Taunton Federal Credit Union V Gabourel Et Al

Case Number: 22VECV00728 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: W ALBERT BOYAJIAN V. SURGE GLOBAL BAKERIES PARTNERS GP, ET AL. DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Date of Hearing: July 18, 2024 Trial Date: None set Department: W Case No.: 22VECV00728 Moving Party: Defendants McLarty Capital Partners SBIC II, LLC, Lauren Steel, and Parris Boyd Responding Party: Plaintiffs Albert Boyajian and Global Chips, Inc. BACKGROUND On May 31, 2022, Plaintiff Albert Boyajian filed a complaint against Defendants Surge Global Bakeries Holdings LLC, Surge Global Bakeries Partners LP, Surge Global Bakeries Partners GP, LLC, Surge Private Equity LLC, Surge Private Equity, McLarty Capital Partners SBIC II, LP, The Firmament Group, Thomas Beauchamp, Lewis Sharp, Lauren Steel, Parris Boyd, Tobias Keller, Andy Burchfield, and Ashur Aghasi for (1) Limited Partner Derivative Suit; (2) Limited Partner Derivative Suit; (3) Fraudulent Concealment; (4) Breach of Contract; and (5) Breach of Contract. This action involves shareholder derivative and direct claims by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges he sold his profitable bakery for an equity position in a parent entity, a place on the board of directors of his former bakery (now a wholly-owned subsidiary), and a Consulting Agreement. However, Plaintiff alleges he did not know, when he sold his company, that the purchase was merely the first step of a lenders scheme to exploit the company for the lenders benefit, entirely contrary to the best interests of the equity holders. Plaintiff contends after the purchase, the company unwarrantedly acquired an additional two companies and took on additional dramatic debt, during periods of mismanagement by inept managers and the lender who controlled the board. Moreover, since the takeover, Plaintiff alleges the lender has not given plaintiff any information on the companies; and has not called a meeting of the board. [TENTATIVE] RULING: Defendants McLarty Capital Partners SBIC II, LLC, Lauren Steel, and Parris Boyds Demurrer is OVERRULED. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendants McLarty Capital Partners SBIC II, LLC, Lauren Steel, Parris Boyd, and Tobias Keller request this court take judicial notice of General Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors, dated March 8, 2024 (ABC Contract), entered between the Assignor, Surge Global Bakeries Holdings LLC, and the Assignee, SG Service Co., LLC (Exh. A). In opposition, Plaintiffs object to the request on the grounds the document is an alleged private agreement purportedly signed by two entities, neither of whom is SBIC or Plaintiffs. Firmament does not indicate how this document came into its possession, much less in a way that would establish authenticity. Additionally, Firmament proffers no evidence that either purported signatory actually signed the document or that the signatures are authentic. The court GRANTS the request for judicial notice. DISCUSSION Defendants McLarty Capital Partners SBIC II, LLC (SBIC), Lauren Steel, Parris Boyd, and Tobias Keller (collectively Firmament Defendants) demur to the First Amended Complaint as to the first cause of action for Limited Partner Derivative Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duty and to the second cause of action for Limited Partner Derivative Suit for Interference with Corporate Governance. Specifically, Firmament Defendants demur to the first and second causes of action on the grounds (1) California does not authorize double derivative suits; (2) neither Delaware nor California law recognize a cause of action for Interference with Corporate Governance; (3) Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead that they have made demand upon the assignee of Holdings LLC, the Stapleton Group, or that such demand would be futile; and (4) Plaintiffs have failed to include the assignee, the Stapleton Group, which is a necessary and indispensable party, as a defendant in this matter. The court briefly notes the opposition and objections were filed one court day late. However, the court finds no prejudice to the Firmament Defendants or its counsel. (See Kapitanski v. Von's Grocery Co., Inc. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 29, 32-33; Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1202.) Double Derivative Suit Firmament Defendants demur to the first and second causes of action of the First Amended Complaint on the grounds Plaintiffs lack standing because California does not allow double derivative lawsuits. [B]y its nature, a double derivative suit is one brought by a shareholder of a parent corporation to enforce a claim belonging to a subsidiary that is either wholly owned or majority controlled. Normally, such a claim is one that only the parent corporation, acting through its board of directors, is empowered to enforce. Cases may arise, however, where the parent corporation's board is shown to be incapable of making an impartial business judgment regarding whether to assert the subsidiary's claim. In those cases a shareholder of the parent will be permitted to enforce that claim on the parent corporation's behalf, that is, double derivatively. [Citation.] ( Villari v. Mozilo ( 2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478.) Firmament Defendants argue California Corporation Code section 800(b) (and by extension Section 17709.02) stand for the proposition only a person who actually owns shares of the entity on which behalf he or she seeks to bring a derivative suit has standing to do so. Firmament Defendants contend by definition a double derivative Plaintiff does not own shares of the ultimate entity on which behalf he or she seeks to bring suit. Accordingly, California courts do not recognize double derivative suits. In support of this contention, Firmament Defendants cite Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100 [court noted there are some noteworthy differences between section 800(b)(1) and Delawares section 327], Gaillard v. Natomas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 410 [holding plaintiff's filing of a double derivative shareholder suit could not meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Corporation Code § 800(b)(1) on either of the two exceptions enunciated in subsection (b)], and Mueller v. Macban (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 258 [holding one who is not a stockholder of the association is not qualified to bring a derivative action on behalf of the association.]. In opposition, Plaintiffs initially argue Firmament Defendants have failed to establish which law applies California or Delaware. Plaintiffs contend Firmament Defendants previously argued, in its original demurrer, that questions of fact required resolution before deciding whether California or Delaware law should apply. Moreover, the Firmament Defendants have not met its burden to show that only California law applies in this case. The court agrees at this time it is unclear whether California or Delaware law applies. However, the court may sustain the demurrer on alternative grounds including different governing laws. (See City of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 861, 870.) Plaintiffs next argue no California court has disavowed double derivative actions. Plaintiffs argue the court in Grosset did not address double derivative claims such as the instant one here. In Grosset , the court concluded that under both Delawares and Californias contemporaneous ownership rules a post-merger plaintiff does not have standing. When analyzing Gaillard , Plaintiffs contend the court in Grosset never addressed the viability of double derivatives generally in California, and certainly not with respect to the non-merger action; it just noted that it would not work with the facts of that case. This court notes that Gaillard explicitly held that double derivative standing could not aid its plaintiff in its present form. ( Gaillard , supra , 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 419.) Plaintiffs also argue the court in Mueller , while finding the plaintiffs lacked standing, did so because the real parties had arguably waived the issue of standing as a shareholder of the holding company. This court also notes that the court in Gaillard found the holding in Mueller was inapposite to Gaillards moving parties argument that California case law requires a restrictive interpretation of section 800. Upon review of these three cases, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the current law in California does not explicitly disavow double derivative actions based on the facts of this case. As noted above, Gaillard explicitly held that double derivative standing could not aid its plaintiff in its present form. ( Gaillard , supra , 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 419.) In fact, Gaillard stated we cannot ignore that an interpretation of section 800 so as to require continuing stock ownership will leave Gaillard and all those similarly situated without a remedy. ( Ibid .) As such, the court in Gaillard explicitly cautioned against what the Firmament Defendants would have us do. Again, the court in Gaillard limited its holding to the post-merger context where it found in that instant a double derivative suit by Gaillard would present the anomalous situation of a corporation suing itself for its own benefit, because of acts it performed. ( Ibid .) Moreover, the court in Grosset actually found that California corporate law is entirely consistent with Delaware corporate law. ( Grosset , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 1115.) As a result, this court finds that Grosset did not entirely foreclose the idea of double derivative suits in California. (See also, Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699 and Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984. Moreover, as already agreed upon by the parties, Delaware law does permit parties to maintain a double derivative action in certain situations. Again, it is therefore entirely possible for California to be in line with Delaware courts recognizing double derivative standing. Given the liberal construction of derivative suits, the court OVERRULES the demurrer on these grounds. Interference with Corporate Governance and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Firmament Defendants demur to the second cause of action on the grounds California does not recognize an Interference with Corporate Governance cause of action. Firmament Defendants argue control over corporate governance is not its own separate tort and no California case or statute addresses such a cause of action or indicates what its elements would be. Accordingly, this court should not be the first in California to recognize a separate tort for interference with corporate governance especially when the Supreme Court has advised against judicial activism for an extension of tort remedies. ( Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 70, 81.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue Firmament Defendants have admitted that a lender may be liable for a claim of undue control of a business under California law when alleged as a breach of fiduciary duty. (See Dem. 2 at p. 9:13-21, quoting Credit Managers Association of Southern California v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 352, 360.) Here, Plaintiffs aver their second cause of action seeks to impose liability on SBIC for interference with corporate governance and breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, it is based on the undue control SBIC as lender took of Surge Bakeries, in directing and dictating Surge Bakeries implausible acquisitions, forcing unsustainable debt on the company then completing a take-over of the company, firing directors and forcing fire sales of assets, while withholding information from a Surge Bakeries director. (FAC¶2-4, 32, 38, 42-47, 55, 59, 65-67.) Plaintiffs contend in taking this excessive and atypical control, SBIC interfered with Surge Bakeries authority to run its own business and conduct its own corporate affairs, thereby placing it in a position where it owed fiduciary duties to Surge Bakeries, akin to the duties owed by Surge Bakeries officers and directors. In reply, Firmament Defendants contend Plaintiffs have effectively admitted that Interference with Corporate Governance is not a separate tort and Plaintiffs have already stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, because this cause of action is redundant of their breach of fiduciary cause of action, the court should strike the Interference with Corporate Governance claim. The court agrees that this cause of action is truly a breach of fiduciary duty claim and does not stand alone as a claim for interference with corporate governance. The court will overrule the demurrer but plaintiff must understand that this is a cause of breach of fiduciary duty and those are the elements which must be proven. Futility of Demand Firmament Defendants next demur to the First Amended Complaint on the grounds Plaintifffs failed to make demand on the Stapelton Group, the assignee of Holdings LLCs assets or show demand futility. A derivative suit plaintiff must allege that he or she made a demand on the corporation itself or that making a demand would be futile. (See Corp. Code §§ 800(b)(2), 17709.02(a)(2); Del. Chancery R. 23.1.) He or she must make an earnest, not a simulated effort, with the managing body of the corporation, and must demonstrate to the court with particularity the efforts he or she made[.] ( Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 789.) Firmament Defendants argue Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this requirement because they do not allege that they made a demand or that it would have been futile to make demand on the Stapleton Group, which controlled Holdings LLC at the time Plaintiffs filed the FAC. Firmament Defendants first contend because this court sustained the demurrer to the original complain because Boyajian lacked standing, the demand requirement must be reevaluated at the time Plaintiffs filed the FAC. (See Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 222, 243 holding derivative action claims are not validly in litigation if a court sustain[s a] demurrer & with leave to amend[.].) Firmament Defendants further argue because the Stapleton Group had assumed control over all assets of Holdings LLC, Plaintiffs were required to renew their demand on the Stapleton Group. (See Falvey v. Foreman-State Nat. Bank (7th Cir. 1939) 101 F.2d 409, 416 holding that when a bank has made an assignment & for the benefit of the creditors, a derivative action complaint is fatally defective in not alleging a demand upon the [assignee entity] to institute and prosecute the suit.) Lastly, Firmament Defendants contend demand on the Stapleton Group would not have been futile nor do Plaintiffs even allege demand futility as to the Stapleton Group. In opposition, Plaintiffs assert the Firmament Defendants argument fails for two reasons: Firmament has not authenticated the assignment for which it seeks judicial notice, as is required; and Global Chips had no equity interest in Surge Bakeries such that it could assert any demand on its board in the first place. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend ownership in and demand on Surge Bakeries is not implicated in this double derivative action, since Plaintiff Global Chips equity interest is only in the parent, which wholly owns the subsidiary, Surge Bakeries. In such cases, the parent and its principals and agents have committed wrongdoings related to the subsidiary, and the parent entitys board is incapable of making an impartial business judgment whether to assert its subsidiarys claims. First, the court notes Firmament Defendants have now properly authenticated the assignment. Moreover, judicial notice of a private agreement may be subject to judicial notice. In Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 754, the court not only analyzed whether the agreement there was judicially noticeable as an act of the FDIC pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c) but also under Section 452(h) judicial notice of facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of ready determination. Other than questioning Firmament Defendants failure to authenticate the document, Plaintiffs do not take any issue with the legal effect of the document. Next, the court finds Apple Inc. persuasive. There, the court held when a trial court declares derivative claims to be legally insufficient and grants leave to amend, the demand requirement must be reassessed against the disinterest and independence of the board of directors in place when the amended derivative claims are filed. ( Apple Inc. , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) The court, relying on Braddock v. Zimmerman (Del. 2006) 906 A.2d 776, noted [t]o begin, a derivative plaintiff under California law already must make a demand on the company's board to take legal action or show that it would have been futile to do so at the time the case is initiated. (§ 800(b)(2).) If the suit is properly initiated and the derivative claims are validly in issue, the presuit demand requirement has been met; hence, the filing of an amended complaint arising from those same claims will not trigger reassessment of the demand requirement. ( Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 222, 246.) The Braddock court had established that certain conditions must be met for a claim to be validly in litigation which included that the original complaint was properly pled as a derivative suit. ( Braddock , supra , 906 A.2d at p. 786.) (Here, Plaintiffs counsel conceded that Boyajian might not be the proper plaintiff for all the causes of action pled. (Minute Order, March 11, 2024.) Plaintiffs argue regardless, demand would have still been futile because it need not make a demand on Stapleton Group and the allegations are sufficient under both California and Delaware law to establish futility of any demand made to Surge LP. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 15, 17, 33-34, 38, 43-47, 62, 73 [there is no general partner of Surge LP, which was completely dominated by Firmament, and Defendants were unlikely to pursue an action because it could result in individual exposure].) Plaintiffs contend because Plaintiffs ownership is vested in Surge LP, Plaintiffs could only demand that Surge LP act, not Surge Bakeries. Thus, the premise of Firmaments argumentthat demand had to be made on Surge Bakeriesis simply wrong. (See Lambrecht v. ONeal (Del. 2010) 3 A.3d 277, 282 [only the parent corporation owns the subsidiarys stock at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, and the plaintiff owns stock only in the parent. Therefore, a Rule 23.1 demand could only be made and a derivative action could only be brought at the parent, not the subsidiary, level.] Ultimately, the court concludes that there was no legal requirement that plaintiff made a demand on Stapleton because such claim would have been futile, as set forth in the FAC at the paragraphs cited. . Stapleton Group Firmament Defendants demur to the complaint on the grounds Plaintiffs failed to join the Stapleton Group, an indispensable party, as a defendant. A necessary party is regarded as indispensable if the court determines, in equity and good conscience, that the action must be dismissed in the partys absence in light of, whether a judgment rendered in the partys absence will be adequate. ( TG Oceanside, L.P. v. City of Oceanside (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1365-66.) Indispensable parties have been identified as those who are essential for a complete determination of the controversy or the ability of a court to enter any effective judgment. ( Kaczorowski v. Mendocino County Board of Supervisors (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 564, 568.) Firmament Defendants argue in this case, the ABC contract confirms that the Stapleton Group assumed Holdings LLCs causes of action and the rights and obligation to step into Holdings LLCs shoes to initiate or defend litigation. (RJN, Exh. A §§ 1, 7.) But Plaintiffs did not add the Stapleton Group as a party to this action. See generally FAC. Therefore, Plaintiffs did not add an indispensable party and this Court should sustain the demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action. Plaintiffs argue it did not need to name Stapleton because the ABC agreement came about after Plaintiffs filed their original complaint. Plaintiffs initially filed this lawsuit in May 2022. The complaint named Surge Bakeries as a nominal defendant. According to the ABC agreement, Stapleton became the ABC of Surge Bakeries in March 2024. Because a plaintiff is not required to amend an existing action to join and name an assignee, when a party in the case transfers its interests, Plaintiffs did not need to name Stapleton. Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 368.5 provides An action or proceeding does not abate by the transfer of an interest in the action or proceeding or by any other transfer of an interest. The action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the original party, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action or proceeding. Accordingly, if the ABC agreement in fact provides what Firmament contends it does, then Surge Bakeries interests are transferred as a matter of law; the assignee obtains the same rights previously held by Surge Bakeries (see Francisco v. Aguirre (1892) 94 Cal.180, 182-183 [receiver acquires same rights of assignor at the time]); and Stapleton automatically becomes a nominal defendant. In reply, Firmament Defendants argue there was no action to abate because when the court sustained the demurrer to the original complaint, Plaintiffs no longer had a valid derivative claim. The assignment occurred before Plaintiffs filed the FAC. The court concludes that although the court had sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, the action was still pending when the ABC agreement went into effect, triggering Section 368.5. The claim remains against the Firmament defendants. If plaintiff wants to secure a judgment against Stapleton, they can be brought in by later amendment.

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

VERDIN VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. Case Number: 23CV-0202892 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of mediation. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

JOHNSON, ET AL VS. PARENT, ETAL Case Number: CVCV21-0197618 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. The Court ordered this matter to arbitration on February 5, 2024. Neither side appeared for the prior hearing on May 3, 2024. The Court notes that Substitutions of Attorney have been filed on behalf of Plaintiffs. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss the status of arbitration.

This matter is on for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Arbitration Stay and Impose Sanctions filed June 3, 2024. However, Plaintiff has not filed a Proof of Service of such Motion upon Defendants. Therefore, hearing on Plaintiff's Motion is continued to August 20, 2024 at 9:00am in Department 10A to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to serve and file with the court a proof of service upon Defendants. Hon. George J. Abdallah, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV08980 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 19 Defendant Sylvia Chasco's Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP CCP 425.16) is CONTINUED TO September 11, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. The Case Management Conference is also continued to September 11, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. The Court has not received courtesy copies of the briefing filed by the parties for the motion. Courtesy copies are required of all briefing and supporting documents. (See operative General Order for Electronic Filings (Unlimited Civil) and Department 19's Courtroom Information Link on the LASC website). The Court orders courtesy copies delivered to Department 19 by August 30, 2024. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 23PSCV01243 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: G Plaintiff TBK Bank, SSBs Application for Default Judgment Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff TBK Bank, SSBs Application for Default Judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $2,135,814.76. BACKGROUND This is a breach of contract action. In 2021, Plaintiff TBK Bank, SSB (TBK Bank) entered into five secured loan agreements with Defendant Little Fat Trucking in which TBK Bank agreed to loan a total amount of $2,334,846.71, including $669,132.00 in March 2021, $650,933.45 in April 2021, $80,520.00 in August 2021, $483,717.26 in September 2021, and $450,544.00 in November 2021. In support of the loan agreements, Defendant Xing Wang executed a personal guaranty. In February 2023, Little Fat Trucking allegedly defaulted on its obligations and now owes a total amount of $1,923,248.81, including $573,298.67 on the first loan, $554,039.61 on the second loan, $58,699.55 on the third loan, $348,374.61 on the fourth loan, and $388,836.37 on the fifth loan. On April 26, 2023, TBK Bank filed a complaint against Little Fat Trucking, Wang, Fanuga Express, December World Inc. (December World), WBD Trucking Inc. (WBD Trucking), Flying Space, WL Trucking Inc. (WL Trucking), and ZYG World Inc. (ZYG World), alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract against Little Fat Trucking, (2) breach of contract against Wang, and (3) claim and delivery. On May 12, 2023, the Court granted TBK Banks application for a temporary restraining order and writ of possession against Fanuga Express, Little Fat Trucking, December World, WL Trucking, and ZYG World. On June 17, 2023, TBK Banks process server served December World with substitute service in Yucaipa. On June 20, 2023, TBK Banks process server served ZYG World with substitute service in Chino Hills. On October 4, 2023, the Court entered default against December World and ZYG World after they failed to file a timely answer. On January 22, 2024, TBK Bank dismissed WBD Trucking and Flying Space from the present action. In February 2024, TBK Bank served Little Fat Trucking, Wang, Fanuga Express, December World, ZYG World, and WL Trucking by publication. On April 18, 2024, the Court entered default against Little Fat Trucking, Wang, Fanuga Express, and WL Trucking after they failed to file a timely answer. On June 13, 2024, TBK Bank submitted the present application for default judgment. A case management conference and OSC Re: Default/Default Judgment is set for July 18, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has filed to timely respond or appear. A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1800.) ANALYSIS TBK Bank seeks default judgment against Little Fat Trucking and Wang in the total amount of $2,366,963.29, including $1,923,248.81 in damages, $410,679.50 in interest, $25,306.57 in attorney fees, and $7,728.41 in costs. TBK Bank also seeks a judgment of possession against all defendants as to one 2022 Peterbilt Model 579, two 2022 Freightliner PT126SLP tractors, one 2019 Freightliner PT126SLP tractor, and one 2020 Kenworth T680. While the court finds TBK Bank has submitted sufficient evidence, the court GRANTS TBK Banks application with the following modifications. First, while TBK Bank requests $25,306.57 in attorney fees, the court calculates reasonable attorney fees as $21,122.49 pursuant to Local Rule 3.214 ($2,890 + $18,232.49 (1% of amount over $100,000 or $1,823,248.81) = $21,122.49). Second, while TBK Bank requests interest calculated at 18% per year, the Complaint only requests an interest rate of 7.45% per year. (Complaint, ¶ 59, 64.) Because a party may not obtain damages in a default judgment that exceed the amount requested in the complaint, the Court will limit interest to the rate requested in the Complaint and calculates interest at a rate of 7.45% from April 7, 2023, to July 18, 2024 for a total of $183,715.05. ( Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826.) Accordingly, court GRANTS TBK Banks application in the reduced amount of $2,135,814.76. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, TBK Banks application for default judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $2,135,814.76 (Damages of $1,923,248.81 + Interest of $183,715.05 + Attorney's Fees of $21,122.49 + Costs of $7,728.41 = $2,135,814.76).

C24-00959 CASE NAME: MAX HINKLE VS. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: COMPLAINT FROM: GENERAL MOTORS LLC FILED BY: GENERAL MOTORS, LLC *TENTATIVE RULING:* Vacated, FAC filed.