Rebecca Rohlsson, Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Viggo Rohl Pastrnak Vs. Kaimal, M.D., Anjali Et Al

CABRERA VS. RYNEARSON, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0201146 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of settlement. The Court notes that the minor turned 18 on July 5, 2024 and a minor’s compromise is no longer necessary. However, no update has been provided regarding status of settlement. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

S-CV-0052327 Duffert, Raymond vs. Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/14/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Geravis, Robert; Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer; Rodriguez, Raphael Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Geravis, Robert; Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer

Case Number: 23CHCV00240 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F49 Dept. F49 Date: 7/9/24 Case Name: James Howard v. Prosper Benhaim Case No. 23CHCV00240 LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT DEPARTMENT F49 JULY 9, 2024 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23CHCV00240 Motion filed: 2/1/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendant Prosper Benhaim (Benhaim or the Defendant) RESPONDING PARTY: None. NOTICE: OK. RELIEF REQUESTED: A judgment on Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED without LEAVE TO AMEND. BACKGROUND On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff James Howard (Howard or Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging Medical Malpractice. Subsequently, on March 8, 2023, Defendant filed his Answer to the Complaint. On January 29, 2024, Department F51 Court granted Defendants unopposed motions to compel Plaintiffs responses to discovery requests, and to deem admitted his Requests for Admission, Set One, filed on November 3, 2023. (1/29/24 Minute Order). On February 1, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the Motion). No Opposition or Reply papers have been received by the Court. ANALYSIS A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the equivalent of a demurrer made after the pleadings are in. ( Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 746 [quoting Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 463].) A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as to an entire complaint or as to a particular cause of action in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438, subd. (c)(2)(A).) If a defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings and argues that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant, then the court should grant a defendants motion only if the court finds as a matter of law that the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438, subd.(c)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677.) The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Bezirdjian v. OReilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) A judgment on the pleadings attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d); Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court should assume that all facts alleged are true and should liberally construe the alleged facts with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties. (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232; Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. ( Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.) Whether a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted with or without leave to amend depends on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment& ( Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402 [quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318].) When a cure is a reasonable possibility, the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting leave to amend& ( Ibid .) A. Meet and Confer Requirement Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a) provides, Before filing a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) However, determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Furthermore, [t]he moving party shall file and serve with the motion for judgment on the pleadings a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the claims raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(3).) Here, Defendants counsel attests that on January 31, 2024, he called and spoke to Plaintiff in order to meet and confer regarding issues raised in the Motion. (Corson Decl. ¶ 7.) According to Defendants counsels declaration, during the meet and confer phone call, Plaintiff stated that he understood that Defendant would be seeking a dismissal based on matters deemed admitted, and Plaintiff indicated that he would try and get his case back in order. ( Ibid .) Based on the above records, the Court determines that the requirements for meet and confer have been sufficiently met. B. Requests for Judicial Notice Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) This Courts January 29, 2024 Minute Order Deeming the Truth of Matters Specified in Requests for Admission Propounded on Plaintiff JAMES HOWARD Admitted (attached hereto as Exhibit A). (2) Defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D.s Request For Admissions, Set No. 1, Propounded on Plaintiff JAMES HOWARD (attached hereto as Exhibit B). A court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Dwan v. Dixon (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 260, 265; Foster v. Gray (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 434, 439.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants Request for Judicial Notice. C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 1) Cause of Action Medical Malpractice A prima facie case for medical malpractice consists of (1) a duty to conform to the relevant standard of care; (2) a breach of that duty, i.e., the negligent conduct; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting damage. ( Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)¿A healthcare provider is negligent if he or she fails to use the level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that other reasonably careful healthcare providers of the same type would use in the same or similar circumstances. ( Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 408.) Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs action is barred because Plaintiff was deemed to have admitted that he had no basis for his action against Defendant. Specifically, it was deemed admitted that defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D., complied with the STANDARD OF CARE at all times when rendering treatment to [Plaintiff], that any action taken by defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D., was not a SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR in causing any INJURY to [Plaintiff], that any action which was not taken by defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D. was not a SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR in causing any INJURY to [Plaintiff], and that to a reasonable degree of medical probability [Plaintiff] have not suffered any INJURY due to a breach of the STANDARD OF CARE by defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D. (RJN, Ex. A, and B.) Defendant contends that by these admissions, which demonstrate the absence of the necessary elements for the claim, Plaintiff cannot sufficiently state a cause of action for Medical Malpractice. (Mot. at pp. 4-5.) The Court agrees. The Court notes that a complaint's al legations may be disregarded when they conflict with judicially noticed discovery responses. ( Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 83.) Acc ordingly, a ple ading valid on its face may nevertheless be subject to demurrer when judicially noticed admissions render the complaint meritless. ( Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) Here, in alignment with these established precedents, the judicial notice of the Minute Order dated January 29, 2024, deeming matters admitted by Plaintiff, is dispositive in this case. The admissions conclusively establish that Defendant did not act below the standard of care and that no act or omission by Defendant was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs alleged injuries. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the essential elements of a medical malpractice claim. Therefore, given that Plaintiff has admitted that his action against Defendant was meritless, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 2) Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Ibid .) Here, Plaintiff does not submit any Opposition to the Motion or argue there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment, failing to meet his burden. Moreover, even assuming that Plaintiffs single-page Complaint may be amended to state a cause of action, it does not overcome the judicially noticed admissions rendering a valid complaint meritless. (See Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co ., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 604.) Accordingly, the Court DENIES leave to amend. CONCLUSION Defendants unopposed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 20STCV30564 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT JANE DOE L.P., Plaintiff, vs. DOWNEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV30564 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe L.P. served a Notice of Taking Deposition of Defendant Downey Unified School Districts Person Most Knowledgeable and Fact Witness Principal Tom Houts and Request for Production of Documents (RFPs) on Defendant Downey Unified School District. On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 4. At the March 19, 2024, hearing, the Court found that some information about K.G., such as that related to Defendants knowledge of his prior similar misconduct and need for supervision, may be relevant. However, the Court found that RFP No. 4 was overbroad. The Court also noted that the request infringed on K.G.s privacy rights without giving him notice before the disclosure. Accordingly, the Court continued the hearing, ordered the parties to meet and confer about the scope of RFP No. 4, and ordered Defendant to provide K.G.s guardians last known address and phone number to Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could provide notice of the motion and the continued hearing date. On May 3, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a supplemental declaration. Plaintiff has served K.G.s guardian with notice of the motion via U.S. mail and email. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 13.) Since the last hearing, Plaintiff and Defendant have been discussing the scope of RFP No. 4. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6-10.) However, from April 18, 2024 through May 1, 2024, Defendants counsel stopped responding to Plaintiffs counsel. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11.) At the June 4, 2024 hearing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing and continued the hearing. Defendant timely filed a supplemental brief with exhibits. One of these exhibits is an email from K.Gs guardian in response to a conversation with Defendants counsel, which states, I do not Authorize Downey Unified School District to release [K.G.s] school records. And also [K.G.] will be pleading the Fifth Amendment. (Evenstad Decl., Ex. D.) As propounded, RFP No. 4 requests Any and all SCHOOL RECORDS in YOUR possession, custody or control for K.G. SCHOOL RECORDS is defined as any and all written notes, memos, reports, or other writings regarding a student including but not limited to report cards, progress reports, letters, notes, nurses notes, attendance records, health records, incident reports, IEP reports, correspondence, class schedules, or any other written material having anything whatsoever to do with the student in YOUR possession, custody or control. Defendants last specific offer (March 26, 2024) was for K.G.s student profile, enrollment history, attendance history, entry into the special education program dates, and the September 2019 IEP outlining the supervision/services that his IEP called for at the time of the incident. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 7.) On April 23, 2024, Defendants counsel communicated that she think[s] the production should be limited to the IEP in place at the time of the incident, which is really the only thing that would meet the directly relevant standard. (Evenstad Supple Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiffs last request (April 25, 2024) was for K.G.s student profile, enrollment history, class schedule for the 2019-2020 school year, entry into the special education program dates, IEP/504 Triennial Plans for the time period of August 1, 2012 - December 6, 2019, behavioral and psychosocial reports up until December 6, 2019, Disciplinary Records from August 1, 2012 - December 6, 2019, if any, which shall include written/recording verbal warnings, written warnings, incident reports, suspensions, detentions, complaints regarding behavioral issues and incidents, reprimands, and any similar admonishments of inappropriate behavior demonstrated by K.G. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 11.) In its supplemental opposition, Defendant now asks the Court to limit the production to K.G.s student profile with his demographic information and enrollment history and special education program information, which includes the special education programs and dates from 2011 through the time of the incident; K.G.s September 2019 IEP; and K.G.s discipline history from the start of summer school 2019 until the incident, which is the only time that plaintiff and K.G. attended Downey High School. (Suppl. Opposition at p. 4.) Defendant contends that it cannot offer more or less supervision of a student where it is not called for in an IEP and agreed to by the parent, and a school cannot implement any special education program or provide services to a child if the parent doesnt agree to them. (Suppl. Opposition at pp. 6-7.) However, Defendant focuses only on the IEPs requirement of parental consent to the provision of special education and related services, not Defendants general duty to supervise and protect against foreseeable harms for all students. (See id. at pp. 6-8 [citing Education Code sections 56340, 56341, 56341.1, 56345].) California courts have long recognized that a student may recover for injuries proximately caused by a breach of [a schools] duty to supervise. ( M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518.) The existence of a duty of care of a school district toward a student depends, in part, on whether the particular harm to the student is reasonably foreseeable. ( Ibid. ) The harm may be foreseeable when the alleged perpetrator was repeatedly disciplined for grave acts of defiance and inappropriate and violent behavior. ( Id. at p. 520.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2019, her one-on-one aide abandoned her, resulting in Plaintiff being assaulted by K.G. (Complaint ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant negligently failed to carry out its duties to properly and adequately supervise Plaintiff L.P. and failed to discipline, investigate, warn, appropriately supervise, or suspend [K.G.] despite having actual or constructive knowledge that he had engaged in inappropriate conduct with other minor student. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 46.) Accordingly, Defendants limitation to K.Gs student profile, September 2019 IEP, and discipline history from summer 2019 is too narrow. The limitation for K.G.s discipline history for the only time that plaintiff and K.G. attended Downey High School is particularly too narrow if Defendant had additional knowledge of K.G.s behavior from prior attendance at other schools in Defendants district. The motion to compel further is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is ordered to respond to RFP No. 4 by producing the following documents to Plaintiff within 30 days: K.G.s student profile; enrollment history; class schedule for the 2019-2020 school year; dates of entry into the special education program; IEP/504 Triennial Plans for the time period of August 1, 2012 to December 6, 2019; behavioral and psychosocial reports up until December 6, 2019; and Disciplinary Records from August 1, 2012 to December 6, 2019, if any, including written/recording verbal warnings, written warnings, incident reports, suspensions, detentions, complaints regarding behavioral issues and incidents, reprimands, and any similar admonishments of inappropriate behavior demonstrated by K.G. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

BAILEY VS. SHASTA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203011 This matter is on calendar for review. The matter was stayed following a stipulation of the parties due to a related Federal Action. Nothing has been filed informing the Court of the status of the Federal Action. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

THE ESTATE OF JIMMIE CHARLES SNEED VS. PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES SHASTA LLC Case Number: 22CV-0199785 This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The Court finds this matter to be exempt from plan designation but intends to set the matter for trial no later than March 18, 2025. Defendant has posted jury fees but Plaintiff has not. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 23STCV21832 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV21832 MOTIONS : Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff A lex Omar Quevedo Herrera OPPOSING PARTY: N one BACKGROUND On September 11, 2023, Plaintiffs Maria B. Munoz de Cote Delgado, Alex Omar Quevedo Herrera, Stephanie Quevedo, Stacey Quevedo, and Alex Quevedo Jr. filed a complaint against Defendants Malek Zaki Shabbar, Shabbar Zaki Suleiman, Mona Shabbar, and Does 1 to 30 for injuries related to a motor vehicle accident. On August 13, 2023, Plaintiff Alex Quevedo Jr. (Decedent) passed away unrelated to injuries in this case. On June 10 2024, Plaintiff A lex Omar Quevedo Herrera (Herrera) filed the instant motion to amend the complaint and appoint Herrera as successor-in-interest to Alex Quevedo Jr. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD Amendment to Pleadings: General Provisions Under Code of Civil Procedure section 576, [a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order. Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: [t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.¿ The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.¿ This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.¿( Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court ¿(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.)¿ The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. ( Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) Moreover, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment. ( Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing party did not establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].) The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the action. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter Weil & Brown).) Denial of a motion to amend is rarely justified if the motion is timely made and granting the motion will not prejudice the opposing party. ( Id . at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.) However, if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. ( Id . at ¶ 6:655, citations omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not grounds for denial. If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced the other side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if sought as late as the time of trial. ( Id . at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).) Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. . . . But the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider. (Weil & Brown, supra , at ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.) Even if some prejudice is shown, the judge may still permit the amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is authorized to grant leave on such terms as may be proper. (Weil & Brown, supra , at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.) For example, the court may cause the party seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in preparing for trial. ( Id . at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del Arroyo Hotel , 42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324: Procedural Requirements Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must: (1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleadings, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies the following: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Successor in Interest California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.31 provides that the decedents personal representative or, if none, the decedents successor in interest may continue a decedents pending action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30; see Adams v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 71, 78-79.) A successor in interest is the beneficiary of the decedents estate or other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular item of the property that is the subject of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.11.) Section 377.33 provides that the court in which an action is continued may make any order concerning parties that is appropriate to ensure proper administration of justice, including the appointment of the decedents successor in interest as a special administrator or guardian ad litem. Section 377.32 provides that a person who seeks to commence such an action as the decedents successor in interest must file an affidavit or declaration providing certain information, including the decedents name, date and place of decedents death, and statements regarding whether the estate has been administered and that the affiant or declarant is the successor in interest on decedents claim. ( Id ., § 377.32(a).) A certified copy of the decedents death certificate must also be attached to the affidavit or declaration. ( Id ., § 377.32(c).) DISCUSSION As an initial matter, the Declaration of Jazmin G. Barra, in support of this motion, does not state the effect of the amendment, why the amendment is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, or the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Moreover, the declaration does not state what allegations are proposed to be added or deleted to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located Nevertheless, the motion includes a copy of the proposed first amended complaint and asserts the amendment is solely to appoint Herrera as successor-in-interest for Decedent. The Declaration of Herrera does not state where Decedent died but includes a copy of his certified death certificate. (Exh. B.) However, the Herreras declaration states that Decedents mother (Maria B. Munoz De Cote Delgado) is also a potential successor-in-interest and has agreed to Herreras appointment. (Exh. C, Herrera Decl. ¶ 5.) No declaration by Maria B. Munoz De Cote Delgado attesting to that fact is provided. Because there is no declaration from Maria B. Munoz De Cote Delgado attesting that she has agreed to Herrera being appointed successor-in-interest, and Herreras declaration does not contain the place of Decedents death and does not provide specific facts regarding the assertions that no other person has a superior right to be substituted, the motion for leave to amend is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint is denied. Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 23STCV21848 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 immigrant rights defense council, llc ; Plaintiff , vs. laura e. vaca , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV21848 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: (1) motion to set aside court order of march 22, 2024 deeming requests for admissions admitted (2) motion for monetary sanctions against plaintiffs attorney MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC (1) Motion to Set Aside Court Order of March 22, 2024 Deeming Requests for Admission Admitted (2) Motion for Monetary Sanctions against Plaintiffs Attorney The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each motion. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The court sustains plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLCs evidentiary objections, filed on June 26, 2024, because defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc. did not authenticate the exhibits to which the objections are directed. MOTION TO SET ASIDE COURT ORDER OF MARCH 22, 2024 DEEMING REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION ADMITTED Defendants Laura E. Vaca (Vaca) and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc. (API) (collectively, Defendants) request that the court set aside its March 22, 2024 order granting the motion to deem requests for admissions admitted, filed by plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC (Plaintiff), or, alternatively, striking Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. First, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should set aside its March 22, 2024 order granting Plaintiffs motion and deeming admitted the truth of the matters specified in the Requests for Admission directed to defendant API. Defendants contend that API responded to Plaintiffs discovery at the same time that Vaca served her responses. In support of that contention, Defendants have filed Defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada De Inmigracion, Inc.s Responses to Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLCs Requests for Admission, Set One, served on Plaintiff on November 10, 2023. (Mot., Exhibit A, pp. 1, 8.) Defendants have also submitted the November 27, 2023 email from Plaintiffs counsel, in which counsel stated that [b]ecause [Defendants] responded jointly, [counsel would] treat the responses together. (Mot., Ex. C, p. 1.) Defendants have not, however, presented evidence or argument establishing that these responses were served in connection with the Requests for Admission that were the subject of the courts March 22, 2024 order. Specifically, the court ruled on Plaintiffs motion as to the Requests for Admission that were served on defendant API on December 28, 2023. (March 22, 2024 Order, p. 2:3-4; Pl. Mot. to Deem Admissions Admitted, filed Feb. 9, 2024, p. 1:22-26 [moving for an order deeming admitted the admissions in the requests served on API on December 28, 2023], and Medvei Decl., Ex. 1 [Requests for Admission, Set One, served on API on December 28, 2023].) Defendants did not present evidence or argument establishing that (1) API served responses to the Requests for Admission that Plaintiff propounded on it on December 28, 2023, or (2) APIs responses to the Requests for Admission directed to defendant Vaca may constitute responses to the Requests for Admission directed to API, particularly in light of the facts that (i) Plaintiff served the subject discovery on API on December 28, 2023, but (ii) the responses that API argues satisfied its obligation to respond to that discovery were served on Plaintiff before that date, on November 10, 2023. Further, Defendants did not argue, or present evidence establishing, that API should be relieved of its admissions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300. The court therefore finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should set aside its March 22, 2024 order granting Plaintiffs motion to deem admitted the truth of the matters specified in the Requests for Admission directed to defendant API. Second, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action by failing to present adequate argument establishing lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should strike Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and dismiss this action on that ground. Third, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff does not have standing. Thus, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should strike Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and dismiss this action on that ground. Here, Plaintiff has prayed for, inter alia , injunctive relief and attorneys fees. (FAC, p. 10, Prayer, ¶¶ 1-2.) Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 22446.5, [a]ny other party who, upon information and belief, claims a violation of this chapter has been committed by an immigration consultant may bring a civil action for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public and, upon prevailing, shall recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22446.5, subd. (b); Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC v. Hudson Ins. Co. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 305, 308 [pursuant to this statute, any person who believes an [Immigration Consultant Act] violation has been committed may bring a civil action on behalf of the general public seeking solely injunctive relief].) Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff, as a party who claims that Defendants have violated the Immigration Consultant Act, may not bring this action for injunctive relief against them. (FAC ¶¶ 14-15, 19-20.) Moreover, while the court notes that Defendants have cited Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th 305 in support of their argument, in that case, the court held that Plaintiff did not fall within the class of persons who may recover against an ICA bond , and did not hold that Plaintiff may not bring an action under section 22446.5, subdivision (b). ( Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 261 [emphasis added].) Instead, the court recognized that this statute sets forth three classes of plaintiff who may pursue actions against immigrant consultants who violate the Immigration Consultant Act, including any party who believes a violation has been committed by an immigration consultant pursuant to section 22446.5, subdivision (b). ( Id. at pp. 309-310.) Fourth, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs cause of action for violation of the Immigration Consultant Act is preempted by federal law. ( People v. Salcido (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 529, 534 [holding that federal law does not preempt the application of the [Immigrant Consultant Act] to the defendant].) Thus, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that the court should strike the First Amended Complaint or dismiss this action on that ground. For the reasons set forth above, the court denies Defendants motion. Finally, the court is concerned about the tone and content of a number of remarks made by Defendants and their counsel in the papers filed in connection with this motion, which include personal attacks, disparaging remarks, taunts, and insults against Plaintiffs counsel. (Mot. to Set Aside, pp. 5:17-19, 14:27, 15:13-14, and Vaca Decl., p. 18:5, 18:24-25.) The court finds that such remarks are distracting from the merits of the issues and arguments presented, are not persuasive advocacy, and have no place in written or oral submissions, presentations, or communications made to the court or to other parties or counsel in this litigation. As the court states in section 1 of its Courtroom Information for Department 53 posted on the courts website, [t]he court places a very high value on civility, courtesy, and professionalism in the practice of law and the judicial process.¿ The court expects all attorneys and parties to treat each other, witnesses, jurors, court personnel, the court, and others with the highest level of civility, courtesy, and professionalism, both inside and outside the courtroom. The court expects all parties, attorneys, and other participants in this litigation to govern their conduct accordingly. MOTION FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY Defendants move the court for an order awarding monetary sanctions in their favor and against counsel for Plaintiff, Sebastian Medvei (Medvei), in the total amount of $145,756.30. It appears that Defendants move for this relief on the ground that Medvei engaged in misuses of the discovery process by (1) violating the meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290, and (2) filing discovery motions beyond the 45-day deadline that applies to motions to compel further discovery responses. (Mot., pp. 2:9-3:19 5:19-21, 5:30-6:15, 7:5-6 [The express admission to engage in the meet and confer requirement, when mandatory, makes the award of attorney fees obligatory].) First, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs counsel, Medvei, engaged in a misuse of the discovery process in electing not to meet and confer before filing three discovery motions on behalf of Plaintiff. As noted by Defendants, Plaintiff filed the following three motions on February 9, 2024: (1) motion to deem admitted the Requests for Admission served on defendant API, which the court granted on March 22, 2024, (2) motion to compel defendant API to respond to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which is set for hearing on October 28, 2024, and (3) motion to compel defendant API to respond to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories, Set One, which is set for hearing on October 29, 2024. As a threshold matter, the court notes that it has not yet ruled on Plaintiffs motions to compel defendant APIs responses to its document demands and interrogatories. Thus, any determination on the merits of those motions is premature. The court does not issue any rulings as to whether Plaintiff has shown that it is entitled to the relief requested in those motions. However, the court notes that Plaintiff filed those motions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280, 2031.300, and 2030.290, respectively. (Pl. Feb. 9, 2024 Mot. to Deem Admissions Admitted, p. 2:1-3; Pl. Feb. 9, 2024 Mot. to Compel Responses to Doc. Demands, pp. 2:1-3, 4:1-20; Pl. Feb. 9, 2024 Mot. to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, pp. 2:1-3, 4:1-17.) Those statutes do not set forth a meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.280, 2031.300, 2030.290.) Plaintiff did not file its motions pursuant to sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290, and therefore Defendants have not shown that the meet and confer requirements of those statutes apply to Plaintiffs motions. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.290, subd. (b)(1) [meet and confer declaration required for motion to compel further responses to requests for admission], 2030.300, subd. (b)(1) [meet and confer declaration required for motion to compel further responses to interrogatories], 2031.310, subd. (b)(2) [meet and confer declaration required for motion to compel further responses to document demands].) To the extent that Defendants contend that Plaintiff brought its motions under the incorrect statutes (i.e., based on Defendants assertion that defendant API did serve responses to the subject discovery), the remedy would be to file opposition papers requesting that the court deny those motions. [1] The court finds, however, that Defendants, have not shown, for purposes of this motion only, that Medvei violated the meet and confer requirements of statutes inapplicable to the motions that Plaintiff filed on February 9, 2024. Second, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs counsel, Medvei, engaged in a misuse of the discovery process by filing the three discovery motions on behalf of Plaintiff on February 9, 2024. Defendants contend that Plaintiff waived the right to compel further responses to discovery by failing to file the three motions described above within 45 days of the date of November 10, 2023. However, as set forth above, Plaintiff filed its motions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280, 2031.300, and 2030.290, which are not subject to the 45-day deadline set forth in sections 2033.290, 2031.310, and 2030.300. To the extent that Defendants contend that Plaintiff should have filed its motions pursuant to those statutes and failed to satisfy their requirements, Defendants may file opposition papers requesting that the court deny those motions. [2] For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Defendants have not shown that Medvei has engaged in a misuse of the discovery process and therefore denies their motion for sanctions. The court denies Medveis request for monetary sanctions against Defendants. ORDER The court denies defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc.s motion to set aside March 22, 2024 order deeming requests for admission admitted. The court denies defendants Laura E. Vaca and Agencia Privada de Inmigracion, Inc.s motion for sanctions. The court orders plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court [1] As set forth above, the court does not issue any rulings regarding whether Plaintiff has properly filed those motions or has shown that it is entitled to the relief requested therein. [2] As set forth above, the court does not make any rulings as to the merits of Plaintiffs pending motions to compel discovery responses.