Mary Staubs Vs. Csx Transportation Inc.

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Case Number: 23SMCV05352 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: I The court already ruled on many of the issues presented herein. The court incorporates by reference and reaffirms its prior rulings and adopts them (as reflected in tentative decisions recited in the minutes of the prior hearing) to the extent not inconsistent with the following. The matter is here today because there was one open issue. The demurring defendant contends that even if the continuing violation doctrine applies to Kennedy William Gordy (Kennedy) such that there is no statute of limitations issue as to him (and that is not conceded more generally), the doctrine does not apply to Berry Gordy (Gordy). Gordy is Kennedys father. He is not accused of actual sexual assault on plaintiff Anita Thompson (Thompson or plaintiff). Instead, he is sued because he allegedly aided and abetted Kennedy in Kennedys conduct, including by making threats against plaintiff to stop her from reporting the violence. Among other things, Gordy is alleged to have moved Kennedy and Thompson to his guesthouse to isolate Thompson and facilitate the assaults; prevent Thompson from speaking to the police by, among other things, taking from her the officers card after the police were called to the scene; and pressuring her into not being candid with the police. Gordy also allegedly threatened Thompson regarding custody and child support issues concerning Thompson and Kennedys child. Eventually, though, Thompson left the property and left Kennedy. And, tragically, her son died. Some years later she re-entered Kennedys life at Kennedys request. Once she did that, Kennedys sexual assault and other physical assaults allegedly resumed or continued. And, eventually, she sued. Many of the allegations occurred before 2016, which is when Thompson left the property and her son passed. She returned to Kennedys life in 2020, and the most recent act of alleged abuse is well within the statutory time frame. Gordy, however, asserts that the last act alleged against him occurred in 2016, which is long before the complaint was filed in November 2023 or the cross-complaint (which is the operative pleading for this motion) was filed in April 2024. According to plaintiff, though, even if Gordys liability is in the nature of aiding and abetting, the statute of limitations for him as an aider and abettor is the same as the statute of limitations for Kennedy, and therefore the action is timely. That is true, Thompson asserts, even if Gordy personally did nothing after 2016. (She does not concede that he took no improper actions after that date, but she agrees that none is listed in the cross-complaint). Gordy, for his part, states that although Thompson correctly cites the general rule, it does not apply to this case. Rather, Gordy asserts, an aider and abetters liability ends when the last act of aiding and abetting took place. At the last hearing, the court noted that in the context of a conspiracy, a co-conspirators liability extends throughout the conspiracy until and unless the conspirator leaves the conspiracy, at which point the conspirator is not liable for things that come later. The court ultimately allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on this issue. All parties agree that the statute of limitations here is found in CCP section 340.15and that it is three years. There is no separate statute of limitations for aiding and abetting. Thus, at least to start, Gordys liability seems to be tied with the statute for the underlying tort, and that is well settled as a general matter. ( American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1451.) It boils down, then, to the date of accrual. For Kennedy, it would be the last act of violence unless the break between 2016 and 2020 is too great to allow the continuing wrong doctrine to applya question not before the court at this time. That is because the statute expressly states that the date of accrual is three years from the last act of domestic violence by the defendant against the plaintiff. Gordy claims that as applied to him, though, this does not mean the last act of violence, but rather the last act of violence that he aided or abetted. In support of his view, Gordy cites to non-binding authority, including an unpublished Ninth Circuit case and out of state cases. While the Ninth Circuit case purports to apply California law, the court puts little weight on it. The Ninth Circuit very intentionally decides what cases to publish and what cases not to publish. Not only that, but unlike our California Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuits memo dispo process results in much thinner decisions for unpublished cases. While the court will not ignore the unpublished authority due to the 2001 rule change allowing such cases to be looked to for persuasive value, the court does not believe it is or was meant to be a definitive recitation of California law. The other cases might or might not reflect the common law view, but none of them purport to reflect California law, which has a special statute of limitations that supersedes the common law. Of course, we presume that the Legislature did not mean to supersede common law principles when it enacts statutes. ( Atempa v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809.) But ultimately, the statute will prevail. Because no one has cited any precedential case on point, and the court has found none, the court must assume that this is a matter of first impression. Given that, the court views the common lawwhich might support Gordyand the statute and general rulewhich support Thompson. The court also looks to conspiracy, where the law is at least plain. Turning to conspiracy, the doctrine would support Thompson. The law there is that once one is in a conspiracy, that party must take some sort of affirmative act to withdraw. Merely not doing anything more is not enough; there must be some affirmative and objective conduct. Thus, for example, if a conspiracy exists to defraud people of property, all members of the conspiracy will be liable for the fraud even if a particular conspirator did not participate with regard to a particular victim or stopped being active entirely. To end the liability, the co-conspirator must take an affirmative action, such as telling the remaining members that the conspirator will no longer be a part of the group. There is no allegation in the complaint that Gordy ever took such an action. But a conspiracy is not the same as aiding and abetting. The scope of liability is broader, but each co-conspirator must be able to commit the tort. A person with no fiduciary duty cannot conspire to breach a fiduciary duty, for example. Nor is aiding and abetting the same for purposes of public policy as conspiracy. Notwithstanding the courts prior musings, the court does not believe that to stop the liability for aiding and abetting an affirmative act is needed. But that hardly answers the question. The statute of limitations for this tort was deliberately enacted with the recognition that it is often difficult for victims of this kind of abuse to come forward and sue. The common law was abrogated by the statute for public policy reasons. Thus, the court tends to look at the question through the lens of recognizing that the Legislature intended to make it easier for the victim of such abuse to bring suits against those responsible and recognizing that victims of abuse are often psychologically unable to come forward. Moreover, the Legislature expressly recognized that issues of child custody and support often played into the psyche of a victim of abuse, making it harder to bring a suit. (California Bill Analysis, S.B. 924 Assem., 7/18/1995.) Those are precisely the mix of things at issue in this case. True, plaintiffs child died and after that issues of child custody and support were no longer in play, but it is fair to say, at least in the courts view, that the mind of a person who has been abused does not work like a computer and does not have an on/off switch. The coercion allegedif it occurreddoes not go away immediately upon the childs death. In a nutshell, the rule Gordy proposes does not further the Legislatures goal; in fact, it thwarts it, for it forces the victim of abuse to come forward against an aider and abettor even when the victim cannotas a practical mattercome forward at all. The courts view is that it might well be that in some cases an aider and abettors conduct was so particular and fleeting such that the statute accrues on the last date of aiding and abetting. But not in all cases, or even most. To illustrate, one can imagine a case where there is a ring of car thieves. One day, a witness sees the theft. Upon approaching the thieves, they offer to cut the witness in for $200 if the witness deletes the cell phone footage of them stealing the car. The witness agrees and not only that, tells the police that the thieves went north when they really fled south. Plainly aiding and abetting. If the thieves go on to steal more cars in the coming months, it is far from clear to the court that the aider and abettor is liable for those other thefts. On the other hand, if the aider and abettor gives the cyberthieves the a list of passwords on day 1 in return for $1000 and thereafter does nothing else, and the thieves keep the list for 4 years, during which time they slowly drain various victims bank accounts, it is not at all clear to the court that the aider and abettor gets to walk due to the statute of limitations. Of course these analogies, like all analogies, break down. But they illustrate the point that the court does not believe that there is a one-size-fits-all answer to the question. The court believes that the better rule is to presume that the statute for aiding and abetting is co-extensive with the statute for the main tortfeasor. The court will not rule out the possibility that, under a particular set of facts, the aiding and abetting conduct may be so specific and relatively minor that the accrual will be earlier. But as a general rule, it runs with the regular statute and limits to the aider and abbettors liability are better dealt with when the jury apportions damages. This also furthers the public policy reflecting the difficulty of bringing a suit that motivated the Legislature to change the law. If one can presume that the psychological trauma of the conduct is such that the victim ought not be forced to sue until three years after the last act of abuse, it is somewhat of an anomaly to expect the victim to sue the aider and abettor earlier than that. After all, it is hard to imagine the victim suing the aider and abettor at a time when the victim is still psychologically unable to sue to major tortfeasor. While it might be that this tilts the pitch in favor of the victim and against the accused aider and abettor, that is a policy question for the Legislature to decide, and it has. At least absent some significant factual showing that the aider and abettors influence had completely dissipated and that it would not be odd to assume that the victim would sue the aider and abettor but not the main tortfeasor, the court believes that the statutes of limitations are co-extensive. While the court will not definitively rule out the possibility that such a showing can be made herealthough it would be difficultit certainly cannot be made on demurrer, which is a pleading motion. Because the court must read the complaint liberally and draw all reasonable inferences in the cross-complainants favor, the court believes that the pleadings pass muster. Of course, that is not to say that when evidence is considered, the gap in time will not be too large to bridge; indeed, the court knows that Kennedy will (at some point) so argue. But for now, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Because the demurrer is overruled on regular statute of limitations grounds, the court need not, and does not, address equitable estoppel. Gordy has 30 days to answer.

Case Number: 23SMCV01089 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The demurrer is OVERRULED. While defendants statement of law is correct in that it is hard to see who the individual is that is alleged to be specifically responsible, there is enough here for pleading purposes. The specifics can be fleshed out in discovery and for now there are allegations, albeit general, as to the defendants acting together. In short, these issues are better raised by way of a summary judgment motion or at trial. The court is also having trouble understanding how the demurrer is timely. The court notes three discovery motions on file. That does not bode well this early in the case. The court has not worked up those motions, but for the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confers, and IDCs. The court encourages IDCs where both parties would like to resolve the matter informally and in good faith, and often the failure to participate in an IDC can have an impact on the recovery or propriety of any sanctions request. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The Court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The Court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the Court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the Court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First , General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second , the Court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the Courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the Court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The Court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous must set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party must so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log must accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third , if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth , for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth , the Court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the Court believes it appropriate to set forth how the Court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the Courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. ( Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a] rgument is not the same as informal negotiation ( id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways ( id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Id. at p. 1439.) ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point, before impasse is reached the process must include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there must be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal then and there. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the Court is not interested in the back and forth, the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally will encourage an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five Court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in an adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the Court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.

Case Number: 22STCV38178 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-18-24 a/f 8-26-24 Case: 2STCV38178 (related to 23STCV13772) Trial Date: 8-19-24 c/f 6-17-24 PITCHESS MOTION MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Richard Tipping, et al. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, City of Los Angeles, et al. RELIEF REQUESTED Motion for LAPD records SUMMARY OF ACTION Houston Tipping, son of Shirley Huffman and Richard Tipping, was a Los Angeles Police Department officer, suffered fatal head injury when a fellow officer conducted an exercise causing blunt force trauma to the head and neck of Officer Tipping during a training exercise purportedly to simulate a fall from a certain height. The training program was part of the Arrest and Control Bicycle Training Program. Officer Tipping was not provided any protective gear normally associated with such a training program, and other padding was not properly placed. Plaintiffs allege that at the time of the fatal injury, Officer Tipping was investigating a fellow officer allegedly responsible for sexually assaulting a person, thereby providing motivation to an officer to cause harm to Officer Tipping. On December 7, 2022, Shirley Huffman, Houston Tipping, and the Estate of Houston Tipping, filed a complaint for Battery, Whistleblower Retaliation, Bane Act, and Wrongful Death against City of Los Angeles and Richard Tipping (nominal defendant). On June 14, 2023, Richard Tipping and the Estate of Houston Tipping filed a complaint for Assault, Battery, Violation of Civil Code section 52.1, Violation of Civil Rights 42 USC 1983, Bane Act, and Wrongful Death against City of Los Angeles, and David Cuellar. On March 6, 2024, the court entered the stipulation of the parties to consolidate the actions. RULING : Denied in Part/Granted in Part. Plaintiffs move for the following records from the City of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD): 1. All WRITINGS related to the investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Administrative Bureau into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, including without limitation witness statements, findings, and conclusions of said investigations. The term WRITINGS as used throughout this motion has the meaning of writing as defined in California Evidence Code § 250 (i.e., tapes, recordings, transcripts of same, etc. are part of this request). 2. With respect to the LAPD Administrative Bureau investigation into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, all WRITINGS related to the video/audio interview of Officer David Cueller conducted by the Administrative Bureau in connection with the investigation into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, together with the handwritten notes taken concurrently by the interviewing officers during the interview. This interview is approximately one (1) hour in length. The Interview occurred in or around 2022. 3. All documents and recordings related to the investigation conducted by LAPD Internal Affairs into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, including without limitation witness statements, findings, and conclusions of said investigations. 4. Produce all WRITINGS, interview notes, summaries, transcripts of interviews, chronologies showing follow up and all other documents showing the follow up to the investigation of L.K. by Officers Tipping and Ramos. 5. Produce all WRITINGS, interview notes, summaries, transcripts of interviews, chronologies showing follow up and all other documents showing the follow up to the investigation of L.K. by Detective Stefani Valdes. This would include but is not limited to Reference No. 211710752. 6. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer David Cuellar. 7. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer Marc Ferris. 8. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer Robert Villegas. 9. All WRITINGS contained in Officer Mark Ferris personnel records concerning his voluntary demotion from Police Officer III to Police Officer II in or around November 2022. 10. All WRITINGS contained in Officer Robert Villegas personnel records concerning his retirement from the LAPD in or around 2022. 11. Produce all Body Worn Camera (BWC) and Body Worn Video (BWV) footage, videos, audio and photos showing L.K., any LAPD officer's interaction with L.K., and/or depicting her home at any point in the past five years, including without limitation: a. The BWC footage taken by Officer Tipping and/or his partner Officer Ramos at the Hospital on or about July 16, 2021, in connection with Incident No. 210716004284, Reference No. 211710752; b. The BWC footage taken by any Detectives or other Officers interviewing LK at any time. 12. All recorded interviews of L.K. by any LAPD officers in the last ten years, including without limitation concerning allegations of assault, sexual assault, and/or rape. Plaintiffs bring a Pitchess motion but also qualifies their request with a disclaimer that categories 4, 5, 11, and 12 are actually not within the purview of a Pitchess motion in that said records are not part of any personnel file. Plaintiffs move for said non-personnel records in regards to officers Marc Ferris and Robert Villegas based on a claim that said officers were likely going to be identified in a sexual assault report being compiled by Houston Tipping, and the officers sought to silence Tipping. City of Los Angeles in opposition cites to limitations in Pitchess motions in discovery and the impropriety of the subject Pitchess motion for admittedly non-personnel related material. City of Los Angeles also challenges categories 1-3 as not constituting personnel records or a complaint within the purview of the motion. Plaintiffs in reply maintains the motion establishes good cause for production of the records, and the sought after records are proper subject matter for a Pitchess motion. The court considers the standard as to all categories. The Pitchess statutes provide for two categories of confidential records: (1) personnel records, and (2) records of citizen complaints about individual officers, and reports or findings relating to investigation of such complaints. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268, 285.) A party seeking discovery of a peace officer's personnel records must follow a two-step process. (Citation.) First, the party must file a written motion describing the type of records sought, supported by [a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery. . ., setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. [Evid. Code § 1043(b)(3).] This initial burden is a relatively relaxed standard [ ]. (Citation.) Information is material if it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. (Citations.) [A] declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the materiality component of that section. ( Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 10851086.) City of Los Angeles also emphasizes the lack of applicability on categories 1-5, and 11-12, under the guise of a Pitchess motion, and counters Plaintiffs should have brought a motion to compel. Plaintiffs represent in discovery that City of Los Angeles objected to production on grounds of a required Pitchess motion and now moves the argument saying proper procedure was a motion to compel under the discovery statutes. Penal Code section 832.7 states in part: (b)(1) Notwithstanding ... the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by a state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection ... (A) A record relating to the report, investigation, or findings of any of the following: (i) An incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer. (ii) An incident involving the use of force against a person by a peace officer or custodial officer that resulted in death or in great bodily injury. (iii) A sustained finding involving a complaint that alleges unreasonable or excessive force. (iv) A sustained finding that an officer failed to intervene against another officer using force that is clearly unreasonable or excessive. (B)(i) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public. (ii) As used in this subparagraph, sexual assault means the commission or attempted initiation of a sexual act with a member of the public by means of force, threat, coercion, extortion, offer of leniency or other official favor, or under the color of authority. For purposes of this definition, the propositioning for or commission of any sexual act while on duty is considered a sexual assault. (iii) As used in this subparagraph, member of the public means any person not employed by the officer's employing agency and includes any participant in a cadet, explorer, or other youth program affiliated with the agency. (C) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency involving dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any false statements, filing false reports, destruction, falsifying, or concealing of evidence, or perjury. (D) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings, online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status. ... (Pen. Code, § 832.7.) (a) In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records, the party seeking the discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or administrative body upon written notice to the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records , as follows: (1) In a civil action, the written notice shall be given at the times prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ... (b) The motion shall include all of the following: (1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of records or information sought. (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. (c) Upon receipt of a notice served pursuant to subdivision (a), the governmental agency shall immediately notify the individual whose records are sought. (d) No hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held without full compliance with the notice provisions of this section except upon a showing by the moving party of good cause for noncompliance, or upon a waiver of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the records. (Evid. Code, § 1043) The court agrees with Plaintiffs that to the extent the Pitchess statute encompasses records arising from a citizen complaint, the Pitchess procedures and protections apply. ( City of Eureka v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 765; Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) The statutes however also specifically define the categories of applicable records. Plaintiffs concede the Pitchess categories 4, 5, 11 and 12 remain outside the scope of discovery guidelines (motion, 8:1-2) [ records requested in Request Numbers 4, 5, 11, and 12 should not require a Pitchess motion since they are not personnel records [ sic ]. ]. Plaintiffs in reply somewhat circle back to the argument with a broader interpretation based on production for impeachment purposes. ( Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 400 [However, once materiality has been shown, nothing in this procedure excuses the trial court from examining information that might reasonably lead to evidence relevant to the defense].) The key terms in the disputed items include WRITINGS and documents and recordings, recorded interviews, and body camera footage. While the report(s) remains categorically discoverable, information, including statements and general camera footage utilized as part of internal investigations appear to remain protected. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.) The court additionally finds the broad nature of the request renders the request well outside the specific incident, and the pursuit of the motivation for the coverup of a potential sexual assault while allowable (see below), insufficiently supports the sought after broad based review of files for the last five years. ( City of Eureka v. Superior Court , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 764-765.) Thus, the court finds the expansive requests improperly lack a sufficient nexus to the exact incident or even a sufficient enough link to the alleged motivation for purposes of compelling the requested information beyond the reports. While public policy supports discovery for purposes of establishing motivation, accountability, liability, etc., the rules in no way provide for general discovery absent more specific connections. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 291-292; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150.) The court also finds said items in no way constitute personnel records. To the extent the argument comes full circle as to the impropriety of bringing a Pitchess motion for non-covered items in the first place, the court also finds no support in the motion or reply for utilizing the Pitchess protocol for compelling review of said items under applicable statutory or case authority. The court also declines to grant the motion on grounds of estoppel. The court finds no basis to compel said records under the Pitchess statute regardless of the representation or objections from City of Los Angeles. Estoppel will not overcome a finding of insufficient authority. The court agrees with City of Los Angeles and DENIES the motion as to categories 1-5, and 11-12. The court finds no basis of authority to compel said documents within the purview of the instant motion and will not allow Plaintiffs to graft on such relief under the guise of a Pitchess motion since its now two months before trial and the discovery and law and motion windows are closing. As for items 6-10, the TEAMS reports and personnel records, City of Los Angeles offers no dispute as to the propriety of the motion to obtain said records, and instead challenges a lack of good cause and plausible factual foundation. The declaration of Mr. Gage seeks the records of Officer Cuellar, as the person responsible for performing the movement leading to the fatal injury. The files of Officers of Ferris and Villegas tie into the alleged cover-up scheme regarding the purported sexual assault. City of Los Angeles challenges the qualitative nature of the basis as not providing a special factual scenario. ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150.) While the death may very well have been unintentional, the deposition testimony of Cuellar specifically admits that a direct blunt force drop to the ground head first (a piledriver) was not an authorized move for an LAPD officer. Such an admission raises valid skepticism over the open use of the move during a training exercise. Cuellar also admitted to the fight club reputation of the bicycle unit. As for other circumstances, Officer Ferris in deposition confirms his presence, along with retired officer Vellegas, at the home of L.K., a person purportedly responsible for filing a sexual assault complaint. The court finds the scenario presented by Mr. Gage of a link between the admittedly improper fatal pile driver and report from citizen L.K. far more factually supported than the general claims rejected in the City of San Jose action notwithstanding the hyperbolic references to movies of police department corruption. The enforcement culture scenario whereby Cuellar effectively executed Tripping certainly lacks specific support of a direct admission or criminal conviction, but the court also appreciates the inability to gather additional information without the ability to seek potential review of the records. The court therefore finds Plaintiffs make a sufficient showing for review based on reasonable circumstantial inference. ( Garcia v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 70; Warrick v. Sup. Ct. , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1016; Zanone v. City of Whittier (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 174, 189; California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 10201021; City of San Jose v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11461147.) Given that moving party made a showing of good cause for category numbers 6-10, the court must engage in an in camera review. Second, if the trial court concludes the defendant has fulfilled these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents potentially relevant to the defendant's motion. . . . The trial court shall examine the information in chambers [Evid. Code § 1045(b).], out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized [to possess the records] and such other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present.. . . Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations. . . the trial court should then disclose to the defendant such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. ( Id . at p. 1086.) The court will exclude all complaints more than five years old, conclusions of an officer investigating any complaint, and facts determined too remote of offer little or no practical effect. (Evid. Code, 1045, subd. (b); Warrick v. Superior Court , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 accord City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Any disclosure shall conform to names, addresses and telephone numbers of complainants and witnesses. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84; Carruthers v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 439, 442; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829.) The determination of admissibility of any alleged statements made during the course of the investigation will not prevent discovery into the information. A party is entitled to discovery of inadmissible evidence. Plaintiffs argument seeking to distinguish the noted limitations under Evidence Code section 1043 and 1045, and subsequent cited cases lack a direct factual or legal statement overruling the noted limitations. Plaintiffs are entitled to the witness information and limited contact information only. ( Haggerty v. Superior Court , supra , 117 Cal.App.4th 1089-1090.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to items 6-11. Discovery or disclosure is protected. The court shall, in any case or proceeding permitting the disclosure or discovery of any peace or custodial officer records requested pursuant to Section 1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).) The court is required to conform to the requirements of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (e) regarding the dissemination of any and all protected information from public file disclosure. The parties are to submit a stipulated protective order. Moving party to give notice. Trial remains set for August 19, 2024. Plaintiffs to provide notice.

LYKKEBERG VS. WILBURN, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202789 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. This matter was stayed by the Court’s Order dated January 23, 2024 pending conclusion of a FINRA arbitration between the parties. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 21STCV29759 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: B SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT REYES VALADEZ, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF NORWALK; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY; FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 21STCV29759 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT Dept. B 1:30 p.m. July 17, 2024 1. Background On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff REYES VALADEZ (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants CITY OF NORWALK (City); COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (County); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (Department); SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY (SCE); FRONTIER CALIFORNIA, INC., erroneously sued as, FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (Frontier); and DOES 1 to 50 (collectively, Defendants), inclusive for: (1) Premises Liability and (2) General Negligence. Defendant Frontier, at this time, moves for an (1) order determining that the settlement between it and Plaintiff is in good faith; (2) order barring all potential third-party complaints and/or cross-complaints and further claims against Defendant Frontier for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity; and (3) order dismissing all causes of action against Defendant Frontier. Defendant Spectrum Pacific West LLC (Doe 1 or Spectrum) opposes the instant motion, and Defendant Frontier filed a reply. 2. Evidentiary Objections Defendant Frontiers objections to the Declaration of Ernest Chang submitted in support of Defendant Spectrums Opposition are: SUSTAINED. 3. Motion to Determine Good Faith Settlement a. Legal Standard Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 877.6, subdivision (a)(1),[a]ny¿party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or. . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(a)(1).) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(c).)¿Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the settlement.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 877(a).)¿¿¿¿¿¿ The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(d).)¿¿ In¿ Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates¿ (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6:¿a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.¿Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of¿nonsettling¿defendants.¿( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates¿ (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to be made¿on the basis of¿information available at the time of settlement.¿( Tech-Bilt,¿supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)¿[A] defendants settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendants liability to be. [Citation.]¿( Ibid. )¿¿¿¿ The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6,¿subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.¿Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a settlement made in good faith within the terms of section 877.6.¿( Id. at 499-500.)¿¿¿¿ ¿Thus,¿Tech-Bilt¿held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlors proportionate share of liability. ( Tech-Bilt, supra , 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499500¿. . . .)¿This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is allocating costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.¿( Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 502¿. . . .).¿( TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court¿ (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)¿Accordingly, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.¿Potential liability for indemnity to a¿nonsettling¿defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.¿[Citation.]¿( Ibid. )¿¿ b. Discussion Defendant Frontier moves for an order determining that the settlement between it and Plaintiff was in good faith. Here, Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff have entered into a settlement agreement wherein Plaintiff will receive $5,000 and a mutual waiver of costs of suit and attorneys fees in exchange for dismissing Defendant Frontier with prejudice in this instant case. (Terzakarian Decl., ¶2.) Defendant Frontier contends this settlement with Plaintiff is for a substantial and equitable amount considering the disputed nature of the claim, Plaintiffs approximated total damages, and Defendants Frontiers proportionate share of potential liability. ( Id. at ¶3.) Specifically, Defendant Frontier argues Plaintiff has no evidence to support a finding that it caused or contributed to any claimed damages. Nonetheless, Defendant Frontier contends the cost of engaging in a long and protracted litigation led to the decision to resolve the matter without a need for trial. (Terzakarian Decl., ¶15.) Furthermore, Defendant Frontier contends that the settlement agreement does not include any collusive or secretive terms. ( Id. at ¶16.) Moreover, Defendant Frontier asserts that co-defendants have been informed of all relevant terms of the settlement agreement. ( Id. at ¶¶4, 17.) In opposition, Defendant Spectrum contends the basis for the settlement agreement between Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff, i.e., that Defendant Frontier has no liability because it did not own, maintain, operate, and/or control the guy-down cables Plaintiff allegedly struck or the surrounding sidewalk is supported by a declaration that lacks personal knowledge and attaches an exhibit that does not support the declared testimony. Defendant Spectrum further contends at the time of the accident in 2020, Defendant Frontier jointly-owned pole 977901E and performed construction at the pole, which removed, lowered, and reorganized Defendant Spectrums lines without its knowledge to allow for an over-build. (Oppn at pp. 4-6.) As such, Defendant Spectrum argues this information demonstrates Defendant Frontiers control over the subject property and directly informs Defendant Frontiers potential liability. However, Defendant Spectrum contends it is a recent addition to the case and has not had sufficient time to fully investigate Defendant Frontiers scope of ownership and control of the jointly-owned utility pole. Thus, Defendant Spectrum requests a continuance to allow for investigation into Defendant Frontiers lack of liability. In reply, Defendant Frontier argues Defendant Spectrum asserts claims that are inapposite to the instant motion, wholly inappropriate for this venue, and improperly presents evidence. The Court agrees. Defendant Spectrum presents Changs declaration, which purports to be based on personal knowledge but fails to lay a foundation for Changs expertise or knowledge apart from being Defendant Spectrums Construction Manager, fails to provide foundational facts for how Chang knows the utility pole is allegedly joint-owned by Defendant Frontier and Defendant Spectrum, and fails to cite any authority that would allow for a continuance in this instance to produce such admissible evidence. As such, the Court will rule on the merits of the instant motion. The Court finds that the settlement agreement between Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff satisfies the Tech-Bilt factors. First, the settlement is based on Defendant Frontier (1) representation that it did not own, maintain, operate, and/or control the guy-down cables that Plaintiff struck or the surrounding sidewalk and (2) Plaintiffs own purported negligence by riding his bicycle along the sidewalk in violation of Traffic Code Section 15.76.080. Thus, it is based on an approximation of Plaintiffs total recovery if the matter went to trial. Also, Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff engaged in lengthy negotiations to reach the settlement amount of $5,000. Moreover, neither Defendant Spectrum nor the other co-defendants argue that the settlement amount is disproportionate to Defendant Frontiers potential liability in this case. Finally, as discussed above, Defendant Spectrum does not present any admissible evidence demonstrating that the settlement agreement between Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff is so far out of the ballpark in relation to the Tech-Bilt factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Code of Civil Procedure Section 877.6. Therefore, Defendant Frontier California, Inc.s Motion for Determination of Good Faith is GRANTED. Moving Defendant is ordered to give notice. Dated this 17 th day of July, 2024 Hon. Karen Moskowitz Judge of the Superior Court

C23-03165 CASE NAME: DIANE SHEFFIELD VS. DOES 1-100 INCLUSIVE HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY: JOHN MUIR HEALTH (JOHN MUIR HEALTH CONCORD MEDICAL CENTER) *TENTATIVE RULING:* On the Court’s own motion, and in order to permit the defendant time to file a reply brief, the hearing is continued to August 21, 2024 at 9:00 am in this Department. The reply shall be filed and served by July 17, 2024.

Case Number: 23STCV02627 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV02627 MOTIONS : Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena MOVING PARTY: Defendants Ehud Levy, 1621 Westerly Terrace, LLC, and Alexander Henry Levin OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Ehud Levy, 1621 Westerly Terrace, LLC, and Alexander Henry Levin (Defendants) now move to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for medical records served on non-party Paramount Family Health Center. Defendants also seek sanctions. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.)¿ A deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.)¿ A service of a deposition subpoena shall be affected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).)¿ Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).)¿A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record. (Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b); Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, . . . in making an order pursuant to motion made . . . under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . . MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Christopher Babadjanian, Defendants counsel, states the following: On March 28, 2024, I sent a meet and confer letter to the COR for Paramount Family Health Center requesting compliance with the subpoena within 14 business days. I advised that failure to comply with the subpoena by this deadline would force my office to seek court intervention. (Babadjanian Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. F.) As of the date of this declarations signing, I have not received a response to my February 15, 2024, meet and confer letter. ( Id. ¶ 12.) DISCUSSION On March 7, 2024, Defendants personally served a deposition subpoena on Paramount Family Health Center. (Babadjanian Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. E.) The date of production was March 25, 2024. ( Id. ) To date, no response has been provided and no opposition has been filed. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to compel. Defendants seek $1,240.51 in monetary sanctions, representing a $160.17 hourly rate, $125 to personally serve the motion, and the $60 filing fee. This also includes $500 in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1992. While the Court finds that sanctions are warranted, the amount requested in excessive given the lack of opposition and type of motion at issue. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in the amount of $345.17 (1 hour of attorney time, $91.50 to personally serve this motion, and the $60 filing fee). CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants the motion for order compelling compliance with the deposition subpoena. The Custodian of Records for Paramount Family Health Center is ordered to produce the documents identified in the deposition subpoena at its place of business by August 5, 2024. The Court further grants Defendants request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $345.17 against Paramount Family Health Center. Said monetary sanctions shall be paid to counsel for Defendants within 30 days. Defendants shall give notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such.