Credit Acceptance Corporation Vs Selena M Courtney

S-CV-0052466 Montarbo, Leslie vs. FCA US, LLC ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: Defendant has not paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 12/29/25 5 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 12/12/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 12/05/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.

Parties to appear in person or remotely 7/19/24 at 9:30 AM in Dept. 10C. Should counsel/parties prefer to appear remotely, follow the instructions below. There is a dedicated conference bridge lines for Dept 10C. Call into dedicated conference bridge line at the time set for the hearing. To attend the remote hearing in Dept 10C: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6937 and Pin # 6822.

23CV057001: LOPEZ vs STEVENSON 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by Joshua David Brysk (Attorney) in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by Joshua David Brysk (Attorney) scheduled for 07/25/2024 is continued to 08/01/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . The unopposed Motion by Joshua Brysk to be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiff is CONTINUED to August 1, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 24. Brysk’s proposed order submitted with the moving papers (1) does not list his client’s address in paragraph 6, and (2) indicates a “next scheduled hearing” that has already passed (in paragraph 7.) By no later than July 25, Brysk shall lodge with the clerk’s office an amended proposed order that (1) includes his client’s address and phone number, and (2) correctly indicates the next scheduled hearing (the Initial Case Management Conference on September 24, 2024.) Brysk shall serve notice of entry of this order on his client, and file proof of service by July 26.

C23-02847 CASE NAME: KRISTEN EDWARDS VS. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLN F.A.C FILED BY GENERAL MOTORS LLC ON 3/26/24 FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Defendant General Motors, LLC’s motion to strike punitive damages from the first amended complaint is granted, with leave to amend. Background The factual background of the case is addressed in the court's tentative ruling on the demurrer by General Motors, LLC ("GM"). GM also moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages primarily because Plaintiff’s fraud claim is not adequately pleaded in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint ("FAC"), the only cause of action that can support a claim for punitive damages. Legal Standards The court may strike allegations that are "irrelevant, false or improper matter" or any portion of a pleading "not drawn . . . in conformity with the laws of this state." (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a) and (b).) "A motion to strike, like a demurrer, challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint's allegations, which are assumed to be true." (Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 53 [citing Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255].) A motion to strike is properly granted when a complaint fails to allege facts to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages under the standards of Civil Code section 3294. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Fraud alone can support a claim for punitive damages as the statute is stated in the disjunctive. (Civ. Code § 3294(a) [punitive damages may be awarded based on "oppression, fraud, or malice"] ; Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1238-1239.) Analysis Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to strike does not dispute that punitive damages are not available under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code section 1790, et seq. ("Song-Beverly Act"), alleged in Plaintiff’s first through third causes of action or the fifth cause of action for violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (“UCL”). (See Civ. Code § 1794(c) [allowing award of civil penalties under that statute]; Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Indus. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [no punitives under Song-Beverly Act]; Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 611 [no private plaintiff punitive damages remedy under UCL].) Plaintiff only opposes based on the sufficiency of the fourth cause of action to state a fraud claim, but the court has concluded GM’s demurrer to that cause of action should be sustained, leaving no cause of action that supports the punitive damages claim. Consequently, the motion to strike is therefore granted.

23CV028479: NOTARO vs REYNOLDS, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Demurrer Defendant Janelle P. Santi's Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 25 Tentative Ruling - 07/19/2024 Jenna Whitman The Hearing on Demurrer Defendant Janelle P. Santi's Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint scheduled for 07/25/2024 is continued to 11/21/2024 at 03:00 PM in Department 25 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse .

C23-02863 CASE NAME: JOAO VITOR LEITE VS. CAMPOS DEMOLITION HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: COMPLAINT FROM: GUSTAVO CAMPOS FILED BY: CAMPOS, GUSTAVO *TENTATIVE RULING:* Defendant Gustavo Campos filed this demurrer on 5/28/24. As of July 8, 2024, no opposition to the demurrer has been filed, therefore, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Background The plaintiff, Joao Vitor Leite, filed a complaint on November 21, 2023, for breach of an oral contract. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant subcontracted with him to perform paving, stair, and wall work on residential property. The plaintiff alleges that he performed the work, but that defendant has not paid and owes the plaintiff over $30,000. The defendant Campos, who owns and operates Campos Demolition, filed this demurrer alleging that the plaintiff is not a licensed contractor, therefore, a demurrer mut be sustained to the complaint. Legal Standard A person or entity who falls under the definition of a contractor cannot obtain relief for non-payment if the person or entity was not a licensed contractor. Business and Professions Code section 7026 defines “contractor” as “any person who undertakes to…construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck, or demolish any building, highway, road…” (Business & Profession Code section 7026). Moreover, courts have held that a demurrer shall be sustained to a complaint for breach of contract if the plaintiff falls within the definition of a contractor under 7026 and was not licensed. (Brunzell Construction Co. v. Barton Development Co. (1966) 240 CA2d 442; Lewis & Queen vs. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal2d 141) Analysis In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he was hired to drain, pave, and perform stair and wall work on a residential property. The work the plaintiff was hired to perform falls within the definition of a “contractor” found in Business and Professions Code section 7026. The plaintiff did not allege that he was a licensed contractor at the time the work was performed or in his complaint. This failure is fatal to the complaint and the court sustains defendant’s demurrer. However, the court notes the plaintiff is self-represented. It may be the plaintiff is a licensed contractor. For this reason, the court is sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024

C22-01746 CASE NAME: ALBERT SEENO, JR. VS. ALBERT SEENO, III *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: FOR COMPLEX CASE DESIGNATION FILED BY: SEENO, ALBERT D., III *TENTATIVE RULING:* Before the Court is Defendant Albert D. Seeno III and Defendant Discovery Builders, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”)’s motion for complex case designation. The motion is opposed by Plaintiffs Albert D. Seeno, Jr. (“Seeno”), Seecon Financial & Construction Co., Inc. (“Seecon”), Seecon Built Homes, Inc. (“Seecon Built Homes”), Albert D. Seeno Construction Co. (“ADSCO”), West Coast Home Builders, Inc. (“West Coast”), North Village Development, Inc. (“North Village”), and Alsan Financial & Leasing, Inc. (“Alsan”) and (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). This hearing is scheduled along with related matters C23-00614, C23-01658, C24-00327, N24-0406, and C23-01029. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to designate this case (C22-01746) complex and consolidates it with the related matters C23-00614, C23-01658, C24-00327, N24-0406, and C23- 01029 for discovery and pretrial determinations. The Court deems case number C22-01746 complex and it is assigned for all purposes to the Honorable John P. Devine, Department 9. Analysis Defendants argue that this case is properly designated as a complex action because it will involve a large number of witnesses and documents, will involve numerous complex pretrial motions, and is likely to require coordination among different departments, counties, and courts. Plaintiffs argue that complex case designation is not appropriate because it is not complex as that term is defined by CRC 3.400. Specifically, that this case involves a “focused pool” of witnesses and documentary evidence, that any pre-trial motions will rely on relatively straightforward corporate law, and “any need for coordination with other cases only arises from Seeno III’s artificial claim splitting.” On reply, Defendants argue that the anticipated witnesses and documents are much broader than Plaintiffs suggest. They also point to the number and complexity of motions that have been heard and are scheduled in this case. A “complex case” is an action that requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the Court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the Court, the parties, and counsel. (California Rules of Court, Rule 3.400(a).) In deciding whether an action is a complex case, the Court addresses whether the action is likely to involve the following: (1) numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve; (2) management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence; (3) management of a large number of separately represented parties; (4) coordination with related actions pending in one or more Courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal Court; or (5) substantial postjudgment judicial supervision. (Id. at (b).) An action is provisionally a complex case if it involves one or more of the following types of claims: (1) antitrust or trade regulation claims; (2) construction defect claims involving many parties or structures; (3) securities claims or investment losses involving many parties; (4) environmental or toxic tort claims involving many parties; (5) claims involving mass torts; (6) claims involving class actions; or (7) insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the claims listed above. (Id. at (c).) Here, the Court finds that the case is properly designated as complex. This case has already seen a number of complex motions which have consumed significant Court resources. This is in addition to the frequent use of ex parte procedures by the parties in this case. Additionally, the parties were also given the opportunity to brief the issue of consolidation of this case with related matters including case numbers C23-00614, C23-01658, C24-00327, and C23-01029. The Court finds that consolidation is merited here. “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subd. (a).) The purpose of consolidation is to enhance trial court efficiency by avoiding unnecessary duplication of evidence and the danger of inconsistent adjudications. (See Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-979.) The consolidation of cases under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048(a) is a matter of trial court discretion. (Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 979- 980.) There is significant party and issue overlap between this case and the related matters C23-00614, C23-01658, C24-00327, and C23-01029. Consolidation would promote judicial economy. The Court reserves the issue of whether to consolidate all cases for trial and at this time consolidates for the limited purpose of discovery and pretrial matters.

23CV036056: HURWITZ vs TESLA MOTORS, INC., et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion to Reinstate Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98; filed by DAVID F. HURWITZ (Plaintiff) in Department 15 Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Peter Borkon The Motion re: Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion to Reinstate Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98 filed by DAVID F. HURWITZ on 05/23/2024 is Granted. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98 is GRANTED. The matter was ordered to arbitration on November 6, 2023. Plaintiff subsequently filed an arbitration demand with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), pursuant to the parties’ arbitration agreement, on January 2, 2024. Thereafter, AAA sent Plaintiff’s counsel (who filed the arbitration demand) and Tesla several notices concerning the arbitration and the payment of required arbitration costs. All notices to Tesla were sent to Tesla-AAA@tesla.com. On January 31, 2024, AAA notified the parties that Tesla was required to pay filing fees of $675 by March 1, 2024. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2.) Tesla did pay those fees pursuant to that notice. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3.) The parties were subsequently notified on April 10, 2024 that Telsa must pay a Case Management Fee of $1400 and an arbitrator compensation deposit of $2500, due upon receipt of that notice. The parties were further notified that if Tesla did not pay those fees by May 10, 2024, AAA may close the case and Plaintiff would have the option of proceeding with litigation of this case in court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1291.98. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 5-6.) AAA sent the parties reminder notices (on April 29, 2024 and May 6, 2024) that Tesla must pay those fees by May 10, 2024. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 7-8.) Tesla failed to pay those fees and it has therefore waived the right to compel Plaintiff to proceed with arbitration. (See Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98(a)(1).) Tesla contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under section 1281.98(a)(1) because Tesla’s counsel was never served with any communications from AAA. However, section 1281.98(a)(2) does not require that any notices be served on counsel for the parties. To the contrary, it requires only that notices be sent to “the parties”. Tesla was sent all the notices referenced above by email to Tesla-AAA@tesla.com. The fact that Tesla timely paid its filling fees pursuant to AAA’s January 31, 2024 notice is credible circumstantial evidence that Tesla received the notices sent to that email address. The Court rejects Tesla’s argument that all notices were required to be sent to its counsel SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV036056: HURWITZ vs TESLA MOTORS, INC., et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion to Reinstate Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98; filed by DAVID F. HURWITZ (Plaintiff) in Department 15 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1014. First, Tesla provides no legal authority that section 1014 applies to arbitration proceedings. Second, even if it did, it would only apply after Tesla, through its counsel, appeared in the arbitration through one of the actions described in section 1014 (e.g., filing an answer or a written notice of appearance, etc.) Tesla’s attorney provides no evidence that he did any of those things. Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 are to be strictly construed whenever the party drafting the arbitration agreement (here, Tesla) fails to pay required fees by the statutory deadline. (See Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 761, 776.) The statute does not permit an inquiry into the reason why the drafting party failed to make a required payment by the deadline. (See Williams v. West Coast Hospitals Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1074-1075 and Doe v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 346, 358-359.) Plaintiff’s counsel had no obligation to communicate with Tesla’s counsel and remind him of the deadline to pay Tesla’s arbitration fees or inquire why Tesla had not done so. (See, e.g., Espinoza, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at 772, 776.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98(a)(1), the Court finds that Tesla has waived the right to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate the claims asserted in this case. The stay of this case is lifted, and Plaintiff’s claim shall be litigated in this Court, not in arbitration. The September 10, 2024 Initial Case Management Conference will be MAINTAINED. Counsel will file their case management conference statements 15 days prior to that hearing.