Clay County Hospital Vs. Wolfe, Robert

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Re: Kristol Serna v. Hudson Insurance Company Superior Court Case No. 24CECG02276 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Oral Argument, if timely requested, will be heard on Thursday, July 18, 2024 at 3:30 PM in Department 502. Tentative Ruling: To deny plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, in its entirety. Explanation: While plaintiff has not explained in her notice of motion what the exact basis for her request for attorney’s fees is, it appears from her points and authorities brief that she is relying on several statutes to support her claim, as well as the attorney’s fees clause in the sales contract. She notes that, under Civil Code section 1717, “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) However, section 1717, subdivision (b)(2) also states that, “[w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) Here, plaintiff dismissed her first amended complaint after she and Freeway Funding reached a settlement of their claims against each other. Therefore, she cannot recover her attorney’s fees under section 1717 based on the attorney’s fees clause in the contract, as she dismissed her complaint pursuant to a settlement, and as a result she is not the prevailing party on the contract as a matter of law. Plaintiff also relies on the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civil Code section 1750, et seq.) and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civil Code section 1788, et seq.). Plaintiff points out that both the CLRA and the Rosenthal Act provide for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing consumer plaintiff in an action under those statutes. (Civil Code, §§ 1780, subd. (e); 1788.30, subd. (c).) However, under the CLRA the consumer is required to give the person alleged to have committed the wrongful acts written notice of their claim and an opportunity to repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or services at least 30 days before filing suit. (Civil Code, § 1782, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Thus, if the consumer fails to give notice 30 days before filing suit, or the merchant offers to repair or replace the defective item within the 30-day period, the consumer is barred from recovering damages or attorney’s fees against the merchant in a subsequent CLRA suit. (Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1212.) In the present case, plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand letter under the CLRA to Freeway on September 15, 2023. (Barry decl., ¶ 15, and Exhibit 6 thereto.) However, instead of waiting at least 30 days for Freeway to respond to the demand, plaintiff filed her complaint asserting a claim under the CLRA and other causes of action on September 18, 2023, only three days after sending the demand letter. Therefore, plaintiff failed to comply with the CLRA’s requirement to give Freeway 30 days’ notice and an opportunity to repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the problem. As a result, plaintiff is now barred from seeking damages or attorney’s fees under her CLRA claim. (Benson, supra, at p. 1212.) Indeed, her complaint does not even seek money damages under the CLRA, so she was apparently aware of the fact that her claim might have been filed prematurely. Nevertheless, her failure to give Freeway 30 days to cure the problem means that she cannot seek attorney’s fees based on the CLRA. Plaintiff also relies on the Rosenthal Act’s fees provision to support her request for attorney’s fees. Under Civil Code section 1788.30, subdivision (c), “[i]n the case of any action to enforce any liability under this title, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs of the action. Reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be based on time necessarily expended to enforce the liability, shall be awarded to a prevailing debtor; reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing creditor upon a finding by the court that the debtor's prosecution or defense of the action was not in good faith.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (c).) Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot recover her fees under the Rosenthal Act because she did not give notice of a violation of the Act within 15 days of filing her lawsuit. Defendant cites to section 1788.30, subdivision (d), which states that, “[a] debt collector shall have no civil liability under this title if, within 15 days either after discovering a violation which is able to be cured, or after the receipt of a written notice of such violation, the debt collector notifies the debtor of the violation, and makes whatever adjustments or corrections are necessary to cure the violation with respect to the debtor.” (Civil Code, § 1788.30, subd. (d).) Defendant argues that this provision means that plaintiff had to give 15 days’ notice before filing her action under the Rosenthal Act, and that because plaintiff did not give such notice, she is barred from recovering her attorney’s fees. However, section 1788.30(d) does not require the debtor to give 15 days’ notice before filing suit. It only provides that, if written notice of a violation is given and the debt collector takes action to correct the violation, then the debt collector is not liable under the Act. Defendant cites to no cases or other authorities that provide that the debtor must always give written notice of a violation at least 15 days before filing suit under the Act, or that failure to give notice results in the waiver of the right to recover attorney’s fees under the Act. Defendant cites to Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, supra, in support of its position, but Benson only dealt with the issue of whether attorney’s fees are recoverable under the CLRA, not the Rosenthal Act. Since the Rosenthal Act contains different language that does not expressly require the debtor to give 15 days’ notice to the debt collector before filing suit, defendant has not shown that the lack of notice bars plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees. As a result, the court will not deny the motion based on the alleged lack of statutory support for her prayer for attorney’s fees. On the other hand, plaintiff still needs to show that she is the prevailing party in order to obtain her attorney’s fees under the Rosenthal Act. (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (c).) The Rosenthal Act does not define what the term “prevailing party” means. However, other courts have analyzed the concept of “prevailing party” in the context of similar fee provisions in statutes such as the CLRA and Civil Code section 1717. In Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 170, the Court of Appeal discussed the standards for determining whether a party had “prevailed” for the purpose of obtaining attorney’s fees under the CLRA. “In Reveles, supra, the court applied the general definition of ‘prevailing party’ found in Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.5. It concluded that a plaintiff is the prevailing party under section 1780(d) ‘if he obtained a “net monetary recovery” on his [CLRA] claim.’ More recently, the court in Graciano, supra, held that, in deciding prevailing party status under the CLRA, ‘the court should adopt a pragmatic approach, determining prevailing party status based on which party succeeded on a practical level. Under that approach, the court exercises its discretion to determine “the prevailing party by analyzing which party realized its litigation objectives.”’” (Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, supra, at p. 179, citations omitted.) The Kim court also cited to Elster v. Friedman (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1439, wherein the court stated that, “[a] plaintiff prevails, in essence, when he gets most or all of what he wanted by filing the action.” (Elster, supra, at pp. 1443–1444.) “In Elster, the plaintiffs were the prevailing party because ‘what they wanted’ was to enjoin the defendant from harassing them and that is the relief they obtained.” (Kim, supra, at pp. 179–180.) “In Coltrain v. Shewalter, the court held that the critical issue for the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c) (the anti-SLAPP statute) ‘is which party realized its objectives in the litigation.’ In cases concluding by way of dismissal, that is usually the defendant. ‘Since the defendant's goal is to make the plaintiff go away with its tail between its legs, ordinarily the prevailing party will be the defendant. The plaintiff, however, may try to show it actually dismissed because it had substantially achieved its goals through a settlement or other means....’” (Id. at p. 180, citations omitted.) “[A] number of courts have elected to take a more ‘pragmatic’ and less restrictive approach to assess whether a buyer has prevailed. Under that approach, it is not enough for a buyer to show that she ‘obtained a net monetary recovery.’ Instead, courts ask: To what extent did the buyer achieve her litigation objectives? By and large, litigation objectives are measured by what the party sought to obtain by filing suit.” (Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 502, citations omitted.) “As one Court of Appeal has explained, ‘[t]ypically, a determination of no prevailing party results when both parties seek relief, but neither prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing party receives only a part of the relief sought.’ By contrast, when the results of the litigation on the contract claims are not mixed—that is, when the decision on the litigated contract claims is purely good news for one party and bad news for the other—the Courts of Appeal have recognized that a trial court has no discretion to deny attorney fees to the successful litigant.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 875–876, citations omitted, italics in original [interpreting the concept of “prevailing party” for the purpose of awarding fees under Civil Code section 1717].) “Accordingly, we hold that in deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the contract,’ the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources. The prevailing party determination is to be made only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by ‘a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.’” (Id. at p. 876, citation omitted.) In the present case, plaintiff was not the “prevailing party” for the purpose of the Rosenthal Act or any other fee shifting statute. Plaintiff argues that she achieved her litigation objectives because she obtained a settlement that rescinded the sales contract, waived the unpaid balance due on the contract, and removed the negative references on her credit report. However, as defendant points out, plaintiff’s complaint sought more than simply to rescind the contract, waive the unpaid balance due, and remove the negative credit history. She also sought actual damages, restitution of the amounts she paid under the contract, incidental and consequential damages, punitive damages, civil penalties, equitable and injunctive relief, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs, and other relief under Business and Professions Code section 17200 as provided by law. (Complaint, p. 12, Prayer for Relief, see also First Amended Complaint, pp. 12-13, Prayer for Relief.) Also, in her demands to defendant, plaintiff sought not only to rescind the contract, cancel any outstanding debt owed on the contract, and remove the poor credit report, but also emotional distress and unfair debt collection practice damages, restitution of the amounts she paid to defendant, and attorney’s fees. (Barry decl., ¶¶ 16, 19, and Exhibits 6 and 7 thereto.) Yet the settlement did not grant most of the relief plaintiff sought, as it did not give her any restitution of payments she had made, money damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, or prejudgment interest. (Exhibit 8 to Barry decl.) While plaintiff did receive part of the relief she sought, as she did not have to pay off the remaining amount of the loan and the negative report was removed from her credit history, she had to give up the vehicle to Freeway Funding and she received no damages, penalties, or restitution payments. In fact, she received no money from the settlement at all. Also, Freeway received some benefit from the settlement, as it was able to retain the vehicle and plaintiff agreed to sign any paperwork necessary to transfer her interest in the vehicle to Freeway. Freeway could then resell the vehicle to offset some of its losses from plaintiff’s failure to pay off the sale contract. Freeway also obtained a dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against it, so it did not have to worry about the potential for any future liability to plaintiff. In addition, Freeway claims that it only settled its cross-claims against plaintiff because plaintiff was claiming to be homeless and insolvent, and therefore she was judgment proof and there was no point in attempting to prosecute the cross-claims against her. (Barry decl., ¶ 20 and Exhibit 9 thereto.) “[I]t seems inaccurate to characterize the defendant as the ‘prevailing party’… if the plaintiff dismissed for reasons, such as the defendant's insolvency, that have nothing to do with the probability of success on the merits.” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 621.) Here, the defendant’s dismissal of its cross-claims against plaintiff was apparently based on the fact that plaintiff was insolvent and judgment proof, and thus it would have been a waste of time and money to continue litigating its claims against her. Consequently, the fact that defendant dismissed its cross-complaint against plaintiff does not mean that plaintiff was the prevailing party here. In summary, both parties obtained some of the relief that they sought by settling their claims against each other, even though neither side recovered any money damages or payments. The overall effect of the settlement was to allow the parties to walk away from the dispute with a “clean slate.” Under the circumstances, then, there was no “prevailing party” for the purpose of the Rosenthal Act or any other fee-shifting statute, and plaintiff is not entitled to an award of her attorney’s fees or costs. As a result, the court intends to deny the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/15/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date) 1Since plaintiff was not the prevailing party, there is no need for the court to consider whether the requested amount of fees and costs is reasonable or whether a lodestar multiplier is warranted.

Case Number: 20SMCV00216 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: I The court has reviewed the objections to the orders of assignment and restraint. The basic objection seems to be that Mr. Hirsh substituted into the case as counsel for Jona Rechnitz. At the time the original motion was servedin April 2024the substitution had not yet occurred and Mr. Hirsh was not counsel. The court, however, continued the original hearing because the court did not believe that electronic service of this particular motion was sufficient standing alone. Mr. Hirsh claims that even after the motion was re-served, he did not get a copy. However, Mr. Goldflam declares the contrary. He states that he served Mr. Hirsh with a courtesy copy of the papers. He claims that a courtesy copy was proper because Mr. Hirsh had not yet (and still has not, according to Mr. Goldflam) done what is necessary to substitute in officially. Mr. Goldflam states that notice of the moving papers was mailed to all parties with that courtesy copy on May 15, 2024. The next day, May 16, 2024, Mr. Goldflam states that he gave notice of the courts ruling electronically to the various parties, including Mr. Hirsh (again, in the form of a courtesy copy), and he has attached the email. Between the proof of service and the email, the court is confident that adequate notice was given. Mr. Hirsh also states that during a telephone call he asked if there was anything on the calendar other than a debtors exam and that Mr. Goldflam told him that nothing else was on even though the hearing on the assignment motion was on the calendar. Mr. Goldflam denies saying anything like that. The court notes that its docket is public. Mr. Hirsh had the opportunity to look at the docket and see for himself whether there was anything pending. Overall, the court is confident that adequate notice was given for the order. Mr. Hirsh makes no objection as to form or substance, and it appears to conform with the courts ruling. The court will, therefore, sign the order and the objections are OVERRULED. There will be no hearing as there is no noticed motion.

24CV00800 BURDGE v. AIRSTREAM INC. AIRSTREAM’S MOTION TO STAY The motion to stay is denied. I. BACKGROUND Kathryn Burdge’s (“Burdge’) amended complaint, filed on March 26, 2024, alleges a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act in relation to her purchase of a 2023 Airstream Atlas RV. She purchased the Airstream in Temecula, California and she resided in Page 6 of 9 Santa Cruz County at the time of the purchase. Burdge asserts various deficiencies/defects with the RV. In connection with the purchase of the Airstream, Burdge signed a Limited Warranty which stated, in part, the following: “LEGAL REMEDIES: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR DECIDING LEGAL DISPUTES RELATING TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY NATURE RESTS IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE STATE OF MANUFACTURE, WHICH IS OHIO.” (Ex. B to Dec. of March.) This language is found on the second page of the Limited Warranty and is the second paragraph before the signature line for the purchaser. The sales contract is 6 pages long and signatures were required on each page and, on some pages, multiple signatures on each page. II. MOTION Airstream seeks to stay this action to allow Burdge to re-file the case in Ohio, the forum selection state. Airstream bases its motion on the above-referenced forum selection clause contained in the signed limited warranty. Airstream contends a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is a motion to stay (or dismiss) the action to allow a plaintiff to file in the proper court. Airstream argues the forum selection provision is mandatory and reasonable. Further, Airstream acknowledges Burdge cannot be compelled to waive her rights under Song-Beverly, and thus, it will stipulate to have the Ohio courts apply Song-Beverly in this case. Airstream contends a stay would allow for time to determine if the Ohio courts would apply Song-Beverly. If they will not, then Burdge could bring the case back to Santa Cruz. Burdge opposes the stay. She argues Airstream failed to provide evidence demonstrating she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause. Even though Burdge signed the limited warranty “she had to sign the document even if she did not understand the importance of the forum selection clause.” (Opp at pg. 3.) That is, Burdge was required to sign the acknowledgment of document and that does not prove she waived her rights under Song-Beverly freely and voluntarily. Burdge asserts Airstream failed to provide evidence that the designated forum will not diminish her rights afforded under California law. Specifically, she argues, even if the court finds she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause, Airstream cannot show that Ohio law will not diminish her substantive rights. Burdge contends Airstream’s offer to stipulate to have the Song-Beverly apply in Ohio is insufficient because the choice of law in the Limited Page 7 of 9 Warranty states that Ohio law will govern procedural issues and how the express warranty is construed and interpreted. III. DISCUSSION “Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489; see also Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; CCP § 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”].) "The procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause is a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1294.) “California law is ‘in accord with the modern trend which favors enforceability of such [mandatory] forum selection clauses. [Citations.] No satisfying reason of public policy has been suggested why enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-445.) “‘California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that violates our state's public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 147.) “The party opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause ordinarily ‘bears the substantial burden of proving why it should not be enforced.’ [Citations.] That burden, however, is reversed when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable rights created by California statutes. In that situation, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause bears the burden to show litigating the claims in the contractually designated forum ‘will not diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded … under California law.’ [Citations.]” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) In this case, while she did sign the limited warranty, the court agrees with Burdge that the warranty was not signed knowingly as to the forum selection clause and that application of the clause would be unreasonable and/or unfair. The clause is buried in the second to the last paragraph and is written in legalese such that a reasonable consumer could not be expected to understand they were acquiescing to file a lawsuit in Ohio. The exclusive jurisdiction section does not adequately inform the consumer that they would need to file suit in Ohio for warranty issues, especially given that Burdge lives in California and purchased the Airstream in Page 8 of 9 California. The court also notes the length of the sales contract and number of signatures required as factors which balance in Burdge’s favor. The court does not find Airstream has carried its burden in demonstrating that Burdge’s substantive rights will not be diminished in any way if the case is brought in Ohio. Despite the offer of Airstream’s counsel to stipulate to apply California law in Ohio, there is no guarantee the Ohio courts will agree to this arrangement; that is, what is the effect of the stipulation in the Ohio courts? Second, Airstream’s proposal would create two pending actions, which does not promote judicial economy. Third, having California courts apply California law simply makes more sense in terms of protecting Burdge’s rights under the Song-Beverly Act and for efficient case management. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 9 of 9

23CV033241: NIJJAR, et al. vs SODHI, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by Thornton Louis Davidson (Attorney) in Department 520 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Julia Spain The Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel filed by Thornton Louis Davidson on 06/27/2024 is Granted. Thornton Davidson and Thornton Davidson, P.C.’s (“Counsel”) Unopposed Motions to be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiffs Harsimran Singh, Ramandeep Sidhu, Nick Warraich, Gurkirat Singh Nijjar, Vikram Vohra and Vinay Vohra (“Plaintiffs”) is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 284; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) Here, Counsel’s declaration indicates that there has been a breakdown of attorney- client relationship. (Davidson Decl. ¶ 2.) A breakdown in the attorney-client relationship is sufficient grounds for allowing the attorney to withdraw. (Estate of Falco v. Decker (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014.) Papers supporting Counsel’s motion satisfy all statutory requirements and demonstrate that Counsel served the following Plaintiffs each at their respective last-known addresses identified below: Garkirat Singh Nijjar: 699 Lewelling Blvd. # 164 San Leandro, CA 94579 Ramandeep Sidhu: 1935 Lovejoy Avenue Manteca, CA 95337 Nick Warraich: 235 Amberstone Lane San Ramon, CA 94582 Harsimran Singh: 2348 Clarendon Avenue Manteca, CA 95337 Vikram Vohra: 2297 E. Turnberry Avenue Fresno, CA 93730 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV033241: NIJJAR, et al. vs SODHI, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by Thornton Louis Davidson (Attorney) in Department 520 Vinay Vohra: 2297 E. Turnberry Avenue Fresno, CA 93730 (Davidson Decl. ¶ 3; Order ¶ 6; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) The Court will sign the proposed orders which will become effective once Counsel files and serves a Notice of Entry of Order and files a Proof of Service indicating that the Notice of Entry of Order was served on Plaintiffs. NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the court’s final order on Thursday July 18, 2024 unless, by no later than 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday July 17, 2024, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or self- represented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling. The subject line (RE:) of the email must state: “Request for CONTESTED HEARING: [the case name], [number].” When a party emails to contest a tentative ruling, the party must identify the specific holding(s) within the ruling they wish to contest via oral argument. The court does not provide court reporters for hearings in civil departments. A party who wants a record of the proceedings must engage a private court reporter. (Local Rule 3.95.) Any privately retained court reporter must also participate via video conference. His/Her email must be provided to the court at the time the Notice of Contest is emailed. ALL CONTESTED LAW AND MOTION HEARINGS ARE CONDUCTED VIA REMOTE VIDEO unless an in person appearance is required by the court. Invitations to participate in the video proceeding will be sent by the court upon receipt of timely notice of contest. A party may give email notice he/she will appear in court in person for the hearing, however all other counsel/parties and the JUDGE MAY APPEAR REMOTELY.

22CV019100: WHITE vs SEEK CAPITAL 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint; filed by Gale White (Plaintiff) in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Motion for Leave to Amend the complaint filed by Gale White on 06/10/2024 is Granted. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is GRANTED. Judicial policy strongly favors allowing amendments to pleadings so that all controversies between the parties can be tried in one lawsuit. Defendant will have the opportunity to attack the validity of the amended pleading by demurrer or motion to strike, or by a motion for summary judgment, after the amended pleading is filed. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) (Having said that, however, the Court agrees with Defendant that the proposed Third Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices doesn’t appear to request any relief at all, and the proposed prayer does not seek any relief that is available under Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq.) Defendant’s claimed prejudice from the proposed amended pleading is not a basis to deny this motion. Trial is not scheduled until April 1, 2025, so the amendment will not lead to any delay of trial and there is sufficient time to conduct discovery on the proposed new claims. The fact that Defendant will have to take discovery on the new claims is not a sufficient basis to deny this motion. The Court declines to impose any conditions on Plaintiff, or require Plaintiff to pay Defendant's attorneys' fees, as a condition for filing her Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff shall file and serve her Second Amended Complaint by July 24, 2024. PLEASE NOTE that the proposed Second Amended Complaint submitted with the moving papers is not deemed filed or served on anyone. The hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, currently scheduled for July 25, 2024, is VACATED as moot, based on this order allowing Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint.

CU23-03186 HYUNDAI’s Motion to Compel Arbitration TENTATIVE RULING Defendant HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA’s unopposed motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff SARAH JOHNSON’s complaint alleging causes of action under the Song- Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and for unfair business practices and negligent repair is granted. A facially valid and binding arbitration agreement exists between the parties in the relevant vehicle warranty contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Declaration of Nicole Croce at ¶ 3, Exhibit B (Croce).) The current dispute between the parties is within the scope of the agreement. (Luxor Cabs, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 970, 977; Croce at ¶ 3, Exhibit B.) Plaintiff, having not filed opposition, does not carry her burden of demonstrating why the agreement does not control.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 4. DEFENDANT PAMELA WIGET , AN INDIVDUAL Notice Of Motion And Motion To Motion To Expunge Lis Pendens And For Statutory Legal Costs is granted in part. The lis pendens is expunged. Plaintiff Scott Maines failed to allege and show that he has a reasonable probability of proving a real property claim against Ms. Wiget. Ms. Wiget is awarded reasonable fees and costs of $8,301.40, consisting of 20 hours of reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $400 per hour plus $301.50 in costs. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.