First Communities Management Inc A/A/F Vue On Medlock Vs Jones

Case Number: 22TRCV00181 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: B 5901 Century Owner, LLC v. Festival Management Corporation, Case No. 22TRCV00181 Tentative Ruling: Motion in limine re Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant Protection Resolution This is an action by Plaintiff 5901 Century Owner, LLC against Defendant Festival Management Corporation for alleged breach of lease. The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid rent, alleged to total $673,956.32, plus interest. By this in limine motion Plaintiff seeks to preclude the introduction of evidence or argument related to the Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant Protections Resolution (Resolution). Plaintiff contends that under the express terms of the Resolution the matter asserted by the Defendant is an affirmative defense which has not been pleaded, and is thus waived. (The Court grants judicial notice of the January 24, 2023 Resolution of the Board of Supervisors and the June 10, 2022 Revised Guidelines to Aid in the Implementation of Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant Protections.) The Resolution provides an affirmative defense to Evictions (Section VI) and in the Remedies article (Section XI). Article VI.A.1. relates to evictions for nonpayment of rent. It provides: Nonpayment of Rent . During the time periods set forth below, a Tenant may assert an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent, late charges, interest, or any other fees accrued if the Tenant demonstrates an inability to pay rent and/or such related charges due to Financial Impacts Related to COVID-19 and the Tenant has provided notice to the Landlord within seven (7) days after the date that rent and/or such related charges were due, unless extenuating circumstances exist that the Tenant is unable to pay. The affirmative defense provided under this Paragraph is described in Section C of Paragraph XI, below . FOR COMMERCIAL TENANTS, THERE SHALL BE NO FURTHER EVICTION PROTECTIONS AFTER JANUARY 31, 2022. (Bold added.) Article XI.C. states: C. Affirmative Defense . Effective March 4, 2020, any Protections , including the Protection pertaining to Personal Guarantees for commercial rental debt, provided under this Resolution shall constitute an affirmative defense for a Tenant in any unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, as amended, and any other civil action seeking repossession and repayment of rental debt. The Tenant shall have the burden to prove the basis of their affirmative defense, including the merit of any self-certification of a Financial Impact Related to COVID-19 made pursuant to this Resolution . Said affirmative defenses shall survive the termination or expiration of these Protections. (Bold added.) Defendant failed to assert the Resolution as an affirmative defense at any time in this proceeding. Defendant makes a number of arguments claiming that it is entitled to introduce evidence of the Resolution created affirmative defense and related facts. First, Defendant claims that the Central Issue of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is the Effect of the Resolution on the Partys Rights. In essence, Defendant contends that since the Second Amended Complaint alleges the existence of the City and County COVID ordinances that therefore the affirmative defense issue was tendered by Plaintiff. The Court disagrees. The fact that the Plaintiff alleged that Defendant remained legally obligated to pay rent, but could not be evicted for a period of time (Complaint ¶ 11) did not relieve the Defendant of an obligation to plead its Resolution based affirmative defense. Nor does the fact that Plaintiff pleaded the existence of the March 2020 and September 2020 County resolutions (Complaint ¶ 12, 13) relieve the Defendant of an obligation to assert any claimed affirmative defense arising under either of those resolutions. Afterall, the affirmative defense is dependent upon proving certain facts to establish the defense. (Article VI.) Not all commercial entities were entitled to a defense. The Court notes that paragraph 14 alleges: Plaintiff does not know if Festival is entitled to the protections of the Resolution since it does not know if Festival was unable to pay rent incurred during the Moratorium due to Financial Impacts Related to Covid-19 as set forth in the Resolution . In an abundance of caution, however, Plaintiff proceeds as if Festival was entitled to such protections. This allegation reveals that Plaintiff is not asserting facts that constitute the affirmative defense. The mention of the resolutions did not relieve Defendant of its obligation to assert any defenses it might have, including an affirmative defense arising under the Resolution. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff added surplusage to the Second Amended Complaint does not relieve Defendant of its obligation to plead its Resolution based affirmative defense. Second, Defendant alleges that its general denial was sufficient to constitute the affirmative defense provided by the Resolution. Defendant cites no case authority for such a proposition. Nor does such a general denial of the material allegations give rise to the affirmative defense claimed by Defendant. This is particularly true here, as the Plaintiff expressly alleged in paragraph 14 that it was not aware of whether or not Defendant was entitled to the protections of the Resolution. Further, establishing the affirmative defense is dependent upon alleging and ultimately proving additional facts such as the financial impact of COVID-19. Paragraph 14 made clear that it was incumbent upon the Defendant to make such claimed defense known. Defendant did not make any assertion that the affirmative defense applied. Third, Defendant asserts that it is not required to plead the Resolution provided affirmative defense, as the Resolution allows a tenant to plead an affirmative defense. (A tenant& may assert an affirmative defense&) The Court disagrees with this argument. The granting to the tenant of an affirmative defense that may be asserted does not mean that the affirmative defense need not be pleaded like every other affirmative defense expressly and affirmatively. The suggestion by Defendant that the affirmative defense was already in the case by virtue of Plaintiffs description of some of the provisions of the COVID ordinances and resolutions is wrong. (See discussion above.) Finally, Defendant suggests that the affirmative defenses it did plead were adequate to raise the issue of the Resolution affirmative defense. The Court disagrees. The Seventh Affirmative Defense states: As a separate and distinct affirmative defense to each of plaintiffs causes of action and, while denying each of the allegations contained therein, this answering defendant asserts that, by virtue of the acts or omissions of the plaintiff, it has been excused from performing under the subject matter lease. This cannot reasonably be understood to allege that the Resolution based defense was being asserted. Defendant claims that its Eleventh Affirmative Defense arises under the Resolution. As a separate and distinct affirmative defense to each of plaintiffs causes of action and, while denying each of the allegations contained therein, this answering defendant asserts that plaintiffs damages, if any, should be reduced, eliminated, and/or offset by the amount of damages suffered by defendant attributable to any wrongful acts and omissions of Plaintiff. That also fails to give anyone notice that the affirmative defense was based on the Resolution. Defendant asserts that the Twelfth Cause of Action preserved this defense. As a separate and distinct affirmative defense to each of plaintiffs causes of action and, while denying each of the allegations contained therein, this answering defendant asserts that by virtue of plaintiffs unlawful, immoral, careless, negligent and other wrongful conduct, plaintiff is barred from recovery from defendant under the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and of in pari delicto . This is not an assertion of the Resolution as an affirmative defense. The Court GRANTS the motion in limine . No evidence of the Resolution shall be introduced.

Case Number: 24STCV10041 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Spring Towers, LLC, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24STCV10041 vs. Tentative Ruling Jacob Carlson, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Motion to Quash Service of Summons Moving Party : Defendant Jacob Carlson Responding Party : Plaintiff Spring Towers, LLC T/R : THE MOTION IS DENIED. PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. DEFENDANT TO FILE AN ANSWER WITHIN 5 DAYS. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers and opposition. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Spring Towers, LLC filed this unlawful detainer action against Defendant Jacob Carlson on April 22, 2024. On May 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs application to serve the summons and complaint by posting it at the subject premises and mailing it to the same address. Plaintiff later attested that it effected service by posting on June 5, 2024. On June 18, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to quash service, claiming Plaintiff failed to serve the summons and complaint in the manner required by the Code of Civil Procedure. ANALYSIS A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process. ( Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) The filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper, but only if the proof of service satisfies relevant statutory requirements. ( Id. , at 1441-1442.) A summons in an action for unlawful detainer of real property may be served by posting if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served ... other than [by] publication and that certain other requirements are satisfied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.45(a).) The Court granted Plaintiffs application to serve by posting. The Court found that Plaintiff had shown reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Defendant by other means. If publication is ordered, [t]he court shall order the summons to be posted on the premises in a manner most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served and direct that a copy of the summons and of the complaint be forthwith mailed by certified mail to such party at his last known address. ( Id. , subd. (b).) Defendant concedes he received the summons and complaint in the mail, but he argues Plaintiff did not post it on the premises as required. Defendant declares: I never found a copy of the summons and complaint at the premises. No[ ]one has appeared at my home in an attempt to serve me with anything. (Carlson Decl., 1:11-13.) Plaintiffs proof of service, accompanied by the declaration of a registered process server, establishes a presumption that service was properly effected. (Evid. Code § 647; Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) Defendant cannot rebut this presumption by denying knowledge of service; he must offer some affirmative evidence that service did not take place in the manner Plaintiff claims. (See Louis & Diederich, Inc. v. Cambridge European Imports, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1574, 1591 [no finding can be predicated on the absence of evidence].) Defendant has not rebutted the sworn statement by Plaintiffs process server in the proof of service. Defendants motion is denied.

Case Number: 21CHCV00247 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/12/24 Case #21CHCV00247 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES Motion filed on 3/13/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jeffrey Harris and Austin Harris, Co-Trustees of the Harris Family Trust RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Helene Stahl and Extensions Plus, Inc. NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order awarding Plaintiff attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of $73,118.75 comprised of $63,643.75 in attorney fees, $7,575.00 in expert fees and $1,900 in fees for the instant motion. RULING : The motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part, as set forth below. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arose out of the alleged breach of a commercial lease and guaranty of the lease. Plaintiff Jeffrey Harris and Austin Harris, Co-Trustees of the Harris Family Trust (Plaintiff) were the landlord and Defendant Extensions Plus (Extensions Plus) was the tenant and Defendant Helene Stahl (Stahl) was the guarantor (collectively, Defendants). Possession of the premises was not at issue as the tenant no longer occupied the premises. Plaintiffs contended that the commercial tenant made unpermitted alterations causing substantial damages to the property and then abandoned the premises with past due rent owing to set up their business in a new location. On 3/30/21, Plaintiffs filed this action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and (3) Common Count. On 10/22/21, Defendants filed answers to the complaint. After a court trial, on 1/30/24, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on Plaintiffs complaint. ( See 1/30/24 Judgment). Plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $203,387.50, prejudgment interest in the amount of $50,036.50 for a total award of $253,424.00. Id . On 3/13/24, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking an order awarding Plaintiff attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of $73,118.75 comprised of $63,643.75 in attorney fees, $7,575.00 in expert fees and $1,900 in fees for the instant motion. Defendants have opposed the motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply to the opposition. ANALYSIS Attorneys fees are recoverable as an item of costs when authorized by contract, statute or law. See CCP 1033.5(a)(10). Civil Code 1717 provides, in relevant part: (a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract , whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. Where a contract provides for attorney's fees, as set forth above, that provision shall be construed as applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit. Attorney's fees provided for by this section shall not be subject to waiver by the parties to any contract which is entered into after the effective date of this section. Any provision in any such contract which provides for a waiver of attorney's fees is void. (b)(1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section , whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section . The lease agreement/contract which provided the basis for this action contained the following attorney fee provision: Attorney's Fees . If any Party or Broker brings an action or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. Such fees may be awarded in the same suit or recovered in a separate suit, whether or not such action or proceeding is pursued to decision or judgment. The term, "Prevailing Party" shall include, without limitation, a Party or Broker who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought, as the case may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment, or the abandonment by the other Party or Broker of its claim or defense. The attorneys' fees award shall not be computed in accordance with any court fee schedule but shall be such as to fully reimburse all attorneys' fees reasonably incurred. In addition, Lessor shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and service of notices of Default and consultations in connection therewith, whether or not a legal action is subsequently commenced in connection with such Default or resulting Breach ($200 is a reasonable minimum per occurrence for such services and consultation). ( See Complaint, Ex.A; Cordero-Sacks Decl., Ex.1). Similarly, the Guaranty provides: In the event any action be brought by said Lessor against Guarantors hereunder to enforce the obligation of Guarantors hereunder, the unsuccessful party in such action shall pay to the prevailing party therein a reasonable attorneys fee. The attorneys fee award shall not be computed in accordance with any court fee schedule, but shall be such as to full reimburse all attorneys fees reasonably incurred. Id . Based on the 1/30/24 Judgment, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees, not unlimited legal fees as claimed in the motion. ( See Motion, p.2:4). The amount of attorneys fees to be awarded is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. PLCM Group (2000) 22 C4th 1084, 1095-1096, internal citations omitted. Further, it has been held that experienced trial judges are the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in their courts and their judgment will only be disturbed on appeal if it is clearly wrong and an abuse of discretion. Id . A trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services without expert testimony. Id . In calculating a reasonably attorney fee award, the trial court begins with the lodestar (the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate). Id . The reasonable hourly rate is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. Id . Here, the Court finds that the hourly rates ranging from $375/hour for associate work and $375-$475/hour for principal work to be reasonable. However, the Court finds that the amount of time claimed to have been spent is excessive. The billing entries are extremely vague. ( See Cordero-Sacks Decl., Ex.2). For example, many of the entries are merely titled Draft without any indication of what was being drafted. Id . Other examples of vague billing entries are those titled Reduced Hourly without any indication of what task was performed at the reduced rate. Id . As such, the Court finds that a 25% reduction of the attorneys fees requested is warranted. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to support its request for an award of expert fees. In the motion, Plaintiff merely argues that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs as provided for in the Commercial Lease and Guaranty, which includes expert witness fees. (emphasis in original) ( See Motion, p.5:28-p.6:3). An award of contractual attorneys fees may not include expenses expressly denominated by statute as nonrecoverable cost items, such as expert fees not ordered by the court, postage, telephone and copying charges. See Carwash of America-PO LLC (2002) 97 CA4th 540, 544; Hsu (2005) 126 CA4th 1330, 1340-1342 (disapproving Bussey (1990) 225 CA3d 1162, 1166); Jones (2005) 127 CA4th 542, 550-551. It has been held by some courts that a contract provision which allows the prevailing party to recover all necessary expenses, or similar broad language, may permit an award of expert fees not ordered by the court. Here, it cannot be argued that the attorneys fee provisions in the lease and/or guaranty are so broad as to cover expert fees. ( See Complaint, Ex.A; Cordero-Sacks Decl., Ex.1). The only reference to recovering costs and expenses in the attorneys fee provision contained in the lease relates to costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and service of notices of Default and consultations in connection therewith, whether or not a legal action is subsequently commenced in connection with such Default or resulting Breach ($200 is a reasonable minimum per occurrence for such services and consultation). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded $49,157.81 in attorneys fees (($63,643.75 + $1,900.00) = $65,543.75 25% ($16,385.94) = $49,157.81). Plaintiffs request for expert fees is denied.

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. VS. SELLS Case Number: 22CV-0200669 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal: An Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (hereinafter “OSC”) issued May 31, 2024, to Plaintiff’s Counsel for failure to submit a proposed judgment as ordered on September 25, 2023. Counsel has submitted a response to the OSC Re: Dismissal, and a Request to Vacate an Order of Sanctions that was made by Judge Boeckman on May 28, 2024. The Court declines to vacate its May 31, 2024 Order imposing sanctions. That issue is not properly before the Court. That order was issued by another judge and Counsel failed to appear at the hearing on that matter. A proposed judgment was lodged with the Court on June 24, 2024. However, the Court notes that the proposed judgment identifies two street addresses for the subject property, each of which are different from the street address identified in the Request for Court Judgment by Default. The Court needs further clarification as to the correct address. The ‘correctness’ of the judgment is not at issue in the instant OSC. Only the failure to timely provide the Court with a proposed judgment is at issue in this hearing. Having reviewed counsel’s declaration, the Court finds good cause to vacate the instant OSCThe Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

GA&TV INC VS LEV RIC1905065 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INVESTMENTS LLC Tentative Ruling: Deny Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees. In their motion, Defendants seek to recover attorney fees based on the attorney fee provision in the Loan Restructuring Agreement (“Agreement”) between Lev and non-party Lake Elsinore Diamond Road. (See Lindemann Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B [“One of the defendants, had a loan document that provided for attorney’s fees pursuant to ¶ 4(k), p. 2.”] [emphasis added].) Paragraph 4(k) of the Agreement, however, provides that “[e]ach of the parties shall bear their own attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement.” (Id.) The Agreement also included an Unconditional Guaranty of Payment and Performance (“Guaranty”), which provides in relevant part: “In addition to the amounts guaranteed under this Guaranty, [RV] agree[s] to pay (i) all of [Lev’s] attorney’s fees and other costs and expenses which may be incurred by [Lev] in the enforcement of this Guaranty . . . .” (Id. [emphasis added].) Defendants do not rely on this provision for their motion for attorney fees. In any event, to the extent Defendants attempt to rely on this provision to recover attorney fees from RV, that attempt must fail. First, the Agreement proffered by Defendants as the basis for their attorney fees claim is unrelated to any of RV’s claims against Defendants in this action. (See FAC ¶¶ 1–22, 37–47, 54– 66.) All of RV’s claims against Defendants pertain to a foreclosure on property it owned in Coachella. More importantly, pursuant to the Guaranty, RV agreed to pay all of Lev’s attorney’s fees and other costs “which may be incurred by [Lev] in the enforcement of this Guaranty . . . .” Lindemann Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B [emphasis added[.) As RV argues, there is no “enforcement” of the Guaranty in this action. (See Civ. Code § 1717 [section 1717 allows recovery of attorney fees “which are incurred to enforce th[e] contract” that has the attorney fee provision].) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement nor the Guaranty. RV further argues that the Agreement provided by Defendants was a proposed deal that never closed. (Burgee Decl. ¶ 4.) It argues that after RV transmitted its signed Guaranty to Defendants in advance of closing, the parties changed the deal and the loan restructuring contemplated by the Agreement was abandoned. (Id.) “Before section 1717 comes into play, it is necessary to determine whether the parties entered an agreement for the payment of attorney fees and, if so, the scope of the attorney fee agreement.” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 752 [emphasis added].) Because the Agreement relied on by Defendants never happened, it cannot be the basis for their claim for attorney fees against RV. Based on the above, Defendants have failed to show any contract that supports their claim for attorney fees in this action. Even if they are entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement/Guaranty, Defendants fail to provide support for the attorney fees sought. It is well settled that the party seeking fees has the burden of proving sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that the fees sought were reasonably incurred. (Gorman Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) This includes demonstrating both the reasonableness of the time spent by counsel and the reasonableness of the hourly compensation sought for that time. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4thc 1122, 1131–32 [attorney fees must be “based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case’”].) Although the submission of time records is not necessarily required (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698–99), a fee request ““‘ordinarily should be documented in great detail.’”” (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) “‘The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.’” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486–87.) Here, Defendants submitted their counsel’s declaration, in which counsel stated that the firm incurred 542.2 hours of time at $550.00 in preparation for trial, appearances, filings, and research, for a total amount of $298,210.00. (Lindemann Decl. ¶ 8.) This evidence, however, is not sufficient to support an award of reasonable fees. Counsel provides no information about himself or other attorneys involved, making it impossible for the Court to determine whether the rate of $550.00 is in line with prevailing rates for similar attorneys in the area. Similarly, counsel provides no information about the nature of the work performed in connection with this case, other than stating that they were spent on trial preparation, appearances, filings, and research. The Court thus is without sufficient evidence on which to base a determination that the time spent (542.2 hours) was reasonable. Defendants also seek following fees incurred by other law firms in defending “related” cases and other proceedings: • $35,733.29 incurred by Greenberg & Bass, LLP • $41,772.50 incurred by Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Golubchik LLP (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7, Exs. C & D.) But as RV points out, fees sought by Greenberg & Bass, LLP in the amount $35,733.29 were incurred in another case (i.e., “v. Ruvin Feygenberg et al.). (Id. at ¶ 6, Ex. C.) Moreover, fees sought by Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Golubchik LLP in the amount of $41,772.50 were incurred in a bankruptcy proceeding. Defendants have failed to show that these fees were reasonably necessary to the instant action. (See Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 [party seeking attorney fees has the “burden of showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount’”].) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to fees incurred in other proceedings. Defendants finally seek costs in the amount of $6,658.13. (Lindemann Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendants, however, have not filed a memorandum of costs, which is required by CRC Rule 3.1700. (See Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“The established procedure for recovering the costs . . . is to file a cost of memorandum, supported by a verified statement of counsel.”] [emphasis added].) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to costs. Finally, Defendants seek attorney fees incurred during this litigation without allocation between GA&TV and RV. Thus, the evidence presented is insufficient to enable the Court to determine the amount of reasonable fees Defendants incurred in defending RV’s claims against them.

Case Number: 24PSCV00472 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: G Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLCs Application for Default Judgment Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLCs Application for Default Judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $43,403.67. BACKGROUND This is an unlawful detainer action. In February 2023, Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLC (Gershman) entered into a written lease agreement with Defendant CH Glendora, LLC (CH Glendora) in which Gershman agreed to lease commercial property in Glendora to CH Glendora. Subsequently, Gershman alleges CH Glendora breached the lease agreement by failing to pay rent. On January 24, 2024, Gershman served a three day notice to pay rent or quit on CH Glendora. CH Glendora subsequently failed to pay rent or vacate the Glendora property. On February 7, 2024, Gershman filed a complaint against CH Glendora and Does 1-30, alleging a cause of action for unlawful detainer. On March 1, 2024, Gershmans process server served CH Glendora by posting notice at the Glendora property. On March 19, 2024, the Court entered default against CH Glendora after CH Glendora failed to file a timely answer. On March 25, 2024, the Court granted a default judgment for Gershman on the issue of possession only. On May 17, 2024, Gershman submitted the present application for default judgment. A case management conference is set for July 9, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has filed to timely respond or appear. A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Gershman seeks default judgment against CH Glendora in the total amount of $43,403.68, including $40,476.72 in damages, $1,604.31 in attorney fees, and $1,322.65 in costs. Because the Court finds Gershman has submitted sufficient evidence, the Court GRANTS Gershmans application for default judgment with the following modification. While Gershman requests $1,604.31 in attorney fees, the correct calculation of attorney fees pursuant to Local Rule 3.214 is $1,604.30. Accordingly, the total requested damages will be reduced to $43,403.67. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Gershmans application for default judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $43,403.67.

MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF COTTONWOOD CANYON SETTLEMENT OF ENTIRE CASE HILLS COMMUNITY TEC1204451 FILED ON JUNE 2, 2020, BY ASSOCIATION VS COTTONWOOD CANYON HILLS ARMENTA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION Tentative Ruling: No tentative will be given, appearances are required. Counsel should be prepared to address why this matter should not be dismissed pursuant to the CCP 664.6 provision in the settlement agreement.

ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INC Case Number: 23CV-0202690 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.