Green Richard &Amp; Trent V. Jacob Bluhm, Cierra Bluhm, All Other Occupants

Case Number: BC452244 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER BC452244 MOTION Motions to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas MOVING PARTY Assignee Adam Harari OPPOSING PARTIES Judgment Debtor Dalia Nosrati MOTION In two separate motions, assignee Adam Harari (Harari) moves to compel compliance with subpoenas Harari purportedly served on Bank of America, N.A. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Deponents). Judgment Debtor Dalia Nosrati (Nosrati) responds to the motions. ANALYSIS Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides, If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party or a witness] . . . may make an order . . . directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) Assignee did not personally serve the motions on Deponents, as required. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1346 [A written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record].) Accordingly, the motions are denied. Further, the parties have apparently agreed Deponents are to produce responsive documents subject to the protective order this court entered in its July 1, 2024 order. As such, the motions are moot and are denied on that basis as well. Nosrati is to notify Deponents of the withdrawal of objections to the subpoenas within 30 days. Harari is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.

Case Number: BC722308 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 61 NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL TENTATIVE Plaintiff Nike USA, Inc.s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Defendants to provide notice. DISCUSSION The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute. Section 657 sets out seven grounds for such a motion: (1) [i]rregularity in the proceedings; (2) [m]isconduct of the jury; (3) [a]ccident or surprise; (4) [n]ewly discovered evidence; (5) [e]xcessive or inadequate damages; (6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence; and (7) [e]rror in law. [Citation.] (Montoya v. Barragan (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and Cross-Complainant Nike USA, Inc. (Nike) moves for a new trial on three of the above grounds: irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors of law. Nikes argument based on procedural irregularity is based on the courts purported lack of consideration of its objections to its statement of decision. (Motion at pp. 1213.) Nike argues for insufficiency of the evidence, based on purportedly contradictory findings that neither Nike nor Defendants and Cross-Complainants 5860 West Jefferson, LLC, 5860 West Jefferson I, LLC, and Samitaur Constructs (Defendants) had prevailed on their respective claims for damages based on construction delay, and on other issues. (Motion at pp. 1320.) Nike finally argues that the statement of decision contains errors of law in the application of the burden of proof under the lease agreement, and fails to adequately set forth any declaration of the parties rights under the lease. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Defendants in opposition argue that the present motion exceeds the page limit articulated in California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1113. (Opposition at p. 9.) They further contend that the present motions memorandum, declaration, and supporting evidence were filed and served tardily. (Opposition at pp. 89.) Defendant argues that Nikes objections to the statement of decision were late, and that the court in any event had notice of Nikes objections from its earlier-filed Request for Statement of Decision. (Opposition at pp. 1011.) Defendants argue that the courts statement of decision was based on substantial evidence and contains no errors of law. (Opposition at pp. 1118.) Plaintiffs memorandum exceeds the page limits prescribed by CRC Rule 3.1113. That rule states that no opening or responding memorandum except in summary judgment motions may exceed 15 pages, excluding the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Excluding these last matters, Plaintiffs memorandum here extends to 21 pages. A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).) The memorandum and supporting materials are also actually late. Nikes notice of intent to move for new trial was filed on May 28, 2024. Per Code of Civil Procedure § 659a, the party seeking new trial shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion within 10 days of filing the notice [of intention to move for a new trial]. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) Although Nike filed the memorandum and supporting declaration by the June 7, 2024 deadline, it did not serve them until June 8 (Evans Decl. ¶ 8), and did not file or serve the supporting evidence until June 10. These timelines are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 342), and the statute provides courts the power, for good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties to extend the period for filing and serving materials for an additional period not to exceed 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) A court may retroactively extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not seek an extension in advance. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.) Here, in the absence of prejudice shown by Defendants arising from the tardiness of service of the memorandum and supporting evidence, the court will exercise its discretion to assess the motion on its merits. Nike argues that the entry of judgment on the statement of decision evidenced irregularity in the proceedings, because the court entered judgment on May 14, 2024, in the erroneous belief that Nikes objections had not been timely filed, when in fact Nike had until May 16, 2024, to file such objections. Nikes argument as to the timing of the objections is persuasive. The proposed statement of decision not captioned proposed, but identified as such in its opening paragraph was filed and served on April 26, 2024. Per CRC Rule 3.1590, subd. (g), [a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment. 15 days after service of the statement of decision would have been May 11, a Saturday, rendering the deadline for filing objections Monday, May 13, 2024. Yet because the statement of decision was served by mail, the time for filing of objections was extended by five calendar days, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 1013, subd. (a). Thus the deadline by which to serve objections was May 16, 2024. Nikes objections were served on May 14, 2024, the same day the court entered judgment on the proposed statement of decision in the belief that no objections had been timely filed. (See 5/14/2024 Minute Order.) However, Nike has suffered no prejudice resulting from the claimed irregularity. In granting a new trial based on judicial error, [p]rejudice is required . . . and there is no discretion to grant a new trial for harmless error. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.) Before Nike filed its objections to the statement of decision, it filed on May 8, 2024, a Request for Statement of Decision, taking issue with what Nike termed procedural ambiguities in the statement of decision and itemizing 87 issues, questions, and arguments for the court to consider. The court considered these issues in its order dated May 14, 2024, and found that its proposed statement of decision sufficiently addresses the evidence and legal and factual issues raised by Nike. (5/14/2024 Minute Order.) The issues raised in Nikes request for statement of decision parallel the objections it later offered, and were considered by the court. This is thus unlike the case in Raville v. Singh (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1130, cited by Nike, in which a different judge signed off on a statement of decision after the judge who had authored the tentative version had died. The same judge here held trial, prepared a proposed statement of decision, reviewed Nikes arguments, and entered judgment. As to insufficiency of the evidence, Nike contends that the courts decision does not support its conclusion that the premises were substantially complete on July 28, 2018. (Motion at pp. 1415.) However, the statement of decision notes that the City issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on July 28, 2018. (Statement of Decision (SOD) at p. 6.) The court noted that it was necessary to determine whether the BSC [base shell and core] or tenant improvements were completed to the extent that only punchlist items remained and whether any remaining uncompleted items adversely affected Nikes use of the property. (Ibid.) The court cited the myriad photos of the construction, and determined no items remained to be addressed which adversely affected Nikes occupancy. (Ibid.) The courts finding was supported by substantial evidence, as noted by Defendants in opposition. (Opposition at p.13.) Nike argues that this courts findings that neither Nike nor Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claims as to who caused the delay are inherently contradictory, because one party must have caused the delay. (Motion at p. 16.) Yet this argument fails to reckon with the applicable burden of proof. The parties each bore the burden to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. to present evidence, which when weighed with contrary evidence, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth. (City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 .) But if two parties make conflicting showings of culpability for the same event, and both showings are equally persuasive, then neither has shown that theirs has the greater probability of truth, and neither has met their burden. The courts statement of decision on the causes of the delay addresses all material disputes and is supported by substantial evidence. Although Nike argues that the court was required to make findings as to the cause of each period of delay, it presents no authority holding that such detail is required. (Motion at pp. 1618.) The applicable authority suggests otherwise: A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163.) The statement of decision meets this standard. Nike further argues that the courts finding as to the tardiness of its request to rent parking spaces under the lease was erroneous. This argument is as follows: The lease provides that Nike could exercise an option to certain parking spaces by the commencement of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date. (Motion Exh. 81, Addendum ¶ 54.1.) Nike cites evidence that it provided notice of its intent to rent 123 monthly parking passes in an email dated January 23, 2020. (Motion Exh. T.) And because Nike had 18 months to request the parking until February 1, 2020, given a commencement date of July 28, 2018 Nike argues that no substantial evidence supports the courts finding that Nikes request was untimely. (Motion at pp. 1819.) The lease, however, did not give Nike until the end of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date to seek the parking spaces. The lease instead set the deadline at the commencement of the eighteenth month i.e., until January 1, 2020. Nike thus did not have until February 1, 2020,to rent the parking spaces, and by this reckoning, Nikes January 23, 2020 request was untimely, and the courts reasoning stands. Nikes argument as to the breach of warranty claim is also unpersuasive, as the courts findings as to the condition of the roof was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the parties were aware of the susceptibility of the roof to leaks, yet requested the type of roof at issue anyway. (SOD at p. 7.) The court found no evidence of structural defects, and that the Defendants had maintained and addressed the leaks that Nike identified. (Ibid.) Nikes arguments as to errors of law, meanwhile, are similarly unavailing. Nike argues that the court misapplied the burden of proof, because under the lease, any delay was attributed to Defendants unless proven to be caused by Nike. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Yet Nike identifies no provision of the lease attributing delayed substantial completion to Defendants by default. It identifies a provision of an attached work letter stating that the date of substantial completion shall be deemed to be . . . the date on which the Tenant Improvements would have been Substantially completed if no such a . . . Delay had occurred, provided that the delay was caused by the lessee (Nike). (Motion at pp. 2021, citing Motion Exh. 81, at pp. 6465.) This provision does not purport to create a presumption of either partys default for the cause of delay, or to affect the ordinary burden of proof applicable to a breach of contract action. Nike further identifies provisions indicating that time was of the essence, and setting a date for completion of construction, but once more, these provisions do not purport to assign a presumption of fault for the delay to Defendants. (Motion at p. 22, citing Motion Exh. 81 at p. 65.) Finally, Nike argues that the statement of decision rendered judgment in favor of Defendants on their declaratory relief cause of action, without offering the actual declaration of rights requested, or a contrary declaration to what Nike requested in its Complaint. (Motion at p. 25.) Nike relies on the case Kroff v. Kroff (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 404, in which the court stated: A dispute existed as to the meaning of a document and the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration of her rights. It was the duty of the court to set forth the meaning and effect of the clause in question. Here the court merely adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by her said cause of action, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff. (Id. at p. 405.) The present case is distinguishable, as the court here did not merely adjudge that plaintiff take nothing and defendants prevail, but offered a statement of decision explaining the facts of the case and its reasoning. Nike sought a declaration that the property was not substantially complete as of the date of the complaint, that its obligation to pay rent had not begun, that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate correction and completion of all incomplete or defective aspects of the property, and it is entitled to free rent for a number of days determined by the court. (FAC ¶ 57.) Yet these prayers for relief were addressed by the courts determination that the property was substantially complete as of July 28, 2018. (SOD at p. 6.) The motion is therefore DENIED.

ACE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION MAA Desert Hospitality, Inc.’s Petition to PSC1908271 INC vs MAA PALM DESERT Correct or Vacate Arbitration Award HOSPITALITY INC Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing will be conducted.

PSC2004313 SANCHEZ vs LUTHER Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Tentative Ruling: Grant. The Court will sign the proposed order lodged with the Court on June 17, 2024. Counsel are reminded that they are not relieved until proof of service of the Court’s signed order upon Defendant is filed with the Court.

AGUINA VS CRAWFORD MCC1901351 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REAL ESTATE SERVICES AGUINA VS CRAWFORD JOINDER TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY MCC1901351 REAL ESTATE SERVICES JUDGMENT Tentative Ruling: Grant Defendant’s requests for judicial notice. Deny Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. Grant the motion as to all five causes of action. Deny Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Corporation’s motion for joinder as it is untimely. I. Late Opposition Plaintiff’s opposition was not filed until July 2 and 3 – only four and five days before the hearing, respectively. No memorandum of points and authorities was filed at all. Under CCP §437c(b)(2), all opposition papers must be served on the moving party and filed with the court at least 14 days before the date set for hearing on the motion, unless the court shortens the time for good cause shown. Here, no good cause has been shown and the court did not shorten the time required to file an opposition. Thus, Plaintiff’s opposition is untimely. A court has discretion to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.) If the court decides to consider late-filed papers, circumstances may require a continuance of the hearing to allow the moving party an opportunity to reply to matters contained therein. (See Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 CA4th 614, 623 (dictum) (disapproved on other grounds by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 C4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6).) The court does consider the late-filed papers as even with these documents, the motion is still properly granted. Thus, there is no prejudice to Defendants if the court considers the documents filed in Opposition. The documents filed in Opposition do not provide any admissible evidence. The issues with the requests for judicial notice are discussed in the next section. The response to the separate statement indicates where Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ assertions, but there is no evidence provided in support. Plaintiff references documents (which are not properly judicially noticed) and makes various statements that are unsupported by a declaration or any other evidence. As a result, no evidence is provided in support of the Opposition meaning Plaintiff has not shown any triable issues of material fact. II. Joinder Defendants Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Service Corporation filed a joinder to the MSJ on June 20, 2024. This joinder includes a memorandum of points and authorities, a separate statement 1, a list of exhibits, request for judicial notice, and declaration of Leonel Tapia. However, 75 days’ notice is required on a motion for summary judgment. (CCP §437c(a).) The motion and accompanying documents were not mailed until June 5, 2024. This does not comply with the 75- day notice requirement. Accordingly, the court does not grant the joinder. Where the moving party notices the hearing in less than the required time, notice must begin anew. The court cannot cure this defect by continuing the hearing for the missing number of days. (Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 CA4th 1258, 1268.) Deny. III. Request for Judicial Notice Generally, a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, the date it was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction and the legally operative language as long as there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 743, 755.) The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 1-8. The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 9-11 under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). GRANTED. Plaintiff makes sixteen (16) requests for judicial notice. Requests 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are properly judicially noticed under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). However, a party requesting judicial notice of any materials under Evid. Code §§ 452 or 453 must provide the court and each opposing party with copies of the material to be so noticed. (CRC 3.1306(c); see Evid. Code § 453; Creed-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 CA4th 488, 519-520—although ordinance qualified for judicial notice under Evid. Code § 452, request properly denied due to insufficient information given under Evid. Code § 453.) Plaintiff did not provide copies of any of the documents they request the court to take judicial notice of. The remaining requests (not court records) are not properly subject to judicial notice. The court therefore denies all of Plaintiff’s requests. IV. First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract “A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1031.) A contact will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite for the court to ascertain the parties’ obligations and to determine whether there has been a breach. (Bustamante v. Intuit Inc. (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 199, 209.) To plead a cause of action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may attach a copy of the written contract and incorporate it by reference or plead the terms verbatim or the legal effect of the contract. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) In the Fifth Amended Complaint (FAC), plaintiff alleges he entered into a written contract with Defendants on November 7, 2013, whereby Defendants agreed to and loaned Plaintiff $500,000 to develop the property. (¶13.) Then, in “mid 2016,” Plaintiff requested and received an extension on the loan, as well as an additional loan to be securitized by the property in the amount of $275,000. (¶15.) Plaintiff asserts Defendants agreed to the loan if Plaintiff met three conditions: (1) an appraisal of the property; (2) Plaintiff obtain a dismissal of a recorded abstract of judgment from a Family Law matter; and (3) Plaintiff acquire title insurance for the new loan. (¶16.) The FAC alleges all of these conditions were met. (¶16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “breached their promise and commitment to give Plaintiff the additional funding and denied the loan.” (¶16.) Defendants argue this claim fails for five distinct reasons. First, Defendants assert it is undisputed that no lender ever spoke a word to Plaintiff, either before or after the $500,000 loan was funded, during the foreclosure process, or after the 1 “Each moving party shall support [the] motion for summary judgment with a separate statement.” Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 636. Here, Crawford and Shoshone filed their own separate statement and evidence so this was complied with. foreclosure process. Thus, there was no agreement between Plaintiff and lenders for an additional $275,000 loan. (SUMF No. 11.) The evidence Defendants provide in support of this material fact is sufficient to meet Defendants’ initial burden. As noted above, Plaintiff has not provided any admissible evidence in support of the Opposition. As a result, the motion is properly granted. Second, Defendants assert Plaintiff did not meet the second requirement to obtain the additional loan because he failed to obtain a dismissal or release of the abstract of judgment in the family law case. Defendants provide evidence in support of this material fact which, again, is not rebutted by Plaintiff. Third, Defendants argue the alleged oral agreement to loan money is not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Civil Code §1624(a)(7) states: “The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent… A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money or to grant or extend credit, in an amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person engaged in the business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or extending credit. For purposes of this section, a contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money secured solely by residential property consisting of one to four dwelling units shall be deemed to be for personal, family, or household purposes.” The FAC notes the property was undeveloped and not residential in nature. (¶8.) Thus, the statute of frauds applies and any alleged oral agreement to the purported loan is unenforceable. Fourth, Defendants argue the alleged loan for $275,000 is not specific enough to be an enforceable agreement. Defendants note there is no allegation as to the terms of repayment, making it too uncertain to enforce under Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 CalApp.3d 103, 115. 2 There is no evidence before the court of any terms of repayment of the alleged $275,000 loan, making it unenforceable. Fifth, Defendants argue the claim is outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations for a breach of oral contract under CCP §339(1). The FAC alleges Defendants breached their promise to loan Plaintiff the additional $275,000 on May 3, 2017. The initial Complaint was not filed under October 29, 2019. This is outside the statute of limitations and makes the claim improper. For all of these reasons, the motion is granted as to the breach of contract claim. V. Second Cause of Action – Promissory Estoppel Promissory estoppel is a doctrine that employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced. (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310.) A promissory estoppel claim requires proof of the same elements as a cause of action for breach of contract, except for consideration. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 903.) The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1672.) 2 “’[a] loan commitment is not binding on the lender unless it contains all of the material terms of the loan, and either the lender's obligation is unconditional or the stated conditions have been satisfied. When the commitment does not contain all of the essential terms ... the prospective borrower cannot rely reasonably on the commitment, and the lender is not liable for either a breach of the contract or promissory estoppel.’ (9 Miller & Starr, op. cit. supra, § 28.4, at p. 8, fn. omitted.) The material terms of a loan include the identity of the lender and borrower, the amount of the loan, and the terms for repayment.” This claim also fails for many of the same reasons stated above. The terms of the alleged loan agreement are uncertain as there are no specified repayment terms. There is evidence no lender ever communicated with Plaintiff in making this alleged loan agreement. This claim also falls outside the two-year statute of limitations. Since the claim for breach of contract fails, the claim for promissory estoppel also fails. VI. Third Cause of Action – Tortious Interference with Contract The elements of a cause of action for the intentional interference contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.) “To establish the claim, the plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the primary purpose of disrupting the contract, but must show the defendant's knowledge that the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his or her action.” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1148.) It is well established that corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of a corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24.) “The tort duty not to interfere with the contract falls only on strangers – interlopers who have no legitimate interest in the scope or course of the contract’s performance.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 513.) Plaintiff alleges he entered into a valid purchase agreement with Robert S. Dickens for the purchase of the lots on September 4, 2019, for a purchase price of $675,000. (FAC ¶46.) Plaintiff alleges he gave actual notice of the opened escrow and purchase agreement to Defendants on September 10, 2019. (¶47.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendants intentionally submitted excessive payment demands to escrow to thwart the closing of escrow and effectuate a non- judicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. (¶48.) Defendants present evidence that escrow’s closing date was set for December 4, 2019, which was after the scheduled Trustee’s sale on November 1, 2019. Defendants present evidence that the lenders did not agree to accept the purchase price of $675,000 as payment of the balance due under the loan which was in excess of $713,000. (Hermansen Decl. ¶22.) The evidence before the court shows the lenders carried out the Trustee’s sale as planned, which was lawful. This is evidence that Defendants’ actions were not designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and the alleged buyer. Defendants have met their initial burden and Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show a triable issue of material fact. VII. Fourth Cause of Action – Quiet Title A quiet title action seeks to establish an interest in real property as between adverse claimants. (Deutsche Bank National Trust v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 201) The elements are: (1) the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land; and (2) defendant claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff. (South Shore Land Co. v. Peterson (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 740- 741.) A quiet title complaint must be verified and must include: (a) a description of the property; (b) the title of the plaintiff as which a determination is sought and the basis of the title; (c) the adverse claims to the title of plaintiff against which a determination is sought; (d) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (e) a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against adverse claims. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §761.020.) Tender is generally a necessary element for a mortgagor to maintain a cause of action to quiet title against the mortgagee. (See Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1372; Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86-87.) The FAC seeks a declaration that Plaintiff is the title owner of record for the property as to the effective date of November 4, 2019. (¶53.) The FAC asserts Plaintiff is willing and able to tender the amount owed to Defendants. (¶54.) “The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title. [Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations. [Citations.] An inquiry into the underlying theory requires the court to identify the nature (i.e., the ‘gravamen’) of the cause of action. [Citation.]” (Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2 Cal. App. 5th 421, 428.) As discussed above, the underlying theory of Plaintiff’s case (breach of contract/promissory estoppel) violates the two-year statute of limitations for an oral agreement. Thus, this claim also is barred by the statute of limitations. VIII. Fifth Cause of Action – Wrongful Foreclosure The elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim are: (1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering. (Lona v.Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104.) A party challenging a foreclosure must make full tender to establish his or her ability to purchase the property. (United States Cold Storage v. Greater Western Savings & Loan (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1225.) While it is not always necessary to establish tender to prevent a foreclosure, the borrower must show that he or she tendered the full amount of indebtedness in order to set aside a foreclosure sale that has already occurred. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1053-1054.) Plaintiff’s claim that the foreclosure was improper is rooted in the purported $275,000 loan commitment. As discussed, any alleged agreement of this loan is not enforceable. Accordingly, the unfounded allegation of breach of contract cannot be the basis for the wrongful foreclosure claim. The evidence before the court shows the foreclosure was properly executed. (SUMF 54- 59.) There is no admissible evidence included with the Opposition, so Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 10, 2024 line 5. PLAINTIFF SARAH LEWIS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is DENIED. There is no proof of service on file and motion is not supported by evidence. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

23CV02548 SHAW v. SHAW (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE The unopposed motion is granted. Mr. Singer will be appointed as the partition referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Case No. 19CV02702 RHOADS v. BECKLEY APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING/OSC FOR SALE OF DWELLING This application is continued as discussed below. The original application, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.740 through 704.850, was filed on January 26, 2023. For a variety of reasons, the application was continued and not ruled upon. When the application was filed, Mr. Beckley was without counsel and the court noted procedural as well as notice issues with the application, resulting in continuances. Mr. Beckley then retained counsel, Thornton Davidson, on June 29, 2023. Mr. Davidson sought to be relieved as counsel on May 8, 2024. The declaration in support of Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved noted the next court date as June 11, 2024. The court issued a tentative ruling the day before the June 11 hearing, tentatively granting the motion to be relieved and specifically continuing the application for sale of dwelling to allow defendant to either retain new counsel or participate in a pro per capacity. The parties were ordered to appear. At the June 11 hearing, attended by Mr. Davidson and plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Eschen, Page 1 of 2 the court granted Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved and set July 11, 2024 as the next hearing date. Mr. Beckley did not attend the June 11, 2024 hearing, nor is there evidence before the court that he was notified of the July 11, 2024 date. The order prepared by Mr. Davidson after the hearing and served on Mr. Beckley stated that the tentative ruling became the order of the court. While the order attached the tentative ruling, there is no mention in either the order or the tentative ruling of the July 11, 2024 hearing date for the application. The tentative ruling specified that the application hearing would be set at the next court date. The court will issue an order to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.770, subdivision (a). “After the judgment creditor has filed an application for an order for sale, the court sets a time and place for hearing and must order the judgment debtor to show cause why an order for sale should not be made in accordance with the application. The hearing must be set no later than 45 days after the application is filed, or such later time as the court orders on a showing of good cause.” (2 MB Practice Guide: CA Debt Collection 17.36 (2024).) After the OSC is set, Mr. Rhoads must serve on the judgment debtor, Mr. Beckley, a copy of the OSC, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearing in the form required by the Judicial Council. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.770, subd. (b).) Page 2 of 2

Case Number: 20STCV03304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 74 MOVING PARTY: Defendants RRM Properties, Ltd. and Robertsons Ready Mix, Ltd. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Motion for Leave to Supplement List of Expert Witnesses The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply in connection with this motion. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority filed its complaint in eminent domain against defendants RRM Properties, Ltd.; H.D. Nogle & Sons, Inc.; Helena A. Hartfield; Frank K. Lyon; Ben Shiffman; William G. Isaac; Consolidated Rock Products Co.; Calmat Co.; Roberts Ready Mix, Ltd.; and all persons known or unknown, on January 27, 2020. Plaintiff seeks to acquire various property interests belonging to Defendants according to its power of eminent domain under the Public Utilities Code, section 130050 et seq., for the Rosencrans/Marquardt Grade Separation Project and for public transportation purposes and all uses necessary, incidental or convenient thereto. (Compl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1 [description of property interests].) Three defendants did not answer, and five have been dismissed. The remaining two, RRM Properties, Ltd. and Robertsons Ready Mix, Ltd. (together Defendants) answered on March 11, 2020. Jury trial is set for August 19, 2024. On May 23, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for an order granting leave to supplement its list of expert witnesses. They seek to designate Michael Orozco, P.E., a civil engineer employed by RRM, as an expert witness for examination at trial. On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On July 1, 2024, Defendants replied. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1258.290 governs the amendment of an expert witness list post-exchange in an eminent domain proceeding. The section permits the court to grant leave for such an amendment if the court finds that such party has made a good faith effort to comply with Sections 1258.210 to 1258.260, inclusive, that he has complied with Section 1258.270, and that by the date of exchange he: (1) Would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call such witness or discovered or listed such opinion or data; or (2) Failed to determine to call such witness or to discover or list such opinion or data through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1258.290(a).) In making a determination under [section 1258.290], the court shall take into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied on the list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data and will be prejudiced if the witness is called or the testimony concerning such opinion or data is given. ( Id. , subd. (b).) DISCUSSION 1. Compliance with Sections 1258.210 through 1258.260 Defendants argue they made good-faith efforts to comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1258.210 through 1258.260 and have complied with section 1258.270. Plaintiff does not directly contest their actual compliance prior to the date of the hearing, and it is not necessary for the Court to examine their compliance to dispose of this motion. Plaintiff prevails on other grounds in particular, Defendants failure to exercise diligence, discussed below. 2. Reasonable Diligence or Mistake The Code requires the Court to find that Defendants could not have uncovered the need for their proposed expert with due diligence, or that they failed to initially designate their expert due to mistake, inadvertence, etc. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1258.290(a)(1)-(2).) Defendants have not shown either. Defendants repeatedly argue they would have produced Orozco as their person most knowledgeable for deposition, but Plaintiff did not proceed with that deposition, which Defendants contend shows Defendants complied in good faith with the expert exchange statutes. (Mot., 2:25; Madueno Decl., ¶ 24.) But Defendants willingness to produce Orozco as a PMK (a fact witness) is not the same as designating him as an expert. Defendants do not explain why Plaintiff had to take Orozcos deposition in order for Defendants to identify him as an expert. Defendants counsels declaration establishes that numerous depositions took place and, in particular, depositions of other expert witnesses from at least January 4, 2023. (Madueno Decl., ¶ 10 [I took the deposition of Metros designated fixtures and equipment appraisal expert].) Defendants do not explain why, if as they anticipate Orozco will be testifying as a fact witness, and they had considered which experts will testify, they did not further designate Orozco as an expert witness, or did not move to supplement earlier. In short, Defendants could have uncovered the need for Orozcos designation earlier by exercising due diligence. Defendants have also not shown mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Counsel testifies [n]either [she] nor [her] office intentionally or knowingly failed to designate Orozco as an expert. (Madueno Decl., ¶ 23.) This is not the standard. Lack of intent is not the same as excusable neglect. The Court must make one of the findings described in section 1258.290, subdivisions (a)(1) and (2), in order to grant Defendants motion. The Court cannot do so. Defendants motion must be denied. 3. Reliance and Prejudice a. Reliance The statutory date for expert exchange was November 16, 2022, more than eighteen months ago. Plaintiff has spent a year and a half preparing for trial while relying on Defendants designation list. This reliance is substantial, particularly given that the case is set for trial only forty-one (41) days from the date of this ruling. b. Prejudice Defendants apparently intend to call Orozco at trial based on his percipient knowledge of relevant facts. But Defendants have already designated an expert James Roberts to testify to the opinions he formed based on Orozcos personal knowledge. If Orozco is also permitted to testify to the same, Defendants will be permitted to duplicate their expert testimony and bolster the credibility of a fact witness, to Plaintiffs detriment and on short notice. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants motion. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.