National Credit Adjusters, Llc, Vs. Esther Salcido

Case Number: BC682984 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING MASSACHUSETTS EDUCATIONAL FINANCING AUTHORITY , vs. ALEXANDER . Case No.: BC682984 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Plaintiff Massachusetts Educational Financing Authoritys unopposed motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement is granted. Plaintiff is to submit a judgment to this Court within 10 days of this ruling. Plaintiff Massachusetts Education Financing Authority (MEFA) (Plaintiff) moves unopposed for an order to enter judgment because Defendant Alexander L Ross (Ross) (Defendant) defaulted on the terms and conditions of the parties settlement stipulation. (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; C.C.P. §664.6.) Background On November 09, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court for damages in the amount of $25,149.19 to recover the unpaid balance on a credit card account. (Decl. of Rohan ¶2.) On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant executed a settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement), with the Court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. (Decl. of Rohan ¶3, Exh. A.) Pursuant to ¶10 of the agreement, if Defendant defaulted under the Settlement Agreement, then Plaintiff could obtain a judgment for the outstanding balance, pre-judgment interest and costs through declaration and order. ( See Decl. of Rohan ¶¶3-4, Exh. A at ¶10.) On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed by Defendant. Motion to Enforce Settlement Legal Standard C.C.P. §664.6 provides, as follows: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (C.C.P. §664.6(a).) Disputes regarding the terms of the settlement (or other disputed facts) may be adjudicated on a C.C.P. §664.6 motion on the basis of declarations or other evidence. ( Malouf Brothers v. Dixon (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 280, 284; Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 795-796 [stating court may resolve reasonable disputes over terms of settlement agreement but may not modify terms from what was agreed to by parties].) Discussion Plaintiff submitted evidence that Plaintiff and Defendant executed a Settlement Agreement that is signed by the parties and contains a provision authorizing this Court to retain jurisdiction under C.C.P. §664.6. (Decl. of Rohan ¶2 , Exh. A.) Accordingly, Plaintiff submitted evidence of the existence of a valid settlement agreement and is therefore entitled to an order enforcing the settlement. Plaintiffs counsel declares Defendant last made a payment on September 9, 2014. (Decl. of Rohan ¶4.) Plaintiffs counsel declares that on March 16, 2023, he last sent a cure letter to Defendant, stating that Defendant had ten days to cure the defect. (Decl. of Rohan ¶6.) Plaintiffs counsel declares Defendant did not cure the defect and Defendant has not made any other payments pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (Decl. of Rohan ¶¶6-7.) Plaintiffs counsel declares the principal outstanding balance on Defendants account is $10,552.09. (Decl. of Rohan ¶8.) Plaintiff requests a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $11,073.93, reflecting a principal balance of $25,149.19, less $14,075.26 in credits for payments made, and $0.00 in costs. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of $11,073.93, reflecting a principal balance of $25,149.19, less $14,075.26 in credits for payments made, and $0.00 in costs is granted. Conclusion Plaintiffs unopposed motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of $11,073.93, reflecting a principal balance of $25,149.19, less $14,075.26 in credits for payments made, and $0.00 in costs is granted. Plaintiff is to submit a judgment to the Court within 10 days of this ruling. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

S-CV-0052368 American Express National Bank vs. Conway, Scott No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/07/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Conway, Scott Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Conway, Scott

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE WELLS FARGO BANK VS CVCO2301842 PLEADINGS ON COMPLAINT FOR DANIELS COLLECTIONS OF WELLS FARGO BANK Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling will be issued.

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.

MCV-231357, Unifund v. Hagstrom Judgment Creditor, Unifund CCR, LLC’s, unopposed Application for Order of Sale of Dwelling is GRANTED. Judgment Debtor, Steve E. Hagstrom, has failed to show cause why the property should not be sold to satisfy the judgment. A homestead declaration has not been recorded by Judgment Debtor. By failing to oppose the application and failing to respond to the Court’s order to show cause, Judgment Debtor has failed to meet his burden of showing that the homestead exemption applies here. (CCP § 704.780.) There is no evidence of any other exemption being applicable here. The property shall be sold in the manner provided in Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as required by CCP § 704.780. Judgment Creditor shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling. The proposed order currently lodged with the Court does not conform with the Court’s ruling. It does not reference the correct hearing date. It refers to the Judgement Debtor as “Adam Seller” on the first page. Also, it states that no minimum bid shall be required, but this does not comply with CCP § 701.620, which states property shall not be sold without a minimum bid. Judgment Creditor shall submit a written order that complies with all of the requirements of Article 6 of Chapter 3 and of Article 4 of Chapter 4. 4. 23CV00186, Jooblay, Inc. v. Steven D. Skolnik The Court awards Defendant $5,545 in fees and costs. Defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with this tentative ruling in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312. I. Background On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action for (inter alia) wrongful foreclosure and quiet title. The subject properties are 1551 Laguna Road, Santa Rosa, and 9579 Ross Station Road, Sebastopol. On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff recorded Notices of Pending Action (“lis pendens”) on both properties. The notices were filed with the Court on April 16, 2024. On the same day, Pacific Private Money (“Defendant”) moved to expunge the lis pendens on the Laguna Road property only (the “Motion”). The Motion included a request for attorney’s fees, but did not specify an amount. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a different lawsuit, Jooblay, Inc. v. Sanchez (24CV03100), concerning the same two properties. The Sanchez complaint alleges causes of action that fundamentally duplicate six of the causes of action in the instant case, though against slightly different sets of defendants. The duplicated causes of action include two for quiet title, one related to the Ross Station property and the other to the Laguna property. On June 13, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal in the instant case, dismissing the causes of action that had been duplicated in the Sanchez complaint, including the two quiet title claims. In summary, Plaintiff moved several causes of action, including two for quiet title, from the instant case into a different lawsuit. Thus, the instant case no longer has a quiet title component. Plaintiff withdrew the lis pendens on the Laguna Road property on June 3. Plaintiff recorded a new lis pendens on the Laguna Road property, relating to the Sanchez matter, on or about June 6. At the June 14 hearing, the Court denied the Motion as moot. Defendant argued that the motion is not moot because it is entitled to attorney’s fees. The Court continued the matter and instructed Defendant to submit an itemization of its fees and costs. Defendant did so on June 24. This matter comes on calendar for consideration of Defendant’s requests for fees and costs. II. Analysis CCP § 761.010(b) requires that “[i]mmediately upon commencement of [a quiet title] action, the plaintiff shall file a notice of the pendency of the action in the office of the county recorder of each county in which any real property described in the complaint is located.” The complaints in both the instant case and Sanchez allege causes of action for quiet title. In the instant case, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens just under a month after filing the complaint. In the Sanchez case, Plaintiff recorded it slightly over a week after filing the complaint. Both timeframes somewhat stretch the definition of “immediately,” but the point is that Plaintiff was required to record the lis pendens in both cases. Plaintiff withdrew the lis pendens in the instant case ten days before dismissing the two quiet-title cause of action that had required it. In other words, as relevant here, Plaintiff has filed a lawsuit containing quiet-title allegations, recorded a lis pendens as required by statute, moved the quiet- title allegations to a different lawsuit, withdrawn the lis pendens in the first lawsuit because it was no longer required by statute, and recorded it in the second one because it was required by statute. The party prevailing on any motion to expunge a lis pendens is entitled to “the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion.” (CCP § 405.38.) If the Court had granted Defendant’s motion and ordered Plaintiff to withdraw the lis pendens, there would be no question that Defendant was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney’s fees. But the Court did not do that; the Court denied Defendant’s Motion as moot because the lis pendens addressed by the Motion had already been withdrawn. The question, then, is whether Defendant is still the prevailing party. Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not, noting that “California law defines the ‘prevailing party’ to include ‘the party with a net recovery’ or ‘a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.’” (Oppo at p. 6.) Plaintiff cites for this proposition to CCP § 1032(a)(4), which does begin with the passage Plaintiff quoted, but goes on to add that “[i]f any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not . . . .” Thus, CCP § 1032(a)(4), as applied to the situation presented here, simply says that the court has the discretion to determine which party is “prevailing,” but provides no guidance on how to make that determination. Significant guidance is provided by Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, which addresses this exact issue. Castro rejects any inflexible rule that the moving party either is or is not entitled to attorney’s fees when a lis pendens is withdrawn before the court has an opportunity to rule on a motion to expunge it. Instead, Castro calls for a “practical approach,” under which “the trial court has the discretion to award attorney fees based on a determination of which party would have prevailed on the motion, and whether the lis pendens claimant acted with substantial justification in withdrawing the lis pendens, or whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the imposition of fees would otherwise be unjust.” (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.) A. Defendant would have prevailed on the Motion. In the Motion, Defendant sets forth a variety of reasons why it should prevail. The reasons fall into two categories: procedural defects, and reasons Plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of prevailing on a real property claim. (CCP § 405.32 [lis pendens to be expunged if claimant does not establish probable validity of claim].) In the first category, Defendant notes that the recording, service, and filing of the lis pendens failed to comply with statutory requirements. First, Defendant points out that the lis pendens bears the wrong caption in that it lists only Defendant, Pacific Private Money, as a defendant in the pending action, whereas the complaint in the instant case lists a number of other defendants. The Court does not find this point significant standing alone, in light of the fact that the actual complaint, with its full caption, was attached to the Notice of Pending Action. Defendant’s second point in this category is that the lis pendens was not served on Defendant, and that it should have been because Defendant is “affected by the real property claim.” (CCP § 405.22.) (Defendant also argues that the lis pendens was not filed with the Court, but in fact it was, on April 16, 2022, the same day the Motion was filed.) In the second category, Defendant makes a series of arguments as to the prospective failure of every cause of action in the complaint. In light of Plaintiff’s contention that its only reason for filing the lis pendens was to comply with a statutory requirement related to quiet-title actions, the most relevant cause of action is the eighth, the one to quiet title on the Laguna property. That cause of action states that the defendants against whom it is alleged have no interest in the Laguna Road property. Defendant argues that this claim will fail for two reasons: first, because it rests on the allegation that the loan upon which the defendants foreclosed was usurious, which is not a valid argument because Defendant is a licensed broker and therefore exempt from the usury laws (Fin. Code § 22002); and second, because Plaintiff cannot contest the foreclosure because he failed to tender the payment due (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1184-1185). Plaintiff did not address any of these arguments in its opposition to the Motion; it rested on the point that the motion was moot because Plaintiff had withdrawn the lis pendens. Nor does Plaintiff address them in its opposition to the instant fee motion, with the exception of Plaintiff’s explanation that the quiet-title causes of action in the complaint are not alleged against Defendant. Plaintiff’s point, presumably, is that Defendant is not “affected by the real property claim” and therefore service on Defendant was not required. (CCP § 405.22.) That argument would carry a great deal more weight if Defendant Pacific Private Money were not the only party mentioned in the caption of the lis pendens document. The fact that Plaintiff named Pacific Private Money, and no other defendant, in the caption of the Notice of Pending Action is at odds with the notion that Plaintiff did not consider Pacific Private Money to be sufficiently “affected by the real property claim” to require the lis pendens document to be served on them. “[T]he court shall order that the [lis pendens] notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” (CCP § 405.32.) In light of Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendant’s contentions about why the claim will fail, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established validity. Therefore, the court finds that Defendant would have prevailed on the Motion if it had gone forward. B. Substantial justification Plaintiff asserts that it, “acted in substantial justification in withdrawing the Laguna Road Property lis pendens when Plaintiff elected, as is its right, to voluntarily dismiss its causes of action for quiet title. Upon deciding to dismiss the quiet title causes of action – the only cause of action requiring the recording of a lis pendens, Plaintiff adopted the only practical approach to the dismissal by withdrawing the lis pendens no longer required because the quiet title cause of action are no longer part of this case. Plaintiff acted with substantial justification in withdrawing the lis pendens.” (Oppo at p. 6.) That is, Plaintiff argues that withdrawing the lis pendens that had been recorded in the instant case was justified and necessary and done in good faith because there ceased to be any need for it once the quiet-title causes of action were dismissed. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff had the legal right remove several causes of action from the instant case and re-allege them in a new case. The Court also acknowledges that when Plaintiff did that, withdrawing the lis pendens he had filed in the instant case was the right thing to do. However, Plaintiff never addresses the question of why he filed the new case. It is not at all obvious why the same thing could not have been accomplished more straightforwardly, without the need for a new $435 first-paper filing fee and without exposing Plaintiff to an additional case’s worth of discovery demands, by moving to file a First Amended Complaint in the case at bar. Plaintiff cannot have reasonably been concerned that the Court would deny such a motion at this early stage of the proceedings. What is obvious is that by taking the action it did, Plaintiff created a basis to oppose the Motion, which had been filed six weeks before Plaintiff filed Sanchez and which was set for hearing two weeks later, as moot. Whether or not that was Plaintiff’s motivation for filing the new case and dismissing the corresponding causes of action in the instant one, the Court finds that doing so does not rise to substantial justification for withdrawing the lis pendens. Accordingly, Defendant is the “prevailing party” under the Castro analysis described above. C. Imposition of the fees is not unjust The Court sees no reason to conclude that imposition of attorney’s fees would be unjust, and will therefore impose them. III. Computation of the fee award The standard for calculating attorney fee awards under California law “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate . . . . The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [Citation.] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In calculating the lodestar, “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located,’ unless the party claiming fees demonstrates that hiring local counsel was impracticable or local counsel was not available.” (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285-286; see also Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26,72 [“fee awards generally should be based on reasonable local hourly rates”]; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 398-399 [different rule where plaintiff demonstrated inability to hire local counsel].) “[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court.” (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1240.) A. Defendant’s request In the Supplemental Declaration of Brianna Milligan accompanying the request for attorney’s fees, Defendant requests fees as follows, as well as $60 for the filing fee for the Motion: Jacoby Perez Researching and evaluating grounds for Motion: 5 hours Preparing and finalizing Motion: 5 hours Reviewing and revising reply: 1.2 hours Total: 11.2 hours @ $525/hour Brianna Milligan Reviewing opposition and preparing reply and declaration: 4.2 hours Reviewing billing charges and preparing declaration re. fees: 1.5 hours Preparing supplemental brief re. fees: 2 hours Anticipated time at hearing: 1 hour Total: 8.7 hours @ $455/hour B. Defendant’s arithmetic is in error Defendant requests a total of $17,773.35 in fees and costs. That figure is the sum of $13,755.00 for Mr. Perez’s time, $3,503.35 for 7.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time attributable to preparing the Reply and the fee request, an additional $455 for Ms. Milligan’s anticipated time at the hearing on the fee request, and the $60 filing fee. Those figures do add up to $17,773.35. However, there are two problems with the calculation. The first is very small: 7.7 hours at $455/hour is $3,503.50, not $3,503.35. Thus, Defendant presumably intends to request a total of $3,958.50 for 8.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time, not $3,958.35. The second is considerably larger. Mr. Perez, according to Ms. Milligan’s declaration, has “spent 5 hours researching and evaluating the grounds for the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens, and an additional 5 hours preparing and finalizing the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens. Mr. Perez also reviewed and revised Defendant’s Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens and spent 1.2 hours doing so.” (Milligan Dec., ¶ 6.) That is a total of 11.2 hours. Mr. Perez’s billing rate is $525/hour. (Milligan Dec., ¶ 7.) 11.2 hours at $525/hour is $5,880. It is not $13,755, the amount claimed for Mr. Perez’s time. $13,775 divided by $525 is 26.2. The claimed amount, therefore, appears to be based on an additional 15 hours of Mr. Perez’s time that are not accounted for in the declaration. The Court will interpret Defendant’s request as being for 11.2 hours of Mr. Perez’s time at $525/hour ($5,880), 8.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time at $455/hour ($3,958.50), and $60 in filing fees, for a total of $9,898.50. D. Time 1. Motion to expunge Defendant claims a total of 10 hours of Mr. Perez’s time in connection with the researching and drafting the Motion. The memorandum of points and authority is detailed and fact-intensive, and includes extensive citation to authority. Its complexity is tied to the complexity of the complaint in this matter: it argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on eight separate causes of action. However, the Court notes that in his declaration accompanying the Reply, Mr. Perez declares that he spent only 6.5 hours on the motion: “2 hours doing preliminary research to form the basis for this expungement motion,” and “4.5 hours preparing the motion to expunge.” Mr. Perez was clearly referring to the motion itself, not to the reply memorandum, as he claims an additional 4.3 hours for that. Ms. Milligan’s declaration does not explain why Mr. Perez now appears to have spent 10 hours researching and drafting the motion. The Court will take Mr. Perez at his word, and award attorney’s fees for 6.5 hours for preparing the Motion. 2. Reply Defendant claims a total of 5.4 hours in connection with drafting the Reply: 4.2 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time and 1.2 of Mr. Perez’s. The Reply was a well-justified response to Plaintiff’s contention that the Motion was moot. The Court finds the 4.2 hours claimed by Ms. Milligan for preparing the reply to be reasonable. However, the Court will not award the 1.2 hours for Mr. Perez’s time on the reply because 4.2 hours should have been sufficient to prepare the memorandum and no review should have been necessary. As noted above, Mr. Perez states in his declaration accompanying the Reply that he “spent 4.3 hours reviewing and researching Plaintiff’s Opposition and in preparing Defendant’s Reply Brief and in making this Declaration.” The Court finds the 4.3 hour figure unreasonable. The Opposition fundamentally says no more than that the motion is moot because the lis pendens was withdrawn; that takes no significant time to review. The declaration is one page long (exclusive of the jurat), much of which consists of the list of defendants; it also cannot have taken significant time. 4.3 hours is no less reasonable than the 4.2 hours claimed by Ms. Milligan for preparing the reply, but if Ms. Milligan spent 4.2 hours preparing it, it is unreasonable to award Mr. Perez an additional 4.3 hours for doing the same thing. Accordingly, the Court will award attorney’s fees for 4.2 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time in connection with the reply. 3. Fee request Defendant claims a total of 3.5 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time in connection with the fee request, consisting of 1.5 hours for reviewing billing charges and preparing the declaration, and 2 hours for drafting the motion. The Court finds the 1.5 hour figure excessive. The Court again notes that Mr. Perez described the time he spent on the original motion in his declaration accompanying the reply; no further review was necessary to determine that figure. Ms. Milligan cannot reasonably have spent an hour and a half determining her own time in connection with the reply, and her time spent preparing the fee request cannot even have been entered into anything she could review while she was engaged in that exact task. The Court will award 2.2 hours of attorney’s fees in connection with the fee request, consisting of two hours to draft the memorandum and .2 hours to review billing records. 4. Anticipated time for hearing The Court will not award attorney’s fees for appearance at the hearing set for July 10 at this time. If the tentative ruling is contested and the hearing takes place, the Court will be amenable to a request to increase the fee award to cover the time spent by Defendant’s counsel. 5. Total time Thus, the Court will award attorney’s fees for 6.5 hours of Mr. Perez’s time and 6.4 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time. E. Hourly rates As noted above, “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) As noted above, the relevant “community” is the “forum district,” here Sonoma county. (Nishiki, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) Fees are limited to local hourly rates unless the party seeking fees has made a good-faith but unsuccessful effort to find local counsel. (Horsford, sura, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398-399.) Defendant’s counsel is located in Irvine. Defendant has not suggested that it has attempted to hire local counsel instead. Therefore, the Court will adjust the hourly rates requested by counsel to reflect Sonoma County rates. Defendant has also not provided any information about Mr. Perez’s and Ms. Milligan’s level of skill and experience or their positions within the firm, but the Court takes judicial notice that the State Bar website indicates that Mr. Perez has seven years’ practice experience and Ms. Milligan has three. On that basis, the Court will set Mr. Perez’s rate, based on the reasonable rates generally awarded to counsel of similar skill and experience in Sonoma County, to $450/hour, and Ms. Milligan’s to $400/hour. IV. Conclusion The Court awards Defendant $5,545 in fees and costs, consisting of $2,925 for 6.5 hours of Mr. Perez’s time at $450/hour, $2,560 for 6.4 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time at $400/hour, and the $60 filing fee.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Thursday, July 11, 2024, Line 16. PLAINTIFF VANESA O'HANLON's Application And Hearing For Right To Attach Order And Writ Of Attachment. "Plaintiff's application for right to attach order and order for issuance of writ of attachment" is denied. This action regards a series of oral loans - several involving credit cards - that plaintiff allegedly made to defendant and he did not fully re-pay. The motion is denied for two principal reasons. First, the amount of plaintiff's claims is not "fixed or readily ascertainable." (CCP 483.010(a).) For example, plaintiff concedes she is "unable to locate my credit card statements to correctly charge" defendant. (O'Hanlon Dec. 3:1-3.) Second, plaintiff has not "established the probable validity" of her claims. (CCP 484.090(a)(2).) For example, plaintiff concedes the loans - all oral - began "in April 2017," raising serious statute-of-limitations issues. (O'Hanlon Dec. 1:25; CCP 339.) The court does not rely on defendant's untimely opposition for the above, but rather plaintiff's own declaration. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript msay be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Case Number: 23STCV07247 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 SURENDRA BHAVNANI DBA LAXMI IMPEX, Plaintiff, v. GREENLEAF DIAMONDS, LLC, ANDRE SENGUL DBA GREENLEAF DIAMONDS, and DOES 1 through 20, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV07247 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant Andre Sengul dba Greenleaf Diamonds, LLCs Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff SURENDRA BHAVNANI DBA LAXMI IMPEX (Plaintiff) filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants GREENLEAF DIAMONDS, LLC (GDL) , ANDRE SENGUL DBA GREELEAF DIAMONDS (Sengul), and DOES 1 through 20 (collectively, Defendants). The FAC asserts the following causes of action against all Defendants: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Book Account 3. Goods Sold and Delivered On June 28, 2023, default was entered against Defendant Sengul. Subsequently, default judgment was entered against Defendant Sengul in the amount of $101,364.86 on October 20, 2023. Defendant Sengul now brings a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment, which Plaintiff has not opposed. A proof of service is attached to the motion showing service on Plaintiffs counsel at the address on the Judgment entered 10/20/23. After review, the Court GRANTS the Motion because Defendant Sengul has shown he did not have actual notice of the action in time to defend on the merits. Background Allegations This action involves seven written contractual agreements between Plaintiff and Defendant Sengul for the sale of certain diamonds to Defendants in the amounts of $394.00, $30,294.00, $5,680.00, $17,769.00, $14,650.00, $3,300.00, and $285.00. (Compl., ¶9, Ex. 1.) Each agreement was to be paid in full within 120 days from the date of each memorandum. ( Id. ) Defendant Sengul failed to make any payments on the seven agreements resulting in a balance owed of $72,372.00. ( Id. at ¶10.) Plaintiff made a demand for payment on the balance due and Defendant Sengul has refused to pay it. ( Id. at ¶11.) Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment Legal Standard : When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i)¿two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii)¿180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(a).)¿¿ ¿ A notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the partys lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(b).) ¿ Upon a finding by the court that the motion was made within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that his or her lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set aside the default or default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(c).) Here, Defendant Sengul contends he has been living in Maui, Hawaii for the past ten years and working at his business Greenleaf Diamonds in Maui at the time the purported service of process was rendered. (Sengul Decl., ¶¶2-3, 7, Exs. 1-2.) Defendant Sengul further contends that the 4220 Mesa Drive, La Canada, Flintridge, CA property where the purported service of process was effectuated is his investment Airbnb property that was being rented out by third-party guests during the time service was rendered. ( Id. at ¶¶4-5, Exs. 3-4.) Moreover, Defendant Sengul asserts he became aware of this pending case in early March of this year, when he received a notice letter from his California bank that a deposition subpoena for his bank records had been issued by Plaintiffs counsel Timothy Krantz. ( Id. at ¶¶6, 13.) Defendant Sengul has provided photographic evidence that he was not physically present in California when the alleged personal service was effectuated. Defendant Sengul has also produced evidence that the property where service was effectuated was occupied by Airbnb guests at the time when service was rendered. Additionally, Defendant Sengul has submitted a proposed Answer with the instant motion. Lastly, Plaintiff has not opposed the present motion as to contest the arguments and evidence raised therein. Therefore, Defendant Sengul presents sufficient grounds for discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473.5. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Defendant Andre Sengul dba Greenleaf Diamonds, LLCs Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant Sengul is ordered to file his Answer within 20 days of this order.

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.