Westmass Area Development Corporation Vs. Peters, Kamil

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT SCOTT HAUSWIRTH , INDIVIDUALLY Notice Of Motion And Motion To Quash Service Of Summons And Complaint is OFF CALENDAR moot. First Amended Complaint and Summons on file. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 22STCV23623 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Case Name: Sanaz Afsar, et al. v. Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association, et al. Case No.: 22STCV23623 Motion: (1) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (2) Motion to Seal Moving Party: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc. (PWTS) Responding Party: None as of July 15, 2024 (PWTS filed Notice of Non-Opposition on 7/11/24) Tentative Ruling: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc.s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED. Defendants Motion to Seal is also GRANTED. I. Background Plaintiff owns Unit 2301 in the Bunker Hill Tower high-rise in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2022, Defendants Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association (BHTCA) and Pacific Water Tank Services Inc. (PWTS) discharged 2000 or more gallons of dirty water directly into Plaintiffs unit, causing extensive property damage. On July 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against BHTCA and PWTS for (1) negligence and (2) trespass. On October 14, 2022, Defendant BHTCA filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, Saied Kashani, PWTS, VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (3) equitable indemnity; (4) apportionment and/or contribution; (5) declaratory relief and (6) declaratory relief. BHTCA dismissed Plaintiff and Saied Kashani from its cross-complaint on Jun 29, 2023. On November 30, 2022, Defendant PWTS filed a cross-complaint against BHTC and VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) equitable indemnity; (2) contribution; (3) apportionment; and (4) declaratory relief. This is the motion by PWTS for determination of good faith settlement, and also a motion to seal the settlement documents by the settlement amount. The motions are unopposed. II. Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement A. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 states, in pertinent part: (a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of good faith or a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors . . . [para.] (c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasors from any further claims against the settling tortfeasors for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. [para.] (d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. In determining whether a settlement is in good faith, our Supreme Court stated that the trial court should inquire into, among other things, ...whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasors proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiffs injuries. ( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of facts be taken into account (i.e. the Tech-Bilt factors) including: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs total recovery and the settlors proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among defendants; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interest of the nonsettling defendants. A defendants settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendants liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (d).) The party asserting lack of good faith should demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the objective of section 877.6. ( Tech-Bilt at pp. 500-501.) A determination that the settlement was in good faith would bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (c).) Any existing cross-complaints for such claims would be subject to dismissal. While an unopposed application for good faith settlement may be granted on bare bones facts, an opposed application requires the Court to consider the settlement based on the Tech-Bilt factors. ( City of Grand Terrace (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) This requires the settlor to provide the Court with sufficient evidentiary basis to enable the court to consider and evaluate the various aspects of the settlement. ( Id. at p. 1263.) Because Tech-Bilt mandates a rough approximation of the settling defendant's proportionate liability and consideration of all other defendants' proportionate liability and consideration of all other factors that might affect the fairness of the settlement as respects non-settling defendants, the affidavits, declarations or other evidence should provide the court with the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors contemplated by Tech-Bilt . Without the facts, in a contested hearing, it is impossible for a court to exercise its discretion in an appropriate fashion. ( Ibid. ) B. Application to Facts 1. Settling parties: (1) Plaintiff Sanaz Afsar (2) Defendant PWTS 2. Terms of settlement: In consideration for a release of the settling parties by each of the settlement parties, and a dismissal of the action against PWTS, PWTS will pay Plaintiff a sum in settlement. [1] The settlement will result in dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint and BHTCA and Seabreeze Management Company, Incs cross-complaint against PWTS. 3. Rough Approximation of Plaintiffs Total Recovery and Settlors Proportionate Liability: Substantial evidence (e.g., factual declarations) showing the nature and extent of the settling defendant's liability is required for a good-faith determination. Without such evidence, a good faith determination is an abuse of discretion. ( Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co . (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348 (questionable assumptions in moving party's memorandum of points and authorities insufficient to show settlement was reasonable); Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834 (attorney's declaration re settling defendant's liability insufficient where he failed to provide specific supporting facts or expert opinion). The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be. ( City of Grand Terrace vs. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal App.3d 1251, 1262.) When a trial court considers the good faith of a settlement, it must determine each tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. The trial court's good faith determination must also take into account the settling tortfeasor's potential liability for indemnity to a cotortfeasor, as well as the settling tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff. In so doing, a trial court must consider each of the plaintiff's claims and possible recoveries and the potential liability of the joint tortfeasors. ( Cal-Jones Properties v. Evans Pacific Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 324, 328.) PWTS maintains its liability for the incident is minimal at best. PWTSs only involvement in this action is as the entity hired by BHTCA to service a water tank on the premises. (Motion, Carpenter Dec., ¶3.) PWTS argues the water intrusion was not the result of its conduct. ( Id. at ¶3.) PWTS maintains the tank was already drained when it arrived, and it was at all times BHTCAs responsibility to drain the tank. ( Id. at ¶4.) PWTS establishes its proportionate liability is likely zero. No oppositions have been filed to this motion. For this reason, PWTSs failure to provide any information regarding Plaintiffs approximate recovery is immaterial. 4. Allocation: In the typical one-plaintiff, multiple-defendants, personal injury action each tortfeasor is potentially liable for the same injury to the plaintiff. Therefore the full settlement by one defendant will offset a judgment against other tortfeasors; no allocation of the settlement is required. But many lawsuits and many settlements do not fit this pattern. In some, the amount of the offset is uncertain because one settlement covers multiple plaintiffs or causes of action with different damages, or because a sliding scale settlement is used and payments by the settling defendant are contingent upon the degree of plaintiff's success against the remaining defendants. In others, the amount of the offset is clouded by injection of noncash consideration into the settlement or, as here, by settling claims for separate injuries not all of which would be attributable to conduct of the remaining defendants. ( Alcal Roofing & Insulation v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1124-1125.) In a situation where the cash amount of the settlement does not dictate the amount of the offset, the settling parties must include an allocation or a valuation in their agreement. A natural tension will exist between plaintiff, who benefits by undervaluing the settlement in order to permit greater recovery against the remaining defendants, and the settling defendant, who would want the settlement value high enough to be approved in order to relieve settling defendant from liability for comparative indemnity or contribution. Requiring a joint valuation by the plaintiff and the settling defendant should generally produce a reasonable valuation. ( Id. ) No allocation of the settlement proceeds is required. There is a single Plaintiff and the causes of action allege the same damages. There is also no noncash consideration in the settlement. 5. Fraud, Collusion and Tortious Conduct: Based on the record, there is no evidence of fraud, collusion or tortious conduct indicating that the settlement was entered into to injure Defendant BHTC or other remaining defendants or cross-defendants. 6. Recognition that settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial: PWTSs settlement is less than if it were found liable at trial. PWTS maintains, however, that its liability is zero. 7. Financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants: The settlement is not disproportionately low. As such, PWTSs financial conditions and insurance policy limits are immaterial. ( L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 749-750 (request for discovery into defendants financial condition for purposes of determining good faith settlement denied; financial condition of settling defendant only relevant where settlement is disproportionately low).) III. Motion to Seal Documents Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (c).) Therefore, pleadings, motions, discovery documents, and other papers may not be filed under seal merely by stipulation of the parties. The parties' agreement that certain documents be filed under seal is improper and insufficient. ( Savaglio v. WalMart Stores, Inc . (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 600.) A prior court order must be obtained. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (a); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 888.) At a minimum, a party seeking to seal documents must come forward with a specific list of facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them. ( Id. at 894.) Before substantive courtroom proceedings are closed or transcripts are ordered sealed, a trial court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) PWTS moves to seal the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement and the declaration of Elizabeth J. Carpenter. PWTS submitted a public redacted version of the documents it the settlement amount redacted and it lodged an unredacted version with the Court, as required under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subdivision (b)(5). PWTS moves to seal these documents to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement amount. The settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provision. (Motion to Seal, Carpenter Dec., ¶2.) There is no overriding public interest in the settlement amount agreed to between Plaintiff and PWTS. No oppositions have been filed to the Motion to Seal. The motion to seal is granted. PWTS demonstrates an overriding interest in sealing the settlement amount, namely preservation of the confidentiality of the settlement as agreed to by the parties. The parties willingness to settle and their interest in maintaining the settlements confidentiality can only be served by the very limited redactions of the papers. PWTS establishes that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this overriding interest. [1] The Court has reviewed this sum, but, in light of the ruling on the motion to seal, does not disclose it here.

23CV02337 COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of Any Proposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2) Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process by which parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the court to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submit a formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

Case Number: 24NWCV01595 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C PIP 4221 BANDINI, LLC v. SCREAMLINE INVESTMENT CORPORATION CASE NO.: 24NWCV01595 HEARING: 07/18/24 ADD ON Defendant SCREAMLINE INVESTMENT CORPORATIONs Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is OVERRULED . Defendant is ORDERED to Answer within 5 days. Opposing Party to give notice. This unlawful detainer action involves commercial real property located at 4221 Bandini Blvd., Vernon, CA 90058 by Plaintiffs PIP 4221 BANDINI, LLC; and CLINE B INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS (collectively Plaintiffs) against Defendants SCREAMLINE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (Screamline); ADW, INC.; AUL PIPE & TUBING, INC.; and DOES 1 through 10 (collectively Defendants) on May 22, 2024. Defendant Screamline specially and generally demurs to the sole cause of action of unlawful detainer. As to the Entire Complaint Uncertainty Screamline argues that the pleading is fatally uncertain. This argument lacks merit because [a] special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made. ( Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145-146.) Moreover, demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. ( Khoury v. Malys of Calif. Inc . (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Ibid .) Here, it is clear from Screamlines other arguments that they understand what Plaintiffs at least attempt to allege, and there is no true uncertainty. The demurrer is not sustained on the basis of uncertainty. Unlawful Detainer Screamline generally demurs on the following grounds: the 10 day period following service of the Notice as set forth in the Lease did not elapse before Plaintiffs filed this action; no breach of lease is properly alleged; and Plaintiffs impermissibly seek to recover amounts for alleged unpaid rent for more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint. [T]he basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in CCP §1161(2) are: (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent ; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed. ( Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16.) Plaintiffs allege the following facts: Defendants failed and refused to make all the payments of rent due under the Lease. (Complaint ¶12.) On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs duly and lawfully served a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit Commercial Premises (the Notice) on Defendants in accordance with the provisions of the Lease and California law by delivery to the Premises, and handing a copy of the Notice to Gwen Slaughter for Tenants, handing a copy to Darlene Alvarado for ADW, and handing a copy to Sonia Marcias for AUL, each of whom was the person apparently in charge of the portion of the Premises occupied by the respective entities, and also by posting a copy of the Notice at the Premises that same day for all three Defendants, and by sending a copy of the Notice to Defendants that same day via U.S. Mail, First Class Postage prepaid&. In addition, a copy of the Notice was emailed to Tenants principal Noonoosh Sapir, on May 16, 2024 in conformity with the provisions of the Lease. The Notice required Defendants to pay the sum of $129,087.97, the amount of Rent outstanding under the Lease for the past one year period through March 31, 2024 or quit the Premises within three (3) business days after service of the Notice. The Notice further set forth Plaintiffs election to declare a forfeiture of the Lease. (Id. ¶13.) More than three (3) business days have elapsed since the service of the Notice and there was no lawful tender of the amount set forth in the Notice. Defendants are still in the possession of the Premises. (Id. ¶14.) Consequently, this action was filed on May 22, 2024. Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges the elements of unlawful detainer: 1) Defendant is in possession of the premises ( ¶ 14), 2) possession is without permission ( ¶ 13), 3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent ( ¶ 12), 4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice ( ¶ 12), and 5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed ( ¶ 14). The demurrer is OVERRULED. Screamlines a rguments raise factual issues inappropriately resolved at this stage in the litigation.

Case Number: 24PSCV00591 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 6 Plaintiff Tawa, Inc. (Retail)s Request for Entry of Default Judgment Defendant: Liming Luo TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. BACKGROUND This is a commercial lease dispute. On February 26, 2024, plaintiff Tawa, Inc. (Retail)[1] (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Liming Luo (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging causes of action for breach of contract lease agreement, account stated, and book account. Default was entered against Defendant on June 4, 2024. Plaintiff requested entry of default judgment on June 13, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $49,960.37, including $41,948.32 in damages, $5,838.29 in interest, $1,648.45 in attorney fees, and $525.31 in costs. The Court finds Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment has some issues. First, Form CIV-100 incorrectly indicated that it was requesting a clerks judgment, to which the clerks office sent a notice of rejection on June 25, 2024. (Notice of Rejection Default/Clerks Judgment (6/25/24).) Plaintiff should instead complete paragraph 1, subdivision (d), on Form CIV-100. Second, the amount stated in paragraph 2, subdivision (a), of Form CIV-100 does not match the amount stated in Exhibit 4. (Form CIV-100, ¶ 2, subd. (2)(a); Plaintiffs Exhibits in Support of Request for Entry of Default Judgment, Ex. 4.) Third, Plaintiff did not provide a proposed judgment per Rule 3.1800, subdivision (a)(6), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(6).) CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. [1] The parenthetical (Retail) is how Plaintiffs name is alleged in the complaint, and is not a defined term.

FCS057009 Motion by Plaintiff DMP MANAGEMENT, LLC to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records and for Sanctions TENTATIVE RULING Evidence Code §1563(b)(1) authorizes a nonparty witness to charge the subpoenaing party “reasonable costs” with respect to the production of business records pursuant to a records subpoena, with those costs generally limited to $24/hour per person for the reasonable clerical costs to locate and produce the records responsive to the subpoena. All reasonable costs incurred in a civil proceeding by a witness who is not a party with respect to the production of all or any part of business records requested pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum shall be charged against the party serving the subpoena duces tecum. (1) “Reasonable costs,” as used in this section, includes, but is not limited to, the following specific costs: ten cents ($0.10) per page for standard reproduction of documents of a size 8½ by 14 inches or less; twenty cents ($0.20) per page for copying of documents from microfilm; actual costs for the reproduction of oversize documents or the reproduction of documents requiring special processing which are made in response to a subpoena; reasonable clerical costs incurred in locating and making the records available to be billed at the maximum rate of twenty-four dollars ($24) per hour per person, computed on the basis of six dollars ($6) per quarter hour or fraction thereof; actual postage charges; and the actual cost, if any, charged to the witness by a third person for the retrieval and return of records held offsite by that third person. After the original enactment of this statute, the Legislature amended it, to add the “including but not limited to” language. Nevertheless, a nonparty receiving a records subpoena should produce responsive documents subject to the clerical hourly rate limitation, absent the providing of sufficient evidence to establish that the document search cannot reasonably be performed by a clerical, non-professional person. The only evidence AMS has presented is the declaration of its founder/chief engineer. All he claims in his declaration is that nearly all work and communications are in electronic form, stored on computers, and not stored yet in separate folders per project. While his declaration reported directing “an associate in my office, Marie Thompson”, to contact AMS’s attorney, he also claimed that “AMS does not employ any clerical persons or secretaries or persons who are compensated at the rate of $24/hour”. That latter statement does not rule out that AMS employs or could employ any clerks or secretaries (only that if AMS does so employ, none are paid at the hourly rate of $24). And it does not seem likely that an engineering firm of even small size lacks any support staff (secretary, clerk, receptionist or even bookkeeper) who at relatively low hourly rates could not be tasked with the job of sorting through computer records. The court therefore grants DMP’s motion, and orders AMS to produce documents (electronic or otherwise) responsive to the business records deposition subpoena. The court also imposes sanctions against AMS, in the amount of $1,460.00, payable to DMP by 5:00 p.m. within 30 days from issuance of this Order. Compliance with all terms of this order is due within 20 days of service of the signed order. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://www.zoomgov.com/j/1602210102?pwd=emlhR29SczExam56NFFqWHFvSitmZz09 Meeting ID: 160 221 0102 Passcode: 650928 One tap mobile +16692545252,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)

Case Number: 24STCV01908 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING THE PICO PLACE LLC , vs. FREDDIE LEWIS . Case No.: 24STCV01908 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Plaintiff The Pico Place LLCs unopposed motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff The Pico Place LLC (Pico Place) (Plaintiff) moves unopposed for summary judgment against Defendant Freddie Lewis (Lewis) (Defendant). (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§437c, 1107.7.) Plaintiff moves on the grounds there is no material disputed facts rendering summary judgment appropriate regarding possession of the property commonly known as 6565 S Western Ave., #3, Los Angeles, CA 90047. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.) Procedural Background On January 12, 2024, Plaintiff had Defendant served with a Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owed for the rental period of March 2023 through January 2024 in the amount of $40,100.00. ( Decl. of Saghian ¶ 6, Exhs. 2, 3.) On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Defendant for unlawful detainer. On or about February 7, 2024, Defendant filed an Answer. On or about April 3, 2024, Defendant filed for Voluntary Chapter 13 Bankruptcy through the California Central Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 2:24-bk-12573-VZ. The case was automatically dismissed on April 25, 2024, for Defendants failure to file schedules, statements and/or plan. (5/31/24 Notice of Lodging.) On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment. As of the date of this hearing Defendant has not filed an opposition. Summary of Allegations Plaintiff alleges it is the owner of 6565 S Western Ave., #3, Los Angeles, CA 90047, Los Angeles County (Premises). (Complaint ¶¶3-4.) Plaintiff alleges on or about February 1, 2023, Defendant agreed to rent the premises as a month-to-month tenancy and agreed to pay monthly rent of $4,000.00 on the first of the month. (Complaint ¶6a.) Plaintiff alleges this oral agreement was made with Plaintiff, and a copy of the written agreement is not attached to the Complaint because the written agreement is no tin the possession of the landlord or the landlords employees and agents, and because this action is solely for nonpayment of rent. (Complaint ¶¶6b, f.) Plaintiff alleges the tenancy is not subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 because the tenancy is commercial in nature. (Complaint ¶7a.) Plaintiff alleges the tenancy was terminated for at-fault just cause, under §1946.2(b)(1). (Complaint ¶8a.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant and all unknown occupants were served a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit. (Complaint ¶¶9a(1), e, Exh. 2.) Plaintiff alleges the notice was served on Defendant by personally handing a copy to Defendant on January 12, 2024. (Complaint ¶¶10a(1).) Plaintiff alleges on January 18, 2024, the period stated in the notice expired at the end of the day and Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the notice by that date. (Complaint ¶9b.) Plaintiff requests possession of the premises, costs incurred in this proceeding, including past-due rent of $40,100.00, reasonable attorney fees, forfeiture of the agreement, and damages at the rate of $133.33 per day for fair rental value of the premises from January 19, 2024, for each day Defendants remains in possession through entry of judgment. (Complaint ¶¶13, 19.) Legal Standard A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (C.C.P. §437c(c).) Unlawful Detainer (1st COA) To establish a claim for unlawful detainer, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) plaintiff owns/leases the property; (2) plaintiff rented/subleased the property to defendant; (3) under the lease/rental agreement/sublease, defendant was required to pay rent in a specified amount per period; (4) plaintiff properly gave defendant three days written notice to pay the rent or vacate the property; (5) as of the date of the three-day notice, at least the amount stated in the three-day notice was due; (6) defendant did not pay the amount stated in the notice within three days after service/receipt of the notice; and (7) defendant is still occupying the property. ( See C.C.P. §1161; CACI 4302.) Plaintiff submitted undisputed evidence that it owns the Premises leased to Defendant. ( Decl. of Saghian ¶ 4, Exh. 1.) Plaintiff submitted undisputed evidence that it entered into an oral lease agreement for the Premises with Defendant on February 1, 2023, for the amount of $4,000.00 to be paid on the first day of each calendar month. (Decl. of Saghian ¶5.) Plaintiff submitted undisputed evidence that the three-day notice of pay rent or quit was personally served to Defendant. ( Decl. of Saghian ¶ 6, Exhs. 2, 3.) Plaintiff submitted undisputed evidence that after the three-day notice of pay rent or quit, Defendant failed to pay or quit possession of the Premises, and Plaintiff has not received any rent from Defendant since March 2023 and Defendant is still in possession of the Premises. (Decl. of Saghian ¶8.) Plaintiff met its burden to demonstrate there is no triable issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ordinarily, Plaintiff would shift the burden to Defendant to raise a triable issue of material fact. However, this motion is unopposed, and no burden-shifting is applicable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs unopposed motion for summary judgement is granted. Conclusion Plaintiffs unopposed motion for summary judgment against Defendant is granted. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23AHCV02835 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 17, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Aida Hernandez, et al. v. Stephen S. Young, et al. CASE NO.: 23AHCV02835 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants Stephen S. Young and Betty Young, individually and as trustees of the Stephen S. Young and Betty Young Trust RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiffs Aida Hernandez and Ruben Hernandez SERVICE: OK / Unopposed OPPOSITION: OK / Unopposed REPLY: OK / Unopposed RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants demur to four of Plaintiffs seven causes of action and move to strike Plaintiffs prayers for punitive damages. BACKGROUND This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs Aida Hernandez and Ruben Hernandez sued defendants Stephen S. Young and Betty Young, individually and as trustees of the Stephen S. Young and Betty Young Trust, on December 7, 2023, asserting causes of action for: 1. Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability, 2. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, 3. Nuisance (Negligence), 4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 5. Negligent Maintenance of the Premises, 6. Nuisance (Intentional Tort), and 7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. As alleged in the complaint and accepted as true for a demurrer and motion to strike: Defendants own the property located at 2190 S. Oak Knoll Ave., San Marino 91108 (the Property). (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs have rented the Property from Defendants since around October 2015. ( Id. , ¶¶ 12-13.) Throughout Plaintiffs tenancy, the Property has suffered from uninhabitable conditions including severe vermin infestations, faulty plumbing and electrical systems, deteriorating structural integrity, and lack of maintenance of landscaping and foliage. ( Id. , ¶ 14.) On March 27, 2024, Defendants demurred to and moved to strike portions of Plaintiffs complaint. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On July 7, 2024, Defendants replied. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants demurrers to the first and seventh causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendants demurrers to the second and sixth causes of action are OVERRULED. Defendants motion to strike is denied as MOOT. LEGAL STANDARD Demurrer Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. ( Id. § 436 (a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. ( Id. , § 431.10.) The court may also [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. ( Id. § 436 (b).) Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) DISCUSSION (Demurrer) Defendants demur to Plaintiffs first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action, on the grounds that none states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 1. First Cause of Action for Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability Breach of the implied warranty of habitability, as any breach of contract, may be regarded as a tortious breach where an injured party demonstrates the defendants intentional, malicious, and outrageous conduct. ( Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 112, fn.3; Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255-256. ) California law defines malice as either (1) conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or (2) despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ( Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 330.) Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of warranty, but they have not stated a claim for tortious breach. The complaint refers solely to the conditions on the Property. It alleges no facts that suggest Defendants possessed any state of mind, malicious or otherwise. Plaintiffs rely on the assertion that (1) Defendants had actual and constructive notice of the poor conditions on the Property and (2) the poor conditions caused Plaintiffs substantial distress. The former allegation is insufficient to show malice, and the latter is irrelevant. The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. 2. Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment A tenant suffering breach of quiet enjoyment may remain in place and sue their landlord for breach of the implied covenant, which is a breach of a promise contained in their lease. ( Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-590) The elements track with a breach of contract or covenant case: (1) a lease; (2) the tenants performance or excuse; (3) the landlords substantial interference with the tenants beneficial use and enjoyment; and (4) some injury to the tenants rights under the lease generally, the failure to obtain the full value bargained for when the tenant paid rent to occupy the premises without disturbance. ( Ibid. ) [T]he implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is similar to, and sometimes overlapping with, the warranty of habitability. [Citation.] [T]he line between the landlord's interference with the tenants quiet enjoyment and the landlords failure to maintain the leased premises in a tenantable condition can be blurred. [Citation.] ( Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 923, fn. 1.) A claim can be stated for one or the other on the same basic facts. (See Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1165 [bedbug infestation and/or raw sewage on the property may violate the warranty of habitability or the covenant of quiet enjoyment].) Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability. They have also alleged the violations were severe and their landlords had notice of the poor conditions, which is sufficient to allege Defendants affirmatively substantially interfered with Plaintiffs use of the Property. These allegations state a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 3. Sixth Cause of Action for Nuisance (Intentional Tort) Although Defendants included Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for nuisance in their Notice of Demurrer, they did not discuss the nuisance claim in their moving papers. The Court disregards this portion of their demurrer because they failed to argue the point. 4. Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) defendants outrageous conduct; (2) defendant's intent to cause distress or reckless disregard for its likelihood; (3) plaintiff's severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) causation. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.) Conduct, to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) Similarly, [s]evere emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it. ( Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) The facts in Plaintiffs complaint do not describe conduct that exceeds all bounds of what might ordinarily be tolerated. In fact, the sorts of wrongs Plaintiffs allege are (regrettably) relatively commonplace. A tenant may recover against her landlord for intentional infliction of emotional distress in extreme cases, such as direct threats of violence against tenants ( Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288) or knowing permission for severe habitability problems to persist across many buildings and units ( McNairy v. C.K. Realty (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504). But no facts of that sort are alleged here. Plaintiffs have not stated a claim. DISCUSSION (Motion to Strike) Because the Court sustains Defendants demurrer with leave to amend, the motion to strike is denied as moot. But in the interest of avoiding unnecessary motion practice, the Court offers the following observation: A motion to strike is the procedure to attack a purportedly improper remedy such as unjustified punitive damages. ( Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) But a complaint including a request for punitive damages must also include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such an award. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud and malice toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. ( Ibid. ) CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrers to the first and seventh causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendants demurrers to the second and sixth causes of action are OVERRULED. Defendants motion to strike is denied as MOOT. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 17, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org