Silver Edge Management, Llc A/M/A For Kingston Square Apartments V. Any And All Other Occupants, Regina Reasonover

HULL, ET AL. VS. THE CADLE COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200159 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions (“OSC”) issued on May 17, 2024, to Plaintiffs James Hull and Shirley Hull for failure to abide by California Rule of Court 3.110. Defendant Tri Counties Bank was amended into the Complaint on January 24, 2024. There has been no summons issued for Tri Counties Bank, and they have not been served. The matter is not at issue. No response to the OSC has been filed. Plaintiff James Hull appeared at the most recent hearing on July 22, 2024, and informed the Court that he intended to dismiss this matter. The Court advised Mr. Hull that the Court would vacate this OSC if the matter was properly dismissed prior to today’s hearing. No request for dismissal has been filed. Plaintiff remains in violation of CRC 3.110. Sanctions will be imposed in the amount of $250. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. Tentative Ruling on Motion for Attorney Fees: This action alleging violations of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, wrongful foreclosure, and other causes of action was filed by Plaintiff James and Shirley Hull on July 14, 2022. Plaintiffs purchased their home in 2006 with a loan from Tri-Counties Bank. BBR Investments LLC bought the loan and deed of trust in August 2016, and currently owns the mortgage note and deed of trust. The Cadle Company (“Cadle”) services the loan for BBR Investments LLC. The Cadle Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by this Court on April 15, 2024. Cadle moves now for attorney fees and costs. The motion for fees and costs is unopposed. Merits: A prevailing party is entitled to costs. CCP § 1032. “Costs” may include attorney’s fees if they are provided by contract. CCP § 1033.5(a)(10). Civil Code § 1717 provides that on any action on a contract where the contract provides for attorney’s fees, the prevailing party on the contract shall be entitled to attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. A prevailing party is defined as the party with a net recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant when neither side obtained any relief and a defendant as against a plaintiff who do not recovery any relief against defendant. CCP § 1032. Here, Cadle’s basis for recovery of attorney fees is contractual. The Deed of Trust between Borrower James and Shirley Hull, and Lender Tri Counties Bank, attached as Ex. A to the Verified Amended Compliant as Ex. 1, provides at p. 9 ¶ 14, for recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs related to the Borrower’s default for the purpose of protecting Lender’s interest in Property and Lender’s rights under the Deed of Trust. A Loan Modification Agreement was entered into on December 14, 2018, by The Cadle Company, servicing for BBR Investments, and James and Shirley Hull. The Agreement provides that it is a modification of the Loan Documents (the Note and Deed to Trust) to the extent it is inconsistent, and the remainder of the terms remain in full force and effect. (Decl. Coleman, Ex. 4, ¶ 15.) The attorney fees provision of the Deed of Trust therefore applies here, entitling Cadle to attorney fees and costs. Cadle prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. Judgment was entered in favor of Cadle and Plaintiffs received no relief. The Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party as defined by CCP § 1032. “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. “A court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.’” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1132. In determining the amount of attorney's fees to which a litigant is entitled, an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court. Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 738, 752. Cadle’s Counsel has provided a declaration and detailed billing records claiming 195.5 hours defending this suit, including time spent by two experienced attorneys at a rate of $340 per hour, and a less experienced attorney at a rate of $325 per hour. Two billing entries for paralegals at a rate of $100 and $125 per hour are also included. Defendant seeks a total of $65,583.50 in attorney fees. The Court finds Counsel’s time spent and rates are reasonable, with the following exception. The Court notes that the attorney billing records provided as Exhibit 6 to the Declaration of June Coleman include time spent on The Cadle Company’s discovery motions filed August 11, 2023, and heard on September 11, 2023. The Court’s Order on those Motions, entered on September 14, 2023, included an award of sanctions for time spent bringing the Motions and associated costs, to Defendant The Cadle Company against Plaintiffs in the amount of $4,100. The Court declines to award attorney fees for this same work a second time. The current request for attorney fees will therefore be reduced by $4,100.00 - the amount previously awarded as sanctions on the discovery motions. The memorandum of costs details reasonable costs incurred of $6,154.46. The Declaration of June Coleman submitted in support of the Statement of Non-Opposition includes a request for additional costs of $525.75 for filing fees and CourtCall, which appear reasonable and will be awarded. The Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED. The total amount awarded to The Cadle Company is $$68,163.71 in fees and costs. No proposed order has been lodged as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Moving party shall prepare the order.

23CV042566: CAMPBELL, et al. vs HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2005-4 TRUST, H..., et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; filed by HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2005-4 TRUST, HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-4 (Defendant) + in Department 16 damages.” 2. Page 18, lines 26-27: “Therefore, Plaintiffs request substantial punitive damages to be proven at trial.” 3. Page 19, lines 16-17: “Therefore, Tenant Plaintiffs request substantial punitive damages to be proven at trial.” 4. Page 21, lines 4-5: “Therefore, Tenant Plaintiffs request substantial punitive damages to be proven at trial.” 5. Page 21, lines 23-24: “Therefore, Tenant Plaintiffs request substantial punitive damages to be proven at trial.” 6. Page 24, line 28: “Tenant Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to punitive damages.” 7. Page 25, line 17: “Tenant Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to punitive damages.” 8. Page 26, line 3: “Tenant Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to punitive damages.” 9. Page 26, lines 27-28: “Tenant Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to punitive damages.” ---- If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. How Do I Contest a Tentative Ruling? Find your case in eCourt at https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov/ using “Case Search” or “Calendar Search” (after you log in) Select the Tentative Rulings Tab Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" Enter your name and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue. Select "Proceed" You must also notify the department via email (Dept16@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and opposing parties by no later than 4:00 PM, one court day before the scheduled hearing. Please provide this information to any opposing parties. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE HEARING/CONFERENCE WILL BE IN- SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV042566: CAMPBELL, et al. vs HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2005-4 TRUST, H..., et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; filed by HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2005-4 TRUST, HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-4 (Defendant) + in Department 16 PERSON WITH THE OPTION TO APPEAR REMOTELY. COUNSEL AND PARTIES MAY APPEAR EITHER IN-PERSON IN DEPARTMENT 16 AT THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING OR BY REMOTELY THROUGH THE ZOOM PLATFORM. ZOOM LOG-IN INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT 16 IS BELOW. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16024053017 Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017 One tap mobile +16692545252,,16024053017# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,16024053017# US (San Jose) -- Dial by your location • +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose) • +1 669 216 1590 US (San Jose) • +1 415 449 4000 US (US Spanish Line) • +1 646 828 7666 US (New York) • +1 646 964 1167 US (US Spanish Line) • +1 551 285 1373 US (New Jersey) • 833 568 8864 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017 Find your local number: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/u/afHtSjITt --- Join by SIP • 16024053017@sip.zoomgov.com --- Join by H.323 • 161.199.138.10 (US West) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV042566: CAMPBELL, et al. vs HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2005-4 TRUST, H..., et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; filed by HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2005-4 TRUST, HOME EQUITY ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-4 (Defendant) + in Department 16 • 161.199.136.10 (US East) Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017

THE COLONY AT CALIFORNIA OAKS MCC2000132 HOMEOWNERS vs Motion to Amend Judgment MAJESTIC ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC Tentative Ruling: This matter was originally scheduled for hearing on July 8, 2024, at which time the Court informed the parties that the Court did not have the chance to post a tentative decision. The Court continued the hearing to July 26, 2024. No further documents in support of, in opposition to, the motion have been filed. This is fraudulent conveyance action. Plaintiff The Colony at California Oaks Homeowners Association (“Association” or “Plaintiff”) alleges that Majestic Asset Management, LLC (“Majestic”) is and has been the owner of a golf course within the Association gated community since 2007. Defendants Hai Huang and Jen Huang (the “Huangs”) are alleged to be the alter ego of Majestic (collectively “Defendants”). In 2015, a judgment was entered in a prior action between the parties, Majestic Asset Management v. Pappas, Case No. RIC 1213939 (“Prior Action”), in favor of the Association and against Majestic for declaratory relief, breach of contract, permanent injunction, monetary damages, attorney fees and costs in the total sum of $583,323.20. The Court also determined the Association is entitled to the remedy of foreclosure pursuant to a 2007 Performance Deed of Trust, but the Court deferred ordering foreclosure at that time and instead entered a permanent injunction requiring Majestic to maintain the golf course property in compliance with maintenance standards, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment to order foreclosure if Majestic did not comply. On September 25, 2023, the Court amended the judgment in the Prior Action, ordering the foreclosure of the golf course property pursuant to the HOA Deed. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants encumbered the golf course property by recording a sham Deed of Trust in August 2019 in favor of defendant Tso Jen Chu in the amount of $3,468,012 (“Chu Deed”) so as to evade liability under the judgment in the Prior Action. The operative Second Amended Complaint alleges: 1) fraudulent conveyance 2) fraud; and 3) declaratory relief. Following a bench trial in September 2023, this Court issued a Final Statement of Decision on December 14, 2023 in favor of the Association and against Majestic, finding that the Chu Deed is based on fraud and therefore void. Plaintiff now moves to amend the judgment 1) deeming non-party Andrew Huang an alter ego of Majestic and the Huangs; 2) voiding the October 11, 2023 transfer of the Huangs’ residence located at 3000 Windmill Drive in Diamond Bar to their son Andrew Huang; and 3) enjoining the Huangs from any further transfers of real property held in their name, Andrew Huang, Majestic or Wintech Development, Inc. during the pendency of this litigation without a court order. Defendants oppose, arguing that there is no judgment to be amended or enforced, Andrew Huang is not a party to this litigation nor an alter ego of any of the defendants, the proposed amendment violates Andrew Huang’s due process rights, and there is no evidence of a fraudulent transfer or conduct to justify enjoining future transfers. In the Reply, Plaintiff argues that the timing of the transfer and the Huangs’ prior conduct suggests the conveyance was fraudulent in their latest attempt to prevent the Association from enforcing its rights. Analysis: Pursuant to CCP § 187, a trial court may use “all the means necessary” to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those processes are not set out in the code.” (McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owners Ass’n (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 746, 752.) This statute has been interpreted to give a trial court the jurisdiction to modify a judgment to add additional judgment debtors. (Id. at 752-753.) This includes amending a judgment against a corporation to add a nonparty alter ego as a judgment debtor. (Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 82, 102-103; Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 508.) The amendment does not add a new defendant; it merely sets forth the true name of the real defendant. (Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at 101.) The amendment lies only if the nonparty alter ego controlled the underlying litigation and was virtually represented. Absent such control, the alter ego is a true nonparty. (Minton v. Caveney (1961) 56 Cal.2d 576, 581; Hall, Goodhue, Haisley & Barker, Inc. v. Marconi Conf. Center Bd. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1555.) The judgment creditor must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the alter ego controlled the litigation. (Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology Int’l (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1017.) Control has been shown where the nonparty alter ego hired counsel to represent the corporation, was the person with whom the corporate defendant’s counsel primarily dealt, was kept fully informed of the suit’s progress, was familiar with all the issues, and helped draft documents for the litigation. (See Alexander v. Abbey of the Chimes (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 39, 46.) But control does not exist where the alter ego only supplies funds for the prosecution or defense, appears as a witness or cooperates without exerting influence over the litigation. (Minton v. Cavaney, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 581; see also Oyakawa v. Gillett (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 628, 631 (wife, who was not named as a defendant and had no control over the litigation, could not be added to the judgment against her husband despite the fact that community property was liable for the debt incurred during marriage).) There must be such “unity of interest” between the alter ego and the judgment debtor as to ensure that the alter ego’s interests were represented in the underlying litigation. (JPV I L.P. v. Koetting (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 172, 194.) To determine whether there is sufficient “unity of interest” and ownership, the court considers factors such as the commingling of funds and assets, identical equitable ownership, use of the same offices and employees, use of one as a mere shell for the other, inadequate capitalization, disregard of corporate formalities, and identical directors and officers. (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538-539.) Preliminarily, this motion is premature because a judgment has not yet been entered in this action. Though the Court issued a Final Statement of Decision, no judgment has been entered for which an “amendment” would be appropriate. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence whatsoever that Andrew Huang controlled this litigation and was virtually represented. Indeed, he was not named as a defendant and there is no evidence Andrew Huang even participated in anyway at trial or during the pendency of this action. There is also no evidence that Andrew Huang was even a shareholder, officer or director of Majestic, or any facts establishing “unity of interest” or ownership of Majestic. The only evidence Plaintiff produced in support of this motion are documents that show the Huangs transferred title to their residence to Andrew Huang, their son. (Declaration of Joseph A. Sammartino, ¶¶ 4-8, Exs. 1-4.) These facts do not show Andrew Huang is the alter ego of Majestic. Moreover, any purported fraudulent conveyance to Andrew Huang must be pleaded and proved by Plaintiff by filing a new lawsuit. The Court has no authority to amend a judgment to rule on a claim (i.e., fraudulent conveyance of the Huangs’ residence) that was never even asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. Furthermore, just because the court determined Majestic was the alter ego of the Huangs in the Prior Action does not show Majestic is also the alter ego of Andrew Huang. Plaintiff’s arguments are not well taken. The Motion to Amend the Judgment is denied.

C23-02420 CASE NAME: RUTH LEVINSON VS. CYNTHIA HO HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY: KOBLICK , JAMES *TENTATIVE RULING:* Defendants James Koblick and Jennifer Knoop Koblick demur to most of the counts in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Their formal demurrer misnumbers the FAC’s causes of action, but their brief is more careful. They do not demur to plaintiff’s first cause of action for financial elder abuse. They argue their demurrers to the second cause of action (fraud), third cause of action (negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress), and fifth cause of action (slander of title). They say they’re demurring also to the fourth cause of action (cancellation of written instrument) and sixth cause of action (quiet title), but their brief contains no separate argument as to those counts. The demurrer is overruled. The Koblicks are given to August 9 to file and serve their answer. The FAC’s Allegations SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024 All of plaintiff’s counts arise from the same narrative of allegations. Plaintiff alleges that she is elderly, dependent, and vulnerable. She alleges that during the events in question she suffered from memory loss, fatigue, immobility, depression, and social isolation, and that she was prone to neglect her own affairs (for example, failing to open her mail for weeks at a time). She alleges that the Koblicks ingratiated themselves with plaintiff, representing themselves as seeking to help vulnerable elder people. In league with co-defendant Ho (who has answered), they hatched an intentional scheme to manufacture a loan default and foreclosure so as to steal the equity in plaintiff’s home, taking advantage of her impaired state and her trust in them. The Koblicks persuaded plaintiff to take out a loan secured on her home, even though she had no need for a loan or extra cash. They allegedly assured her that they would not foreclose. When plaintiff fell modestly behind in her payments, the Koblicks recorded a notice of default, and then prevented plaintiff from realizing she faced a default by actively stealing her mail. They then arranged a foreclosure sale, in which their alleged co- conspirator Ho purchased the property for far below its actual market value. She alleges she did not understand any of this was going on until she got a check for the excess-value recovery from the foreclosure sale. Second Cause of Action (Fraud in the Inducement) The Koblicks raise two arguments in demurrer to plaintiff’s fraud count. They argue that the allegations are insufficiently detailed, and that the FAC shows that the fraud count is barred by limitations. The first argument largely blends into the second, however, as the facts that the Koblicks say are too vaguely alleged are (mostly) those relating to the dates on which the alleged fraudulent acts occurred. Taking the latter point first, therefore: The statute of limitations for a fraud claim is three years. Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d). However, “[t]he cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud….” (Id.) The complaint in this case was filed on September 25, 2023. Thus, the limitations cutoff was September 25, 2020. “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred." (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781, quoting Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.) And where a demurrer flunks that test, the demurring defendant cannot save the day by complaining that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to identify the dates at issue sufficiently. The demurrer’s limitations argument keys on the allegation that the fraudulent loan occurred in February 2019. But that is hardly the entirety of the alleged fraudulent scheme, which (as defendants acknowledge) is alleged to have occurred over the period from February 2019 to April 2023. In SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024 particular, the foreclosure – the principal form of harm alleged to have resulted from the fraud – occurred in 2023; as did the Koblicks’ alleged intentional concealment from plaintiff of the fact of her delinquency, default, and pending foreclosure (for example, by actually stealing plaintiff’s mail). Moreover, even assuming (as the demurrer does) that the only “fraud” was the original 2019 loan, defendants entirely fail to come to grips with the discovery theory of accrual dictated in § 338(d). They make no argument that the FAC proves that plaintiff must have discovered the fraudulent nature of the loan by no later than September 2020, and the FAC alleges it wasn’t discovered until after the foreclosure sale. Defendants try to combine their limitations argument with one about insufficient specificity, criticizing the FAC for not being specific enough about dates. For example, defendants argue that although they are alleged to have stolen plaintiff’s mail sometime in 2023, there is no specification of when in 2023. They offer no explanation as to how plaintiff is supposed to know or learn the specific dates on which defendants surreptitiously purloined the default notice. But that aside, who cares (for demurrer purposes) about allegations of specific dates in this connection? All one needs to know about the mail theft, for purposes of liability, is that the mail was allegedly stolen in order to conceal the default-foreclosure problem from plaintiff. And all one needs to know about the mail theft, for purposes of limitations, is that it occurred after September 2020. As for specificity: “Each element in a cause of action for fraud or negligent misrepresentation must be factually and specifically alleged. The policy of liberal construction of pleadings is not generally invoked to sustain a misrepresentation pleading defective in any material respect.” (Cadlo v. Owens- Illinois, Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519, internal citation omitted.) “[A] plaintiff must plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made.” (Wald v. TruSpeed Motorcars, LLC (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 378, 393-94, citations omitted; see also Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) Defendants attempt no serious argument otherwise as to how the fraud allegations are insufficiently detailed to withstand demurrer. The only point they raise in any detail is the assertion that plaintiff’s allegations of justifiable reliance are “hollow”. But their discussion of the point consists of recounting how reliance allegations in other published cases have fallen short – with no articulated argument that the allegations in this case are similarly deficient. The Court is satisfied with the level of specific factual allegations supporting the fraud allegations in the FAC. Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action Defendants formally demur to these two causes of action, but their brief contains no separate discussion of them. Apparently the theory is that these claims rest on fraud, and hence they fail with the second cause of action. To the contrary, they survive just as the second cause of action does. Third Cause of Action (Negligent and Intentional Emotional Distress) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024 Plaintiff oddly combines, in a single count, assertions of both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is improper; the two theories are quite distinct substantively, resting on different requirements of factual allegations – indeed, one might say, even mutually inconsistent sets of alleged facts. Defendants are correct in arguing that plaintiff alleges no viable theory of negligent infliction. As Plaintiff acknowledges, NIED is not an independent tort but, instead, a remedy available for select negligence-based claims, generally on a so-called “bystander” theory – such as witnessing your own child being hit by a negligently driven car. (See, e.g., Burgess v Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1071-72; Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 647.) Plaintiff alleges nothing remotely of that kind. And indeed, to the contrary, plaintiff’s overall theory of this case in the FAC is the opposite of a “negligence” theory: She contends that defendants’ conduct was an intentional, directed, and knowingly predatory scheme to take her home from her. There is no room in the FAC for a suggestion that any of this alleged conduct was committed “negligently”, by inadvertence or carelessness, rather than by overt wrongful intention. If defendants defrauded plaintiff and stole her home (as plaintiff contends), they did so because that was their plan and their objective, not because they weren’t paying enough attention. However, a demurrer may be sustained only if it shows the invalidity of an entire cause of action; there is no such thing as a demurrer to only part of a cause of action. (E.g., Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) If plaintiff’s third count adequately alleges a cause of action for intentional infliction, then the defective invocation of a “negligent infliction” claim can be disregarded as non-actionable surplusage. As for the IIED theory, defendants again try to piggyback on their arguments why the fraud allegations are insufficient. But they make only a cursory and ineffective argument otherwise as to the insufficiency of this count. Granted, it may be fairly assumed from plaintiff’s allegations that the Kobricks’ purpose and goal in their asserted wrongdoing were not to cause emotional distress to plaintiff as such, but rather to secure the financial gain of fleecing her of the equity in her home. But “a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) can arise from reckless disregard of the probability that [decedent] would suffer emotional distress, knowing that [she] was present when the conduct occurred”. (E.g., Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 215, 235; see CACI 1600.) Fifth Cause of Action (Slander of Title) Defendants argue that recordation of foreclosure documents on title cannot form the basis of a cause of action for slander of title, because such acts and documents are privileged under Civil Code §§ 47 and 2924 pursuant to Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331. The holding in Schep supports finding a qualified privilege under § 47(c) with respect to recordation of foreclosure documents, where there is no malice. (12 Cal.App.5th at 1338-39.) As discussed in Schep, although § 2924(d)(1) states that acts thereunder are subject to § 47 privilege, it does not specify a subpart of § 47 or the type of privilege that applies. (Id. at 1338.) Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Schep SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024 specifically states that it is not deciding that recordation of foreclosure documents is subject to the litigation privilege. (Ibid.) Schep provides that application of a privilege under § 47 depends on the allegations pertaining to intent behind Defendants’ acts and representations as provided in subpart (c). Here, the Court is holding that plaintiff has adequately alleged that the foreclosure, and hence the recordation of the foreclosure documents, were brought about by fraud. For pleading purposes, that is sufficient to support this cause of action against a defense of qualified privilege.

Case Number: 23STCV27912 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 805 WOOSTER, LLC , Plaintiff, vs. BRETT HYMAN , et al ., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV27912 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. of The Law Office of Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. (Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendant Brett Hyman. While Counsel has provided sufficient reason for withdrawal, Items 5, 6, and 7 of the proposed order (Form MC-053) are blank. If Counsel provides the Court with a revised order prior to the hearing, the Court will grant the motion.¿ Counsel is ordered to give notice of this order.¿ DATED: July 26, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

RG20071794: Portillo VS Cornejo 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Sanctions in Department 22 Tentative Ruling - 07/23/2024 Brad Seligman The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Ligia Portillo on 07/01/2024 is Granted. Plaintiffs Ligia Portillo, Leonor Martinez, Gloria Ortiz, Andres Sanchez and Luis Trujillo’s (“Plaintiffs”) Unopposed Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One), Request for Production (Set One), and Request for Production (Set Two) and for sanctions is GRANTED in its entirety. Defendant Ana M. Cornejo (“Defendant”) is ordered to provide further code-compliant responses to the discovery identified above within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Defendant is further ordered to provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with three dates that are before August 30th, 2024, on which she agrees to appear for deposition. These dates shall be provided within five (5) days of the date of this Order. If no agreeable dates prior to August 30, 2024 are provided within five (5) days of the date of this Order to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Defendant shall appear for a properly noticed deposition on any date to be unilaterally chosen by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Sanctions in the amount of $800 are imposed on Defendant (not on Defendant’s counsel). The Court additionally issues an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) as to why terminating sanctions should not be imposed. The hearing on the OSC is set for Friday October 4, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Department 22. Any papers that the parties wish to have considered at the OSC shall be filed and served on later than fourteen (14) days before the OSC hearing. At the OSC, the Court will also consider whether Defendant has appeared for her deposition prior to August 30, 2024 and whether code- compliant discovery responses (and any corresponding production of documents) have been timely served on Plaintiffs. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH eCOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20071794: Portillo VS Cornejo 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Sanctions in Department 22 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept22@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

Case Number: 23STCV28108 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. CASE NO.: 23STCV28108 MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE MOVING PARTY : Defendant Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Atlantic Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 11/15/23: Complaint filed. · 05/21/24: Dismissal entered without prejudice as to all parties and all causes of action. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to timely vacate the premises after failing to exercise an option to renew or extend the commercial lease agreement between the parties. Defendant moves to consolidate this action with three other actions. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. DISCUSSION: Defendant to consolidate this action, Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc ., Case No. 23STCV28108, with two other unlawful detainer actions with the same title, Case Nos. 23STUD14911 and 24STCV11586, and with the civil action entitled Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center Inc. v. Atlantic Management LLC , Case No. 24STCV13007. Legal Standard for Consolidation When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay . (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048(a), bold emphasis added.) Requests for Judicial Notice Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Request for Dismissal in this action and (2) the Request for Dismissal in the identically titled action with Case No. 23STUD14911. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). Procedural Requirements A motion to consolidate must satisfy the requirements of California Rules of Court Rule 3.350, which provides, in relevant part: (a) Requirements of motion (1) A notice of motion to consolidate must: (A) List all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (B) Contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, with the lowest numbered case shown first; and (C) Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. (2) The motion to consolidate: (A) Is deemed a single motion for the purpose of determining the appropriate filing fee, but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must be filed only in the lowest numbered case; (B) Must be served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all of the cases sought to be consolidated; and (C) Must have a proof of service filed as part of the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a).) Under Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.3(g), cases must be related into the same department prior to consolidation. Defendant seeks to consolidate this action, Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. , Case No. 23STCV28108, with two other unlawful detainer actions with the same title, Case Nos. 23STUD14911 and 24STCV11586, and with the civil action entitled Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center Inc. v. Atlantic Management LLC , Case No. 24STCV13007. The moving party has not listed the parties who have appeared in each case in the notice of motion, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(A). Defendant merely recites the abbreviated case names with docket numbers for each of the cases at issue. (See Notice of Motion pp.1-2.) The moving party also has not listed the names of the respective attorneys of record, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(A). The motion does not contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(B), nor has it been filed in any of the other actions as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(C). Further, Defendant has neglected to include a proof of service or provide any evidence that the motion was served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all cases, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(2)(B)-(C). Moreover, the other three actions have not been related into this department, as required by Local Rule 3.3(g). While the parties are identical across the three unlawful detainer actions and have retained the same counsel in all three cases, the civil action (Case No. 24STCV13007) names an additional party, Sergio Gutierrez, as a defendant, who is not accounted for in any of the papers. The Court therefore cannot find that Defendant has complied with the procedural requirements for a motion to consolidate. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 26, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 23STCV25637 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV25637 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendant Linda J. Maultsby, in pro per RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Mural Media LLC 401k Plan CASE HISTORY : · 10/20/23: Complaint filed. · 06/11/24: First Amended Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to permit an inspection of her rental unit which was necessary for Plaintiff to complete a sale of the property to a third party. Defendant Linda J. Maultsby demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c). The Court enters an interlocutory judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 597 that no trial of any other issues in this matter shall be had until final determination of the action titled Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby LASC Case No. 23STCV21301. // // DISCUSSION: Defendant Linda J. Maultsby demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. Legal Standard A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn, supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. ( Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, [o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true].) This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. ( Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) There is no meet and confer requirement for a demurrer in an action for unlawful detainer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(d).) Requests for Judicial Notice Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Complaint in the action entitled Mural Media LLC 401k Plan v. Maultsby , LASC Case No. 23STCV21301 filed September 1, 2023 (hereafter, the First Action); (2) the First Amended Complaint in that same action filed March 14, 2024; (3) Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint in that action; (4) Defendants Request for Judicial Notice in support of her demurrer to that action; and (5) the Courts May 13, 2024 Ruling sustaining Defendants demurrer without leave to amend. Defendant also requests, in support of her reply, that the Court take judicial notice of this demurrer. Defendants requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Notice of Appeal filed on July 16, 2024 in the First Action. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). // Res Judicata & Abatement Defendant demurs to the First Amended Complaint on the grounds that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar any unlawful detainer claims grounded in the two Notices attached to the First Amended Complaint. However, although Defendant references the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, her arguments only address claim preclusion, also known as res judicata. The Court therefore refuses to consider Defendants collateral estoppel contention and will confine its analysis to res judicata. In determining the validity of a res judicata plea, the questions to be resolved are (1) whether the claim decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one in the current action; (2) whether there was a final judgment on the merits in the previous adjudication; and (3) whether the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. ( Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Assn (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 813.) The First Action, filed on September 1, 2023, originally alleged a single cause of action for unlawful detainer premised on a Three-Day Notice to Quit allegedly served on August 24, 2023. Plaintiff then amended the complaint in the First Action to allege unlawful detainer based on (1) an August 24, 2023 Notice to Quit for failure to permit inspection of Defendants unit; and (2) a February 29, 2024 Three Day Notice to Quit following a foreclosure sale. The Court sustained Defendants Demurrer in the First Action without leave to amend on May 13, 2024, on the grounds that the August 24, 2023 notice was defective and could not be cured by the second notice. (Defendants RJN Exh. E.) In the meantime, Plaintiff filed this action on October 20, 2023, alleging a claim for unlawful detainer premised on an August 11, 2023 Three Day Notice to Quit and an August 24, 2023 Three Day Notice to Quit, both for failure to permit inspection of Defendants Unit. (Complaint ¶ 17, Exh. 2.) Only the August 24, 2023 Notice was attached to the original Complaint. ( Id. ) Thereafter, Plaintiff amended the Complaint to allege unlawful detainer based on (1) an August 24, 2023 Notice to Quit for failure to permit inspection of Defendants unit; and (2) a February 29, 2024 Three Day Notice to Quit following a foreclosure sale, though the text of the Amended Complaint states that the Three-Day Notice was actually given on March 1, 2024. (FAC ¶¶ 24, 28, Exhs. 2, 4.) Defendant forcefully argues that the First Amended Complaint in this action is asserting the same claims that were asserted in the First Action filed in September 2023, as both Amended Complaints assert two causes of unlawful detainer premised on the same Notices to Quit. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that res judicata cannot apply to bar Plaintiffs claims in this action for two reasons: (1) the judge in the First Action did not rule that the second February 29, 2024 Notice to Quit was deficient, instead ruling that the action could not be pursued for procedural reasons; and (2) the judgment in the First Action is not final, as Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the ruling sustaining Defendants demurrer in that case. (Plaintiffs RJN Exh. 1.) Neither argument saves Plaintiffs action from demurrer. Contrary to Plaintiffs contentions, the Court in the First Action made a ruling on the merits of that action, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing the action. (Exh E, Minute Order in Case No. 23STCV21301, entered May 13, 2024, p. 3.) The bases for the Order were twofold. First, the Court held the first August 24, 2023 Notice to Quit constituted invalid notice because it failed to identify the real party in interest and could not provide a legally valid foundation for the unlawful detainer action. Second, the Court in the First Action found that the unlawful detainer action was fatally flawed in that it could not be grounded on a subsequent notice to quit served as a substitute for the prior defective notice. (Exh E, May 13, 2024 Minute Order in Case No. 23STCV21301, p. 3.) These are rulings invalidating the First Action on the merits because of its improper reliance on the two attached Notices to Quit. As these are the same Notices to Quit attached to the Complaint in this action, the prior ruling acts as a bar to re-litigation of these claims in this case. The Court finds greater force in Plaintiffs argument that finality is lacking. A judgment is not final for res judicata purposes until appeals have been exhausted or the time to appeal has expired. ( Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1171.) In reply, Defendant concedes that the judgment was not final, but argues that, in any event, the Court should abate this action pending resolution of that appeal because the First Action concerns the same issues. The Court concurs. A plea in abatement, without disputing the justness of plaintiff's claim, objects to the place, mode, or time of asserting it and requires pro hac vice that the judgment be given for the defendant, leaving it open to renew the suit in another place, or form, or at another time. ( V & P Trading Co. v. United Charter, LLC (2012) 212 Cal. App. 4th 126, 133 [citation omitted].) The proper mode of abatement in such a case is a stay of the action that may be lifted if and when the reason for abatement dissipates. ( People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 771 [Where abatement is required, the second action should be stayed, not dismissed.]; see also County of Santa Clara v. Escobar (2016) 244 Cal. App. 4th 555, 565 -568 [discussing supporting authorities].) Because the First Amended Complaint in this action raises the same issues regarding identical claims as the First Action, which remains pending, the Court will sustain Defendants demurrer without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c) and enter an interlocutory judgment abating this case until final determination of the First Action. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c). The Court enters an interlocutory judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 597 that no trial of any other issues in this matter shall be had until final determination of the action titled Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby LASC Case No. 23STCV21301. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.