Pierre, Juvica V Kouri, Debra

Case Number: 23STCV23757 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On September 29, 2023, Plaintiffs Erwin Quintanilla (Quintanilla ) , Gerber Izaguirre, and Eddy Lopez filed this action against Defendants Piazza St. Pauls Inc., 824 Wilshire LLC, and Does 1-100 for negligence, assault and battery, and premises liability. On May 7, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel, Casey E. Kilday, Esq., filed a motion to be relieved as counsel for Quintanilla to be heard on June 3, 2024. The Court continued the hearing to July 11, 2024. Trial is currently scheduled for March 28, 2025. COUNSELS REQUEST Casey E. Kilday, Esq., asks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Erwin Quintanilla . LEGAL STANDARD California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362 , provides: (a) Notice A notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051). (b) Memorandum Notwithstanding any other rule of court, no memorandum is required to be filed or served with a motion to be relieved as counsel. (c) Declaration The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). (d) Service The notice of motion and motion, the declaration, and the proposed order must be served on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case. The notice may be by personal service, electronic service, or mail. (1) If the notice is served on the client by mail under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, it must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing that either: (A) The service address is the current residence or business address of the client; or (B) The service address is the last known residence or business address of the client and the attorney has been unable to locate a more current address after making reasonable efforts to do so within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. (2) If the notice is served on the client by electronic service under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and rule 2.251, it must be accompanied by a declaration stating that the electronic service address is the client's current electronic service address. As used in this rule, current means that the address was confirmed within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. Merely demonstrating that the notice was sent to the client's last known address and was not returned or no electronic delivery failure message was received is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the address is current. If the service is by mail, Code of Civil Procedure section 1011(b) applies. (e) Order The proposed order relieving counsel must be prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-053) and must be lodged with the court with the moving papers. The order must specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action or proceeding, including the date of trial, if known. If no hearing date is presently scheduled, the court may set one and specify the date in the order. After the order is signed, a copy of the signed order must be served on the client and on all parties that have appeared in the case. The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) DISCUSSION Counsel has completed, filed, and served the paperwork required to support the request to be relieved as counsel. The Court grants the motion. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Casey E. Kilday, Esq.s motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Erwin Quintanilla. Counsel will be relieved upon filing proof of service on Plaintiff Erwin Quintanilla of the Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053). Counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Counsel is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

COSSUTO VS. ESTATE OF MICHAEL GARRETT, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200449 and

FCS057573 Motions for Contempt TENTATIVE RULING: Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied. No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to the court. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a contempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1

Case Number: 24SMCV01139 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 JOSEPH ARIEL HAZANI, Plaintiff, v. USG CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.: 2 4 SMCV0 1139 Hearing Date: Ju ly 10, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT This hearing is on Plaintiff Joseph Ariel Hazani s motion to amend complaint . The motion is 46 pages long and exceeds the page limit of 15 for an opening memorandum . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (d) ( Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. ).) A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these¿rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (g).) [A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers. ( Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker ¿(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 .) Accordingly , a trial court also has discretion to reject oversize briefs . The Court exercises its discretion to disregard Plaintiffs motion to amend. Even if Plaintiffs motion were not oversize, it is moot . The Court sustained Defendant USG Corporations demurrer to the complaint and gave Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend . (June 14, 2024 Minute Order.) Accordingly , there is no need for a separate motion to amend . Plaintiff also failed to properly serve Defendant with its motion . Plaintiff filed his motion on June 18, 2024 . There is no proof of service showing the motion was served . Based on Plaintiffs failure to serve, the Court cannot properly consider the motion without depriving Defendant of its due process rights . Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10 , 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV02998 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B LILLIAN SMITH, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV02998 vs. [Tentative] RULING RICARDO HERNANDEZ, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant Ricardo Hernandez Responding Party: None Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default; The Court considered the moving papers. No Opposition was filed. RULING The motion is GRANTED. The default entered on May 3, 2024 against defendant is set aside and vacated. Defendant is ordered to file a responsive pleading within 15 days of the date of this Order. BACKGROUND On September 18, 2023, plaintiff Lillian Smith Sr (self-represented) filed a complaint against Ricardo Hernandez. On May 3, 2024, a default was entered against defendant. LEGAL AUTHORITY CCP §473 CCP §473(b) states, in relevant part: The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . [T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits, and it looks with disfavor upon a party, who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary. Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 681, 697 (citations and internal quotations omitted). CCP §473.5 CCP §473.5(a) states, in relevant part: When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered. CCP §473.5(b) requires that a notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the partys lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action. CCP §473.5(c) allows upon a finding by the court that the motion was made within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that his or her lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set aside the default or default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend the action. DISCUSSION Defendant Ricardo Hernandez requests that the Court set aside the default entered on May 3, 2024, pursuant to CCP §§473 and 473.5. On January 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a proof of service, which was stricken on March 27, 2024, because plaintiff had failed to identify any person who the summons and complaint were left and to attach a declaration of due diligence. It was also not signed under penalty of perjury. On January 11, 2024, plaintiff filed a proof of service, which was rejected on February 1, 2024, as it failed to identify a person and there was no declaration of due diligence. On March 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a proof of service, which stated that defendant was substitute served at 920 W. Commonwealth Ave., Fullerton, on March 15, 2024, on a male Hispanic shirt displaying company logo who refused to take documents by a person who is not a registered process server. There is no declaration of due diligence. On April 10, 2024, plaintiff filed a proof of service, which indicated that defendant was substitute served on April 1, 2024, on Jenifer an employee with Uhaul Storage and Moving and willing to give the documents when he returns to location. It did not include a declaration of diligence or a declaration of mailing. Defendant states in his declaration that he is employed by U-Haul Co. of California as a field relief manager. Defendant decl., ¶2. He does not have an assigned office at the facility in Inglewood. Id., ¶3. He typically works out of another U-Haul facility located in Fullerton, California. Id., ¶4. To date, he has never been personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint. Id., ¶5. On April 1, 2024, he was notified that someone had attempted to serve him legal papers at a U-Haul storage facility located at 920 W. Commonwealth Ave., Fullerton. That day, he went to the storage facility to pick up the paperwork that was left for him and passed it on to his manager. Id., ¶7. Defendant contends that the default entered against him was the result of reasonable mistake, surprise, and/or excusable neglect. He asserts that the default was prematurely entered against him before the statutory deadline to respond to the complaint. He contends that he was served with a copy of the summons and complaint via substitute service on April 1, 2024, and that based on this date of service, the deadline to respond to the complaint would have been May 10, 2024, but that the default was entered on May 3, 2024. Defendant also argues that plaintiff improperly entered a default against defendant after learning that he was represented by counsel and after counsel attempted to meet and confer with plaintiff prior to filing a demurrer and motion to strike. There is no opposition. The Court rules as follows: The Court finds that the April 1, 2024 service was not valid as it was not a proper substituted service. Also, the Court finds that the default was entered prematurely. If plaintiff was properly served on April 1, 2024, then defendant had 40 days from when the papers were mailed to file a response. See CCP §415.20. There is no indication that the summons and complaint were mailed. In any event, the default was entered on May 3, 2023, which is seven days too early. In addition, the entry of the default taken against the Defendant was the result of excusable neglect, assuming that service was valid. It is in the interests of justice to grant the Motion and allow this case to proceed for resolution on the merits. The motion is thus GRANTED. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. The Court sets aside and vacates the default entered on May 3, 2024. Defendant is ordered to file a responsive pleading within 15 day of the date of the Order. Defendant is ordered to give notice of ruling.

KUHN, ET AL. VS. DIGNITY HEALTH, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203118 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 21, 2024 to Plaintiffs Natalie Kuhn and Carey Kuhn and counsel Kroeker Law Offices for failure timely serve all Defendants in compliance with CRC 3.110(b). A Substitution of Attorney has since been filed for both Plaintiffs who are now represented by The Zinn Law Firm. While Plaintiffs did not file a written response to the Order to Show Cause, the declarations filed in support of the substitution of attorney provide evidence that previous counsel, Dennis Kroeker, is deceased. It appears to the Court that the delay in service is not attributable to Plaintiffs or current counsel. The Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED. The clerk is directed to serve Plaintiffs’ new counsel with today’s minutes.

On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, in Department 301, Line 1. Plaintiff's Application for Default Judgement is HEARING REQUIRED. Plaintiff to appear at the hearing to set a new hearing date. =(301/RCE)

Case Number: 22STCV26639 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 MARYAM KHANI, Plaintiff, v. BOBBY BABAK SAADIAN, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV26639 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion for terminating sanctions BACKGROUND On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against Defendants Bobby Babak Saadian and Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint on December 6, 2022, asserting causes of action for (1) legal malpractice, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) fraud. On December 8, 2023, the Court granted Defendant Wilshire Law Firms motion to compel further responses to requests for admissions and form interrogatories. On May 8, 2024, the Court granted Defendant Saadians motions to compel responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission. On June 12, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for terminating sanctions based on Plaintiffs failure to comply with those two orders. Defendants alternatively request issue, evidentiary, and monetary sanctions. Plaintiff filed her opposition on June 26, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on July 2, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD The Court may impose monetary or nonmonetary sanctions against a party engaging in misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) Misuse of the discovery process is defined as, among other things, failing to respond to an authorized method of discovery, making an evasive response to discovery, or disobeying a court order for discovery. ( Id. , § 2023.010.) If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. ( Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) The penalty should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. ( Wilson v. Jefferson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 952, 959.) Generally, two facts are prerequisite to the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions: (1) there must be a failure to comply with a court order; and (2) the failure must be willful. ( Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) DISCUSSION I. December 8, 2023 Order Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Courts December 8, 2023 order by failing to pay the monetary sanctions. (Coronel Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff otherwise complied with the order by serving further responses. ( Ibid. ) [I]t is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to issue a terminating sanction for failure to pay the sanction. ( Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610.) A monetary sanction is enforceable as a judgment, and in an appropriate case, failure to pay a sanction may be punishable as contempt. ( Ibid. ) Thus, terminating sanctions are not the appropriate way to address Plaintiffs failure to pay sanctions. ( Ibid. ) II. May 8, 2024 Order After the Courts order, Plaintiff only served responses to requests for admission and form interrogatories but did not serve responses to the requests for production or special interrogatories, nor paid sanctions. (Coronel Decl. ¶¶ 11-13.) Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly believed that all of the discovery responses had been sent on May 6, 2024, when in reality only the RFAs and FROGs were sent. (Seuthe Decl. ¶ 10.) Furthermore, the order required moving party to give notice, but there is no indication that Defendants served notice of the order to Plaintiff. Plaintiff served the missing responses soon after this motion was filed. ( Id. , ¶ 9.) The adequacy of the responses is not at issue in this motion. The May 8 order only concerned Plaintiffs failure to provide responses in the first instance, not the substance of the responses. III. Sanctions Based on the above facts, the Court finds that the requested sanctions are unwarranted. Specifically, the terminating, issue, and evidentiary sanctions would be disproportionate because Plaintiff only failed to serve two sets of responses and eventually did so upon realizing the error. Plaintiff has otherwise responded to the other discovery requests implicated in the prior orders. Plaintiffs failure to serve the RFAs and FROGs was not willful because counsel inadvertently believed that all of the responses had been sent together. CONCLUSION Defendants motion for sanctions is DENIED.