Jackson Vs Jackson

S-CV-0051881 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. vs. Powell, Jeremy Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Powell, Jeremy

Case Number: EC063728 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: Disposed (8/16/21) CASE: Soni v. Cartograph, Inc. CASE NO.: EC063728 MOTION TO SET ASIDE/VACATE JUDGMENT AND STAY OF EXECUTION AND PROCEEDINGS MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm RESPONDING PARTY : Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. SERVICE: Filed on June 14, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed on July 3, 2024 REPLY: Filed on July 11, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm seeks an order setting aside and vacating the August 16, 2021 Judgment in this case and all orders issued by Judge Ralph C. Hofer since November 25, 2020. Plaintiff also requests a stay of execution on the judgment in this case until this motion is ruled upon. BACKGROUND On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Cartograph, Inc., Simplelayers, Inc., Timothy Tierney, and DOES 1-10. The Complaint asserted eight causes of action for: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Quantum Meruit 3. Money Had and Received 4. Book Account 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 6. Negligent Misrepresentation 7. Fraudulent Inducement to Enter into Contract 8. Breach of Guaranty On August 16, 2021, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $334,458.41. On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an appeal as to the August 16, 2021 Judgment. The matter was finally disposed on August 2, 2023, wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the August 16, 2021 Judgment. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to set aside/vacate judgment and stay of execution and proceedings. On July 3, 2024, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) filed an opposition. On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firms Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment and Stay of Execution and Proceedings is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a, subdivision (a), A party intending to make a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment, as described in Section 663, shall file with the clerk and serve upon the adverse party a notice of his or her intention, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and specifying the particulars in which the legal basis for the decision is not consistent with or supported by the facts, or in which the judgment or decree is not consistent with the special verdict, either: (1) After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment&(2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 663a(a).) A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: [¶](1) Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected. [¶] (2) A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., § 663.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves for an order setting aside and vacating the August 16, 2021 Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a(a)(2). Plaintiff contends all orders issued by Judge Hofer after November 25, 2020 are void and should be vacated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.4, subdivision (c)(1) because Judge Hofer took inconsistent positions with respect to his relationship with Attorney Jeffrey G. Sheldon in sworn declarations and it impacted his impartiality in this present case. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends Judge Hofer refused to recuse himself from this case when Plaintiff brought a Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 Preemptory Challenge and Motion to Disqualify in 2020 on the basis that Judge Hofer was presiding over case involving someone who had extensive litigation against his close and personal friend. Moreover, Plaintiff contends only after appeal and affirmance of his rulings on attorney fee and costs motions did Judge Hofer voluntarily recuse himself in the interest of justice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i). As such, Plaintiff argues Judge Hofer must be deemed disqualified pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6. Lastly, Plaintiff argues Judge Hofer should not have ruled on the sufficiency of his Statement of Disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.3, subdivision (5)(c)(5). By contrast, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to disclose the dispute between him and Attorney Sheldon occurred thirteen (13) years ago. Defendants also argue there is no evidence that Judge Hofer ever discussed Plaintiff with his friend. Similarly, Defendants contend in Judge Hofers order striking Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application seeking disqualification, he stated he had a past and casual relationship with Attorney Sheldon. On the other hand, Defendants contend Judge Hofers minute order recusing himself from the case, Siguo Su v. Sherry Lin, et. al. (Case No. 19GDCV00656) on July 28, 2020, states he was a close and personal friend of Jeffrey G. Sheridan and his family, so he appears to be discussing a different person than Attorney Sheldon. Likewise, Defendants assert there is no basis other than pure speculation to assume Judge Hofer recused himself due to a relationship with Attorney Sheldon, let alone create doubt as to his impartiality in handling this case. Moreover, Defendants argue Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for disqualification raised no grounds for disqualification and was untimely, thus Judge Hofers order striking the application were proper under Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.4, subdivision (b). Additionally, Defendants contend the instant motion is untimely because it was filed outside the fifteen (15) day deadline. Finally, Defendants argue to the extent Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of Judge Hofers 2020 order striking the Ex Parte Application, it fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. Here, the Court finds that the instant motion fails on both procedural and substantive grounds discussed more thoroughly below. First, Plaintiff seeks to set aside and vacate the August 16, 2021 Judgement. However, the Notice of Entry of Judgment was served on Plaintiffs counsel of record on August 25, 2021. (Soni Decl., ¶19n, 19r, Exs. 14, 18.) Thus, Plaintiff had until September 16, 2021 to seek to set aside or vacate the August 16, 2021 Judgment because it would have been fifteen (15) days from the service of the notice of entry. Further, the Court had until December 15, 2021 to move to set aside or vacate the judgment on its own pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a, subdivision (b). Next, the instant motion does not raise any arguments to suggest the August 16, 2021 is based on an incorrect legal conclusion or erroneous judgment inconsistent with the facts of this case. Neither does the motion raise any arguments indicating the judgment is inconsistent with a special verdict. Although Defendants do not make this argument, the case law supporting a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 663a stand for the proposition that such motion may only be brought on the grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 663. In Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, the court held A motion to vacate under section 663 may only be brought when the trial judge draws an incorrect legal conclusion or renders an erroneous judgment upon the facts found by it to exist. ( Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 477.) However, [i]n ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment the court cannot in any way change any finding of fact. ( Id. ) Moreover, Plaintiff cites to no other legal authority that would allow this Court to set aside or vacate the August 16, 2021 and other orders issued by Judge Hofer, let alone on the basis raised in the present motion, i.e., Judge Hofers alleged inconsistent statements concerning his relationship Attorney Sheldon and his voluntarily recusal due to purported impartiality. Code of Civil Procedure 170.4, subdivision (c)(1), states in pertinent part, If a statement of disqualification is filed after a trial or hearing has commenced by the start of voir dire, by the swearing of the first witness or by the submission of a motion for decision, the judge whose impartiality has been questioned may order the trial or hearing to continue, notwithstanding the filing of the statement of disqualification. The issue of disqualification shall be referred to another judge for decision as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 170.3, and if it is determined that the judge is disqualified, all orders and rulings of the judge found to be disqualified made after the filing of the statement shall be vacated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4(c)(1).) Even though Plaintiff cites this statute in support of his contention that Judge Hofers Judgment and orders are void, there is no indication that Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application was filed under the circumstances set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 170.4, subdivision (c)(1). Last, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was seeking reconsideration of the order to strike his Ex Parte Application for Disqualification on the basis that Judge Hofers inconsistent statements regarding his relationship with Attorney Sheldon warrants disqualification, the motion does not meet the requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, subdivision (a), [w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).)¿As it relates to new or different facts, circumstances, or law under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, subdivision (a), the moving party must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time.¿ ( Shiffer v. CBS Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 246, 255.) Furthermore, facts of which the party seeking reconsideration was aware at the time of the original ruling are not new or different. ( In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468.)¿ In this instant case, Plaintiff does not appear to set forth new or different facts, or arguing that theres been a change in the law, and such motion would be untimely as it would not have been filed within the ten (10) days required under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firms Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment and Stay of Execution and Proceedings is DENIED. MOTION TO CORRECT THE JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm SERVICE: Filed on June 20, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed on July 3, 2024 REPLY: Filed on July 9, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. seek an order correcting the spelling of Plaintiff Surjit P. Sonis name in the final judgment. BACKGROUND On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Cartograph, Inc., Simplelayers, Inc., Timothy Tierney, and DOES 1-10. The Complaint asserted eight causes of action for: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Quantum Meruit 3. Money Had and Received 4. Book Account 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 6. Negligent Misrepresentation 7. Fraudulent Inducement to Enter into Contract 8. Breach of Guaranty On August 16, 2021, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $334,458.41. On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an appeal as to the August 16, 2021 Judgment. The matter was finally disposed on August 2, 2023, wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the August 16, 2021 Judgment. On June 20, 2024, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) filed the instant motion to correct the judgment. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On July 9, 2024, Defendants filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion to Correct the Judgment is GRANTED. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (a)(1), The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party , or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars ; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1).) Similarly, The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d).) Essentially, [a] court of general jurisdiction has the power, after final judgment, and regardless of lapse of time, to correct clerical errors or misprisions in its records, whether made by the clerk, counsel or the court itself , so that the records will conform to and speak the truth. [Citations.] ( Ames v. Paley (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 668, 672.) DISCUSSION Here, Defendants contend there is a clerical error in the Final Judgment entered on August 16, 2021. Specifically, Defendants assert the Final Judgment contains a misspelling of Plaintiff Surjit P. Sonis name in the fourth paragraph on line 17. The fourth paragraph, line 17 spells Plaintiffs first name as Surgit, instead of Surjit. (Weisel Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues correction of the Final Judgment is both unnecessary and a wasted exercise because the judgment is void or voidable as a result of Judge Hofers voluntary self-recusal in the interests of justice. As addressed in the tentative for Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment, Plaintiff fails to raise arguments pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663 that supports setting aside or vacating the Final Judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contention that Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (d) only relates to errors made by the clerk or the Court is incorrect. As cited in the legal standard section of the tentative, California courts have interpreted Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (d) to include errors by legal counsel. Thus, Defendants properly seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (d) in the instant motion. Lastly, Plaintiff does not refute that his first name is misspelled in the Final Judgment. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion to Correct the Judgment is GRANTED. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES MOVING PARTY: Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm SERVICE: Filed on September 8, 2023 OPPOSITION: Filed on December 29, 2023 REPLY: Filed on January 5, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. seek an order awarding the reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred on appeal and post-appeal in the amount of $109,021.00. BACKGROUND On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Cartograph, Inc., Simplelayers, Inc., Timothy Tierney, and DOES 1-10. The Complaint asserted eight causes of action for: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Quantum Meruit 3. Money Had and Received 4. Book Account 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 6. Negligent Misrepresentation 7. Fraudulent Inducement to Enter into Contract 8. Breach of Guaranty On August 16, 2021, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $334,458.41. On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an appeal as to the August 16, 2021 Judgment. The matter was finally disposed on August 2, 2023, wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the August 16, 2021 Judgment. On September 8, 2023, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) filed the instant motion for attorneys fees. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 5, 2024, Defendants filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $109,021.00. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE The Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections to the declaration of Jessica Weisel. LEGAL STANDARD Neither party to the arbitration may recover costs or attorney's fees incurred in preparation for or in the course of the fee arbitration proceeding with the exception of the filing fee paid pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section. However, a court confirming, correcting, or vacating an award under this section may award to the prevailing party reasonable fees and costs incurred in obtaining confirmation, correction, or vacation of the award including, if applicable, fees and costs on appeal . (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203(c).) DISCUSSION Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) seek $109,021.00 in attorneys fees consisting of $86,946 in fees for litigation or collection efforts, $13,705.00 in fees for preparing the instant motion, and $9,000.00 in additional fees for filing a reply to the opposition. Here, the parties do not dispute Defendants were the prevailing parties on appeal and are entitled to attorneys fees and costs. However, Plaintiff contends the Court of Appeal only awarded Defendants costs on appeal. This argument is irrelevant because Defendants may also recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs associated with having to obtain confirmation of the arbitration award including appellate costs and fees. Defendants done just that by opposing Plaintiffs appeal of the August 16, 2021 Judgment that confirmed the arbitration award. Next, Plaintiff contends Defendants cannot recover attorneys fees because they were represented by pro bono counsel. The California case law does not support such contention. In Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Group Staffing Company, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 670, the court reiterated even attorneys who perform services pro bono may obtain reasonable attorney fees under a fee-shifting statute. ( Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Group Staffing Company, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 670, 683.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts Defendants are seeking recovery at excessive billing rates where the motion fails to provide adequate descriptions of the work performed and contain time entries that are blocked billed. As such, Plaintiff argues a negative lodestar of at least 30 percent should be placed on the billing rates requested. However, Defendants advance the declaration of their attorney Jessica Weisel, which attests to the prevailing market rates for appellate lawyers involving complex litigation issues. (Weisel Decl., ¶¶37-46.) Additionally, Weisel attests to the number of hours expended by each attorney and paralegal in this matter in connection to the preparing the response brief to the second appeal, holding a moot court, preparing for oral argument, and even engaging in settlement talks. ( Id. at ¶¶27-35.) Thus, Defendants describe the type of work that was performed and the associated hours expended to complete these tasks including preparing the present motion. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $109,021.00. Dated: July 18, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV04042 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 17, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 8 PROCEEDINGS Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc. v. Mark Ferrera, et al. 23TRCV04042 1. Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is denied. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 4, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Defendant owes a balance due from a loan provided to Defendant by Plaintiffs assignor. On February 5, 2024, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainant alleges the following facts. Cross-Defendant maintains and practices a policy of attempting to collect on student loans without providing the mandated information, and without possessing and providing the mandated documentation. Cross-Defendant employs unfair and deceptive practices in their loan collection process. Cross-Complainant alleges the following causes of action for violations of: 1. California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act; 2. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; 3. Private Student Loan Collections Reform Act; 4. Unfair Competition Law. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Cross-Defendant filed a special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendants constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation. Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, 393. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Id. at 384. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. Baral, 1 Cal.5 th at 384 (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court has described this second step as a summary-judgment-like procedure. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiffs evidence as true, and evaluates the defendants showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiffs claim as a matter of law. [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing. Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(f). Subdivision (f) does not require the moving party to ensure that the hearing is so scheduled. Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 352. In addition, the Court has the discretion to hear an untimely anti-SLAPP motion even if the Defendant failed to request leave of court to file an untimely motion. Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684. Here, the motion runs afoul of both time measures of CCP § 425.16(f). However, the Court exercises its discretion to hear the motion on the merits. I. Conduct in Furtherance of Right of Petition or Free Speech CCP § 425.16(e) states: As used in this section, act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: . . . (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4 th 69, 78. The anti-SLAPP's statute focuses, not on the form of cross-complainants causes of action but, rather, cross-defendants underlying activity that gives rise to the asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92. In Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, the court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may be utilized to strike specific allegations of protected activity without eliminating the entire cause of action or primary right. By referring to a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the protected rights of petition and speech, the Legislature indicated that particular alleged acts giving rise to a claim for relief may be the object of an anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 425.16(b)(1), italics added.) Thus, in cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity. I d. at 395. A Cross-Complaint may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. However, [o]nly those cross-complaints alleging a cause of action arising from the plaintiff's act of filing the complaint against the defendant and the subsequent litigation would potentially qualify as a SLAPP action. (§ 425.16, subds. (b) and (d).) For example, a person may attempt to bring a SLAPP suit alleging that libelous allegations or statements were contained in the complaint itself. However, because defendant's allegations are privileged communications under Civil Code section 47, the suit would be merit-less. A compulsory cross-complaint on a related cause of action against the plaintiff (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a)) would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP suit arising from petition activity. By definition, a related cause of action is a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c), italics added.) The SLAPP suit is not related to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint, but arises out of the litigation process itself. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651(internal citation omitted). Here, a review of the Cross-Complaint and Complaint reveals that the Cross-Complaint arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Complaint. The Cross-Complaint does not arise from petitioning activity. See, Kajima Engineering and Const., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 934. The gravamen of the Cross-Complaint involves allegations that Cross-Complainant is entitled to statutory damages and other relief based on Cross-Defendants unlawful debt collection activities. The Cross-Complaint does not itself arise from the simple act of filing the Complaint, but, instead upon the underlying factual disputes outlined in the Cross-Complaint. The gravamen of the causes of action and the underlying theory of recovery do not depend on the filing of the Complaint itself but upon the alleged underlying facts and conduct of Cross-Defendant during the debt collection process. However, the Court does note that certain specific allegations of the Cross-Complaint do implicate petitioning activity. Cross-Complainant alleged: In this case, the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Credit Corp Solutions, Inc. (Cross-Defendant or Credit Corp) sued Mr. Ferrera without providing the disclosures and documents required under state law. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4.) In addition, paragraphs 42 to 48, 58c, and 84c-f, of the Cross-Complaint, which attempts to outline failures within the Complaint, also implicate petitioning activity. Here, however, the principle delineated in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376 applies because these allegations referenced above do implicate protected conduct of filing litigation. The constitutional right to petition ... includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action. Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 . In this situation, it is appropriate to analyze whether to strike the specific allegations of the protected activity without eliminating the entirety of the causes of action. II. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. However, the Court must accept as true the evidence favorable to Plaintiff. See Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. [Plaintiffs] second-[prong] burden is a limited one. [He] need not prove [his] case to the court [citation]; the bar sits lower at a demonstration of minimal merit [citation]. At this stage, [t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 531 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Since Cross-Defendant established the first prong (solely as to the specific allegations referenced above), Cross-Complainant must establish a probability of prevailing on the merits with respect to those allegations. See, Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. See, Id. Here, as to the specific allegations of protected speech noted above, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to establish a probability of prevailing. Cross-Complainant submitted competent evidence supporting the alleged violations outlined within the allegations. (Decl., Mark Ferrera, ¶¶ 4-10.) Cross-Defendant did not submit any substantive evidence in connection with the motion. The only declaration that was submitted simply outlined attempts in service of documents. (Decl., Abril Saglio-Ruiz.) Instead, it appears that Cross-Defendant primarily relies upon the litigation privilege of Civ. Code § 47(b). However, the litigation privilege does not bar claims for violations of debt collection laws that regulate conduct in litigation. Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc . (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 691, 706; Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc . (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 340. Therefore, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the allegations. Thus, Cross-Defendants anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entirety of Cross-Complaint is denied. The anti-SLAPP motion to strike the allegations noted above that do implicate protected activity is also denied. Cross-Complainant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 23TRCV04037 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 17, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 9 PROCEEDINGS Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc. v. Mark Ferrera, et al. 23TRCV04037 1. Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is denied. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 4, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Defendant owes a balance due from a loan provided to Defendant by Plaintiffs assignor. On February 5, 2024, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainant alleges the following facts. Cross-Defendant maintains and practices a policy of attempting to collect on student loans without providing the mandated information, and without possessing and providing the mandated documentation. Cross-Defendant employs unfair and deceptive practices in their loan collection process. Cross-Complainant alleges the following causes of action for violations of : 1. California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act; 2. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; 3. Private Student Loan Collections Reform Act; 4. Unfair Competition Law. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Cross-Defendant filed a special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendants constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation. Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, 393. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Id. at 384. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. Baral, 1 Cal.5 th at 384 (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court has described this second step as a summary-judgment-like procedure. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiffs evidence as true, and evaluates the defendants showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiffs claim as a matter of law. [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing. Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(f). Subdivision (f) does not require the moving party to ensure that the hearing is so scheduled. Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 352. In addition, the Court has the discretion to hear an untimely anti-SLAPP motion even if the Defendant failed to request leave of court to file an untimely motion. Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684. Here, the motion runs afoul of both time measures of CCP § 425.16(f). However, the Court exercises its discretion to hear the motion on the merits. I. Conduct in Furtherance of Right of Petition or Free Speech CCP § 425.16(e) states: As used in this section, act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: . . . (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4 th 69, 78. The anti-SLAPP's statute focuses, not on the form of cross-complainants causes of action but, rather, cross-defendants underlying activity that gives rise to the asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92. In Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, the court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may be utilized to strike specific allegations of protected activity without eliminating the entire cause of action or primary right. By referring to a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the protected rights of petition and speech, the Legislature indicated that particular alleged acts giving rise to a claim for relief may be the object of an anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 425.16(b)(1), italics added.) Thus, in cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity. I d. at 395. A Cross-Complaint may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. However, [o]nly those cross-complaints alleging a cause of action arising from the plaintiff's act of filing the complaint against the defendant and the subsequent litigation would potentially qualify as a SLAPP action. (§ 425.16, subds. (b) and (d).) For example, a person may attempt to bring a SLAPP suit alleging that libelous allegations or statements were contained in the complaint itself. However, because defendant's allegations are privileged communications under Civil Code section 47, the suit would be merit-less. A compulsory cross-complaint on a related cause of action against the plaintiff (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a)) would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP suit arising from petition activity. By definition, a related cause of action is a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c), italics added.) The SLAPP suit is not related to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint, but arises out of the litigation process itself. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651(internal citation omitted). Here, a review of the Cross-Complaint and Complaint reveals that the Cross-Complaint arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Complaint. The Cross-Complaint does not arise from petitioning activity. See, Kajima Engineering and Const., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 934. The gravamen of the Cross-Complaint involves allegations that Cross-Complainant is entitled to statutory damages and other relief based on Cross-Defendants unlawful debt collection activities. The Cross-Complaint does not itself arise from the simple act of filing the Complaint, but, instead upon the underlying factual disputes outlined in the Cross-Complaint. The gravamen of the causes of action and the underlying theory of recovery do not depend on the filing of the Complaint itself but upon the alleged underlying facts and conduct of Cross-Defendant during the debt collection process. However, the Court does note that certain specific allegations of the Cross-Complaint do implicate petitioning activity. Cross-Complainant alleged: In this case, the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Credit Corp Solutions, Inc. (Cross-Defendant or Credit Corp) sued Mr. Ferrera without providing the disclosures and documents required under state law. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4.) In addition, paragraphs 42 to 48, 58c, and 84c-f, of the Cross-Complaint, which attempts to outline failures within the Complaint, also implicate petitioning activity. Here, however, the principle delineated in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376 applies because these allegations referenced above do implicate protected conduct of filing litigation. The constitutional right to petition ... includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action. Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 . In this situation, it is appropriate to analyze whether to strike the specific allegations of the protected activity without eliminating the entirety of the causes of action. II. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. However, the Court must accept as true the evidence favorable to Plaintiff. See Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. [Plaintiffs] second-[prong] burden is a limited one. [He] need not prove [his] case to the court [citation]; the bar sits lower at a demonstration of minimal merit [citation]. At this stage, [t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 531 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Since Cross-Defendant established the first prong (solely as to the specific allegations referenced above), Cross-Complainant must establish a probability of prevailing on the merits with respect to those allegations. See, Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. See Id. Here, as to the specific allegations of protected speech noted above, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to establish a probability of prevailing. Cross-Complainant submitted competent evidence supporting the alleged violations outlined within the allegations. (Decl., Mark Ferrera, ¶¶ 4-10.) Cross-Defendant did not submit any substantive evidence in connection with the motion. The only declaration that was submitted simply outlined attempts in service of documents. (Decl., Abril Saglio-Ruiz.) Instead, it appears that Cross-Defendant primarily relies upon the litigation privilege of Civ. Code § 47(b). However, the litigation privilege does not bar claims for violations of debt collection laws that regulate conduct in litigation. Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc . (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 691, 706; Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc . (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 340. Therefore, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the allegations. Thus, Cross-Defendants anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entirety of Cross-Complaint is denied. The anti-SLAPP motion to strike the allegations noted above that do implicate protected activity is also denied. Cross-Complainant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 23CHCV00539 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-16-24 Case #23CHCV00539, American Express National Bank vs. Anahit Khrimian, et al. Trial Date: 11-4-24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff American Express National Bank RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Motion for Summary Judgment RULING : Motion is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff American Express National Bank (Plaintiff) filed this action on February 27, 2023. Plaintiff alleged a cause of action of Common Counts for an open book account and an account stated against Defendants Anahit Khrimian and St. Jacob Hospice, Inc. (Defendants). This is a credit card collections case wherein Defendants opened an American Express credit card on June 25, 2015. (UMF 1.) In using the card, Defendants were bound by the terms of the cardmember agreement. (UMF 2, 4.) Defendants used the card to pay for goods and services. (UMF 5.) Plaintiff maintained an open book account for the card in the form of billing statements. (UMF 8.) Pursuant to the cardmember agreement and the most recent billing statement, a balance of $150,397.63 is now due on the account. (UMF 11; Touhidi Decl., Ex. B.) Based on the amount due on the account, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its complaint for an open book account and an account stated. Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2024. No opposition has been filed. ANALYSIS The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. ( Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The pleadings frame the issues for motions, since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. ( Citation. ) ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472. ) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. ( Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. ( Ibid .) Account Stated Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on the Account Stated cause of action because Plaintiff issued and submitted monthly billing statements on the account to Defendants and there are no unresolved disputes on the account. An account stated is an agreement, based on prior transactions between the parties, that all items of the account are true and that the balance struck is due and owing from one party to the other. ( Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 68 Cal.2d 17, 25.) In order to establish an account stated, [i]t must appear that at the time of the statement an indebtedness from one party to other existed, that a balance was then struck and agreed to be the correct sum owing from the debtor to the creditor, and that the debtor expressly or impliedly promised to pay to the creditor the amount thus determined to be owing. ( H. Russell Taylors Fire Protection Service, Inc. v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 711, 726-727.) Assent may be expressly given or implied by the circumstances or the conduct of the debtor including failing to object. ( Trafton , supra , 68 Cal.2d at 25.) In addition, partial payment of a debt without objection and without otherwise indicating non-recognition of the validity of the debt is proof of the validity of the debt. ( Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 480.) Thus, if a statement is rendered and the debtor fails to object or reply within a reasonable time, the law implies an agreement that the account is correct as rendered. ( Maggio Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d at 752-753.) Plaintiff argues that it can establish an account stated because it mailed billing statements to Defendants every month, and Defendants did not dispute the balance on the statements. In this case, there is a cardmember agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants. (UMF 14.) The cardmember agreement indicated that Defendants were required to make regular monthly payments on the account. (UMF 18.) Each month, Plaintiff mailed an account statement to Defendants at the address that Defendants provided to Plaintiff, and the account statement accurately reflected the amount that Defendants owed on the account. (UMF 20.) Finally, the account is considered to be truly stated because there are no unresolved disputes on the account. (UMF 22; see Maggio Inc. , supra , 196 Cal.App.3d at 752-753 (finding that the law implies an agreement that an account is truly stated when there are no outstanding disputes on the account).) Based on the foregoing and the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for an account stated, and there are no triable issues of material fact for this cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff prevails as a matter of law on Plaintiffs claim for account stated. Plaintiffs motion is granted for this claim. Open Book Account Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on the Open Book Account cause of action because there is a book account as evidenced by detailed statements kept by Plaintiff. CCP § 337a(a) defines a book account as a detailed statement which constitutes the principal record of one or more transactions between a debtor and creditor arising out of a contract ...and show the debits and credits in connection therewith, and against whom and in favor of whom entries are made, is entered in the regular course of business as conducted by such creditor ..., and is kept in a reasonably permanent form and manner and is (1) in a bound book, or (2) on a sheet or sheets fastened in a book or to a backing but detachable therefrom, or (3) on a card or cards of a permanent character, or is kept in any other reasonably permanent form and manner. The California Supreme Court has explained it as follows: a book account is a detailed statement of debit/credit transactions kept by a creditor in the regular course of business, and in a reasonably permanent manner. ( Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579, fn. 5.) Courts construe CCP § 337a broadly and have adopted a liberal approach in defining the term book account. ( Costerisan v. DeLong (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 768, 770-771 (Adverting to the broad language of section 337a of the Code of Civil Procedure, kept in any other reasonably permanent form and manner, it seems manifest that the Legislature intended to adopt the liberal approach&in defining the term book account.).) In Costerisan v. DeLong , the Court of Appeal found that ledger sheets kept in an office file cabinet constituted a book account under CCP § 337a. ( Id . at 771.) In that case, the Court of Appeal held that the critical determination was whether the sheets were permanent records and constitute[d] a system of bookkeeping as distinguished from mere private memoranda. ( Id . at 770; see also Fresno Credit Bureau v. Batteate (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 545, 547-548 (holding that one ledger entry was sufficient to support a judgment based on an open book account).) Plaintiffs business records are computerized, and Plaintiff maintained an account of all the credits and debits on Defendants account in the form of billing statements that were stored on its internal network. (UMF 8.) These billing statements constituted an electronic book account that was created and maintained on Plaintiffs secure network. (See Costerisan , supra , 251 Cal.App.2d at 770-771.) Every month Plaintiff mailed billing statements to Defendants (UMF 8), and Defendants had 60 days to submit a dispute for any charges (UMF 9). There are no unresolved disputes on Defendants account (UMF 10.) Because there are no disputes, this means that an open book account has been established. The evidence is undisputed that a book account was established between Plaintiff and Defendants. Accordingly, there are no triable issues of material fact, and Defendants are liable as a matter of law for the open book account under Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiffs motion is granted for this claim. CONCLUSION The motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Damages are to be awarded in the amount of $150,397.63, and costs are to be requested via a memorandum of costs. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a proposed judgment. Moving party to give notice.

S-CV-0051866 Grassy Sprain Group, Inc. vs. Brock, Brian ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Brock, Brian; Brock, William Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Brock, Brian; Brock, William

SIERRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION VS. BOWEN Case Number: 23CVG-00603 This matter is on calendar for confirmation of Judgment. The Court’s June 5, 2024 Ruling after trial ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s signature. No proposed judgment has been filed. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24NWCV00138 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Alliant Credit Union vs. Tong V. Tran, et al. Case No.: 24NWCV00138 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 @ 10:30 AM #9 Plaintiffs Application for Pre-Trial Writ of Possession is GRANTED. The Court will hear from counsel regarding the amount of the undertaking. Plaintiff to give notice. Background This action was filed on May 17, 2024, by Plaintiff Alliant Credit Union (Plaintiff) against Defendant Tong v. Tran (Defendant). The Complaint alleges: (1) Claim and Delivery of Personal Property, for pre-trial writ of possession, and order directing transfer of personal property and restraining order, and (2) Money Due on a Contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant purchased a Thor Motor Coach, but defaulted on June 27, 2023, such that there is now a total of $113,439.62 due on the contract. Plaintiff has filed the instant application for a pre-trial writ of possession. The application is unopposed as of July 12, 2024. Legal Standard Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this chapter for a writ of possession by filing a written application for the writ with the court in which the action is brought. (CCP § 512.010(a).) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b), the application must be submitted under oath and include: (1) A showing of the basis of the plaintiff's claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed. If the basis of the plaintiff's claim is a written instrument, a copy of the instrument shall be attached. (2) A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention. (3) A particular description of the property and a statement of its value. (4) A statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there. (5) A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure. Before the hearing on the Writ of Possession, the Defendant must be served with (1) a copy of the summons and complaint; (2) a Notice of Application and Hearing; and (3) a copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof. (CCP § 512.030.) The writ will be issued if the court finds that the plaintiff's claim is probably valid and the other requirements for issuing the writ are established. (CCP § 512.040(b).) A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (CCP § 511.090.) Prior to the issuance of a writ of possession, the Plaintiff must file an undertaking in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount. (CCP § 515.010(a).) Discussion Here, Plaintiff has stated the basis for its claim and entitlement to possession of the Thor Motor Coach: pursuant to a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Chism Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff includes a copy of the retail installment sales contract, which states in the third section: We may take the vehicle from you. If you default, we may take (repossess) the vehicle from you . . . ( Id. at Ex. A [PDF p. 7].) Indeed, Plaintiff attests that Decedent defaulted on June 27, 2023, and currently owes $113,439.62 under the contract. ( Chism Decl., ¶ 12.) The contract in Exhibit A constitutes a copy of the written instrument that the claim is based on. Plaintiff recounts that demand was made upon defendant Tong Tran for surrender of possession of the motor vehicle to plaintiff, but defendant has failed, refused or neglected to return possession of such property, or any part thereof, to plaintiff. (Chism Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. C.) Thus, the Motor Coach is being wrongfully detained. Defendant entered into a contract to purchase the Motor Coach on May 13, 2023. (Chism Decl, Ex. A.) Plaintiff has described the property: it is a 2023 Thor Motor Coach Sequence motor vehicle, Vehicle Identification No. 3C6MRVUG2NE129083. (Chism Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine nor seized under an execution against the property of Plaintiff. (Chism Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff states that the current location of the property is 10182 Roselee Dr., Garden Grove, CA 92840. This is the address where Defendant Tong Tran resides. (Chism Decl., ¶ 10.) Accordingly, the Application for Pre-Trial Writ of Possession is GRANTED. Undertaking Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010 requires an undertaking to be filed before the writ issues in the amount of not less than twice the value of the defendants interest in the property. The Court will hear from Counsel regarding the amount of the undertaking.