Madyson Stalder , Vs. Michael Allen Curtis, Melissa Curtis, And All Other Occupants Of 121 Wiseman Avenue, Twin Falls, Idaho .

Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-16-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Noah Penn-El RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. On June 10, 2024, Derrick Robinson filed a Request for Dismissal from the complaint. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 12.4, from Plaintiff Noah Penn-El. The responses consist of incomplete replies, or admission of certain unspecified documents or media. The responses are incomplete and fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows one remaining, scheduled motion to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. The final motion to compel further responses for this set of items addresses Shenikwa Malone on July 22, 2024. Defendant to give notice. Dept. 68 Date: 7-16-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. On June 10, 2024, Derrick Robinson filed a Request for Dismissal from the complaint. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 9.2, and 12.4 from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with assurances of later production upon entry into a protective order, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of information. The responses are incomplete and fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows nine remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next set of motions to compel further responses begins with Noah Penn-El beginning on July 22, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 16, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT CARUZOS ROOFING LLC MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD is GRANTED. No opposition filed. Counsel to prepare an order. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23LBCV00238 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: S25 Background On February 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Fred Di Bernardo (erroneously sued as Fred Di Bernardo), Kathryn Vance (erroneously sued as Kathryn Vance) (collectively Defendants) and Does 1 through 20, alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of governing documents, (2) nuisance, (3) negligence and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiffs allege that they, at all relevant times, owned and resided at a condominium at 162nd Place Unit 303, Long Beach, CA 90803 and that Defendant Bernardo has, at all relevant times, owned Unit 403, located directly above Plaintiffs condominium. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiffs assert Defendant Vance resides at Unit 403 as a Tenant. (Compl., ¶ 4.) The two condominiums are part of the Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the HOA); Plaintiffs allege the HOA and each of its members, including Plaintiffs and Defendant Dibernardo, are bound by the Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations (the CC&Rs) recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on August 23, 1973 as well as the Bylaws of Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the Bylaws). (Compl., ¶¶ 10-14, Exhs. A-B.) Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 1, 2022, they discovered black mold along the baseboards of their master bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 19, Exh. C.) Plaintiffs contacted All-American Mold Remediation & Consulting LLC (AMR) to investigate, and AMR found extensive water damage in the master bedroom and vanity area, detected high moisture throughout the ceiling and walls, and discovered mold and moisture in other parts of the master bathroom. (Compl., ¶¶ 20-22, Exh. D.) After AMRs first property inspection, Plaintiffs emailed the HOA and Defendant Vance, notifying them of the mold issue; Defendant Vance agreed to have a leak detection service conduct an inspection. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-24, Exh. E.) On July 22, 2022, American Leak Detection (ALD) inspected Unit 403 and determined water was leaking from Unit 403 to Unit 303 through a bathtubs improperly sealed spout and cover plates. (Compl., ¶¶ 26, 27, Exh. F.) Plaintiff also asserts that on July 25, 2022, AMR returned to Unit 303 and confirmed the source of the water damage as a leak from Unit 403s bathtub. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that while the ceiling in the Unit 303s master bathroom was open, Plaintiffs and ALD observed and recorded water entering Unit 303 from Unit 403 when the Defendant Vance ran water upstairs in Unit 403s bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 29.) On July 28, 2022, Plaintiffs allegedly spoke with Defendant Dibernardo, who disputed the leak in Unit 403 and refused to further communicate with Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims Defendant Dibernardo will not provide Defendant Vance or the HOA with his insurance information. (Compl., ¶¶ 30-33.) Plaintiffs state Defendant Dibernardo allegedly hired a plumber to fix the leak in Unit 403, but no proof of work completion was provided to the HOA until around December 22, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs claim they were unable to live in Unit 303 as no assurances were made that the leak would not reoccur. (Ibid.) Legal Standard The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalfv. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1). When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).) Evidentiary Objections The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Michele Travis: Nos. 1, 3 and 4 (Overruled) and Nos. 2 and 5 (Sustained). The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of William Idleman. Nos. 1 and 2 (Overruled). Judicial Notice Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations recorded on August 23, 1973, as Instrument No. 3059 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County) is granted pursuant to Evidence Code, §§ 451, 452, subds. (c) and (g). Parties Arguments Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication on the following: (1) 1st Cause of Action (Breach of the Governing Documents); (2) whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; (3) whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and (4) whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property. Defendant Dibernardo opposes arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of the HOA Governing Documents is essentially a breach of contract claim and (2) triable issues of material facts exist. Analysis The existence of an issue of duty may be a proper subject for a motion for summary adjudication. Courts may summarily adjudicate that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. (CCP § 437c(f)(1); Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden Assocs. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 508, 518. Thus, theoretically, a motion for summary adjudication as to whether Defendant owed a duty under the CC & Rs would be appropriate. Plaintiffs characterize their motion as seeking adjudication as to whether Defendants owed a duty under the CC&Rs. However, the instant motion, as well as Plaintiffs separate statement of facts, it appears that Plaintiffs not only seek the Court to determine whether such a duty exists as a matter of law, but consequently, find that the Defendants breached their alleged duty and are liable for damages as a matter of law. (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Adjudication, p. 5:7-14, 9:28 10:1-5, 13:22-23.) The instant motion for summary adjudication as the 1st cause of action; Issue of Duty No. 1 - whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; Issue of Duty No. 2 - whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and Issue of Duty No. 3 -whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property are denied to the extent that the motion seeks adjudication of the elements of breach and causation. These are not proper matters for a motion for summary adjudication. (See Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 [where damages are an element of a cause of action, such as here in the cause of action for negligence, and the damages amount remains disputed, Plaintiff cannot obtain summary adjudication on the elements pertaining to liability]). Assuming arguendo that the Defendants are bound under the terms of the CR&Rs, which Defendants may not dispute (See DSSUF Nos. 7-9), the Court finds there are triable issues of material facts as to whether Defendants Dibernardo and Vance breach their duty of care under the CC&Rs, whether that breach resulted in the alleged water damage of Unit 303, and/or whether alternative sources within Unit 303s bathroom contributed to the claimed damage. (See DSSUF 2-7, 10; Daly Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6-11; Carpenter Decl., ¶¶ 6-12, 14, 15.)

WAGNER VS. LLOYD Case Number: CVCV21-0198602 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.

C24-00316 CASE NAME: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT VS. THE HEIRS AND DEVISEES OF P.J. MOODY, DECEASED, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING BY, THROUGH, OR UNDER THE DECEDENT *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: FOR PREJUDGMENT POSSESSION OF PROPERTY FILED BY: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT *TENTATIVE RULING:* This motion for prejudgment possession is expressly unopposed, and it is granted.

At the June 10, 2024, case management conference, the court noted that the court was not lifting the discovery stay at that time and without a Phase 1 discovery plan in place. The court required the parties to meet and confer as to such a discovery plan, including whether the participation of a discovery referee/ special master is appropriate in the formulation of such plan. This issue was identified as being a subject of discussion at this, the next CMC. The parties have filed numerous documents addressing the appointment of a discovery referee/ special master and made alternative proposals. The proposals address the following subjects: (1) Appointment of a special master or discovery referee; (2) The scope of the authority of the special master or discovery referee; (3) Discovery dispute procedures; (4) Who is to be appointed as a special master or discovery referee; and, (5) Allocation of fees and costs of the special master or discovery referee. (1) Appointment of a special master or discovery referee The first issue presented is whether the position to be appointed should be that of a special master under Code of Civil Procedure section 845 or a discovery referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 639. (Note: Insofar as the parties have filed papers in groups that are not easily identified by a common name, non-plaintiff party groups are identified herein for ease of writing by a shortened version of the name of the first named party in that group’s own list of parties.) Plaintiffs propose appointment of a special master, with the order specifically noting that the special master is not subject to disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Defendants City of San Buenaventura, City of Oxnard, City of Camarillo, Calleguas Municipal Water District, The Proctor & Gamble Paper Products Company, R.N. Daily Ranch, LLC, Archdiocese of Los Angeles, The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, Archdiocese of Los Angeles Education & Welfare Corp., St. John’s Seminary in California, Camrosa Water District, California-American Water Company, United Water Conservation District, and the Marathon 100 defendants (consisting of Marathon Land Inc. and 99 other landowner defendants) filed a separate proposal for the appointment of a discovery referee rather than a special master (the San Buenaventura Response, and sometimes collectively, the Diverse Defendants Coalition). Defendant Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (FCGMA) joins this proposal. Defendants Oxnard Union High School District, Rio School District, and Vineyard Mutual Water Company filed a partial joinder to the above-defendants’ proposal (the Oxnard Union Response). This partial joinder does not specifically take a position with respect to the issue of special master as opposed to discovery referee (although it uses the term “discovery referee throughout”). Defendant Intervenors Pleasant Valley County Water District, Guadalasca Mutual Water Company, and defendants John S. Broome and Rancho Guadalasca, LLC, filed a response to both proposals (the Pleasant Valley Response) in which they state that they do not oppose the description of the role and accompanying tasks as described in either proposal. Defendant Arnold H. Meyerstein, trustee of the Meyerstein Family Trust filed a partial joinder in the above-defendants’ proposal (the Meyerstein Trust Response), stating on this issue: “Whether titled ‘discovery referee’ or ‘special master’, the appointee should be given functions that include discovery referee and retaining a data consultant for the initial disclosures’ compilation, manipulation, analysis, and presentation. An appropriate title would insulate the appointee from disqualification challenges.” Defendant Deardoff-Jackson Company filed an opposition to plaintiffs’ proposal (the Deardoff-Jackson Response) focusing on cost allocation (discussed below) and not taking a position on the issue of special master or discovery referee. (Note: Deardoff-Jackson Company identifies itself as self-represented in its caption and is signed by an individual on its behalf. As plaintiffs note in their opposition, an entity may not appear in litigation without an attorney of record. (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145 [“[A] corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. It must be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record.”].) This representation issue is not now before the court, but needs to be addressed by Deardoff-Jackson Company.) Defendants Saticoy Properties, LLC, State Ready Mix, Inc., and State Ready Mix Recycling, Inc., filed a response (the Saticoy Response) stating their position with respect to the person to be appointed, particularly responding to the above-defendants’ proposal. Defendant United States filed a response (the United States Response) which generally supports the appointment of a third-party neutral, whether as a referee or special master. Defendants John W. Borchard, Jr., trustee, Suzanne Kelly, trustee, J. David Borchard, trustee, Marilyn Bachler Unruh, trustee, Edward B. Chamberlain, trustee, Hibbs Properties, LLC, Jacob J. Talbot, and Angelina C. Juaraz filed a response to both proposals (the Borchard Response). These defendants support appointing a special master. These parties have also filed responses to other parties’ contentions. The court has reviewed all of the papers filed by the parties. The difference between a special master under section 845 and a discovery referee under section 639 is one of breadth. A special master under section 845 may have broad authority under the direction of the court. “The court may appoint one or more special masters whose duties may include the following: “(1) Investigating technical and legal issues, as directed by the court. The special master shall compile a report of findings in accordance with Section 846. “(2) Conducting joint factfinding with the parties, their designees, or both. “(3) Investigating the need for, and developing a proposal for, a preliminary injunction pursuant to Article 13 (commencing with Section 847). “(4) Performing other tasks the court may deem appropriate.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 845, subd. (a).) “The special master shall make a draft report available to the parties and provide at least 60 days for the parties to submit written objections to the draft report.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 846, subd. (a).) “An objection to the draft report shall identify the specific grounds and evidence on which the objection is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 846, subd. (b).) “The special master may notice and hold hearings, as he or she deems appropriate, to gather information or address issues raised in the objections to the draft report.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 846, subd. (c).) “The special master shall consider the objections to the draft report and develop a final report that shall be filed with the court, together with supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 846, subd. (d).) By contrast, a discovery referee under section 639, where the appointment is not with the consent of all parties, has much narrower authority. “When the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the written motion of any party, or of its own motion, appoint a referee in the following cases pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section 640: “(1) When the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of a long account on either side; in which case the referees may be directed to hear and decide the whole issue, or report upon any specific question of fact involved therein. “(2) When the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. “(3) When a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of the action. “(4) When it is necessary for the information of the court in a special proceeding. “(5) When the court in any pending action determines that it is necessary for the court to appoint a referee to hear and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to discovery in the action and to report findings and make a recommendation thereon.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 639, subd. (a).) “In a discovery matter, a motion to disqualify an appointed referee pursuant to Section 170.6 shall be made to the court by a party either: “(A) Within 10 days after notice of the appointment, or if the party has not yet appeared in the action, a motion shall be made within 10 days after the appearance, if a discovery referee has been appointed for all discovery purposes. “(B) At least five days before the date set for hearing, if the referee assigned is known at least 10 days before the date set for hearing and the discovery referee has been assigned only for limited discovery purposes.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 639, subd. (b).) “When a referee is appointed pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a), the order shall indicate whether the referee is being appointed for all discovery purposes in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 639, subd. (c).) Two issues are presented by the parties in their discussion of this issue. The first is the application, if any, of disqualification pursuant to section 170.6. Some parties have indicated their intent to exercise whatever rights they have under section 170.6 if the appointed discovery referee is not acceptable to them. (E.g., Saticoy Response, at p. 3.) Others have argued that section 170.6 disqualification absolutely does not apply to groundwater adjudications regardless of what section is used as the basis for appointment of a neutral. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 838, subd. (c).) The court agrees with the point made by the Meyerstein Trust that an appropriate title may obviate issues regarding the application of section 170.6—if indeed it has any application here. Moreover, as discussed below regarding scope, the tasks to be performed by the third-party neutral are now envisioned to be a bit broader than that typically assigned to a discovery referee under section 639. Accordingly, the court determines that the appropriate approach is to appoint a special master under section 845. (2) Scope of Authority and Discovery Dispute Resolution As the court indicated in its prior rulings, the initial stage of Phase 1 is to gather and exchange information necessary to address Phase 1 issues, whether by settlement or trial. In order to accomplish this effectively, a discovery plan is required before the parties commence discovery. The task of the special master will be to evaluate the scope of available information through initial disclosures and the discovery needs of the parties. The court expects this evaluation will lead to a reasonable and efficient discovery plan, including appropriate deadlines and guideposts. The court will leave it to the special master to take appropriate steps to see this occurs expeditiously. To the extent that discovery disputes arise in the course of discovery, the court will assign to the special master the resolution of all such disputes, subject to review by the court. Again, the special master may accomplish this in whatever manner is most appropriate and is consistent with law. The court will not constrain the special master to any specific briefing procedure or schedule. It is not now contemplated that that special master would act independently to investigate or to find facts. It is also not now contemplated that that the special master engage any third parties to collect, organize, or distribute data. It may, or may not, prove advisable to do so after the discovery plan is developed, but the court prefers a recommendation or proposal from the special master before authorizing such additional expense or expanding the scope of the special master’s commission. (3) Special Master Appointment Plaintiffs propose a special master to be appointed from among: (i) Hon. Patrick J. Walsh (ret.); or (ii) Hon. Mitchell Beckloff (ret.). The San Buenaventura Response proposes a special master to be appointed from among: (ii) Hon. Mitchell Beckloff (ret.); (iii) Hon. Jack Komar (ret.); or (iv) Hon. James Smith (ret.). This proposal is joined by FCGMA. Certain of those joining the San Buenaventura Response have expressed reservations as to the appointment of Judge Walsh. The Oxnard Union Response joins in the proposal of Judge Beckloff, but does not oppose the appointment of Judge Walsh. The Pleasant Valley Response also supports the appointment of either Judge Beckloff or Judge Walsh. The United States Response supports the appointment of Judge Beckloff, or if Judge Beckloff is not available, the appointment of Judge Walsh. The Borchard Response supports either Judge Beckloff or Judge Walsh. The Meyerstein Trust Response supports the appointment of Judge Beckloff. The Deardoff-Jackson Response does not take a position on who should be appointed, but disputes whether a special master is required (and more particularly how a special master should be compensated). The Saticoy Response supports the appointment of Judge Walsh and opposes the appointment of Judge Komar. Based upon the totality of these responses, it appears that Judge Beckloff is the best candidate, being both qualified and not subject to any party’s specific objection. At least as of May 23, 2024, Judge Beckloff has confirmed that he is available and willing to be considered for this appointment. (Newmark decl., dated July 12, 2024, ¶ 3.) Subject to confirmation that Judge Beckloff remains available, the court will appoint Judge Beckloff as special master. (4) Allocation of Special Master Fees and Costs The most contentious issue presented here is the manner is which the fees and costs of the special master are allocated among the parties to this litigation. (Note: A separate discussion of caps follows the allocation discussion, below.) There are several alternatives and qualifications proposed: (i) Plaintiffs propose a two-category approach to allocation. Category 1, work that impacts specific parties litigating specific issues, and category 2, work generally assisting all parties. Category 1 fees and costs would be allocated by the special master only to the parties litigating those issues, making recommendations as to the allocation among those parties. Category 2 fees would be allocated one-third pro-rata by law firm (or party if self-represented), and two-thirds pro-rata by each party’s average annual groundwater pumped from the OPV Basins between 2017 and 2019 as reported to FCGMA. The United States by statute is exempt from all such fees, and the United States’ share is not considered in determining pro rata amounts. (All parties appear to acknowledge the exemption of the United States from these fees and costs. All further discussions and proposals, below, should be understood to include this exemption. Because the United States is exempt, it takes no position as to allocation among the other parties.) (ii) The San Buenaventura Response, joined by FCGMA, also proposes a two-category approach based on specific (category 1) and general (category 2) special master activities. For category 1 fees and costs, the fees should be split equally between the moving (50 percent) and responding (50 percent) parties. Category 2 fees and costs should be allocated 50 percent to plaintiffs and 50 percent to defendants, with the respective 50 percent amount further divided equally by party. (iii) The Oxnard Union Response joins the San Buenaventura proposal, but notes that some parties may need to seek relief because of their size or circumstances and that for category 1 fees and costs the special master should be able to recommend shifting fees based upon the nature of the discovery conduct. (iv) The Pleasant Valley Response supports a cost-sharing framework that is representative of each party’s draw on the Basin’s resources and so supports plaintiffs’ proposal and does not support the San Buenaventura Response proposal. (v) The Meyerstein Trust Response proposes a meet and confer as to allocation after initial disclosures are assessed, but there should be a distinction between non-participant defendants. The Meyerstein Trust Response proposes, as among defendants, an initial allocation of $50 for each defendant individual or family landowner or small non-profit entity and granting exemptions for entities seeking 2 AFY or less and farming in a disadvantaged community or classed as a small farmer under Code of Civil Procedure section 850, with the remainder allocated by stipulation. (vi) The Saticoy Response does not take a position on allocation of fees and costs. (vii) The Deardoff-Jackson Response opposes the plaintiffs’ proposal, arguing that category 2 work does not actually benefit self-represented defendants who should not have to pay any special master fees or costs. While questioning whether there is any value to special master work for that class of defendants, this response suggests that plaintiffs should pay all such costs as the principal beneficiary of such costs. Apart from the abstract formula to be used to allocate costs, these proposals also point out the numerical effect of these choices given the number of parties and the total amount of funds to be raised by the allocation. With respect to the total amount of funds, plaintiffs propose a cap of $250,000 without further court authorization. The San Buenaventura Response proposes an initial cap of $200,000. Neither of these proposals provide a factual basis for these amounts. With respect to number of plaintiffs, the declaration of counsel for the City of Oxnard, attorney Gregory Newmark, provides a count of the parties by position in this litigation: 462 parties, of which 168 are plaintiffs, collectively represented by one firm, and 294 defendants. (Newmark decl., dated July 12, 2024, ¶ 8.) If $200,000 is allocated first 50/50 plaintiffs/defendants and then per party, the results would be: each plaintiff would pay $595.24; each defendant would pay $340.14. If $200,000 is allocated strictly per party, each party would pay $432.90. These numbers would, of course, change with the respective denominator as parties may be excluded for reasons of size or circumstance. Under plaintiffs’ proposal the allocation is more complicated because it depends on how each party is represented and how much water each party is reporting as pumped. Everyone appears to agree that the United States is statutorily exempt from being charged with any such fees. Consequently, that exemption, including the exclusion of the United States from any pro-rata calculation, will be part of the court’s order. As a general proposition, the court agrees as to category 1 fees and costs that the parties engaged in a discovery dispute should initially bear the fees and costs associated with that dispute 50 percent to the moving party or parties and 50 percent to the responding party or parties, with the special master being authorized to recommend a reallocation of such fees and costs depending upon the circumstances of the particular dispute. As this is consistent with discovery practice involving discovery referees in less complex cases, there does not appear to be substantial dispute about this allocation method for this type of fees and costs. The court’s authority as to special master fees is as follows: “The court shall fix the special master’s compensation on the basis and terms stated in the appointing order, and the court may set a new basis and new terms after giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court shall allocate payment of the special master’s compensation among the parties in an amount and a manner that the court deems equitable. The court may waive a party’s obligations to pay the special master’s compensation upon a showing of good cause.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 845, subd. (b).) The difficulty with allocating category 2 fees and costs is that each of the proposals is equitable in some respects and not equitable in others. The two principal competing equitable concepts are that “[h]e who takes the benefit must bear the burden” (Civ. Code, § 3521) and “[e]quality is equity” (In re Miller’s Estate (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 284, 298). As to benefits and burdens, those whose participation in this litigation is minimalist should not be burdened to the same extent as those who are lead players. The suggestion of setting a threshold of 2 AFY appears to be reasonable (i.e., that to obtain such an exemption a party would file a stipulation that it does not, and will not, seek more than that amount in this litigation ), although the effect of such a threshold on the remaining parties, either in dollars or as a denominator, is unclear. The court is concerned about the perception suggested in some papers that an allocation of such costs may become a “pay to play” regime. However, the amounts under discussion for special master fees and costs are modest, especially compared with the attorney fees and other party litigation costs and considering the significance of the rights of each party being resolved by this litigation. At the same time, the court finds it equitable that if certain parties are unequally benefitting from the special master proceedings (not by virtue of success in making or opposing proposals, but in the underlying purposes of the proceedings) it may be appropriate for those parties to bear a larger share of the expenses. This may make allocation in some sense correlate to the size of their claim of water rights or to some other measure of significance of the discovery proceedings. Whatever might eventually be the best answer (there is clearly no obvious “right” answer), the court is not in a position to anticipate such a nuanced allocation at this time. This analysis suggests that the issue should be reviewed later with input from the special master. In terms of “equal” allocations, the court does not favor any allocation that is proportional to the number of law firms or self-represented individuals. One fairness issue raised as to such an allocation (one-third of category 2 fees and costs under plaintiffs’ proposal) is that because plaintiffs are collectively represented by one law firm, under such an allocation all plaintiffs would have only one share of a third of the costs, as compared with one share for each separately represented party. Parties already receive a benefit from sharing their attorney fees based upon the work of their attorneys and the economies of scale that may apply to such sharing. The underlying benefit to the parties is not dependent upon party choice to prefer unique representation or small groupings of litigants. This aspect of plaintiffs’ proposal is rejected. As between a “per party” (irrespective of position in the litigation) allocation and a plaintiff-defendant split first followed by an allocation among plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, the difference is, based on the numbers presented but not adjusted for exemptions, not very significant in absolute dollars. Because the court will not resolve these issues now, further discussion among the parties of this issue is warranted. The court reminds the parties that the aggregate cost in attorney time of an aggressive dispute is likely to exceed whatever savings might be achieved through an otherwise “more favorable” allocation scheme. This leaves the following issues outstanding: (1) Is Judge Beckloff willing to accept this appointment at this time? Assuming he remains willing: (2) How much money is necessary for the organizational meetings/ hearings with Judge Beckloff? Once the amount necessary for start-up is determined, the court will finalize an initial allocation to assess this amount from the parties. This initial allocation is not intended to represent the interim or final allocation, but is to get the process started so that Judge Beckloff can provide a recommendation as to the allocation and mechanism for ongoing payments. To the extent the initial allocation differs from the interim or final allocation, the court expects to address the interim or final allocation retroactively so that any relative over-payments or under-payments made initially are credited or debited against the allocation as if it had been initially determined. The parties’ further input or agreement regarding this initial allocation is also needed. (3) What process should exist to determine exemptions from assessment on the basis of de minimis participation or other circumstances? (4) What orders are necessary to meet statutory requirements to appoint and effect the special mastership as discussed herein? The court will make such orders at the next case management conference. This leaves the final issue of when the next case management conference should be held given the need to meet and confer as discussed herein. There is now a case management conference scheduled for August 9, 2024. Counsel will need to be able to discuss whether this case management conference should be rescheduled.

Case Number: 22STCV23623 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Case Name: Sanaz Afsar, et al. v. Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association, et al. Case No.: 22STCV23623 Motion: (1) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (2) Motion to Seal Moving Party: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc. (PWTS) Responding Party: None as of July 15, 2024 (PWTS filed Notice of Non-Opposition on 7/11/24) Tentative Ruling: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc.s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED. Defendants Motion to Seal is also GRANTED. I. Background Plaintiff owns Unit 2301 in the Bunker Hill Tower high-rise in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2022, Defendants Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association (BHTCA) and Pacific Water Tank Services Inc. (PWTS) discharged 2000 or more gallons of dirty water directly into Plaintiffs unit, causing extensive property damage. On July 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against BHTCA and PWTS for (1) negligence and (2) trespass. On October 14, 2022, Defendant BHTCA filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, Saied Kashani, PWTS, VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (3) equitable indemnity; (4) apportionment and/or contribution; (5) declaratory relief and (6) declaratory relief. BHTCA dismissed Plaintiff and Saied Kashani from its cross-complaint on Jun 29, 2023. On November 30, 2022, Defendant PWTS filed a cross-complaint against BHTC and VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) equitable indemnity; (2) contribution; (3) apportionment; and (4) declaratory relief. This is the motion by PWTS for determination of good faith settlement, and also a motion to seal the settlement documents by the settlement amount. The motions are unopposed. II. Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement A. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 states, in pertinent part: (a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of good faith or a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors . . . [para.] (c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasors from any further claims against the settling tortfeasors for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. [para.] (d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. In determining whether a settlement is in good faith, our Supreme Court stated that the trial court should inquire into, among other things, ...whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasors proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiffs injuries. ( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of facts be taken into account (i.e. the Tech-Bilt factors) including: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs total recovery and the settlors proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among defendants; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interest of the nonsettling defendants. A defendants settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendants liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (d).) The party asserting lack of good faith should demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the objective of section 877.6. ( Tech-Bilt at pp. 500-501.) A determination that the settlement was in good faith would bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (c).) Any existing cross-complaints for such claims would be subject to dismissal. While an unopposed application for good faith settlement may be granted on bare bones facts, an opposed application requires the Court to consider the settlement based on the Tech-Bilt factors. ( City of Grand Terrace (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) This requires the settlor to provide the Court with sufficient evidentiary basis to enable the court to consider and evaluate the various aspects of the settlement. ( Id. at p. 1263.) Because Tech-Bilt mandates a rough approximation of the settling defendant's proportionate liability and consideration of all other defendants' proportionate liability and consideration of all other factors that might affect the fairness of the settlement as respects non-settling defendants, the affidavits, declarations or other evidence should provide the court with the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors contemplated by Tech-Bilt . Without the facts, in a contested hearing, it is impossible for a court to exercise its discretion in an appropriate fashion. ( Ibid. ) B. Application to Facts 1. Settling parties: (1) Plaintiff Sanaz Afsar (2) Defendant PWTS 2. Terms of settlement: In consideration for a release of the settling parties by each of the settlement parties, and a dismissal of the action against PWTS, PWTS will pay Plaintiff a sum in settlement. [1] The settlement will result in dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint and BHTCA and Seabreeze Management Company, Incs cross-complaint against PWTS. 3. Rough Approximation of Plaintiffs Total Recovery and Settlors Proportionate Liability: Substantial evidence (e.g., factual declarations) showing the nature and extent of the settling defendant's liability is required for a good-faith determination. Without such evidence, a good faith determination is an abuse of discretion. ( Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co . (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348 (questionable assumptions in moving party's memorandum of points and authorities insufficient to show settlement was reasonable); Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834 (attorney's declaration re settling defendant's liability insufficient where he failed to provide specific supporting facts or expert opinion). The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be. ( City of Grand Terrace vs. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal App.3d 1251, 1262.) When a trial court considers the good faith of a settlement, it must determine each tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. The trial court's good faith determination must also take into account the settling tortfeasor's potential liability for indemnity to a cotortfeasor, as well as the settling tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff. In so doing, a trial court must consider each of the plaintiff's claims and possible recoveries and the potential liability of the joint tortfeasors. ( Cal-Jones Properties v. Evans Pacific Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 324, 328.) PWTS maintains its liability for the incident is minimal at best. PWTSs only involvement in this action is as the entity hired by BHTCA to service a water tank on the premises. (Motion, Carpenter Dec., ¶3.) PWTS argues the water intrusion was not the result of its conduct. ( Id. at ¶3.) PWTS maintains the tank was already drained when it arrived, and it was at all times BHTCAs responsibility to drain the tank. ( Id. at ¶4.) PWTS establishes its proportionate liability is likely zero. No oppositions have been filed to this motion. For this reason, PWTSs failure to provide any information regarding Plaintiffs approximate recovery is immaterial. 4. Allocation: In the typical one-plaintiff, multiple-defendants, personal injury action each tortfeasor is potentially liable for the same injury to the plaintiff. Therefore the full settlement by one defendant will offset a judgment against other tortfeasors; no allocation of the settlement is required. But many lawsuits and many settlements do not fit this pattern. In some, the amount of the offset is uncertain because one settlement covers multiple plaintiffs or causes of action with different damages, or because a sliding scale settlement is used and payments by the settling defendant are contingent upon the degree of plaintiff's success against the remaining defendants. In others, the amount of the offset is clouded by injection of noncash consideration into the settlement or, as here, by settling claims for separate injuries not all of which would be attributable to conduct of the remaining defendants. ( Alcal Roofing & Insulation v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1124-1125.) In a situation where the cash amount of the settlement does not dictate the amount of the offset, the settling parties must include an allocation or a valuation in their agreement. A natural tension will exist between plaintiff, who benefits by undervaluing the settlement in order to permit greater recovery against the remaining defendants, and the settling defendant, who would want the settlement value high enough to be approved in order to relieve settling defendant from liability for comparative indemnity or contribution. Requiring a joint valuation by the plaintiff and the settling defendant should generally produce a reasonable valuation. ( Id. ) No allocation of the settlement proceeds is required. There is a single Plaintiff and the causes of action allege the same damages. There is also no noncash consideration in the settlement. 5. Fraud, Collusion and Tortious Conduct: Based on the record, there is no evidence of fraud, collusion or tortious conduct indicating that the settlement was entered into to injure Defendant BHTC or other remaining defendants or cross-defendants. 6. Recognition that settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial: PWTSs settlement is less than if it were found liable at trial. PWTS maintains, however, that its liability is zero. 7. Financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants: The settlement is not disproportionately low. As such, PWTSs financial conditions and insurance policy limits are immaterial. ( L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 749-750 (request for discovery into defendants financial condition for purposes of determining good faith settlement denied; financial condition of settling defendant only relevant where settlement is disproportionately low).) III. Motion to Seal Documents Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (c).) Therefore, pleadings, motions, discovery documents, and other papers may not be filed under seal merely by stipulation of the parties. The parties' agreement that certain documents be filed under seal is improper and insufficient. ( Savaglio v. WalMart Stores, Inc . (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 600.) A prior court order must be obtained. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (a); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 888.) At a minimum, a party seeking to seal documents must come forward with a specific list of facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them. ( Id. at 894.) Before substantive courtroom proceedings are closed or transcripts are ordered sealed, a trial court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) PWTS moves to seal the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement and the declaration of Elizabeth J. Carpenter. PWTS submitted a public redacted version of the documents it the settlement amount redacted and it lodged an unredacted version with the Court, as required under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subdivision (b)(5). PWTS moves to seal these documents to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement amount. The settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provision. (Motion to Seal, Carpenter Dec., ¶2.) There is no overriding public interest in the settlement amount agreed to between Plaintiff and PWTS. No oppositions have been filed to the Motion to Seal. The motion to seal is granted. PWTS demonstrates an overriding interest in sealing the settlement amount, namely preservation of the confidentiality of the settlement as agreed to by the parties. The parties willingness to settle and their interest in maintaining the settlements confidentiality can only be served by the very limited redactions of the papers. PWTS establishes that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this overriding interest. [1] The Court has reviewed this sum, but, in light of the ruling on the motion to seal, does not disclose it here.

ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INC Case Number: 23CV-0202690 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.