Wells Fargo Bank V Gregory Hagen

23CV02548 SHAW v. SHAW (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE The unopposed motion is granted. Mr. Singer will be appointed as the partition referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Case No. 19CV02702 RHOADS v. BECKLEY APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING/OSC FOR SALE OF DWELLING This application is continued as discussed below. The original application, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.740 through 704.850, was filed on January 26, 2023. For a variety of reasons, the application was continued and not ruled upon. When the application was filed, Mr. Beckley was without counsel and the court noted procedural as well as notice issues with the application, resulting in continuances. Mr. Beckley then retained counsel, Thornton Davidson, on June 29, 2023. Mr. Davidson sought to be relieved as counsel on May 8, 2024. The declaration in support of Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved noted the next court date as June 11, 2024. The court issued a tentative ruling the day before the June 11 hearing, tentatively granting the motion to be relieved and specifically continuing the application for sale of dwelling to allow defendant to either retain new counsel or participate in a pro per capacity. The parties were ordered to appear. At the June 11 hearing, attended by Mr. Davidson and plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Eschen, Page 1 of 2 the court granted Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved and set July 11, 2024 as the next hearing date. Mr. Beckley did not attend the June 11, 2024 hearing, nor is there evidence before the court that he was notified of the July 11, 2024 date. The order prepared by Mr. Davidson after the hearing and served on Mr. Beckley stated that the tentative ruling became the order of the court. While the order attached the tentative ruling, there is no mention in either the order or the tentative ruling of the July 11, 2024 hearing date for the application. The tentative ruling specified that the application hearing would be set at the next court date. The court will issue an order to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.770, subdivision (a). “After the judgment creditor has filed an application for an order for sale, the court sets a time and place for hearing and must order the judgment debtor to show cause why an order for sale should not be made in accordance with the application. The hearing must be set no later than 45 days after the application is filed, or such later time as the court orders on a showing of good cause.” (2 MB Practice Guide: CA Debt Collection 17.36 (2024).) After the OSC is set, Mr. Rhoads must serve on the judgment debtor, Mr. Beckley, a copy of the OSC, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearing in the form required by the Judicial Council. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.770, subd. (b).) Page 2 of 2

Case Number: 23SMCV01967 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Osborn v. Maroja, et al. CASE NO.: 23SMCV01967 MOTION: Motion to Strike HEARING DATE: 7/19/2024 LEGAL STANDARD Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded].) Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given. ( Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿ in what manner ¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿ how ¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿( Id .) ANALYSIS Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn, individually and as Trustee of the Mary Ann Osborn Trust dated April 2, 2007, moves to strike the punitive damage allegations in Cross-Complainant Camila Marojas Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendant seeks to strike the punitive damages allegations related to the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Cross-Defendant asserts that, at best, the Cross-Complaint only shows that the parties disagreed regarding ownership of the Property, whether monies paid toward the Property were a loan or a gift, and that the parties had verbal altercations on several occasions. Cross-Defendant asserts that the generic allegations of IIED are insufficient to establish malice as a matter of fact. Cross-Defendant focuses entirely on the generic allegations of the seventh cause of action. However, Cross-Defendant ignores the entirety of the Cross-Complaint, including facts which were expressly incorporated into the seventh cause of action. Punitive damages are available where plaintiff shows that defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Section 3294 defines malice as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Despicable is a powerful term used to describe circumstances that are base, vile, or contemptible. ( Coll. Hosp. v. Superior Ct. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 704, 726.) The statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff , malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of despicable conduct must be found. ( Id ., emphasis added.) The Cross-Complaint alleges, as a matter of fact, that Cross-Defendant intended to injure Cross-Complainant with her course of conduct. The Cross-Complaint alleges the following facts relevant to the allegations of malice. Cross-Defendant purchased the Subject Property for Cross-Complainant and her family (Dustin and Julian Osborn). (CC ¶¶ 9-10.) Cross-Complainant and her family moved into the Property on April 1, 2020, furnished the Property with wallpaper and bookshelves designed especially for the Property, and treated and considered the Property as their own. (Id.) Cross-Defendant obtained a purchase money loan in the amount of $861,750.00 (the Loan), secured against the Property by a Deed of Trust recorded on March 27, 2020. (CC ¶ 11.) Upon purchase by Cross-Defendant, the Property was acquired on behalf of and in trust for Cross-Complainant and Dustin Osborn. (CC ¶12.) Cross-Defendant transferred title to the Property by Grant Deed dated May 7, 2020, to Dustin F. Osborn and Camila Maroja, Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants, and caused that Grant Deed to be duly recorded on May 27, 2020. (CC ¶ 13.) Dustin Osborn allegedly reimbursed Cross-Defendant. (CC ¶ 14.) Dustin Osborn also rendered management and advising services to Cross-Defendant in exchange for compensation and/or offset of the HOA dues, property taxes, and loan payments. (CC ¶ 15.) Cross-Defendant also made certain lump sum payments as a gift to Cross-Complainant and Dustin Osborn. (¶ 16.) Dustin Osborn died suddenly and unexpectedly on January 6, 2023, whereby Cross-Complainant became the sole owner of the Property. (CC ¶17.) Cross-Defendant ceased paying the monthly HOA dues, property taxes, and Loan payments for the Property. (CC ¶ 18.) Cross-Defendant advised Cross-Complainant that Cross-Complainant would be financially responsible for all future payments on the Loan, monthly HOA dues, and property taxes. (Id.) Cross-Complainant has made or caused to be made all payments regarding the Property. (CC ¶ 19.) Cross-Complainant further alleges that Cross-Defendant began to act erratically and aggressively in her interactions with Cross-Complainant. Cross-Defendant told Cross-Complainant that she hopes her son (Cross-Defendants grandson) dies so that you know how I feel. (CC ¶ 20.) Cross-Defendant claimed that the transfer of the Property was invalid, refused to accept payments on the Loan from Cross-Complainant, claimed that the Loan was in immediate jeopardy of foreclosure if title to the Property was not conveyed back to Cross-Defendant, and threatened to file bankruptcy, among other things, thereby jeopardizing Cross-Complainants home. (Id.) More specifically, on February 14, 2023, Cross-Defendant entered the Property unannounced using a spare key, threatened Cross-Complainant in front of her four-year old son, calling Cross-Complainant a bitch, said that she had only verbal agreements with Dustin Osborn and that nobody would believe Cross-Complainant about the agreements concerning the property, said that the death of a son is much more severe than the death of a husband, and threatened to declare bankruptcy so that Cross-Complainant would lose the Property. (CC ¶21.) On February 16, 2023, Cross-Defendant again entered the Property unannounced, this time threatening to take Cross-Complainants four-year old son to New York, without Cross-Complainants consent, while Cross-Complainant was on a scheduled business trip the following month. (CC ¶ 22.) In response to Cross-Complainants objection, Cross-Defendant said you will be away, what can you do? thereby frightening Cross-Complainant, and subjecting Cross-Complainant to fear loss of control of her four-year old son, and again calling Cross-Complainant, among other inappropriate things, a bitch and "crazy" in front of the four-year old child, causing the four-year old to start crying. (Id.) On February 20, 2023, after learning that Cross-Complainant changed the lock on the door to the Property, Cross-Defendant texted Cross-Complainant, stating, among other things, Dustins salary was never written anywhere. It was only verbal between him and me. There is no proof that we had a contract at all. The loan is all in my name. I have the liability only. I am calling the bank tomorrow to refinance the loan which means payments will be much higher at 7% for y[o]ur mother. (CC ¶23.) Cross-Complainant felt unsafe staying in the Property and no longer comfortable living across the hall from Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn. (CC ¶ 24.) Accordingly, Cross-Complainant accepted out-of-state employment, and began staying elsewhere. (Id.) In March, 2023, Cross-Complainant commenced efforts to sell the Property in order the pay off the Loan and thereby terminate the ongoing monthly payments to maintain the Property. (Id.) On April 21, 2023, Cross-Defendant advised Cross-Complainant that she was going to call the bank on April 27, 2023 and tell the bank to foreclose on the Property. (Id.) Cross-Defendant also interfered with efforts to sell the Property by accosting an interested buyer on May 2, 2023. (CC ¶ 25.) The seventh cause of action incorporates the allegations of conversion and invasion of privacy. On May 30, 2023, without the knowledge or consent of Cross-Complainant, Cross-Defendant entered the Property and removed various personal property belonging to Cross-Complainant. The Personal Property included cherished keepsakes and reminders of Cross-Complainants life with her now-deceased husband, Dustin Osborn, including but not limited to the following: · 3 large framed photographs of a solar eclipse; · Dustin Osborns framed UCLA and Yale diplomas; · A framed certificate from the Court of Appeal with a letter on the back; · Several family pictures including Dustin and Camilas wedding pictures, postcards of Julian Osborn (then 4 years old), polaroid pictures of Julian Osborn, and other family photos; · 2 frames photographs of Dustin Osborn; · A lithograph of a girl and a deer; · A framed picture of Julian Osborn wearing a mushroom t-shirt and red jacket. (CC ¶43.) Cross-Complainant demanded the return of the Personal Property, but Cross-Defendant refused to return the items. (CC ¶44.) Cross-Defendant acted with malice and oppression by taking and thereby converting the Personal Property. (CC ¶45.) Cross-Defendant intended her conversion of the Personal Property to cause Cross-Complainant to suffer harm and emotional distress. (Id.) On February 14, 2023, and again on February 16, 2023, Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn intentionally intruded on Cross-Complainants privacy by entering the Property unannounced and without permission, and in the presence of both Cross-Complainant and Julian Osborn, screamed at, belittled and insulted Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶49.) As a result of this invasion, Cross-Complainant moved out of state, did not share her new address with Cross-Defendant, and took precautions to preserve the confidentiality of her new residential address. (CC ¶ 50.) Despite these efforts, on November 7, 2023, Cross-Defendant entered the mailroom of the condominium complex in which the Property is located, found a package addressed to Cross-Complainant and/or her son, opened the package, examined the contents, and discovered Cross-Complainants new residential address. (CC ¶51.) Cross-Defendants intrusions into the Property and her unauthorized opening of Cross-Complainants mail would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and were in fact highly offensive to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶ 52.) According to the seventh cause of action itself, Cross-Defendants alleged conduct was outrageous. (CC ¶56.) Cross-Defendant intended to cause Cross-Complainant emotional distress and/or acted with reckless disregard for the probability that Cross-Complainant would suffer emotional distress. (CC ¶57.) As a result, Cross-Complainant suffered severe emotional distress. (CC ¶¶58-59.) Throughout the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainant establishes as a matter of fact that Cross-Defendants conduct was intended to cause Cross-Complainant injury. Conversion may subject a defendant to punitive damages when performed with the requisite malice, oppression or fraud. ( Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137, 148.) Cross-Defendant does not explain how the above factual allegations are insufficient to support the pled intentional harm. Taken as a whole, a reasonable person could conclude that the above course of conduct was intended to cause injury and/or emotional distress. Further, these acts are independent of the alleged breach of contract claim. As such, the Cross-Complaint establishes sufficient facts in support of the allegations of malice for pleading purposes. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

22CV020739: JENNINGS vs BAYSIDE COURT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (CCP 877.6) in Department 16 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Somnath Raj Chatterjee Parties to appear. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE HEARING/CONFERENCE WILL BE IN-PERSON WITH THE OPTION TO APPEAR REMOTELY. COUNSEL AND PARTIES MAY APPEAR EITHER IN-PERSON IN DEPARTMENT 16 AT THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING OR BY REMOTELY THROUGH THE ZOOM PLATFORM. ZOOM LOG-IN INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT 16 IS BELOW. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16024053017 Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017 One tap mobile +16692545252,,16024053017# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,16024053017# US (San Jose) --- Dial by your location • +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose) • +1 669 216 1590 US (San Jose) • +1 415 449 4000 US (US Spanish Line) • +1 646 828 7666 US (New York) • +1 646 964 1167 US (US Spanish Line) • +1 551 285 1373 US (New Jersey) • 833 568 8864 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017 Find your local number: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/u/afHtSjITt --- Join by SIP • 16024053017@sip.zoomgov.com --- Join by H.323 • 161.199.138.10 (US West) • 161.199.136.10 (US East) Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017

Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-16-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Noah Penn-El RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. On June 10, 2024, Derrick Robinson filed a Request for Dismissal from the complaint. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 12.4, from Plaintiff Noah Penn-El. The responses consist of incomplete replies, or admission of certain unspecified documents or media. The responses are incomplete and fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows one remaining, scheduled motion to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. The final motion to compel further responses for this set of items addresses Shenikwa Malone on July 22, 2024. Defendant to give notice. Dept. 68 Date: 7-16-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. On June 10, 2024, Derrick Robinson filed a Request for Dismissal from the complaint. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 9.2, and 12.4 from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with assurances of later production upon entry into a protective order, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of information. The responses are incomplete and fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows nine remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next set of motions to compel further responses begins with Noah Penn-El beginning on July 22, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 18, 2024 line 10. PLAINTIFF ISA MUAWIEH MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Hearing Required to address service. Proof of Service on file indicates service at a location that is not Defendant's address of record. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. VS. SELLS Case Number: 22CV-0200669 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal: An Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (hereinafter “OSC”) issued May 31, 2024, to Plaintiff’s Counsel for failure to submit a proposed judgment as ordered on September 25, 2023. Counsel has submitted a response to the OSC Re: Dismissal, and a Request to Vacate an Order of Sanctions that was made by Judge Boeckman on May 28, 2024. The Court declines to vacate its May 31, 2024 Order imposing sanctions. That issue is not properly before the Court. That order was issued by another judge and Counsel failed to appear at the hearing on that matter. A proposed judgment was lodged with the Court on June 24, 2024. However, the Court notes that the proposed judgment identifies two street addresses for the subject property, each of which are different from the street address identified in the Request for Court Judgment by Default. The Court needs further clarification as to the correct address. The ‘correctness’ of the judgment is not at issue in the instant OSC. Only the failure to timely provide the Court with a proposed judgment is at issue in this hearing. Having reviewed counsel’s declaration, the Court finds good cause to vacate the instant OSCThe Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

2016-6638 SSJID Motion for Stay 7/16/2024 Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company brings a Motion to Stay Action Under Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine. Having read the moving papers, the opposition papers, and reply papers, the court issues the following tentative ruling: MOTION AND ARGUMENTS Defendant, Pacific Gas & Electric (PGE), filed a Motion to Stay Action under the primary jurisdiction doctrine and Code of Civil Procedure §128. The premise of the motion is that the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) is required by Public Utilities Code §851(a) to review and, if appropriate, approve the involuntary taking of PGE system/assets by Defendant, South San Joaquin Irrigation District (SSJID) if it finds that the proposed taking would serve the public interest. See also, Public Utilities Code §854.2(b)(1)(F). Any sale or disposition that has not been approved by the Commission – even if ordered by the court - is void. Public Utilities Code §851(a). Thus, the proposed taking must be authorized by both the Commission and the Court, although the Commission’s review is much narrower than the review required by the Court in the right-to-take trial. [Under the eminent domain law, the Court holds two trials. First, there is a bench trial on plaintiff’s right-to-take. Code of Civil Procedure §1260.110. If plaintiff prevails, there is a jury trial on valuation for payment. Ibid @ §1260.210. During the right-to-take trial, the Court will consider whether public interest is served by the project. The Court will also consider whether necessity requires the project; whether the project is planned or located in a manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and lease private injury; whether the property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project; and whether the new use is a more necessary public use. See, Code of Civil Procedure §§1240.030 and 1240.610.] PGE basically argues that it will be judicially economic and efficient to have the public interest issue (which is the only issue before the Commission and one of several issues before the Court) resolved first with the Commission. To that end, PGE proposes that the Court exercise its discretion, invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine and stay this action so that resolution of the public interest issue can be presented, considered and decided by the Commission. PGE argues, “‘[T]he primary jurisdiction doctrine advances two related policies: it enhances court decisionmaking and efficiency by allowing courts to take advantage of administrative expertise, and it helps assure uniform application of regulatory laws.’” MPA, page 14:10-12 citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lara (2022) 84 C.A.5th 1119, 1122. PGE urges that a stay for the purpose of referring the case to the Commission will expedite this matter. For example, if the Commission does not find that the proposed taking would serve the public interest and therefore, does not approve it, the Court and the parties will be spared the expense and time of two trials. See, Public Utilities Code §1759 [“(a) No court of this state, except the Supreme Court and the court of appeal, to the extent specified in this article, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commission or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties, as provided by law and the rules of court. (b) The writ of mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court and from the court of appeal to the commission in all proper cases as prescribed in Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure.]. If, on the other hand, the Commission authorizes the proposed taking, after finding that the taking serves the public interest, the Commission’s decision “will facilitate this Court’s review” of the issue and could “streamline the Court’s workload” by resolving factual issues and/or provide a record. MPA, page 17:13-14, 22-23. SSJID concedes that the Commission must make its review and decision under Public Utilities Code §851 (Section 851 review) in order for there to be any sale or disposition of PGE property to it. Opposition, page 7:3-4. It is the timing of the review that SSJID disputes. SSJID maintains that now is not the time; a stay in this case in order to conduct a Section 851 review before the right-to-take trial and valuation trial would be premature. SSJID advances many reasons for its position. SSJID points to a different eminent domain action against PGE by the City and the County of San Francisco in which PGE argued that the Commission’s review “should follow the Superior Court’s condemnation proceeding.” Opposition, page 6:24-26 citing PGE’s August 23, 2022 brief to the Commission in Petition 21-07-012 [Petition of the City and County of San Francisco for a Valuation of Certain Pacific Gas & Electric Company Property Pursuant to Public Utilities Code Sections 1401-1421], page 25 (emphasis added). SSJID further argues that there is no transaction for the Commission to review; a conditional order of condemnation is required and so, the eminent domain trials must proceed first. Opposition, page 7:12-13. In addition, SSJID submits that in order to do a Section 851 review, the Commission must know the value of the PGE assets proposed to be condemned and that valuation won’t be done/known until after the right-to-take trial. Opposition, page 7:23-9:17. SSJID insists that staying the case in order to have the Commission do a Section 851 review first is not efficient because a Section 851 review involves a singular issue with a limited scope of review. SSJID argues that in its motion, PGE overstates the scope of a Section 851 review because PGE is conflating it with a Commission’s Section 854 review which is a review of a change in the ownership/control of a public utility – not the acquisition of utility assets which is the case before the Court here. SSJID adds that in this case, several considerations relative to the Commission’s Section 851 review have already been addressed; for example, 1) the Commission already found that SSJID’s proposed service could raise rates for other customers in the area that PGE will continue to serve but the estimated increase is small and “does not substantially impair PGE’s ability to provide adequate service at reasonable rates.” (See, Resolution #-4301, December 17, 2009, page 27.); 2) by virtue of the fact that SSJID is a public entity, SSJID “may be entitled to the presumption that [it is] creditworthy and will operate the public utility system in a manner consistent with the public interest[;]” and, 3) San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) found that SSJID has the administrative, technical and financial ability to operate the system and further set forth the findings and conditions and made determinations required by CEQA (LAFCO Resolution No. 1327, Finding 2). SSJID also points to procedural questions with the Section 851 review; for example, 1) who may file a Section 851 petition; and, 2) whether the Commission has jurisdiction over public entities such as SSJID. Finally, SSJID stresses that there is no legal authority to argue that the Commission’s Section 851 review is a prerequisite or condition precedent to the eminent domain trials. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS In support of their respective arguments, both PGE and SSJID have submitted a Request for Judicial Notice. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE ARE BOTH GRANTED IN FULL. See, Evidence Code §452(c)[official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of ... any state of the United States]; §452 (h)[resolutions, Commission decisions, Bill Analysis, legal databases, state-controlled websites are not reasonably subject to dispute and/or capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources or reasonably indisputable accuracy]. RULING AND ANALYSIS After due consideration of the arguments made in the motion, the opposition, and the reply and after review of the documentary evidence submitted by both parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE MOTION TO STAY IS GRANTED IN ORDER TO ALLOW A REVIEW AND DECISION BY THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE PROPOSED TAKING PURSUANT TO PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE §851. The reasons for the Court’s ruling follow. THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 287, 293, 295-295, explains the primary jurisdiction doctrine as follows: "Article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution vests the judicial power of this state in the courts. However, article XII establishes the PUC [i.e., the Commission,] and gives it broad regulatory power over public utilities, “including the power to fix rates, establish rules, hold various types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own procedures.” (Citations.) The Constitution also gives the Legislature “[P]lenary power ... to establish the manner and scope of review of [PUC] action in a court of record ....” (Cal. Const., art. XII, § 5; San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. Superior Court (1996) 13 C.4th 893, 915.) ... The primary jurisdiction doctrine “ 'applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.' ” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 826 P.2d 730] (Farmers Ins. Exchange), quoting United States v. Western Pac. R. Co. (1956) 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 [77 S.Ct. 161, 164-165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126].) The doctrine does not permanently foreclose judicial action, but provides the appropriate administrative agency with an opportunity to act if it chooses to do so. (Shernoff v. Superior Court (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 406, 409 [118 Cal.Rptr. 680] (Shernoff).)" The primary jurisdiction doctrine advances two related policies: (1) it enhances judicial efficiency by permitting courts to take advantage of administrative expertise; and (2) it helps to assure uniform application of regulatory laws. (Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 391.) Application of the doctrine lies within the court's discretion. (Id. at pp. 391-392.) In applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine the proper procedure is to stay the action pending resolution of the issues within the administrative body's expertise. (Id. at p. 401; South Bay Creditors Trust v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] (South Bay Creditors Trust); Cellular Plus, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.) Courts have frequently applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine and stayed actions where the issues raised in the trial court action were pending before an administrative agency. (Citations.) Administrative agency involvement may serve to resolve factual issues or provide a record for subsequent judicial review. (Citation.) In addition, a stay will conserve judicial and other resources which otherwise would be consumed in litigation of issues that may be resolved by the administrative proceeding. (Citation.) As explained by the Wise Court, application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine lies within the trial court's discretion. Ibid. PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTION 851 MANDATES THE COMMISSION REVIEW THE PROPOSED TAKING TO DETERMINE IF PUBLIC INTEREST IS SERVED Public Utilities Code §851 reads, in pertinent part: "(a) A public utility, ..., shall not sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, or encumber the whole or any part of its ... system, or other property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, ..., without first having either secured an order from the commission authorizing it to do so for qualified transactions valued above five million dollars ($5,000,000), or for qualified transactions valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, filed an advice letter and obtained approval from the commission authorizing it to do so. ... Every sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, disposition, encumbrance, merger, or consolidation made other than in accordance with the advice letter and approval from the commission authorizing it is void. .... (b)(1) Subdivision (a) shall apply to any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2. ...." PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTION 854.2(b)(1)(F) PRECISELY DESCRIBES THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THIS CASE; THAT IS, THE PROPOSED TAKING WOULD EFFECT AN “INVOLUNTARY CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS FROM AN ELECTRICAL/GAS CORPORATION TO OWNERSHIP BY A PUBLIC ENTITY.” Thus, circling back, the Legislature has mandated that the Commission review and approve the proposed taking under the provisions of Public Utilities Code Section 851 to determine whether the proposed taking serves the public interest. See, Koponen v. PG&E (2008) 165 C.A.4th 345, 353; see also, D.95-10-045,1995 Cal. PUC LEXIS 901, *18-19; D.91-05-026, 40 CPUC 2d 159,171; D.00-07-010, at 6; and D.3320, 10 CRRC 56,63. The necessity and object of the Commission’s Section 851 review is not at issue. Both parties agree that the Commission’s Section 851 review must take place at some point in time and both parties agree that the review will determine if the proposed taking serves the public interest and both parties agree that this consideration is one of the required findings by the Court in the eminent domain action. See, MPA, page 10:18-19; see also, Opposition, page 10:18-23. THIS COURT CANNOT RECONSIDER, MODIFY, REVERSE OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH COMMISSION’S PUBLIC INTEREST DECISION Public Utilities Code Section 1759 reads: "(a) No court of this state, except the Supreme Court and the court of appeal, to the extent specified in this article, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commission or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties, as provided by law and the rules of court. (b) The writ of mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court and from the court of appeal to the commission in all proper cases as prescribed in Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure." See also, Pellandini v. Pacific Limestone Products, Inc. (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 774, 777 [“It is well established that an order of the Public Utilities Commission is not reviewable by any court of this state except the Supreme Court. (Pub.Util.Code, s 1759; People v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.2d 515, 42 Cal.Rptr. 849, 399 P.2d 385.) The superior court, therefore, may not effectually negate a decision of the commission within the latter's jurisdiction.”]. Accordingly, the Commission’s decision in its Section 851 review as to whether the proposed taking will serve the public interest is binding on this Court. COMMISSION’S FINDING THAT PROPOSED TAKING SERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE ANY TRANSFER OF PGE ASSETS TO SSJID Reading Public Utilities Code Section 851 and Section 1759 together, in the context of this case, it is crystal clear that the proposed taking must be approved by the Commission in its Section 851 public interest review because any transfer without the Commission’s approval is void. PUC §851(a). EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY IS SERVED BY STAYING ACTION TO ALLOW THE COMMISSION’S SECTION 851 REVIEW TO PROCEED FIRST Regardless of the Commission’s findings in its Section 851 review, judicial efficiency and economy will be served by staying this action in order to allow the Commission’s Section 851 review to proceed first. As stated above, the Commission’s approval is critical in order for the proposed taking to proceed; a finding that the proposed taking does not serve the public interest is fatal to the project. If the Commission found that the proposed taking does not serve the public interest and the Commission does not approve the project, the decision would obviate the need for any trial in the eminent domain action. By the same token, if the Commission found that the proposed taking serves the public interest and approves the project, the Commission’s decision on the public interest factor is conclusive as to that factor and may assist the Court in its review of the remaining factors in the eminent domain action. The Commission’s decision would certainly narrow the issues to be litigated at the right-to-take trial. SSJID’S OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS ARE NOT COMPELLING TO OVERCOME THE JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY THAT WILL BE ACHIEVED BY GRANTING THE MOTION FOR STAY. As noted previously, SSJID submits several arguments in opposition to the motion to stay. The Court does not find SSJID’s arguments to be persuasive or compelling enough to overcome the judicial efficiency and economy that can be achieved by granting the motion. SSJID references an unrelated eminent domain action against PGE by the City and the County of San Francisco in which PGE argued that the Commission’s Section 851 review “should follow the Superior Court’s condemnation proceeding.” Opposition, page 6:24-26. The fact that PGE made such an argument in a different case is irrelevant. PGE’s argument in the San Francisco case is not a concession; it is not an admission. It is merely an argument and notably, the issues in the San Francisco case differ considerably from those to be determined in this case. [The Section 851 petition filed by the City and County of San Francisco involved valuation issues; the petition was filed pursuant to PUC §§1401-1421.] SSJID suggests that in order for the Commission to do its Section 851 review, a conditional order of condemnation is required and so, the eminent domain trials must proceed first. See, Opposition, page 7:12-13. The Court’s review of Public Utilities Code Section 851 undermines the argument. The statute specifically precludes any transaction that transfers a public utility asset until the Section 851 review is done and the proposed transaction is approved. See, PUC Section 851(a) [“A public utility ... shall not sell, ... or otherwise dispose of ... any part of its ... system ... without FIRST ...secur[ing] an order from the commission authorizing it to do so .... Every sale [or] ... disposition... made ... [without] the commission authorizing it is void.” (Emphasis added)]. Moreover, Public Utilities Code Section 851 specifically contemplates eminent domain scenarios for Section 851 review when it references Section 854.2(b)(1)(F) [“[a] ... involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical or gas corporation to ownership by a public entity”]. Notably, nowhere in the statute did the Legislature state that a conditional order of condemnation is required before the Section 851 review. Next, SSJID submits that in order to do a Section 851 review, the Commission must know the value of the PGE assets proposed to be condemned and that valuation of the PGE assets proposed to be condemned won’t be done/known until after the right-to-take trial. Opposition, page 7:23-9:17. The Commission knows what information is necessary and what information is not necessary for its Section 851 review. If values are critical to the Commission’s review, as SSJID urges, the Commission can dismiss the petition as premature, or alternatively, it can issue a conditional order based on the information before it. As the parties are well-aware, this case was filed in 2016 and is currently set for trial in less than a year. Thus, it is likely that all key information is available and/or known regarding valuations, and more. All relevant information can be raised and argued to the Commission. As PGE urges, this challenge is properly directed to the Commission and not to this Court. In a similar vein, SSJID characterizes the Commission’s Section 851 review as involving a singular issue with a limited scope of review. SSJID argues that PGE has overstated the scope of a Section 851 review in order to make its judicial efficiency and economy argument. Regardless of either parties’ arguments, the Commission will know the appropriate scope of its review and apply it. Whether singular or broad, it is undisputed that the Commission’s Section 851 review and decision is mandated and judicial economy and efficiency favors having the Section 851 review occur before the eminent domain trial in this case. SSJID adds that in this case, several considerations relative to the Commission’s Section 851 review have already been addressed. This circumstance does not persuade the Court that the Section 851 review should follow the eminent domain trial[s]; in fact, if the review is simpler because several relevant considerations have already been addressed and decided, then all the more reason to complete the consideration and have the benefit of the Commission’s Section 851 decision before moving forward with the eminent domain action. SSJID’s next argument seems to be that there are procedural inconsistencies as to who may file with the Commission and whether the Commission has jurisdiction over SSJID, a public entity. Neither of these arguments excuse the Commission’s mandated Section 851 review and decision. Moreover, PGE has addressed those concerns in its Reply. Typically, a Section 851 review is initiated by a Section 851 petition filed by a public utility. PGE has represented that “if the Court grants the motion, PGE will formally ask the Commission to review the proposed taking.” Reply, page 4:12-13. With regard to the Commission’s jurisdiction over SSJID, it behooves SSJID to participate in the Section 851 hearing and to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission because if it elects not to do so, the Commission will not have the benefit of SSJID’s arguments and persuasion regarding the public interest served by the proposed taking and without a finding that there is a public interest supporting the project and approval of the proposed taking by the Commission, the project dies. The Court sees no procedural conundrum. The Court, however, notes that SSJID correctly argues that Section 851 review is not a prerequisite to an eminent domain trial. For all these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE MOTION TO STAY IS GRANTED IN ORDER TO ALLOW A REVIEW AND DECISION BY THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE PROPOSED TAKING PURSUANT TO PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE §851. Defendant PGE to prepare order for court signature. This matter is set for a status hearing for November 13, 2024, 9:30 am, Dept. 11B. The court will address the status of the scheduled trial date at the November 13, 2024, 9:30 am, Dept. 11B status hearing. The court does note that it will work with the parties to reschedule the trial date if necessary due to the granted stay. The court requests that the parties file a joint statement regarding the status of the Public Utilities §851 review one week prior to the November 13, 2024 status hearing. The parties may attend the November 13, 2024 status hearing remotely via the Department 11B Dedicated Bridge Line. To attend the hearing remotely dial (209) 992-5590 and follow the prompts entering Bridge No. 6941 and Passcode 5564. If either party request a hearing to argue this tentative ruling, the parties may attend the argument remotely via the Department 11B Dedicated Bridge Line. WATERS 7/15/2024 Directions for Contesting or Arguing the Tentative Ruling: Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org. that they intend to appear remotely no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name must be in the header of the email. 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Please mute your phones when you are not speaking, and remember to unmute your phone when you are speaking. At this time, we are not able to provide information over the phone. To communicate with the Courtroom Clerk of Dept. 11B, please email questions to civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org, indicating in the title of the email the Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name. A Courtroom Clerk will return your email. To ensure the Court has your most recent contact information, if you have not already done so, please register your email address and mobile number on the Court’s website under Online Services, Attorney Registration. (You do not have to be an attorney to register.) We thank you for your cooperation, assistance, patience and flexibility

Case Number: 22STCV23623 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Case Name: Sanaz Afsar, et al. v. Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association, et al. Case No.: 22STCV23623 Motion: (1) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (2) Motion to Seal Moving Party: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc. (PWTS) Responding Party: None as of July 15, 2024 (PWTS filed Notice of Non-Opposition on 7/11/24) Tentative Ruling: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc.s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED. Defendants Motion to Seal is also GRANTED. I. Background Plaintiff owns Unit 2301 in the Bunker Hill Tower high-rise in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2022, Defendants Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association (BHTCA) and Pacific Water Tank Services Inc. (PWTS) discharged 2000 or more gallons of dirty water directly into Plaintiffs unit, causing extensive property damage. On July 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against BHTCA and PWTS for (1) negligence and (2) trespass. On October 14, 2022, Defendant BHTCA filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, Saied Kashani, PWTS, VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (3) equitable indemnity; (4) apportionment and/or contribution; (5) declaratory relief and (6) declaratory relief. BHTCA dismissed Plaintiff and Saied Kashani from its cross-complaint on Jun 29, 2023. On November 30, 2022, Defendant PWTS filed a cross-complaint against BHTC and VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) equitable indemnity; (2) contribution; (3) apportionment; and (4) declaratory relief. This is the motion by PWTS for determination of good faith settlement, and also a motion to seal the settlement documents by the settlement amount. The motions are unopposed. II. Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement A. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 states, in pertinent part: (a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of good faith or a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors . . . [para.] (c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasors from any further claims against the settling tortfeasors for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. [para.] (d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. In determining whether a settlement is in good faith, our Supreme Court stated that the trial court should inquire into, among other things, ...whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasors proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiffs injuries. ( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of facts be taken into account (i.e. the Tech-Bilt factors) including: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs total recovery and the settlors proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among defendants; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interest of the nonsettling defendants. A defendants settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendants liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (d).) The party asserting lack of good faith should demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the objective of section 877.6. ( Tech-Bilt at pp. 500-501.) A determination that the settlement was in good faith would bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (c).) Any existing cross-complaints for such claims would be subject to dismissal. While an unopposed application for good faith settlement may be granted on bare bones facts, an opposed application requires the Court to consider the settlement based on the Tech-Bilt factors. ( City of Grand Terrace (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) This requires the settlor to provide the Court with sufficient evidentiary basis to enable the court to consider and evaluate the various aspects of the settlement. ( Id. at p. 1263.) Because Tech-Bilt mandates a rough approximation of the settling defendant's proportionate liability and consideration of all other defendants' proportionate liability and consideration of all other factors that might affect the fairness of the settlement as respects non-settling defendants, the affidavits, declarations or other evidence should provide the court with the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors contemplated by Tech-Bilt . Without the facts, in a contested hearing, it is impossible for a court to exercise its discretion in an appropriate fashion. ( Ibid. ) B. Application to Facts 1. Settling parties: (1) Plaintiff Sanaz Afsar (2) Defendant PWTS 2. Terms of settlement: In consideration for a release of the settling parties by each of the settlement parties, and a dismissal of the action against PWTS, PWTS will pay Plaintiff a sum in settlement. [1] The settlement will result in dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint and BHTCA and Seabreeze Management Company, Incs cross-complaint against PWTS. 3. Rough Approximation of Plaintiffs Total Recovery and Settlors Proportionate Liability: Substantial evidence (e.g., factual declarations) showing the nature and extent of the settling defendant's liability is required for a good-faith determination. Without such evidence, a good faith determination is an abuse of discretion. ( Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co . (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348 (questionable assumptions in moving party's memorandum of points and authorities insufficient to show settlement was reasonable); Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834 (attorney's declaration re settling defendant's liability insufficient where he failed to provide specific supporting facts or expert opinion). The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be. ( City of Grand Terrace vs. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal App.3d 1251, 1262.) When a trial court considers the good faith of a settlement, it must determine each tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. The trial court's good faith determination must also take into account the settling tortfeasor's potential liability for indemnity to a cotortfeasor, as well as the settling tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff. In so doing, a trial court must consider each of the plaintiff's claims and possible recoveries and the potential liability of the joint tortfeasors. ( Cal-Jones Properties v. Evans Pacific Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 324, 328.) PWTS maintains its liability for the incident is minimal at best. PWTSs only involvement in this action is as the entity hired by BHTCA to service a water tank on the premises. (Motion, Carpenter Dec., ¶3.) PWTS argues the water intrusion was not the result of its conduct. ( Id. at ¶3.) PWTS maintains the tank was already drained when it arrived, and it was at all times BHTCAs responsibility to drain the tank. ( Id. at ¶4.) PWTS establishes its proportionate liability is likely zero. No oppositions have been filed to this motion. For this reason, PWTSs failure to provide any information regarding Plaintiffs approximate recovery is immaterial. 4. Allocation: In the typical one-plaintiff, multiple-defendants, personal injury action each tortfeasor is potentially liable for the same injury to the plaintiff. Therefore the full settlement by one defendant will offset a judgment against other tortfeasors; no allocation of the settlement is required. But many lawsuits and many settlements do not fit this pattern. In some, the amount of the offset is uncertain because one settlement covers multiple plaintiffs or causes of action with different damages, or because a sliding scale settlement is used and payments by the settling defendant are contingent upon the degree of plaintiff's success against the remaining defendants. In others, the amount of the offset is clouded by injection of noncash consideration into the settlement or, as here, by settling claims for separate injuries not all of which would be attributable to conduct of the remaining defendants. ( Alcal Roofing & Insulation v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1124-1125.) In a situation where the cash amount of the settlement does not dictate the amount of the offset, the settling parties must include an allocation or a valuation in their agreement. A natural tension will exist between plaintiff, who benefits by undervaluing the settlement in order to permit greater recovery against the remaining defendants, and the settling defendant, who would want the settlement value high enough to be approved in order to relieve settling defendant from liability for comparative indemnity or contribution. Requiring a joint valuation by the plaintiff and the settling defendant should generally produce a reasonable valuation. ( Id. ) No allocation of the settlement proceeds is required. There is a single Plaintiff and the causes of action allege the same damages. There is also no noncash consideration in the settlement. 5. Fraud, Collusion and Tortious Conduct: Based on the record, there is no evidence of fraud, collusion or tortious conduct indicating that the settlement was entered into to injure Defendant BHTC or other remaining defendants or cross-defendants. 6. Recognition that settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial: PWTSs settlement is less than if it were found liable at trial. PWTS maintains, however, that its liability is zero. 7. Financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants: The settlement is not disproportionately low. As such, PWTSs financial conditions and insurance policy limits are immaterial. ( L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 749-750 (request for discovery into defendants financial condition for purposes of determining good faith settlement denied; financial condition of settling defendant only relevant where settlement is disproportionately low).) III. Motion to Seal Documents Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (c).) Therefore, pleadings, motions, discovery documents, and other papers may not be filed under seal merely by stipulation of the parties. The parties' agreement that certain documents be filed under seal is improper and insufficient. ( Savaglio v. WalMart Stores, Inc . (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 600.) A prior court order must be obtained. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (a); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 888.) At a minimum, a party seeking to seal documents must come forward with a specific list of facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them. ( Id. at 894.) Before substantive courtroom proceedings are closed or transcripts are ordered sealed, a trial court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) PWTS moves to seal the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement and the declaration of Elizabeth J. Carpenter. PWTS submitted a public redacted version of the documents it the settlement amount redacted and it lodged an unredacted version with the Court, as required under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subdivision (b)(5). PWTS moves to seal these documents to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement amount. The settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provision. (Motion to Seal, Carpenter Dec., ¶2.) There is no overriding public interest in the settlement amount agreed to between Plaintiff and PWTS. No oppositions have been filed to the Motion to Seal. The motion to seal is granted. PWTS demonstrates an overriding interest in sealing the settlement amount, namely preservation of the confidentiality of the settlement as agreed to by the parties. The parties willingness to settle and their interest in maintaining the settlements confidentiality can only be served by the very limited redactions of the papers. PWTS establishes that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this overriding interest. [1] The Court has reviewed this sum, but, in light of the ruling on the motion to seal, does not disclose it here.