Watson Vs Spoke Logistics Llc, Et Al.

Case Number: 22STCV18122 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 78 ROLANDO FLORIAN , Plaintiff(s), vs. MY FAMILY HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE, INC. , ET AL., Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO: 22STCV18122 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Dept. 3 1 1 :30 p .m. July 10 , 2024 Defendant Carmona's Care Inc. ( Defendant ) attorney of record, Jonathan L. Gerber of Miller Miller Gerber LLP (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel contending relief is necessary because of an irreparable breakdown in the working relationshi p . Counsel declares he has served Defendant by mail at the last known address, which Counsel confirmed within the last 30 days as current t hrough conversation. Counsel has filed proof of service of the motion, declaration, and proposed order on all parties to the action, including on Defendant . (California Rules Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The motion is unopposed and granted; the ruling is effective upon filing proof of service of the final order. Trial is currently set for September 3, 2024 . Therefore, there is sufficient time for Defendant to seek other counsel or otherwise prepare prior to trial. Counsel is ordered to file proof of service of the final order within ten (10 days). The Court sets an Order to Show Cause re: Proof of Service of the Final Order for ___________________. Moving Counsel is ordered to give notice .

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, line 2, PLAINTIFF TALIA KENNEDY Partially Renewed Notice Of Motion And Motion To Compel Further Responses To Plaintiff'S Request For Production Of Documents (Set One) To Meta Platforms, Inc. And Request For Monetary Sanctions In The Amount Of $5,760.00 Against Said Defendant And Its Counsel, Jointly And Severally; Dec Of William Reed (tentativer ruling part 1 of 2) Pro Tem Judge Scott Borrowman, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: Motion to compel DENIED without prejudice. The Court of Appeal held in Wellpoint that if a defendant employer seeks to show that "it investigated an employee's complaint and took appropriate action to the findings of the investigation, then it will have put the adequacy of the investigation directly at issue, and cannot stand on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine to preclude a thorough examination of its adequacy." 59 Cal.App.4th at 128. However, the conflict-of-interest investigation on which Meta said it based its decision to terminate Plaintiff is different from an investigation into Plaintiff's complaints of harassment that might support such a defense. Rather, it was an investigation into alleged violations of policy akin to the misconduct investigation discussed in Kaiser, where the Court of Appeal upheld an assertion of privilege. 66 Cal.App.4th at 1225-26. The analytical difference is that evaluating the "adequacy of the investigation" is required for a harassment defense but is not required to prove that an employee violated a policy. The first amended privilege log (excluding the color-coded components, which I understand were produced) includes sufficient information (including authors and recipients) for Plaintiff to identify any specific materials for which she challenges the assertion of privilege or protection. However, the current motion and related meet-and-confer correspondence reflect a categorical argument (produce everything because privilege/protection are waived) as opposed to specific challenges to various documents. Because Plaintiff's categorical argument is not persuasive, the motion is denied without prejudice so that the parties can address specific documents. In camera review appears premature. Plaintiff should identify specific documents she believes are discoverable so that Meta can respond to specific documents. Once there is such a record, in camera review may be appropriate. Sanctions are DENIED. (End of part 1 see part 2) = (302/JPT)

Case Number: 23STCV20273 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT JADE GONZALES, Plaintiff, vs. DAVID HOPP, M.D., et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV20273 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULTS Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 9, 2024 On August 23, 2023, Plaintiff Jade Gonzales filed this action against Defendants David Hopp M.D., Andrew Hopp, and Youthfill MD XIX LLC. In December 2023, the Court entered defaults against David Hopp and Andrew Hopp. On March 6, 2024, the Court entered default against Youthfill. On June 3, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to set aside their defaults. Defendants evidentiary objections are overruled. Defendants request for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary because the documents are already part of this cases record. DISCUSSION [I]f a defendant is not validly served with a summons and complaint, the court lacks personal jurisdiction and a default judgment in such action is subject to being set aside as void. ( Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 564.) The Court may also set aside a default or default judgment upon a motion and affidavit attesting that the lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by the partys avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5.) If the court has acquired jurisdiction, i.e., summons has been served, but service of summons has not resulted in actual notice to a defendant, although the defendant has acquired actual knowledge of the action from another source, this does not preclude a defendant from seeking relief under section 473.5. ( Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 40.) A. Plaintiff Concedes Relief for Andrew Hopp. Plaintiff admits that Andrew presents a plausible case for relief because he never received actual notice of the summons and complaint, and Plaintiff is agreeable to the relief he seeks because Defendant Andrew Hopp should not be made to suffer for the sins of the father. (Opposition at pp. 5-6.) The motion is therefore granted for Andrew Hopp. B. David Hopp and Youthfill Were Properly Served. Substituted service requires leaving a copy of the summons and complaint either at the individuals dwelling house or usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).) Plaintiff must also mail a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).) According to the filed proofs of service, after two failed attempts at personal service , David and Andrew were served via substituted service via Jane Doe on September 20, 2023 at 3:30 p.m. and 3:31 p.m. at 123 South Robertson Boulevard B, Los Angeles, California 90048. T he summons, complaint, and other documents were mailed via first class mail to the same address on September 29, 2023. According to the filed proof of service, after two failed attempts at personal service , Youthfill was served via substituted service via Jane Doe on September 20, 2023 at 3:00 p.m. at 123 South Robertson Boulevard B, Los Angeles, California 90048. The summons, complaint, and other documents were mailed via first class mail to the same address the next day . Both individual defendants contend that the service address is not their normal place of business. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 11; A. Hopp Decl. ¶ 5.) Davids normal office location is in Culver City, and he is at the service address approximately once every two weeks. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 11.) Andrew occasionally provides bookkeeping services for Youthfill, but he primarily works from home and has been at the service address only on a few occasions over a period of years. (A. Hopp Decl. ¶ 5.) No one ever provided them with the papers that were allegedly mailed to the service address. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 11; A. Hopp Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff declares that when she was employed by Youthfill at the service location, David was typically present at this location two to three times per week. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) The description of Jane Doe matches only Koko, the long-time receptionist. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 5.) In reply, David clarifies that he has never challengedand does not now challengethe validity of Plaintiffs substitute service on him or Youthfill, or that Plaintiffs process server mailed the Summons and Complaint to the Los Angeles Office for him and Youthfill. (Reply at p. 10.) Instead, he contends that he was never personally served and was never actually provided with the summons and complaint. ( Ibid. ) C. The Lack of Actual Notice Was Not Due to Avoidance of Service and Was Excusable, and David Acted Diligently Thereafter. David declares that he first learned of the above-captioned lawsuit on November 2, 2023 when one of my other attorneys notified me of its existence. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 3.) The same day, he reviewed the case docket online by searching [his] name on the Los Angeles Superior Courts website, reviewed the complaint, but did not review the summons or any of the Proofs of Service of Summons filed by Plaintiff. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 4.) David has shown that he did not have actual notice of this action until November 2, 2023. David then attempted to contact Plaintiffs counsel via fax and phone. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff argues that David could not have faxed copies of documents because he does not have a fax number and has not used a fax machine for about twenty years. (Nichols Decl. ¶ 1; see D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 4.) He also never received a call or voicemail from David. (Nichols Decl. ¶ 2; see D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 5.) After Davids November 2, 2023 actual notice of this action, David appeared at the Case Management Conference on December 21, 2023. Although this was after the entry of default against him (December 7, 2023), it was still before entry of default against Youthfill (March 6, 2024). [I]t is now well-acknowledged that an attorney has an ethical obligation to warn opposing counsel that the attorney is about to take an adversarys default. ( Lasalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, 135 ( Lasalle ).) Upon seeing that David was attempting to appear and defend himself in this action, Plaintiffs counsel had an ethical obligation to warn him, the single manager of the LLC and the agent for service of process, before taking Youthfills default. (See Nichols Decl. ¶ 5.) The motion is therefore granted for Youthfill. David did not receive notice from Plaintiff about the continued Case Management Conference, so he believed the March 11, 2024 CMC had been cancelled, and thus [he] did not appear at the March 11, 2024 CMC. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 8.) He was delayed in retaining counsel because he suffered from an unexpected health issue and also was dealing with a serious family matter. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 8.) David contacted counsel in May 2024 and filed this motion on June 3, 2024. (D. Hopp Decl. ¶ 9.) [T]he law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, and only very slight evidence is required to set aside an entry of default. ( Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) Plaintiff has not shown any prejudice if the default is set aside, given the relatively short time between [Plaintiff] seeking the default and [Defendants] asking to be relieved from it. ( Lasalle, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138-139 .) When evaluating a motion to set aside a default judgment on equitable grounds, the court must weigh the reasonableness of the conduct of the moving party in light of the extent of the prejudice to the responding party. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 139.) As in Lasalle , setting aside this default involves little wasted time. The Court concludes that David did not have actual notice of this action until November 2, 2023, his lack of actual notice was excusable and not due to avoidance, and his delay in moving to vacate default was excusable. Accordingly, the motion is also granted for David Hopp. CONCLUSION The Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default is GRANTED. The entries of default are VACATED. Defendants are ordered to file their responsive pleading within 10 days. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 9th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC695225 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles JOHN ROBERT KOCHAKJI; Plaintiff , vs. CAPRI COAST CAPITAL, INC, et al.; Defendants . Case No. BC695225 Department 45 [Tentative] RULING Action Filed: 02/23/18 Trial Date: 08/26/24 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendants Counsel, Loyst P. Fletcher Responding Party: Plaintiff John Robert Kochakji Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Capri Coast Capital, Inc and Mary Guidry. The court has considered the moving and opposition papers. The court DENIES Counsels motions to be relieved as counsel without prejudice. Discussion Loyst P. Fletcher, Law Offices of Loyst P. Fletcher (Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for defendants Capri Coast Capital, Inc and Mary Guidry. The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client, and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) CRC, Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under CCP § 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under CCP § 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). Here, Counsel has not complied with CRC, Rule 3.1362 for either motion. Counsel only filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel (MC-051) but failed to file MC-052 and MC-053 . Therefore, the motions are procedurally defective. On another note, the Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition/declarations signature space is blank and therefore is unable to be considered by the Court. The court therefore DENIES Counsels motions to be relieved as counsel without prejudice. It is so ordered. Date: July 9, 2024 ______________________ Mel Red Recana Judge of the Superior Court

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION SOTO JUAREZ VS RANCHO CVRI2300518 FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF FRESCO MARKETS, INC. ISSUES UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 437C(T) TERESA SOTO JUAREZ Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling issued. Appearances requested.

Case Number: 21STCV22368 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING THEODORE FAYE , vs. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Case No.: 21STCV22368 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Plaintiff Theodore Fayes motion for attorneys fees is granted in the total reduced amount of $1,269,893.26, comprised of $1,196.687.50 in attorneys fees and $73,205.76 in costs. Plaintiff Theodore Faye (Faye) (Plaintiff) moves for an order awarding him attorneys fees in the total amount of $2,100,268.14, plus 7% interest from the date of judgment, comprised of (1) the lodestar amount of $1,161,647.50 for 1592 hours incurred; (2) a multiplier of 1.75; and (3) costs in the amount of $67,385.91. (Notice of Motion Fees, pgs. i-ii; C.C.P. § 1021.5; Govt. Code §12965(b).) Evidentiary Objections Plaintiffs 7/1/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Jack M. Schuler (Schuler) are sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiffs 7/1/24 request for judicial notice of (1) The December 22, 2020, United States District Court Northern District of California Order on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Center for Medical Progress, (N.D. Cal., Dec. 22, 2020, No. 16-cv-00236- WHO); and (2) The April 7, 2011, United States District Court Northern District of California Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs in Stonebrae, L.P. v. Toll Bros., Inc . (N.D. Cal., Apr. 7, 2011, No. C-08-0221 EMC), at *23 affd 521 Fed.Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2013) is denied as not relevant. Background This is a FEHA case involving claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and failure to engage in the interactive process, violations of the Labor Code, interference with the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and a cause of action under PAGA (C.C.P. §1021.5). This matter came on regularly for a jury trial from February 5, 2024, to February 20, 2024. On February 20, 2024, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him $915,281.00 in damages. Judgment was entered on March 20, 2024. On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed his memorandum of costs. On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended memorandum of costs. On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys fees. Defendant filed its opposition on June 25, 2024. Plaintiff filed his reply on July 1, 2024. Discussion FEHA provides that the court, in its discretion may award to the prevailing party. . . reasonable attorney fees. (Govt. Code §12965(c)(6).) Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party because he prevailed on his FEHA causes of action. Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in its opposition, rather Defendant argues an award of attorneys fees under FEHA is discretionary, not mandatory, and Plaintiffs requested fees should be reduced because Plaintiffs counsel did not meet its burden of establishing the reasonability of fees requested. For the purpose of this motion, Plaintiff is regarded as the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Government Code §12965(c)(6). Reasonable Fees To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiffs counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.) The attorneys of Horton Law Firm, APC, declare the following hourly rates: (a) Laura L. Horton ($950 per hour); (b) Flor C. Dery ($525 per hour); and (c) Meriah Prendergast (paralegal, $125 per hour). (Decl. of Horton ¶¶29-30; Decl. of Dery ¶13.) These rates are appropriate given the attorneys relative experiences and qualifications. ( See id. ) Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated his counsels hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law. Defendant challenges Plaintiffs counsels hourly rates as unreasonable but Defendants argument is unavailing. (Opposition, pgs. 12-17.) The Court finds Plaintiffs counsels rates to be reasonable in their community of practice and do not warrant reductions. Billed Hours The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) The courts discretion in awarding attorney fees is, initially (absent circumstances rendering the award unjust), to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client. The basis for the trial courts calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. [Citation.] Then the court must adjust the resulting fee to fulfill the statutory purpose of bringing the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights . . . into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-service basis. ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) Plaintiffs counsels fee recovery is based on 1,592 hours spent litigating this case ($1,161,647.50). (Decl. of Horsford ¶¶19-20, Exhs. B, C.) Plaintiffs counsel declares the following hours incurred: (a) Laura L. Horton (773.1 hours or $734,445.00); (b) Flor C. Dery (812.1 hours or $426,352.50); and (c) Mariah Prendergast (6.8 hours or $850.00). (Decl. of Horsford ¶20, Exh. C.) Defendant argues Plaintiffs counsels billed hours were not reasonably incurred because they were double-billed and inflated. (Opposition, pgs. 9-12.) Defendants objections to Plaintiffs counsels billed hours are not well taken. Defendants argument that the work performed by two attorneys at trial, depositions, or hearing was duplicative or unreasonable is unsupported by case law. ( See Margolin v. Regional Planning Commission (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1007.) To show unreasonable duplication, fee opponents must provide specific evidence that plaintiffs hours were duplicative or inefficient; generalized objections that the work is excessive or duplicative do not satisfy that burden. ( Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 684.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees is granted in the amount of $1,196,687.50. Final Lodestar Determination The Court denies Plaintiffs request for lodestar multiplier of 1.75. Plaintiffs counsels rates already take into account the risks associated with contingent risk and the preclusion of other work, and the instant case did not pose exceptional difficulty compared to similar FEHA litigation brought before this Court. Costs Any effort to tax or strike costs must occur in the form of a motion to strike or to tax costs and must be served and filed fifteen (15) days after service of the cost memorandum. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) After the 15-day deadline to file a motion to tax costs has passed, the Court clerk must immediately enter the costs. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4).) Plaintiff submitted his cost memorandum on March 27, 2024, and then filed an amended memorandum of costs on April 16, 2024. Defendant failed to submit a motion to tax costs within the 15-day deadline. Therefore, Defendants objections to Plaintiffs costs must be denied. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4).) Plaintiff requests an additional $5,820.75 that was not included in the amended memorandum of costs for expert fees incurred by Richard M. Pearl in support of the instant motion. ( See Supp.-Decl. of Horsford ¶8, Exh. D.) Such fees are also recoverable by Plaintiff as expert fees. (Gov. Code §12965(c)(6).) Accordingly, Plaintiffs costs are granted in the total amount of $73,205.76, comprised of $67,385.01 in the amended memorandum of costs and $5,820.75 in expert fees incurred on the instant motion. Conclusion Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees and costs is granted in the reduced total of $ 1,269,893.26 , comprised of $1,196.687.50 in attorneys fees and $73,205.76 in costs. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC475210 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California ¿ County of Los Angeles ¿ Department 78 ¿ ¿ ROBERT E OWENS JR., Plaintiff (s) , vs.¿ OREILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC. , et al., Defendant ( s ) .¿ Case No.:¿ BC475210 Hearing Date:¿ July 9, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO STRIKE COSTS I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Robert E. Owens, Jr. and Raul Michael Pedroza, Jr. filed this PAGA action against defendant CSK Auto, Inc. n/k/a OReilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (Defendant) , et al . On January 16, 2024, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant against plaintiff Raul Michael Pedroza, Jr. (Plaintiff). On February 13, 2024, Defendant filed its memorandum of costs . Plaintiff now moves to strike the cost memorandum. Defendant opposes the motion, and Plaintiff filed a reply . II. DISCUSSION ¿ Plaintiff first argues that Defendant is not entitled to recover costs in its entirety because Labor Code § 2699(g)(1) authorizes only a one-way fee-shifting provision, and that t her e is no provision in this section allowing a successful employer to recover fees or costs. The Court rejects this argument . Pursuant to CCP § 1032, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding . (CCP §1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. o f Calif. v. Blount, Inc . (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) CCP § 1032 applies [e] xcept as ot her wise expressly provided by statute. (CCP 1032(b); Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc . (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 989-999.) Labor Code 2699(g)(1) provides that a prevailing plaintiff can recover fees and costs, but does not ot her wise expressly provide that a defendant cannot recover costs. When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous t her e is no need for construction, and courts sh ould not indulge in it. ( Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198, 137 Cal.Rptr . 460, 561 P.2d 1148.) A court may not construe the plain language of a statute as to substitute its wisdom for that of the legislature. ( Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 264, 279; Standon Co. v. Superior Ct. (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 898, 904.) The Court t her efore finds that Defendant is entitled to costs as the prevailing party pursuant to CCP § 1032. The Court declines to consider Plaintiffs public policy arguments, which are better expressed to the Legislature . Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that if the Court finds CCP § 1032 applicable, that the following costs be taxed: (1) $1,060.00 for documents filed in the appellate court, and (2) $4,948.70 for trial transcripts. In opposition, Defendant concedes that the $1,060.00 appellate costs sh ould be taxed, averring that these costs were inadvertently included. T her efore, Plaintiffs request to tax $1,060.00 is GRANTED . As to the trial transcripts, Plaintiff argues that these are not recoverable because they were not ordered by the court pursuant to CCP § 1033.5(a)(9). In opposition, Defendant argues that these transcripts were in fact ordered by the Court, and that the parties were ordered to lodge the trial transcripts and exhibits at the conclusion of trial for the Courts review. Plaintiff does not contest this on reply. The Court finds that the transcripts were ordered and therefore recoverable . Plaintiffs request to tax $4,948.70 for trial transcripts is DENIED . III . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is GRANTED IN PART. The Court taxes $1,060.00 from Defendants costs memorandum and awards Defendant its litigation costs in the total amount of $53,438.76. Moving Party is ordered to give notice . DATED: July 8, 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim ¿ Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting . " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties sh ould arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You sh ould assume that ot her s may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neit her submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

Case Number: 23STCV21234 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 BEN PARKER , Plaintiff, vs. THE LOBSTER LLC , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV21234 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND/OR TO STAY ACTION PENDING ARBITRATION The Lobster LLC (The Lobster) moves to compel arbitration and to stay any further proceedings in this matter until any arbitration award is final. The Lobsters motion is continued as set forth below. The parties have interposed 33 evidentiary objections. Due to the voluminous number of objections, the hearing on the motion will be continued to a date that will be set at the Hearing on Objections discussed below. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer by telephone or in person in a serious and good faith effort to resolve and eliminate the objections. The only objections that should remain are those that pertain to material evidence regarding material issues. Keeping the rules of evidence in mind, the parties should be able to reduce the objections to just a few. If any material objections remain unresolved, the parties are to set them forth in a joint statement with the text, the objection, and the argument of each side in favor of their respective positions regarding the remaining material objections, along with a space for a ruling. The joint statement must be filed on or before _______ with a courtesy copy delivered to Department 50 . The Court will review any remaining objections with the parties at a hearing on _______________ at 2:00 p.m. (the Hearing on Objections). The date for the hearing on the motion will be set at the Hearing on Objections. If necessary, based upon the resolutions reached during the meet and confer process and/or at the Hearing on Objections, the parties may respectively file and serve revised briefing and evidence. The revised evidence may eliminate objectionable material; however, no new evidence or new argument is to be submitted unless it is as a result of compromises reached during the meet and confer process . In the event that revised briefing and evidence is necessary, the Court will discuss with the parties a briefing schedule for the revised briefing at the Hearing on Objections. The Lobster is ordered to give notice of this Order. DATED: July 10, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court