Bank Of America, N.A. Vs Wama

MCV-231357, Unifund v. Hagstrom Judgment Creditor, Unifund CCR, LLC’s, unopposed Application for Order of Sale of Dwelling is GRANTED. Judgment Debtor, Steve E. Hagstrom, has failed to show cause why the property should not be sold to satisfy the judgment. A homestead declaration has not been recorded by Judgment Debtor. By failing to oppose the application and failing to respond to the Court’s order to show cause, Judgment Debtor has failed to meet his burden of showing that the homestead exemption applies here. (CCP § 704.780.) There is no evidence of any other exemption being applicable here. The property shall be sold in the manner provided in Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as required by CCP § 704.780. Judgment Creditor shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling. The proposed order currently lodged with the Court does not conform with the Court’s ruling. It does not reference the correct hearing date. It refers to the Judgement Debtor as “Adam Seller” on the first page. Also, it states that no minimum bid shall be required, but this does not comply with CCP § 701.620, which states property shall not be sold without a minimum bid. Judgment Creditor shall submit a written order that complies with all of the requirements of Article 6 of Chapter 3 and of Article 4 of Chapter 4. 4. 23CV00186, Jooblay, Inc. v. Steven D. Skolnik The Court awards Defendant $5,545 in fees and costs. Defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with this tentative ruling in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312. I. Background On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action for (inter alia) wrongful foreclosure and quiet title. The subject properties are 1551 Laguna Road, Santa Rosa, and 9579 Ross Station Road, Sebastopol. On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff recorded Notices of Pending Action (“lis pendens”) on both properties. The notices were filed with the Court on April 16, 2024. On the same day, Pacific Private Money (“Defendant”) moved to expunge the lis pendens on the Laguna Road property only (the “Motion”). The Motion included a request for attorney’s fees, but did not specify an amount. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a different lawsuit, Jooblay, Inc. v. Sanchez (24CV03100), concerning the same two properties. The Sanchez complaint alleges causes of action that fundamentally duplicate six of the causes of action in the instant case, though against slightly different sets of defendants. The duplicated causes of action include two for quiet title, one related to the Ross Station property and the other to the Laguna property. On June 13, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal in the instant case, dismissing the causes of action that had been duplicated in the Sanchez complaint, including the two quiet title claims. In summary, Plaintiff moved several causes of action, including two for quiet title, from the instant case into a different lawsuit. Thus, the instant case no longer has a quiet title component. Plaintiff withdrew the lis pendens on the Laguna Road property on June 3. Plaintiff recorded a new lis pendens on the Laguna Road property, relating to the Sanchez matter, on or about June 6. At the June 14 hearing, the Court denied the Motion as moot. Defendant argued that the motion is not moot because it is entitled to attorney’s fees. The Court continued the matter and instructed Defendant to submit an itemization of its fees and costs. Defendant did so on June 24. This matter comes on calendar for consideration of Defendant’s requests for fees and costs. II. Analysis CCP § 761.010(b) requires that “[i]mmediately upon commencement of [a quiet title] action, the plaintiff shall file a notice of the pendency of the action in the office of the county recorder of each county in which any real property described in the complaint is located.” The complaints in both the instant case and Sanchez allege causes of action for quiet title. In the instant case, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens just under a month after filing the complaint. In the Sanchez case, Plaintiff recorded it slightly over a week after filing the complaint. Both timeframes somewhat stretch the definition of “immediately,” but the point is that Plaintiff was required to record the lis pendens in both cases. Plaintiff withdrew the lis pendens in the instant case ten days before dismissing the two quiet-title cause of action that had required it. In other words, as relevant here, Plaintiff has filed a lawsuit containing quiet-title allegations, recorded a lis pendens as required by statute, moved the quiet- title allegations to a different lawsuit, withdrawn the lis pendens in the first lawsuit because it was no longer required by statute, and recorded it in the second one because it was required by statute. The party prevailing on any motion to expunge a lis pendens is entitled to “the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion.” (CCP § 405.38.) If the Court had granted Defendant’s motion and ordered Plaintiff to withdraw the lis pendens, there would be no question that Defendant was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney’s fees. But the Court did not do that; the Court denied Defendant’s Motion as moot because the lis pendens addressed by the Motion had already been withdrawn. The question, then, is whether Defendant is still the prevailing party. Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not, noting that “California law defines the ‘prevailing party’ to include ‘the party with a net recovery’ or ‘a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.’” (Oppo at p. 6.) Plaintiff cites for this proposition to CCP § 1032(a)(4), which does begin with the passage Plaintiff quoted, but goes on to add that “[i]f any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not . . . .” Thus, CCP § 1032(a)(4), as applied to the situation presented here, simply says that the court has the discretion to determine which party is “prevailing,” but provides no guidance on how to make that determination. Significant guidance is provided by Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, which addresses this exact issue. Castro rejects any inflexible rule that the moving party either is or is not entitled to attorney’s fees when a lis pendens is withdrawn before the court has an opportunity to rule on a motion to expunge it. Instead, Castro calls for a “practical approach,” under which “the trial court has the discretion to award attorney fees based on a determination of which party would have prevailed on the motion, and whether the lis pendens claimant acted with substantial justification in withdrawing the lis pendens, or whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the imposition of fees would otherwise be unjust.” (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.) A. Defendant would have prevailed on the Motion. In the Motion, Defendant sets forth a variety of reasons why it should prevail. The reasons fall into two categories: procedural defects, and reasons Plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of prevailing on a real property claim. (CCP § 405.32 [lis pendens to be expunged if claimant does not establish probable validity of claim].) In the first category, Defendant notes that the recording, service, and filing of the lis pendens failed to comply with statutory requirements. First, Defendant points out that the lis pendens bears the wrong caption in that it lists only Defendant, Pacific Private Money, as a defendant in the pending action, whereas the complaint in the instant case lists a number of other defendants. The Court does not find this point significant standing alone, in light of the fact that the actual complaint, with its full caption, was attached to the Notice of Pending Action. Defendant’s second point in this category is that the lis pendens was not served on Defendant, and that it should have been because Defendant is “affected by the real property claim.” (CCP § 405.22.) (Defendant also argues that the lis pendens was not filed with the Court, but in fact it was, on April 16, 2022, the same day the Motion was filed.) In the second category, Defendant makes a series of arguments as to the prospective failure of every cause of action in the complaint. In light of Plaintiff’s contention that its only reason for filing the lis pendens was to comply with a statutory requirement related to quiet-title actions, the most relevant cause of action is the eighth, the one to quiet title on the Laguna property. That cause of action states that the defendants against whom it is alleged have no interest in the Laguna Road property. Defendant argues that this claim will fail for two reasons: first, because it rests on the allegation that the loan upon which the defendants foreclosed was usurious, which is not a valid argument because Defendant is a licensed broker and therefore exempt from the usury laws (Fin. Code § 22002); and second, because Plaintiff cannot contest the foreclosure because he failed to tender the payment due (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1184-1185). Plaintiff did not address any of these arguments in its opposition to the Motion; it rested on the point that the motion was moot because Plaintiff had withdrawn the lis pendens. Nor does Plaintiff address them in its opposition to the instant fee motion, with the exception of Plaintiff’s explanation that the quiet-title causes of action in the complaint are not alleged against Defendant. Plaintiff’s point, presumably, is that Defendant is not “affected by the real property claim” and therefore service on Defendant was not required. (CCP § 405.22.) That argument would carry a great deal more weight if Defendant Pacific Private Money were not the only party mentioned in the caption of the lis pendens document. The fact that Plaintiff named Pacific Private Money, and no other defendant, in the caption of the Notice of Pending Action is at odds with the notion that Plaintiff did not consider Pacific Private Money to be sufficiently “affected by the real property claim” to require the lis pendens document to be served on them. “[T]he court shall order that the [lis pendens] notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” (CCP § 405.32.) In light of Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendant’s contentions about why the claim will fail, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established validity. Therefore, the court finds that Defendant would have prevailed on the Motion if it had gone forward. B. Substantial justification Plaintiff asserts that it, “acted in substantial justification in withdrawing the Laguna Road Property lis pendens when Plaintiff elected, as is its right, to voluntarily dismiss its causes of action for quiet title. Upon deciding to dismiss the quiet title causes of action – the only cause of action requiring the recording of a lis pendens, Plaintiff adopted the only practical approach to the dismissal by withdrawing the lis pendens no longer required because the quiet title cause of action are no longer part of this case. Plaintiff acted with substantial justification in withdrawing the lis pendens.” (Oppo at p. 6.) That is, Plaintiff argues that withdrawing the lis pendens that had been recorded in the instant case was justified and necessary and done in good faith because there ceased to be any need for it once the quiet-title causes of action were dismissed. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff had the legal right remove several causes of action from the instant case and re-allege them in a new case. The Court also acknowledges that when Plaintiff did that, withdrawing the lis pendens he had filed in the instant case was the right thing to do. However, Plaintiff never addresses the question of why he filed the new case. It is not at all obvious why the same thing could not have been accomplished more straightforwardly, without the need for a new $435 first-paper filing fee and without exposing Plaintiff to an additional case’s worth of discovery demands, by moving to file a First Amended Complaint in the case at bar. Plaintiff cannot have reasonably been concerned that the Court would deny such a motion at this early stage of the proceedings. What is obvious is that by taking the action it did, Plaintiff created a basis to oppose the Motion, which had been filed six weeks before Plaintiff filed Sanchez and which was set for hearing two weeks later, as moot. Whether or not that was Plaintiff’s motivation for filing the new case and dismissing the corresponding causes of action in the instant one, the Court finds that doing so does not rise to substantial justification for withdrawing the lis pendens. Accordingly, Defendant is the “prevailing party” under the Castro analysis described above. C. Imposition of the fees is not unjust The Court sees no reason to conclude that imposition of attorney’s fees would be unjust, and will therefore impose them. III. Computation of the fee award The standard for calculating attorney fee awards under California law “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate . . . . The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [Citation.] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In calculating the lodestar, “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located,’ unless the party claiming fees demonstrates that hiring local counsel was impracticable or local counsel was not available.” (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285-286; see also Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26,72 [“fee awards generally should be based on reasonable local hourly rates”]; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 398-399 [different rule where plaintiff demonstrated inability to hire local counsel].) “[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court.” (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1240.) A. Defendant’s request In the Supplemental Declaration of Brianna Milligan accompanying the request for attorney’s fees, Defendant requests fees as follows, as well as $60 for the filing fee for the Motion: Jacoby Perez Researching and evaluating grounds for Motion: 5 hours Preparing and finalizing Motion: 5 hours Reviewing and revising reply: 1.2 hours Total: 11.2 hours @ $525/hour Brianna Milligan Reviewing opposition and preparing reply and declaration: 4.2 hours Reviewing billing charges and preparing declaration re. fees: 1.5 hours Preparing supplemental brief re. fees: 2 hours Anticipated time at hearing: 1 hour Total: 8.7 hours @ $455/hour B. Defendant’s arithmetic is in error Defendant requests a total of $17,773.35 in fees and costs. That figure is the sum of $13,755.00 for Mr. Perez’s time, $3,503.35 for 7.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time attributable to preparing the Reply and the fee request, an additional $455 for Ms. Milligan’s anticipated time at the hearing on the fee request, and the $60 filing fee. Those figures do add up to $17,773.35. However, there are two problems with the calculation. The first is very small: 7.7 hours at $455/hour is $3,503.50, not $3,503.35. Thus, Defendant presumably intends to request a total of $3,958.50 for 8.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time, not $3,958.35. The second is considerably larger. Mr. Perez, according to Ms. Milligan’s declaration, has “spent 5 hours researching and evaluating the grounds for the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens, and an additional 5 hours preparing and finalizing the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens. Mr. Perez also reviewed and revised Defendant’s Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens and spent 1.2 hours doing so.” (Milligan Dec., ¶ 6.) That is a total of 11.2 hours. Mr. Perez’s billing rate is $525/hour. (Milligan Dec., ¶ 7.) 11.2 hours at $525/hour is $5,880. It is not $13,755, the amount claimed for Mr. Perez’s time. $13,775 divided by $525 is 26.2. The claimed amount, therefore, appears to be based on an additional 15 hours of Mr. Perez’s time that are not accounted for in the declaration. The Court will interpret Defendant’s request as being for 11.2 hours of Mr. Perez’s time at $525/hour ($5,880), 8.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time at $455/hour ($3,958.50), and $60 in filing fees, for a total of $9,898.50. D. Time 1. Motion to expunge Defendant claims a total of 10 hours of Mr. Perez’s time in connection with the researching and drafting the Motion. The memorandum of points and authority is detailed and fact-intensive, and includes extensive citation to authority. Its complexity is tied to the complexity of the complaint in this matter: it argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on eight separate causes of action. However, the Court notes that in his declaration accompanying the Reply, Mr. Perez declares that he spent only 6.5 hours on the motion: “2 hours doing preliminary research to form the basis for this expungement motion,” and “4.5 hours preparing the motion to expunge.” Mr. Perez was clearly referring to the motion itself, not to the reply memorandum, as he claims an additional 4.3 hours for that. Ms. Milligan’s declaration does not explain why Mr. Perez now appears to have spent 10 hours researching and drafting the motion. The Court will take Mr. Perez at his word, and award attorney’s fees for 6.5 hours for preparing the Motion. 2. Reply Defendant claims a total of 5.4 hours in connection with drafting the Reply: 4.2 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time and 1.2 of Mr. Perez’s. The Reply was a well-justified response to Plaintiff’s contention that the Motion was moot. The Court finds the 4.2 hours claimed by Ms. Milligan for preparing the reply to be reasonable. However, the Court will not award the 1.2 hours for Mr. Perez’s time on the reply because 4.2 hours should have been sufficient to prepare the memorandum and no review should have been necessary. As noted above, Mr. Perez states in his declaration accompanying the Reply that he “spent 4.3 hours reviewing and researching Plaintiff’s Opposition and in preparing Defendant’s Reply Brief and in making this Declaration.” The Court finds the 4.3 hour figure unreasonable. The Opposition fundamentally says no more than that the motion is moot because the lis pendens was withdrawn; that takes no significant time to review. The declaration is one page long (exclusive of the jurat), much of which consists of the list of defendants; it also cannot have taken significant time. 4.3 hours is no less reasonable than the 4.2 hours claimed by Ms. Milligan for preparing the reply, but if Ms. Milligan spent 4.2 hours preparing it, it is unreasonable to award Mr. Perez an additional 4.3 hours for doing the same thing. Accordingly, the Court will award attorney’s fees for 4.2 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time in connection with the reply. 3. Fee request Defendant claims a total of 3.5 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time in connection with the fee request, consisting of 1.5 hours for reviewing billing charges and preparing the declaration, and 2 hours for drafting the motion. The Court finds the 1.5 hour figure excessive. The Court again notes that Mr. Perez described the time he spent on the original motion in his declaration accompanying the reply; no further review was necessary to determine that figure. Ms. Milligan cannot reasonably have spent an hour and a half determining her own time in connection with the reply, and her time spent preparing the fee request cannot even have been entered into anything she could review while she was engaged in that exact task. The Court will award 2.2 hours of attorney’s fees in connection with the fee request, consisting of two hours to draft the memorandum and .2 hours to review billing records. 4. Anticipated time for hearing The Court will not award attorney’s fees for appearance at the hearing set for July 10 at this time. If the tentative ruling is contested and the hearing takes place, the Court will be amenable to a request to increase the fee award to cover the time spent by Defendant’s counsel. 5. Total time Thus, the Court will award attorney’s fees for 6.5 hours of Mr. Perez’s time and 6.4 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time. E. Hourly rates As noted above, “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) As noted above, the relevant “community” is the “forum district,” here Sonoma county. (Nishiki, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) Fees are limited to local hourly rates unless the party seeking fees has made a good-faith but unsuccessful effort to find local counsel. (Horsford, sura, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398-399.) Defendant’s counsel is located in Irvine. Defendant has not suggested that it has attempted to hire local counsel instead. Therefore, the Court will adjust the hourly rates requested by counsel to reflect Sonoma County rates. Defendant has also not provided any information about Mr. Perez’s and Ms. Milligan’s level of skill and experience or their positions within the firm, but the Court takes judicial notice that the State Bar website indicates that Mr. Perez has seven years’ practice experience and Ms. Milligan has three. On that basis, the Court will set Mr. Perez’s rate, based on the reasonable rates generally awarded to counsel of similar skill and experience in Sonoma County, to $450/hour, and Ms. Milligan’s to $400/hour. IV. Conclusion The Court awards Defendant $5,545 in fees and costs, consisting of $2,925 for 6.5 hours of Mr. Perez’s time at $450/hour, $2,560 for 6.4 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time at $400/hour, and the $60 filing fee.

24CV00043 TD Bank USA, NA v. Touch, KC EVENT: Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Matters Admitted Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Matters Admitted is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order. 3-||4. 24CV00299 Armatis, Katrina v. Goldstein, Rachel Lynn EVENT: (1) Defendant AirBNB Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and For Stay of Proceedings Pending Disposition of this Motion and Arbitration (2) Case Management Conference Defendant Airbnb Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. This case is stayed in its entirety pending arbitration. A Case Management Conference is hereby scheduled for December 11, 2024 at 10:30am. 1 ||5. 24CV00970 In re: MacNeil, Kaci EVENT: Change of Name (minor) (Continued from 5/22/24) There is no proof of publication on file. Upon the filing of the proof of publication, the Court will sign the decree provided. 6-||7. 22CV02404 Guinn, Lisa v. Graham Solar Systems, Inc. et al. EVENT: (1) Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel (Defendant Nicholas Graham) (2) Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel (Defendant Graham Solar Systems Inc.) (Continued from 6/12/24) Both motions to be relieved as counsel are granted. The court will sign the proposed orders. The orders will become effective upon the filing of the proof of service indicating Defendants were served with the order. 2|Page 8-||10. 19CV01226 Randolph, Teresa v. Trustees of the California State University et al. EVENT: (1) Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admissions and for Sanctions; (2) Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University’s Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents and for Sanctions; (3) Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University’s Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories and for Sanctions Continued from 6/26/24 These discovery motions are unopposed. Defendants’ Motions are granted in their entirety to the extent Plaintiff’s verifications do not comply with the Code of Civil Procedure as they are not under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff is ordered to provide further code complaint verifications within 10 days of notice of this order. As to other issues, the Court rules as follows. Production of Documents Request No. 103 – As it appears Plaintiff has failed to follow through with her promise to produce documents, Plaintiff is ordered to produce responsive documents within 10 days of notice of this order. Request No. 105 – The objections are untimely and must be removed. As to the adequacy of the response, the response seems to indicate Plaintiff cannot comply, but the response includes the qualifier “nearly all” documents were destroyed. Thus, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has any responsive documents. Further response is required. Request No. 107 - The objections are untimely and must be removed. As to the adequacy of the response, the response seems to indicate Plaintiff cannot comply, but the response includes the qualifier “nearly all” documents were destroyed. Thus, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has any responsive documents. Further response is required. Special Interrogatories, Set Two Interrogatory No. 26 – Although Plaintiff’s alleged inconsistent statements might potentially be considered in other contexts, the Court finds the response to this question is sufficient for purposes of the discovery statutes. Interrogatory No. 27 – Unlike Interrogatory No. 26, this response is evasive considering it asks whether Plaintiff attempted to contact Ms McRae. A response of “unknown” to that request is 3|Page evasive. It is within her personal knowledge, and she either attempted to contact her, or she didn’t. Further response is required. Form Interrogatories Interrogatory No. 217.1 – To the extent Plaintiff seeks to respond by employing CCP section 2030.230 by referring to other documents, the Court finds the subject requests are not the type of requests necessitating a summary. Even if they were, simply making a general referral to deposition transcript is not a sufficiently specific response for purposes of section 2030.230. Special Interrogatories, Set Three Interrogatory No. 36 - Similar to interrogatory 217.1, general reference to deposition transcripts and documents produced is simply not specific enough. Plaintiff is ordered to provide further substantive responses as discussed within 10 days of notice of this order. Defendant is awarded sanctions in the amount of $ 2,950.00.

MOTION FOR ASSIGNMENT ORDER by COACHELLA VALLEY PSC1902678 COACHELLA VALLEY COLLECTION COLLECTION VS HART SERVICE Tentative Ruling: The Motion of Plaintiff Coachella Valley Collection Service for an Assignment Order pursuant to C.C.P. §708.510 is GRANTED. Judgment debtor, Sara Lynn Hart, shall forthwith assign to judgment creditor, Coachella Valley Collection Service, judgment debtor’s rights to twenty-five percent of any monies due from any insurance broker, production agency or insurance company licensed to do business in the State of California. Judgment debtor is restrained from assigning or otherwise disposing of the right to payment sought.

DISCOVER BANK VS MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF MVC2004794 SARMIENTO SETTLEMENT BY DISCOVER BANK Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. Appearance is required.

22CV-02837 LVNV Funding, LLC v. Michelle Reed Order to Show Cause re: Dismissal-Notice of Settlement Appearance required to address whether case can be dismissed. A Notice of Settlement of Entire Action was filed on December 7, 2022, stating that a dismissal would be filed by April 14, 2024. No request for dismissal has been filed. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1385(c).)

S-CV-0052368 American Express National Bank vs. Conway, Scott No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/07/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Conway, Scott Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Conway, Scott

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.

23CV-03377 Citibank, N.A. v. April Gonzalez Court Trial Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE WELLS FARGO BANK VS CVCO2301842 PLEADINGS ON COMPLAINT FOR DANIELS COLLECTIONS OF WELLS FARGO BANK Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling will be issued.