Section 664.6 was amended, however, effective January 1, 2021 to allow for written out of court settlement agreements to be signed by an “attorney who represents the party.” (W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: DANIELLE K DOUGLAS HEARING DATE: 07/12/2024 18 fn. 7; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 (b).) Plaintiffs submit a proposed “Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement” (“Settlement Agreement”) which is signed by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Redner Decl. Ex. D.) Defendant did not sign the Settlement Agreement. (Ibid.) Nor did Defendant’s attorneys. (Ibid.) Defendant’s declaration confirms that fact that she never approved “any settlement of this dispute that was limited to the terms set forth in the [Settlement] Agreement.” (Batra Decl. ¶ 3.) As such, the submitted written Settlement Agreement does not comply with the requirements of section 664.6, such that enforcement is warranted. As for an oral agreement before the Court, Plaintiffs argue that at the February 20 CMC “the parties, through their respective attorneys, represented to the Court that the entire case was settled,” and that the “terms were stated by Plaintiffs’ attorney, with the concurrence of Defendants’ attorney….” (Motion at 2:24-27.) First, the minutes from the CMC do not indicate that the terms of the purported settlement agreement were stated on the record. The minutes merely note that the “matter settled.” Second, there is no indication that the parties were present during the CMC, nor that they themselves approved the terms of the settlement agreement at that time. As noted above, the California Supreme Court has held, “the term ‘parties’ as used in section 664.6 (“If parties to pending litigation stipulate … for settlement of the case…”) means the litigants themselves and does not include their attorneys of record.” (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586.) While section 664.6 was amended to allow for the signature of a party’s attorney on a written settlement agreement, it did not change the requirement that the parties themselves must agree to the terms of the settlement agreement if the stipulation to settle the case is made “orally before the court.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 (a).) Thus, even if the terms were stated on the record (which the record does not indicate), the fact that the Parties were not present to affirm the terms of the settlement precludes enforcement under section 664.6. Plaintiff makes other arguments regarding a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as equitable and judicial estoppel. To begin with, such arguments are not properly before the Court on a motion to enforce under section 664.6. (See Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood, (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 209 fn. 4: “[A] court’s power to make factual determinations under section 664.6 is generally limited to whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement.”) Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence that Defendant Batra actually agreed to the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, or that there is even a valid agreement to enforce. Based on the above, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: DANIELLE K DOUGLAS HEARING DATE: 07/12/2024

Case Number: 22AHCV01390 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS, B.L. PRICE CO., INC., AND GUILLERMO PERALTA GUITERREZS MOTION COMPELLING PLAINTIFF SAY TANGS FURTHER DEPOSITION AND GRANTING IN PART ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AT DEPOSITION AND DENYING AWARD OF MONETARY SANCTIONS I. INTRODUCTION This personal injury case arises from an automobile collision. Plaintiff Destiny Ravelo (Ravelo) alleges that on March 1, 2022, while in her vehicle on the I-101 freeway, she was involved in a collision caused by a vehicle and trailer owned and operated by Defendants B.L. Price Co., Inc., and Defendant Guillermo Peralta Gutierrez (together Defendants). On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting three causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se and (2) statutory liability against Defendants. During the collision, the right rear of Plaintiff Ravelos vehicle contacted Plaintiff Say Tangs (Plaintiff) vehicle, allegedly causing a traumatic brain injury (TBI), cervical spine injury, lumbar spine injury, severe emotional distress and economic harm. On February 10, 2023, the Court received notice of related case no. 23AHCV00167, Say Tang v. B.L. Price Co. Inc., Guillermo Peralta Gutierrez, Destiny Maria Ravelo and Ivan Ravelo , filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court on January 1, 2023. Before the Court is a motion by Defendants B.L. Price Co. Inc. and Guillermo Peralta Gutierrez to compel Plaintiffs further deposition, compel answers to certain questions to assess damages, and the imposition of sanctions for related costs. On May 1, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for the Court to issue the following orders: 1. Order compelling Plaintiffs further deposition; 2. Order compelling Plaintiff to answer all questions related to her childhood in Cambodia; 3. Order compelling Plaintiff to answer all questions related to her business, including information about her supply chain; and 4. Order for Plaintiff and/or her counsel to pay $2,105.00 in sanctions for the costs of the motion and Plaintiffs second deposition. (Motion, ¶¶ 1-4.) On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition and separate statement. As of July 12, 2024, no reply has been filed. The hearing is set for July 15, 2024. Trial is scheduled for January 28, 2025. T he Court is unaware of any further meet and confer efforts that may have occurred after the filing of the instant motion. Having reviewed the moving and opposition papers, the Court makes the following rulings: The order compelling Plaintiffs further deposition is GRANTED; The order compelling Plaintiff to answer questions related to her childhood in Cambodia is GRANTED, subject to modification explained below; The order compelling Plaintiff to answer questions related to her business, including information about her supply chain, is DENIED; The order for Plaintiff and/or her counsel awarding $2,105.00 in sanctions for the costs of the motion and Plaintiffs second deposition is DENIED. II. ANALYSIS A. Procedural Matters Code of Civil Procedure, section 2025.480, subdivision (a) provides: If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponents control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).) This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. ( Id ., § 2025.480, subd. (b).) The 60-day deadline is mandatory. ( Weinstein v. Blumberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 316, 321 (Weinstein).) Meet-and-Confer Requirement A motion to compel the deposition of a party to the action must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, or, when the deponent failed to attend the deposition, a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(b)(2).) A discovery motion should not be denied automatically based upon the reason that the moving parties failed to meet and confer in good faith. ( Obregon v. Sup. Ct . (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434. But see Townsend v. Sup. Ct . (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1439 [motion must be denied where lack of meet and confer]. Separate Statement Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. This includes a motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection of documents or tangible things. CRC Rule 3.1020(a)(3). The record of the deposition was completed and certified on March 27, 2024. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 4; Exh. B.) Accordingly, the 60-day period to compel further answers expired on May 26, 2024. Defendants counsel declares parties discussed the relevance of the requested answers and did not reach a resolution. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 7.) On May 1, 2024, Defendant filed the subject motion concurrently with a separate statement. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has met all procedural requirements. B. Motion to Compel Further Deposition Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 2025.610: Once any party has taken the deposition of any natural person, including that of a party to the action, neither the party who gave, nor any other party who has been served with a deposition notice pursuant to Section 2025.240 may take a subsequent deposition of that deponent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.610, subd. (a).) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), for good cause shown, the court may grant leave to take a subsequent deposition&. ( Id ., § 2025.610, subd. (b).) This section does not preclude taking one subsequent deposition of a natural person who has previously been examined under either or both of the following circumstances: (1) The person was examined as a result of that persons designation to testify on behalf of an organization under Section 2025.230. & ( Id., § 2025.610, subd. (c)(1).) Defendant moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to appear for a further deposition and answer questions regarding: (1) Plaintiffs early life in Cambodia from 1962 to 1979, and possible traumatic experiences that could have occurred during that time; (2) Plaintiffs business, her suppliers, and their location, including any possible exposure to contaminants that could have neurological impacts. These subjects were initially raised in Plaintiffs March 14, 2024, deposition, however Plaintiffs counsel instructed Plaintiff not to answer questions on these topics and objected to the questions as an invasion of Plaintiffs privacy. (Johnson Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) Since Defendant has filed this motion to compel further responses, Plaintiff has the burden to justify each of its objections. ( Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220 - 221.) Plaintiff argues that further inquiry into these topics is unwarranted because Plaintiff has not placed anything at issue in this car accident litigation that justifies permitting disclosure of information about her childhood and business transactions. (Oppn., p. 2.) Plaintiff also argues that this motion was brought due to Plaintiffs alleged failure to accept Defendants good faith offer to abandon the line of questioning . . .in exchange of Plaintiff dropping her claim of a TBI but that offer was not accepted during a meet and confer during the deposition ( Id; Johnson Decl., ¶ 8.) Inquiry into Possible Traumatic Childhood Experiences in Cambodia Defendants argue that Plaintiff is claiming that the accident caused neurological injuries and has therefore placed into dispute all issues relating to alternative causes for her alleged cognitive problems and mood disorders. The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that as a further direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants & Plaintiff has suffered emotional damages which are believed to be permanent. (Compl., p. 5.) During this litigation, Defendant served Form Interrogatories on Plaintiff which asked about her damages. Specifically, Form Interrogatory No. 9.1 , states: Are there any other damages that you attribute to the INCIDENT? If so, for each item of damage state: (a) the nature; (b) the date it occurred; (c) the amount; and (d) the name ADDRESS, and telephone number of each PERSON to whom an obligation was incurred. Plaintiffs Response to Form Interrogatory No. 9.1 , states: Yes. (a)-(d) Plaintiff seeks all damages to which she is entitled, both economic and non-economic. Plaintiff suffered, and continues to suffer physical pain, mental suffering, loss of enjoyment of life , physical impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety , humiliation, emotional distress (emphasis added), and other damages to be proven at trial. As no fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these non-economic damages, the amount of said damages is a matter for the jury to decide. Discovery and investigation are ongoing. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement and/or amend this response. (Motion, Exh. A; pp. 19-20.) A general acquaintance with history informs us that Cambodians suffered greatly under the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s. Undoubtedly, many individuals who grew up in Cambodia during that time experienced significant childhood trauma, which can affect individuals throughout their lives. If Plaintiff had traumatic childhood experiences, it is possible that symptoms like mental suffering, grief, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life and permanent emotional damage could have preexisted the accident in this case. Therefore, the Court will permit limited inquiry into past traumatic experiences in Cambodia, including: 1. Whether Plaintiff witnessed acts of violence as a child in Cambodia; 2. Whether Plaintiff was a victim of acts of violence as a child in Cambodia; and 3. Whether Plaintiff had close friends or family who were victims of violence during her childhood in Cambodia. Notwithstanding the above, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff has legitimate privacy interests that must be balanced against Defendants need for information. Therefore, the Court will not permit any inquiry or disclosure of past traumatic experiences that may have been of a sexual nature. The Court is not suggesting that Plaintiff experienced such events but is only guarding against that possibility given the prevalence of sexual violence in many societies throughout history. Inquiry into Plaintiffs Business Dealings Defendant moves the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff to answer questions about her business dealings. Plaintiff has operated a business, Nancy Gem Inc., for 24 years. (Motion, Exh. A; Response to FROG No., 2.6.). When asked about where she sources the jewelry for Nancy Gem Inc., Plaintiffs counsel objected. Defendants counsel stated that Plaintiff is making a claim for TBI and loss of cognitive ability. Handling dangerous metals can contribute to cognitive problems. It is relevant. (Motion, Exh. B, p. 47.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly questioned Plaintiff about her business operations because those matters are irrelevant and private. Plaintiff argues that Defendant offers no compelling purpose for inquiring about Plaintiffs business affairs. The Court agrees. Defendants counsels questions about purchasing jewelry from China were based on a theory that such jewelry may have contained contaminants which may have contributed to Plaintiffs alleged cognitive impairments. The Court finds that the stated basis for this line of inquiry is too speculative to allow Defendants to question Plaintiff about her business dealings. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot be compelled to produce answers to the inquiries about her business transactions or practices. C. Sanctions Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 is a general statute authorizing the Court to impose discovery sanctions for misuse of the discovery process, which includes (without limitation) a variety of conduct such as: making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to discovery; and unsuccessfully and without substantial justification making or opposing a motion to compel or limit discovery. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010.) If sanctions are sought, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040 requires that the notice specify the identity of the person against whom sanctions are sought and the type of sanction requested, that the motion be supported in the points and authorities, and the facts be set forth in a declaration supporting the amount of any monetary sanction. Defendant requests the court to impose a monetary sanction of $2,105.00 on Plaintiff and or/ her counsel for the motion costs and deposition part two. Defendants Counsel, Jerry L. Johnson, a California-licensed attorney, and senior associate at Tharpe & Howell, LLP, states that $1,540.00 was incurred in preparing this motion, based on: (1) his hourly rate of $185.00 being applied to 8 hours to prepare this motion and separate statement; and (2) the $60.00 filing fee. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 10.) Attorney Johnson estimates incurring $555 in additional fees through an estimated 3 hours spent preparing the reply and oral argument, and hearing attendance. ( Id. ) Defendants motion requests sanctions in the amount of $2,105.00. However, according to this Courts admittedly questionable math skills, it appears that the total sought is actually $2,095, calculated as follows: Mot. to Compel Preparation 5 hours at $185.00 $925.00 Separate Statement Preparation 3 hours at $185.00 $555.00 Estimated Reply Fees 3 hours at $185.00 $555.00 Motion Reservation Fee $60.00 TOTAL $2,095.00 The Court declines to award sanctions. Plaintiffs counsel had substantial justification for objecting to these lines of inquiry during the deposition. Based upon the deposition transcript, it appears that these objections were made in good faith to protect Plaintiffs privacy. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff opposed this motion in good faith. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court orders Plaintiff to appear for deposition within thirty days and answer questions as set forth above. Moving party to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July 15, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Case Number: 23AHCV01967 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 17, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Zhiwei Chen v. Verizon Wireless Services, LLC CASE NO.: 23AHCV01967 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Zhiwei Chen RESPONDING PARTY : Defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC OPPOSITION: NO OPPOSITION FILED REPLY: None filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Courts May 16, 2024 order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate ruling in favor of the defendants application for arbitration. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Zhiwei Chen filed this action against defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC on on August 28, 2023. Plaintiff has been self-represented since the outset of the suit. Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed an intentional tort wherein Defendant used technical means to take control of [Plaintiffs] phone ... [and] forged the plaintiffs signature with the intention of taking possession of plaintiffs property. (Compl., p. 4, ¶ IT-1.) On November 7, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motion to compel the parties to arbitrate their dispute. The Court stayed the action pending the completion of arbitration. On March 27, 2024, one hundred forty-one (141) days after the Courts November 2023 order, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Quash to vacate /quash the ruling of November 7, 2023, which he subsequently removed from calendar. On April 16, 2024, one hundred sixty-one (161) days after the Courts November 2023 order, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate ruling in favor of the defendants application for arbitration. On May 16, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion to vacate. On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the May 16, 2024 ruling. That motion is now before the Court. Defendant filed no opposition, although Plaintiff filed no proof of service indicating Plaintiff gave Defendant notice of his motion. Plaintiff filed no reply. TENTATIVE RULING The motion is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008 (c); see also Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1106-1107.) DISCUSSION As an initial matter: Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate was, in operation, a motion to reconsider, which the Court denied. (See 05-16-2024 Minute Order, p.2 [recharacterizing motion by relief sought].) The instant motion is a motion to reconsider the Courts ruling on a motion to reconsider. Any renewed motion, including a renewed motion for reconsideration, must be justified by new facts or law. (See Le Francois v. Goel , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1099.) Plaintiff objects that the Court did not consider evidence that was already available at the time of the May 16, 2024 ruling. This does not justify a renewed motion for reconsideration of the Courts November 2023 order, nor does it justify a motion to reconsider the motion to reconsider. For the same reason, reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a) is unwarranted. Plaintiff specified no new or different facts, circumstances etc. in his declaration(s) accompanying his motion. Reconsideration under section 1008(c) is similarly unwarranted. Plaintiff cites no relevant change in the law since November 2023, and the Court is aware of none. The Court declines to exercise its own discretion to reconsider either prior ruling. Plaintiffs motion is denied. Court to provide notice. Dated: July 17, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23NWCV02588 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C TU v. GAXIOLA CASE NO.: 23NWCV02588 HEARING: 07/18/24 #7 Plaintiff JENNIFER TUs unopposed Motion to Set Aside Dismissal under CCP §473(b) is CONTINUED to Thursday, July 25, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C . Moving Party to give notice. No Opposition filed as of July 15, 2024. This personal injury action was filed by Plaintiff on August 21, 2023. On May 30, 2024, Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed without prejudice due to Plaintiffs Counsels second failure to appear without good cause for a Case Management Conference and OSC Re: Dismissal of the Entire Action for Plaintiffs Failure to Appear on 03/28/24. (See 05/30/24 M.O.) Plaintiff moves to set aside the dismissal under CCP §473(b). The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted &. (emphasis added.) (CCP §473(b).) The Motion is DENIED without prejudice for failure to comply with the express terms of CCP §473(b). There is no proposed pleading or proposed amended complaint attached to subject Motion. The Motion is CONTINUED as indicated above due to Plaintiffs failure to attach a copy of a pleading proposed to be filed therein as required by CCP §473(b). The terms of the code are mandatory; compliance is not optional. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file and serve a Proposed First Amended Complaint by no later than July 19, 2024.

Case Number: 23SMCV04996 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Nikfarjam v. Garcia CASE NO.: 23SMCV04996 MOTION: Motion to Compel Initial Discovery Responses HEARING DATE: 7/12/2024 Legal Standard If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (CCP § 2030.290(b).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. ( Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905-906.) Where there has been no timely response to a CCP section 2031.010 inspection demand, the demanding party must seek an order compelling a response. (CCP § 2031.300.) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product. Thus, unless the party to whom the demand was directed obtains relief from waiver, he or she cannot raise objections to the documents demanded. There is no deadline for a motion to compel responses. Likewise, for failure to respond, the moving party need not attempt to resolve the matter outside court before filing the motion. Where the motion seeks only a response to the inspection demand, no showing of "good cause" is required. ANALYSIS D efendant Carol Garcia moves to compel Plaintiff Farshid Nikfarjam to respond, without objections, to the Special Interrogatories, Set No. One, Form Interrogatories, Set No. One, and Demand for Production of Documents, Set No. One (collectively, the Subject Discovery), within fifteen (15) days. This action concerns personal injuries and damage from an automobile accident occurred on October 25, 2021. Defendant propounded the subject discovery by mail on January 19, 2024. Plaintiff did not serve responses within the original due date of February 21, 2024. (Saakian Decl., Exs. A.) On April 16, 2024, Defendant informed Plaintiff of their intent to move to compel. (See Id., Exs. B.) Defendant demonstrates that Plaintiff has failed to respond to duly issued discovery. Accordingly, the motions to compel are GRANTED. Further responses are ordered, without objection, within 20 days. SANCTIONS Sanctions are mandatory. The Court must sanction any party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (See, e.g., CCP, § 2030.290 (c).) Plaintiff has failed to oppose, and therefore failed to justify their failure to respond to these discovery requests. Defendant requests sanctions of $1,760.00, $760.00, and $760.00 for the respective motions to compel. (See Saakian Decl., ¶ 5.) Using the lodestar method, and considering the duplicative nature of the three motions, the Court finds that a reasonable sanction for the three motions would be $2,280.00 ($760/motion), inclusive of costs.

SOCIAL SERVICES), ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200829 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of default and trial setting. This case was filed in October of 2022, but is still not at issue. Doe Defendant La-Z-Boy Incorporated was served on December 4, 2023, but has not yet appeared. The Court has received and executed a stipulated order re filing of a Second Amended Complaint. The Court will therefore continue this matter 60 days to allow said Complaint to be filed and served. The Court continues this matter to September 16, 2024 at 9:00 p.m. in Dept. 64. The parties are to file with the Court a Status Conference Statement 5 days prior thereto. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 21STCV31743 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 28 Having reviewed the moving and supplemental papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff Malvina Mkchyan (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Margaret Mary Lewis (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On May 15, 2023, Defendant filed an answer. On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed (1) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, and (2) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions. The motions were set to be heard on April 22, 2024. On April 22, 2024, the Court continued the hearing to May 16, 2024 and ordered Defendant to file supplemental declarations or briefs explaining whether her motions were timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file responsive declarations or briefs. On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed supplemental briefs. The Court continued the hearing to July 15, 2024. Trial is currently scheduled for August 22, 2024. DISCUSSION A. Informal Discovery Conference The Los Angeles Superior Courts Eighth Amended Standing Order for Procedures in the Personal Injury Hub Courts Effective October 10, 2022 (filed September 20, 2022) (Eighth Amended Standing Order), ¶ 9E, provides: PI Hub Courts will not hear Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Discovery until the parties have engaged in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC). PI Hub Courts may deny or continue a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery if parties fail to schedule and complete an IDC before the scheduled hearing on a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery. Defendant scheduled and attended an IDC on February 20, 2024. Plaintiff did not attend the IDC. The Court took the IDC off calendar and ruled that Defendant could proceed with motions to compel further discovery responses. B. Timeliness Unless notice of [a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).) The statutory deadline for a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is mandatory and the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a belated motion to compel. (See Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 137 ( Golf & Tennis Pro Shop ); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681, 683, 685 ( Vidal Sassoon ).) On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed (1) a motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and request for sanctions, and (2) a motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and request for sanctions. The motions stated that Defendants counsel received Plaintiffs responses to Defendants special and form interrogatories on November 3, 2023. The motions also stated that although Defendants counsel asked Plaintiffs counsel for an extension of time to file a motion to compel further responses to the interrogatories, Plaintiffs counsel did not respond to the request. On April 22, 2024, the Court issued an order observing that the 45-day deadline to file a motion to compel further responses begins to run only when verified responses are served and it was not clear if the responses which Defendants counsel received on November 3, 2023 were verified. The Court continued the hearing to May 16, 2024 and ordered Defendant to file supplemental declarations or briefs explaining whether her motions were timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file responsive declarations or briefs. On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed supplemental briefs stating that Plaintiff served verifications to the discovery responses on November 7, 2023. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs counsel agreed to extend Defendants time to file motions to compel further responses to January 12, 2024 and then for an additional three weeks. (Defendants Supplemental Brief p. 6.) Based on Defendant's representations, Defendant's deadline to file motions to compel further responses would have been February 2, 2024. On January 19 and 30, 2024, Defendants counsel asked Plaintiffs counsel for a 60-day extension of time to file motions to compel further responses to the special and form interrogatories. (Defendants Supplemental Brief p. 6.) Plaintiffs counsel did not respond to the request. As noted, Defendant filed motions to compel further responses on February 22, 2024, after the February 2, 2024 deadline. Nonetheless, Defendant argues that the Court instructed Defendant to file motions to compel further discovery and tolled all motion deadlines related to the discovery at issue in doing so at the February 20, 2024 informal discovery conference. (Supplement Brief pp. 2-3.) As support for this argument, Defendant cites the Courts February 20, 2024 minute order, which stated that notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to appear at the informal discovery conference, Counsel for Defendant may move forward with filing the Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses and the Court will rule on the Motions on their scheduled dates of 4/22 and 4/23/22024 at 1:30 p.m. in this Department. The timeliness issue was not before the Court at the February 20, 2024 informal discovery conference and the Court did not address it. In stating that Defendant could proceed with filing her motion, the Court meant only that Defendant had complied with the Eighth Amended Standing Orders requirement that a party participate in an informal discovery conference before the Court will hear the partys motion to compel further discovery responses. Indeed, the Court has no authority to waive the timeliness requirement. (See Golf & Tennis Pro Shop , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 137; Vidal Sassoon , supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 683, 685.) If Defendant relied on the language of the Courts February 20, 2024 minute order to support a belief that that the Court tolled all motion deadlines related to the discovery (Supplemental Brief p. 3), Defendants reliance was misplaced. Defendant also argues that [a]t the February 20, 2024, IDC hearing, the court necessarily tolled the applicable motion deadlines under former Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.080(c)(2) by giving Defendant permission to file her Motions at the Informal Discovery Conference. (Supplemental Brief p. 4.) But as Defendant acknowledges, former Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.080, subdivision (c)(2), was not in effect when the February 20, 2024 informal discovery conference took place. Defendant also relies on the Eighth Amended Standing Orders statements that (1) parties are encouraged to stipulate to extend the deadline for filing a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses by 60 days in order to allow time to participate in an IDC and to informally resolve the pending discovery issues and (2) [a] partys failure to stipulate to extend the time to bring a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses so that an IDC may be held may subject the parties and/or counsel to the imposition of sanctions. (Eight Amended Standing Order ¶ 9 E.) Defendant does not mention the Eighth Amended Standing Orders warning that [r]eserving or scheduling an IDC does not extend the time to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses. ( Ibid ., bold in original.) The Eighth Amended Standing Order suggests that [i]f parties do not stipulate to extend the deadline(s) to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses, the moving/propounding party may file the motion to avoid it being deemed untimely. ( Ibid .) Defendant did not follow this suggestion. The Court denies the motions as untimely. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Defendant Margaret Mary Lewiss motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions. The Court DENIES Defendant Margaret Mary Lewiss motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file proof of service of this ruling within five days.

Case Number: 22STCV05360 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Invasix, Inc. dba InModes Motion to Stay Entire Action Pending Disposition of Defendant Dr. Sabours Bankruptcy Action is DENIED. Defendant Invasix, Inc. dba InMode to give notice. REASONING Defendant Invasix, Inc. dba InMode (Invasix) moves to stay this entire action pending disposition of Defendant Abedelmajid Sabour, M.D. aka Majid Sabour, M.D.s bankruptcy proceeding on the ground that Dr. Sabour is indispensable to this action because Plaintiffs Suzanne Swerner and Hana Sabour (Plaintiffs) are seeking to hold the non-debtor Defendants liable for Dr. Sabours conduct, and vice versa, Plaintiffs claims arise from the alleged joint conduct and concurrent representations of Dr. Sabour and Defendant Claire Jimeno, who was acting as an agent for Invasix, during the cosmetic procedures at issue in this action. Plaintiffs oppose the issuance of a stay. As a general matter, the automatic stay of judicial proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy does not apply to non-debtor codefendants, and [i]t is clearly established that the automatic stay does not apply to non-bankrupt co-defendants of a debtor even if they are in a similar legal or factual nexus with the debtor. (Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote International, Inc. (Fed.Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 1360, 1364-1365, quotation marks omitted.) There are narrow exceptions in unique circumstances, such as when there is such identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor. (A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (4th Cir. 1986) 788 F.2d 994, 999.) However, the Court is not convinced that this case represents the sort of unusual situation requiring a stay of the entire action as to all defendants. First, Invasix provides no evidence that Dr. Sabours participation is necessary to allow Invasix to fully present its defenses. Second, Invasixs arguments that Dr. Sabour will need to participate and be considered for apportionment of damages is not well taken because this would essentially eliminate the rule that bankruptcy stays are limited only to the debtor because a significant number of cases are brought against many parties, and if apportionment is a basis to stay the whole action, this would be evident in legal authority. The fact that the claims are intertwined is also not a reason in itself to stay the action as to all defendants, and Invasixs arguments as to equity are not convincing, i.e., it is not clear that results will be inconsistent given the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and Plaintiffs will be prejudiced if they are required to wait to litigate their claims when there is no imminent end date to Dr. Sabours bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, Defendant Invasix, Inc. dba InModes Motion to Stay Entire Action Pending Disposition of Defendant Dr. Sabours Bankruptcy Action is DENIED. The Court reminds Plaintiffs counsel to include page numbers on all future filings in compliance with rule 2.109 of the California Rules of Court.