Bernard Obeng Vs. Stolburg Landscaping L L C, Et Al.

Case Number: 22STCV39957 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Rodolfo Garcia-Rosas, and Alma Delia Llamas Plaintiff, Case No.: 22STCV39957 vs. Tentative Ruling Architectural Surfaces, Inc., et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Moving Party : Defendant Caesarstone Ltd. Responding Party : Plaintiffs Rodolfo Garcia-Rosas and Alma Delia Llamas T/R : DEFENDANTS motion to strike is granted in part, denied in part DEFENDANT TO NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿ SMCdept54@lacourt.org ¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply. Plaintiff also filed a Supplemental Opposition on July 5, 2024. BACKGROUND On March 13, 2023, Plaintiffs Rodolfo Garcia-Rosas and Alma Delia Llamas filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants Architectural Surfaces, Inc., et al., asserting causes of action for (1) negligence; (2) strict liability warning defect; (3) strict liability design defect; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) breach of implied warranties; and (6) loss of consortium. Plaintiff Garcia-Rosas alleges he developed silicosis and consequential injuries through his employment working with stone products manufactured, distributed, and/or supplied by Defendants. ANALYSIS Any party, within the time allowed to response to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part" of that pleading. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court." (CCP § 436.) A. FAC: Page 7, Line 3 Defendant Ceasarstone requests that the Court strike and other stone products to be identified during the course of discovery because Defendant argues that it is a catchall product identification that violates Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Company , Inc. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 71. Defendant argues that this catchall provision is not specific enough to meet Bockraths standard for toxic tort pleading because Bockrath requires that a plaintiff plead each product that allegedly caused the injury. ( Id . at pg. 80.) Defendant is correct. Plaintiffs must specify the products; this clause does not comply with the standard. The Court grants the motion to strike page seven (7), line 3. B. FAC ¶ 362, ¶ 378, and ¶ 455; Punitive Damages Defendant moves to strike paragraphs 362, 378, 455, and prayer for relief number 4, all of which pertain to punitive damages, claiming that the Complaint does not allege an adequate basis for punitive damages. Civil Code section 3294 subdivision (a) provides: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (Civ. Code § 3294(b).) Defendant contends that the Complaint does not adequately allege a basis for punitive damages because it does not allege malice, oppression, or fraud in sufficient detail as to this Defendant, nor does it allege ratification. The elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. ( Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that: Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to allege a fraudulent concealment claim. ( Jones, supra , 198 Cal.App.4th at 1195 [plaintiffs complaint is not unacceptably speculative if a plaintiff has not specifically identified which toxin contained in a particular product caused the alleged injury or has sued the manufacturers of multiple products, alleging all of them contained toxins that were substantial factors in causing his injury.) As the California Supreme Court stated in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, the remedy for an improperly speculative pleading is provided by Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7(b), which permits the imposition of sanctions on an attorney who is found to have deliberately filed a products liability suit without a well-founded belief in the truth of a particular allegation. ( Bockrath, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 82; see also Jones, supra , 198 Cal.App.4th at 1196.) As Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a claim for fraud, they are entitled to seek punitive damages. The Court denies this portion of the motion. Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Rodolfo Garcia-Rosas, and Alma Delia Llamas. Plaintiffs, Case No.: 22STCV39957 vs. Tentative Ruling Architectural Surfaces, Inc., et al. Defendants. Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter Motion to Quash Service of Summons Moving Party : Specially Appearing Defendant Cosentino Group, S.A. Responding Party : Plaintiffs Rodolfo Garcia Rosas and Alma Delia Llamas T/R : SPECIALLY-APPEARING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS GRANTED. DEFENDANT TO NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿ SMCdept54@lacourt.org ¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply, as well as the supplemental briefing. BACKGROUND On March 13, 2023, Plaintiffs Rodolfo Garcia-Rosas and Alma Delia Llamas (collectively Plaintiffs) filed the first amended complaint against Defendants Architectural Surfaces, Inc., et al., asserting causes of action for (1) negligence; (2) strict liabilitywarning defect; (3) strict liabilitydesign defect; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) breach of implied warranties; and (6) loss of consortium. Plaintiff Garcia-Rosas alleges he developed silicosis and consequential injuries through his employment working with stone products manufactured, distributed, and/or supplied by Defendants. Specially Appearing Defendant Cosentino Group, S.A. moves to quash service of the summons and complaint for defective service or lack of personal jurisdiction. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS Specially Appearing Defendant Cosentinos Evidentiary Objections Specially Appearing (SA) Defendant objects to Plaintiffs exhibits attached to the Declaration of Raphael Metzger in opposition to this motion. Objections 1-26 are sustained due to lack of authentication. Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections Plaintiffs object to the statements in the Declaration of Jorge Cuervo Velo filed in support of Cosentinos Motion to Quash. Objections 1-4 are overruled. Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of (A) the Hague Service Convention; (B) Canadas central authority for service under the Hague Convention; (C) the United States Central Authority under the Hague Convention; (D) Pages 7 and 8 of the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention; and Exhibit (A) Rule 4.3 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules of British Columbia Reg. 168/2009. Plaintiffs Requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(f) (law of organization of nations and foreign nations). ANALYSIS A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (CCP § 418.10(a)(1).) When a motion to quash is properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.) A. Service of Summons SA Defendant Cosentino seeks to quash service of the summons and complaint on the grounds that it was not served in compliance with the Hague Service Convention. Plaintiffs retained the services of Aaron Lukken of Viking Advocates LLC to arrange for service of process on one of SA Cosentinos executives, Eduardo Cosentino, in Vancouver, B.C. (Dowse Decl., Ex. 3, ¶¶ 2-3.) Lukken then retained the services of Axis Vero Inc., a private investigation firm based in Canada, to effect service in Canada. ( Id . at ¶¶ 1-2.) Axiss process server, Vladimir Raiman, presented the documents to Eduardo Cosentino at an opening event in Vancouver, Canada on September 13, 2023. ( Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7-9.) Plaintiffs filed an affidavit on behalf of Raiman on September 25, 2023, attesting to service on SA Defendant Cosentino. SA Defendant argues that service was improper because SA Cosentino is a Spanish corporation and Eduardo Cosentino is a Spanish national. SA Defendant argues that service would have been proper in Spain pursuant to the Hague Convention but was improper in Canada. Service of process here is governed by the Hague Convention. Article 10 states: Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination, c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination. (Hague Service Convention, art. 10.) The text of the Hague Convention does not define State of destination. The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau has published a Practical Handbook on the convention, which defines State of destination as the State where service is, or will be, effected. (RJN Exh. D.) Article 10 does not concern who may be served, but who may effectuate service. It provides that if service complies with the law of the state from which the documents originate (California), and the law of the jurisdiction where service is attempted (Canada), and neither state has objected to Article 10, service is proper. There is no evidence that either California or Canada has objected to Article 10. Plaintiffs may serve documents pursuant to CCP § 414.10, and Raiman is authorized to effect service in Canada. (See Dowse Decl., Ex. 3, ¶1.) California law authorizes a corporation to be served by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the president, CEO, or other head of corporation or person authorized to receive service. (CCP § 416.10(b).) Rule 4.3 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules of British Columbia Regulations authorizes personal service to be effectuated on a corporation by leaving a copy with a chief officer or other agent of the corporation. (Supreme Ct. Civ. R. B.C. Reg 168/2009 Rule 4.3(2)(b)(i)-(iii).) When a corporations principal place of business is outside of Canada, any person who carries out business for the corporation is considered an agent. ( Id . subd. (2)(b)(iv).) Eduardo Cosentino was properly served because (1) he is SA Cosentinos Vice President who (2) was present in Canada for business on behalf of SA Cosentino, and (3) was served in compliance with the laws of both California and British Columbia. Service of the summons and complaint cannot be quashed on this basis. B. Personal Jurisdiction A non-resident defendant may be subject to either general or specific jurisdiction. (See Elkman v. National States Insurance Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314.) General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities there are substantial, continuous, and systematic. ( F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796.) Specific jurisdiction involves a three-part test in California. California courts adopt the test in Boschetto v. Hansing (9th Cir. Cal. 2008) 539 F.3d 1011,1016: (1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen (9th Cir. 1998) 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 [applying California law].). ( Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (Rambam) (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054.) The parties agree that the Court does not have general jurisdiction over SA Cosentino. Plaintiffs must demonstrate this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over SA Defendant. SA Defendant argues that it did not purposefully avail itself of conducting activities in California. They argue that purposeful availment in tort cases requires (1) intentional actions, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is sufferedand which the defendant knows is likely to be sufferedin the forum state. ( Jewish Defense Organization , Inc. , supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at 1057-59.) Vice President for Legal and Compliance, Jorge Vela, states that SA Defendant is headquartered in Spain, organized under Spanish law, and operates exclusively in Spain. (Declaration of Jorge Cuervo Vela ¶4.) Vela states that SA Defendant has never conducted any business in California and, as a holding company, does not develop, design, manufacture, distribute, sell, advertise, or market any products. ( Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) According to Vela, the company responsible for marketing and selling the products at issue in this case is C & C North America, Inc., an indirect subsidiary of SA Defendant that keeps its own accounts and records, and pays and manages its own employees. ( Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) In response, Plaintiffs sought to introduce exhibits of materials evidencing SA Defendants activities in California, such as website pages and an address in Los Angeles. But Plaintiffs have not established the authenticity of these exhibits. They are not sufficient to establish that SA Defendant is an alter ego corporation such that it should be subject to the specific jurisdiction of this Court. At the original argument on this motion, on June 3, 2024, the Court gave Plaintiffs the opportunity to file a supplemental opposition and allowed SA Defendant to file a supplemental reply. On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Further Supplemental Opposition, containing a short memorandum, another Declaration of Raphael Metzger (Supp. Metzger Decl.), and Exhibits A-C which respectively are (A) the deposition transcription of Jose Cuervo Vela regarding lack of personal jurisdiction, (B) a true and correct copy of the trademark registration for SA Defendants Silestone product that Plaintiffs allege caused his silicosis; and (C) a true and correct copy of a photo from the Cosentino website of the building in Los Angeles that is called Cosentino City of Los Angeles which bears both the Cosentino wordmark and the Silestone wordmark. But Velas testimony is that the trademark registrations have never been held by SA Cosentino. And the case Plaintiffs cite to contend that trademark registration is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in any state does not itself discuss personal jurisdiction. (See generally, Kasel v. Remington Arms Co . (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711, 721.) Plaintiffs have not met their evidentiary burden to demonstrate that SA Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California. Service of the Summons and Complaint must be quashed.

HOLDING COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0201274 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. This is a breach of contract case arising out of maintenance and repair work that Plaintiff alleges it hired Defendants to perform on a bulldozer in 2020. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, on the grounds that the First Amended Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants Peterson Holding Company and Peterson Tractor Company. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Meet and Confer: Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, moving party's counsel must meet and confer, in person or by telephone, with counsel for the party who filed the pleading subject to the judgment on the pleadings motion “for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” CCP § 439(a). Here, the Declaration of Paul Meidus attaches as Exhibit A a “Meet and Confer” email he sent to Plaintiff’s counsel midday on May 21, 2024. Mr. Meidus’s Declaration states that as of the date of the filing, he had not received a response from counsel. The instant Motion was filed May 22, 2024. The Court’s Order dated June 17, 2024, noted that this was not a good faith effort to meet and confer, and ordered Defendant to file a supplemental declaration regarding additional efforts to determine if an agreement could be reached, no later than July 9, 2024. No such declaration has been filed. Defendant has not adequately met and conferred as required by CCP § 439(a). Defendant was also ordered to file proper proof of service of the motion, as none had been previously filed. Defendant did not do so. Timeliness of Motion: CCP 438(e): No motion may be made pursuant to this section if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits. Here, it appears no pretrial conference order has been entered. However, the date the action was initially set for trial was November 28, 2023. That date has long passed, and the parties have sought and received two continuances of the trial date since then. The parties have participated in a mandatory settlement conference, and have engaged in motion practice including on discovery issues. As Defendants argue, the motion is untimely under CCP 438(e). Despite the time limitation imposed by CCP 438(e), which was codified in 1994, Courts have since held that a nonstatutory motion for judgment on the pleadings survives without the time limitation. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.” Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 CA4th 644, 650. Request for Judicial Notice: Pursuant to Evid. Code §§ 452 and 453, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Complaint and First Amended Complaint. Merits: A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by CCP § 438, the rules governing demurrers apply. Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 CA4th 995, 999; Templo v. State of Calif. (2018) 24 CA5th 730, 735 (motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer). The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or be based on facts the court may judicially notice. CCP § 438(d); Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 CA5th 734, 758-759. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed October 26, 2023, is the operative pleading. Defendants named in the caption include Peterson Holding Company, Brian Adams, and Peterson Tractor Co. The parties stipulated to the amendment of the FAC, which changed Plaintiff’s name to Black Knight Enterprises (it was formerly Black Knight Fire Support, Inc.). The order on that stipulation was entered on October 23, 2023. The FAC alleges: Peterson Holding Company and Peterson Tractor Company (“Peterson”) operate several lines of business, including Peterson- CAT. (FAC ¶4.) Peterson, as Peterson-CAT, sells Caterpillar brand earthmoving and construction equipment, and provides maintenance and repair services for such equipment. (FAC ¶4.) Peterson operates at several locations, including a facility in Redding, County of Shasta, California, which was where Peterson’s obligations which are the subject of this complaint were to be performed. (FAC ¶4.) Peterson’s service manager Brian Adams provided a quote for maintenance work which Plaintiff accepted on December 2, 2020. (FAC ¶ 10.) The FAC contains numerous further allegations against Peterson. The Court only looks to the face of the pleadings and matters subject to judicial notice on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. This is a well-pleaded complaint making allegations that Peterson Holding Company and Peterson Tractor Company entered into a contract with Plaintiff in 2020 for maintenance work that was performed. The identity of the correct business entity which is directly liable to Plaintiff may be Peterson Holding, Peterson Tractor, or Peterson-CAT – but that information is in the control of the Defendants. The Court notes that on June 24, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Discovery Responses, which had not been provided as required by the CCP, despite several reasonable extensions granted by Plaintiff. The responses presumably will permit Plaintiff to amend to add Peterson-CAT as a named defendant if necessary. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as on a demurrer, the court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” Hood v. Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 435, 438. No matter how unlikely, a plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on a demurrer. Del. E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604. A plaintiff must plead ultimate facts that acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of plaintiff’s causes of action. Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 542, 550. Here, Defendants are clearly aware of the allegations in this matter and the events which gave rise to them. Defendants are arguing corporate form shields two of the defendants from liability. Notably, Defendants’ pleading is conspicuously silent as to what the actual corporate relationship is here, even though that information is within its custody and control. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. No proposed order has been lodged as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Defendant shall prepare the order.

Case Number: 21STCV04307 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the petitioning papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On February 3, 2021, July 29, 2022, Plaintiffs Hernan Vicente, Ani Piliposian, and Nicholas Vicente filed this action against Defendants City of Los Angeles (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort. Also on February 3, 2021, the Court appointed Ani Piliposian to serve as Plaintiff Nicolas Vicentes guardian ad litem. On May 3, 2021, Plaintiffs Hernan Vicente, Ani Piliposian, and Nicholas Vicente, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, filed a first amended complaint against Defendant and Does 1-50 for negligencemotor vehicle (Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a)). On May 24, 2021, Defendant filed an answer. On January 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. On June 20, 2024, Petitioner Ani Piliposian (Petitioner) filed a petition for expedited approval of the compromise of minor Plaintiff Nicholas Vicente s claims. PETITIONERS REQUESTS Petitioner asks the Court for expedited approval of the compromise of the action of minor Plaintiff Nicholas Vicente ("Plaintiff"). DISCUSSION In Section 8 of the petition, Petitioner states that Plaintiff received treatment at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles. However, the petition does not include medical expenses for this treatment (see Section 13a) or provide medical or billing records from Childrens Hospital Los Angeles. The Department of Health Care Services February 5, 2024 letter does not state that Medi-Cal paid for Childrens Hospital Los Angeles treatment. Petitioner should explain whether Plaintiff incurred medical expenses for treatment at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles, the amount of those expenses, and whether those expenses will be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. The Court cannot approve the petition unless it shows that the minors compromise will reimburse all of Plaintiffs medical expenses that have not been reduced or waived. The non-medical expenses include $100.02 for Administrative/Misc. fee. (Section 14b.) The Court will not award this amount without evidence that it qualifies as an allowable cost under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5., subdivision (a), or is allowable as a cost expressly authorized by law (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)). Section 19b(2) of the petition states that Petitioner will provide the name, address, and branch of the depository in Attachment 19b(2). The petition does not include an Attachment 19b(2). The Court denies the petition. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice the petition to approve the compromise of minor Plaintiff Nicolas Vicentes action filed by Petitioner Ani Piliposian on June 20, 2024. Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Petitioner is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 22STCV31797 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B Jesus Siordia , et al. , Plaintiffs, v. united aeronautical corporation , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV31797 Related/Consolidated Case: 23BBCV01790 ( Westchester Action) Related Case: 23BBCV01696 ( Zurich Action) Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion to be relieved as counsel Defense counsel, William D. Koehler, Esq. (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Defendant Norton Sales, Inc. (Defendant). Counsel filed this instant motion to be relieved as counsel on June 12, 2024. Counsel has filed the requisite forms pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1362. According to the declaration of Counsel, Counsel seeks to be relieved as counsel because Carlos Guzman, President of Norton Sales, Inc., requested that Counsel filed this motion and Mr. Guzman has consented to Counsel being relieved as counsel of record. (MC-052, §2.) Mr. Guzman also provides his declaration stating that there are 3 pending actions stemming from a wrongful death lawsuit to which his company had minimal involvement and his company can no longer afford the financial burden or retaining Counsel. (Guzman Decl., ¶¶2-3.) He states his understanding that a corporation cannot represent itself. ( Id. , ¶4.) For these reasons, Counsel seeks to withdraw from representing Defendant in this action. Counsel properly served Defendant at its last known mailing address, which was confirmed by telephone and conversation within the past 30 days of filing the motion. As for future hearing dates, a hearing on a motion for leave to amend is set for August 9, 2024; a Status Conference re: Mediation Completion is set for September 12, 2024; a hearing on a Motion for Summary Adjudication is set for October 11, 2024; a Final Status Conference is set for October 31, 2024; and the Jury Trial is set for November 12, 2024. Thus, there is sufficient time for Defendant to obtain substitute counsel. Accordingly, the motion to be relieved as counsel is granted. The order electronically lodged by Counsel will be signed at the hearing. The order will become effective upon the filing of a proof of service of a signed copy of the order on Defendant. In addition, as Defendant Norton Sales, Inc. is a corporate entity, it cannot represent itself in propria persona . (See Rogers v. Municipal Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1314, 1318.) Thus, the Court will set an Order to Show Cause re Status of Representation of Defendant Norton Sales, Inc. for September 12, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Notice to be provided by Counsel. DATED: July 19, 2024 ___________________________ John J. Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Matter on calendar for Wednesday, July 17, 2024, Line 2, PLAINTIFF CYNTHIA DURAZO, DANIEL MORENO's Motion To Compel Eco Terra Pest Managements Production Of Business Records And Notice Of Hearing. The matter is continued to August 1, 2024 on the court's motion. =(302/JPT).

Case Number: 23SMCV00072 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Panduro v. Carson CASE NO.: 23SMCV00072 MOTION: Motion for Terminating Sanctions; Monetary Sanctions HEARING DATE: 7/17/2024 Legal Standard If a party fails to obey a court order compelling it to provide a discovery response, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction . . . In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction . . .. (CCP §§ 2030.290(c), 2030.300(e), 2031.300(c), 2031.320(c).) Misuse of the discovery process, which includes disobeying a court order to provide discovery, is conduct subject to sanctions. (CCP § 2023.010(g).) Possible sanctions are: (a) [A] monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct&. (b) [A]n issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. (c) [A]n evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. (d) [A] terminating sanction by one of the following orders: (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. (e) [A] contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of court. (CCP § 2023.030.) The party seeking to impose sanctions need only show the failure to obey earlier discovery orders. ( Puritan Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 877, 884 [interpreting former statute dealing with refusal to comply].) However, numerous cases hold that severe sanctions (i.e., terminating or evidentiary sanctions) for failure to comply with a court order are allowed only where the failure was willful. ( R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495; Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545; Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) The burden of proof then shifts to the party seeking to avoid sanctions to establish a satisfactory excuse for his or her conduct. ( Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201.) Analysis Defendant Marcie Marie Carson moves for terminating and monetary sanctions against Plaintiff Yamilet Panduro for their failure to obey this courts order of November 28, 2023, to pay monetary sanctions to Defendant in the amount of $660.00. Defendant also requests monetary sanctions of $1,060.00 against Plaintiff and counsel of record, Hesam Yazdanpanah, for costs and fees associated with having to bring this motion. Defendant does not cite any authority suggesting that a party and/or counsels failure to pay monetary sanctions would justify terminating sanctions absent other violations. The Court is also disinclined to grant sanctions-on-sanctions. Monetary sanctions are enforceable as judgments under the typical procedures available to such orders. (See CCP §680 et seq. [enforcement of money judgments].) Accordingly, Defendants motion is DENIED.

Case Number: 24CHCV00967 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-16-24 Case #24CHCV00967, Shi Pei Wu vs. Lowes Home Centers, LLC, et al. Trial Date: N/A DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant Lowes Home Centers, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Shi Pei Wu RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to the Complaint and Motion to Strike RULING : Demurrer and motion to strike are moot. SUMMARY OF ACTION This action was filed by Plaintiff Shi Pei Wu (Plaintiff) on March 20, 2024. On May 31, 2024, Defendant Lowes Home Centers, LLC, (Defendant) filed its demurrer with motion to strike for Plaintiffs complaint. Rather than file an opposition, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint pursuant to CCP § 472 on July 2, 2024. The filing of the amended complaint moots Defendants demurrer and motion to strike. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

MARTINEZ VS. PG&E CORPORATION, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200316 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of coordinated proceeding. This matter is currently coordinated as JCCP No. 5165 in the San Francisco County Superior Court. The Court has received status statements from Plaintiff and Defendants, which indicate the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s action (following summary judgment) is currently under appeal. The parties request continuance pending appeal. Today’s hearing is continued to Monday, January 13, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 64. The parties are ordered to file a status report at least five court days prior to the continued hearing date. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar. MASON VS. CONTECH ENGINEERED SOLUTIONS LLC, ET