Brooks, Vincent V Universal Property And Casualty Insurance Company

Case Number: 23STCV31057 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-18-23 Case #23STCV31057 Trial Date: Not Set SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Topa Insurance Company, et al. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Faramarz Massachi RELIEF REQUESTED Special Motion to Strike the Complaint SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs Faramarz and Mojgan Massachi allege a burst pipe caused significant water damage in their home, thereby leading to the submission of a claim to Defendants Topa Insurance Company and Hippo Analytics, Inc. The parties subsequently disputed the claim adjustment process which led to an appraisal hearing. The appraisal panel found in favor of Plaintiffs. On December 19, 2023, Plaintiffs file their complaint for 1. Breach of Contract; 2. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and 3. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq. Topa Insurance Company answered the complaint on January 22, 2024, and filed an amended answer on February 1, 2024. RULING : Denied Defendants Topa Insurance Company(Topa) and Hippo Analytics, Inc. (Hippo) move to strike limited portions of the introductory paragraphs, as well as the first, second, and third causes of action. [1] Defendants move on grounds that the identified allegations and claims arise from privileged and protected conduct. Plaintiff in opposition challenges the motion as relying on allegations not integral to the claim, thereby barring application of the statute. Plaintiffs also maintain a likelihood of prevailing on the merits even if Defendants shift the burden. Defendants in reply emphasize the reliance on the undisputed privilege conduct as integral to the claims, and therefore barred. Defendants also maintain Plaintiffs lack evidence of a probability of prevailing on the claim. Timing A special motion to strike must be filed within 60 days from service of the complaint (with an additional five days under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013(a) for service by mail), or at any later time that the court deems proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (f).) The complaint was filed December 19, 2023. The December 26, 2023 filed proofs of service indicate personal service on both defendants on December 21, 2023. The instant motion was filed on February 16, 202457 days after service. The motion is timely. Application of the Anti-SLAPP Statute Defendants contend the complaint specifically arises from the allegations in the underlying complaint regarding the appraisal process. The appraisal process itself constitutes a protected activity under the litigation privilege. Hippo Analytics, Inc. also specifically notes that any separate and distinct conduct under the wrongful withholding of insurance benefits claim against Topa Insurance Company comprises a course of conduct without any direct nexus to the insurance based claims, and therefore barred. In addition to citation to the complaint, Defendant Topa Insurance Company also submits a declaration in support, which the court can rely upon in determining whether moving party meets the threshold for shifting the burden in a special motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 679 [The court interprets the activities of the parties through the allegations in order to determine free speech activity but need not adhere to the strict form of the operative pleading in order to make such determinations].) Defendant offers the declaration in order to present the conclusions of the adjustment process, including the appraisal process. [Declaration of Kelly Yates.] Plaintiffs in opposition contend the allegations regarding the appraisal conduct constitute incidental allegations, in order to establish a pattern of conduct intended to delay or withhold benefits due under the policy. Plaintiffs deny any reliance on litigation privilege protected activity as any way integral to the sought after relief. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides that [a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b).) Such a motion involves a two step analysis, in which the court must first determine whether a movant "has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity . . . ." ( Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 712, quoting Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If the court so finds, it must then examine whether the respondent has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. ( Taus v. Loftus , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 712.) An act in furtherance of a person's right to petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or California Constitution includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The anti-SLAPP applies where the allegations of the defendants protected activity are the gravamen or principal thrust of the cause of action. ( Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mulin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672 [where a cause of action alleges both protected and unprotected activity, the cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the protected conduct is merely incidental to the unprotected conduct].) If the allegations of protected activity are only incidental to a claim based essentially on non-protected activity, the mere mention of the protected activity does not subject the claim to an anti-SLAPP motion. ( Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 [We conclude it is the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies (Citation), and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute].) .) [W]hether the defendant's act qualifies as one in furtherance of protected speech or petitioning will depend on whether the defendant took the action for speech-related reasons. ( Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 889.) [T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Citation.) Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been triggered by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such. (Citation.) In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. ( Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) Courts must draw a careful distinction between a cause of action based squarely on a privileged communication & and one based upon an underlying course of conduct evidenced by the communication. ( White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888.) In determining the application of the special motion to strike statute, the court focuses not on the label of the cause of action, but on the underlying activities alleged in the challenged pleading. ( 1100 Park Lane Assocs. v. Feldman (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1484.) If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) [A] plaintiff cannot frustrate the purposes of the SLAPP statute through a pleading tactic of combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity under the label of one cause of action. ( Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 308.) The anti-SLAPP statute's definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilityand whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. ( Navellier v. Sletten , supra , 29 Cal.4th 82, 92.) The Court may look to the litigation privilege as an aid in determining the first step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry. ( Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322-323.) The anti-SLAPP statute does not apply where protected activity is only collateral or incidental to the purpose of the transaction or occurrence underlying the complaint. ( California Back Specialists Medical Group v. Rand (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037.) [T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Citation.) Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been triggered by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such. (Citation.) In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. ( Navellier v. Sletten , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.) [T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Citation.) Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been triggered by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such. (Citation.) In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. ( Navellier v. Sletten , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.) Courts must draw a careful distinction between a cause of action based squarely on a privileged communication & and one based upon an underlying course of conduct evidenced by the communication. ( White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888.) The challenged allegations of the complaint begins with the dispute over the scope and quality of the damages, thereby leading to the appraisal process. Hippo was responsible for the claim adjustment process on behalf of Topa. As the dispute progressed, Hippo subsequently hired its own counsel for representation in the appraisal process and settlement discussions. The communications were not productive, and Hippo instead demanded an Examination Under Oath (EUO) as a condition of participating in the appraisal process. According to Plaintiffs, the focus of the EUO regarded a prolonged disagreement over tile replacement. The appraisal process eventually occurred and the panel found in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants also challenge the damages claim. [5:24-28; 6:1-9:18; 11:1-12:17.] The parties agree that certain alleged underlying conduct, such as the appraisal process itself, constitutes litigation privileged activity. Plaintiffs contend a distinction exists between Plaintiffs efforts to recover damages for the wrongful withholding of insurance benefits due under the policy, which insulates the action from any privileged conduct bar. Section 1152, subdivision (a), provides that offers of compromise are inadmissible to prove the liability of the offeror for the loss or damage. In insurance litigation, [t]he language of this section does not preclude the introduction of settlement negotiations if offered not to prove liability for the original loss but to prove failure to process the claim fairly and in good faith. (Citation.) ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 915.) Although Defendants challenge the cases as not directly addressing a special motion to strike or the insurers right to petition, the court finds the language instructive. The issue is not the content of the settlement offer itself, if any, but the course of conduct presented as alleged indifference towards meaningful negotiations. In a second case involving alleged bad faith handling of an uninsured motorist claim, a court found the course and conduct of the insurer in no way related to furthering the course and conduct of its rights to petition. The conduct centers on the delay in responding to and resolving plaintiff's claim. None of this conduct involved [Insurers] right to petition. While communications preparatory to bringing (or responding to) an action or arbitration might, under the proper circumstances, be deemed to fall within the scope of section 425.16 (citations), the conduct complained of here does not cross this threshold. The outlined actions (or nonactions) occurred as part of a coverage dispute between an insurer and its insured, and occurred long before any arbitration or other proceeding commenced. (Citation.) ... While ... an insurer is entitled to defend itself against unmeritorious claims, the fact that a dispute exists that might ultimately lead to arbitration does not make every step in that dispute part of a right to petition. ( Beach v. Harco National Ins. Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 82, 93-94; Miller v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 247, 258-259.) Again, contrary to the argument in reply, the court finds the cases on-point. While Plaintiffs rely on the appraisal valuation total as a demonstration of the large disparity between the parties positions thereby constituting supporting evidence of the wrongfully withheld benefits, the resulting sum in no way necessarily interlinked the entire adjustment process leading up to the privileged appraisal. The course of conduct specifically articulates a separate and distinct course of conduct leading up to the indisputably privileged appraisal. The law and public policy support a finding for a separate and distinct course of unprivileged conduct leading up to the appraisal process itself constituting unprivileged conduct. The cases specifically reject an insurers right to incorporate non-privileged conduct under the guise of the right to petition as a means of thwarting potential bad faith claims. The extensive case law on both the general subject and specific case regarding insurance bad faith causes of action therefore categorically leads to the conclusion of a failure to shift the burden as to the first prong by Topa. The insurer, however, also raised a valid argument regarding the distinction in bad faith claims as to adjusters on which Plaintiffs present no apparent opposition. An insurance adjuster in no way participates in the contractual relationship between the parties. ( Henry v. Associated Indemnity Corp. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1416.) Again, the conduct of Hippo itself leading up to the appraisal was by no means privileged conduct. While Hippo is named in all causes of action, the scope of the motion requires a finding of privileged conduct barring all claims. Consideration of the validity of the claims based on the entitlement to seek damages against a non-contracting party requires a finding beyond the scope of the subject motion. The court motion is therefore denied as to this separate argument regarding the Hippo as a proper to any and all claims in its role as adjuster to Topa. Finally, to the extent the second prong of the test depends on the litigation privilege barring all claims, the court finds the litigation privilege inapplicable to the subject cased based on the relied upon authority in the first section. [See Declaration of Alex Cohen.] The motion is therefore DENIED in its entirety as to both defendants. Any counter motion for attorney fees by Plaintiffs must be filed in a separate noticed motion. [See Declaration of Sara McClain.] Demurrer to the complaint scheduled for July 23, 2024. Defendants to provide notice. [1] Page 5:24-28; 6:1-28; 7:1-28; 8:1-8; 8:9-28; 9:1-4; 9:5-28; 10:1-18; 11:1-15; 11:16-28;12:1-3; 12:4-17.

Re: Baldeep Dhindsa v. Suretec Insurance Company Superior Court Case No. 21CECG02866 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: Default Prove-Up Oral Argument, if timely requested, will be heard on Thursday, July 18, 2024 at 3:30 PM in Department 502. Tentative Ruling: To deny without prejudice. Explanation: Plaintiff Baldeep Dhindsa has not filed a Judicial Council Form Civ-100 Request for Entry of Court Judgment, and the Court may not proceed without it. Should Plaintiff calendar another hearing, the Court prefers a default packet that complies with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, and the Superior Court of Fresno County, Local Rules, rule 2.1.14, be submitted at least ten court days prior to the hearing in order to avoid unnecessary consumption of time at the hearing. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/15/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Case Number: 24STCV08590 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING PAOLA MELGAR , vs. EAST LA AUTO SALES, INC . Case No.: 24STCV08590 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Cross-Defendant Paola Melgars demurrer to Cross-Complainant East LA Auto Sales, Inc.s cross-complaint is sustained. Cross-Defendant Paola Melgar (Melgar) (Cross-Defendant) demurs to Cross-Complainant East LA Auto Sales, Inc.s (East LA) (Cross-Complainant) cross-complaint (CC) on the following grounds: (1) the 1st cause of action for breach of contract does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ; and (2) the 2nd cause of action for negligence does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 1.) Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41, emphasis added.) Cross-Defendants counsel declares that at least five days before the date the responsive pleading date was due to be filed, he met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading, and they did not reach an agreement resolving the matters raised in the demurrer. ( See Decl. of Rose ¶2a.) Cross-Defendants counsels declaration is insufficient under C.C.P. §430.41 because his declaration does not state that the parties met and conferred in person, by telephone, or by video conference. However, the failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Cross-Defendants demurrer. Background Cross-Complainant filed the operative CC on May 8, 2024, against Cross-Defendant alleging two causes of action: (1) breach of contract; and (2) negligence. Cross-Complainants causes of action arise from its entry into a Retail Installment Sale Contract (Contract) with Cross-Defendant on August 16, 2022, in which Cross-Complainant agreed to purchase a used 2009 BMW (Subject Vehicle). ( See CC ¶5.) Cross-Defendant filed the instant demurrer on June 10, 2024. Cross-Complainant filed its opposition on July 3, 2024, and filed a second opposition on July 5, 2024. Cross-Defendant filed her reply on July 8, 2024. Summary of Demurrer Cross-Defendant demurs to the 1st and 2nd causes of action on the basis the claims fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action. (Demurrer, pg. 3.) Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Failure to State a Claim Breach of Contract (1st COA) To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) resulting damage to the plaintiff. ( Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Cross-Complainant alleges on August 16, 2022, Cross-Defendant entered into the Contract with Cross-Complainant in which Cross-Defendant agreed to purchase the Subject Vehicle from Cross-Defendant. (CC ¶5, Exh. A.) Cross-Complainant alleges it performed all of its obligations under the Contract. (CC ¶6.) Cross-Complainant alleges in ¶2, §2 of the Contract, Cross-Defendant agreed not to expose the Subject Vehicle to misuse. (CC ¶7.) Cross-Complainant alleges on or about October 2022, Cross-Defendant poured coolant into the Subject Vehicles engine, causing damage to the Subject Vehicle. (CC ¶8.) Cross-Complainant alleges it suffered harm and damages as a result of Cross-Defendants conduct. (CC ¶9.) Nonetheless, Cross-Complainant does not sufficiently how Cross-Defendants pouring coolant into the Subject Vehicle constitutes a breach of the Contract, nor how Cross-Complainant suffered any affirmative damages thereby. Accordingly, Cross-Defendants demurrer to Cross-Complainants 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Negligence (2nd COA) The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. ( Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, internal quotations omitted.) The first element, duty, may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship. ( Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 552].) [T]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court. ( Kentucky Fried Chicken of California v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.) Cross-Complainant alleges Cross-Defendant owed Cross-Complainant a duty of care not to subject the Subject Vehicle to misuse . (CC ¶15.) Cross-Complainant alleges in October 2022, Cross-Defendant breached the duty of care owed to Cross-Complainant by pouring coolant into the Subject Vehicles engine, causing damage to the Subject Vehicle, causing harm to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶16.) Cross-Complainant alleges Cross-Defendants conduct was the proximate cause and cause in fact in causing harm and damages to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶17.) Cross-Complainant alleges as a result of Cross-Defendants breach, Cross-Complainant sustained general and specific damages in an amount to be determined at trial. (CC ¶18.) Cross-Complainant fails to allege a legal duty owed by Cross-Defendant to Cross-Complainant. Specifically, Cross-Complainant fails to allege a legally cognizable duty a buyer owes to a seller to not subject the Subject Vehicle to misuse. Accordingly, Cross-Defendants demurrer to Cross-Complainants 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion The Court observes that absent allegations of affirmative damages, the causes of action pled in the Cross-Complaint appear more appropriately pled as affirmative defenses. Cross-Defendants demurrer to Cross-Complainant is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STLC01016 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 26 Koury v. FB Insure Select, LLC, et al. DEMURRER (CCP § 430.10, et seq.) TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Janessa Rodriguezs Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED. DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ IS TO FILE AND SERVE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS ORDER. ANALYSIS: On February 8, 2023, Plaintiffs Ken Koury (Plaintiff), in propria persona, filed the Complaint in this action against Defendants FB Insure Select, LLC (Defendant FB Insure) and Janessa Rodriguez (Defendant Rodriguez). Defendant Rodriguez filed the instant Demurrer to the Complaint on behalf of both Defendants on March 15, 2023. The notice page indicates the Demurrer will be heard on August 7, 2024 at 8:30 am in Defendant 25 and 26 in the Spring Street Courthouse. (Demurrer, p. 1.) The Demurrer, however, was reserved for July 18, 2024 at 10:30 am in Department 26 in the Spring Street Courthouse. On March 29, 2023, the Court entered default against Defendant FB Insure. On July 10, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One. (Minute Order, 07/10/23.) No opposition to the Demurrer has been filed to date. Discussion The Demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. However, notice of the Demurrer is improper in that it sets forth the wrong date and time, and refers to two different departments in the Spring Street Courthouse. Failure to give notice of a motion is not only a violation of the statutory requirements but of due process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005; Jones v. Otero (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 754, 757.) The Court additionally notes that Defendant Rodriguez cannot represent Defendant FB Insure; a corporation must be represented by an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of California. It is black letter law that corporation cannot represent itself in court. ( Clean Air Transport Systems v. San Mateo County Transit Dist. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 576, 578 (citing Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729-730).) This rule applies to all entities regarded as separate from their owners, including partnerships and unincorporated associations. (See Clean Air Transport Systems , supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 578.) The Court will only consider the Demurrer on behalf of Defendant Rodriguez. The Demurrer is brought for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) However, the Demurrer does not indicate what facts are missing from the Complaint. Instead, it repeatedly states that the Complaint sets forth certain facts. (Demurrer, pp. 1:25-3:13.) The memorandum in support of the Demurrer also does not address what facts are missing from the causes of action for (1) violation of Title 47 United States Code, section 227 and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200; and (2) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. It appears to be premised on Defendants version of the facts regarding the parties dispute. This is not a proper basis for a demurrer. A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Complaint is overruled. Conclusion Defendant Janessa Rodriguezs Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED. DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ IS TO FILE AND SERVE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS ORDER. Court clerk to give notice.

SIMMONS, ET AL. VS. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURAN Case Number: CVCV21-0198289 This matter is on calendar for review for status of removal. On December 1, 2021, the Court received a “Notice of Removal of State Action.” Based on the Notice, the Court suspended its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1446. No Status Report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to provide the Court with a status of the federal action. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA VS. $12,276.00

BROCKMAN VS. FCA US, LLC, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0201145 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the most recent review hearing on April 15, 2024, the Court was informed that parties were working toward finalizing a settlement agreement. No updated information has been provided. No Notice of Settlement has been filed. No Request for Dismissal has been filed. The Court is in receipt of “Notice of Removal of Action to United States District Court” filed in the Shasta County Superior Court on May 8, 2023. Pursuant to that notice, this Court’s jurisdiction is automatically suspended. 28 USC §1446(d); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 670. All future hearing dates were therefore vacated. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds this case is exempt from the case disposition time goals under California Rule of Court §3.714(c)(1) and the case is hereby Administratively Closed unless and until it is remanded. No further appearances are required by the parties, including at today’s Review Hearing.

JONES, ET AL. VS. TAYLOR Case Number: 22CV-0201290 This matter is on calendar trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan III case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. Plaintiffs have posted jury fees but Defendant has not. Defendant is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

23CV038384: CITY OF ALAMEDA vs SHEEHAN 07/19/2024 Case Management Conference in Department 17 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Frank Roesch The scheduled CMC is reset as stated below as the matter is not yet at issue. FURTHER CONFERENCE A Case Management Conference is scheduled for 10/04/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 17. Updated Case Management Statements in compliance with Rule of Court 3.725, on Judicial Council Form CM-110, must be filed no later than 09/19/2024. If the foregoing date is a court holiday or a weekend, the time is extended to the next business day. The Court orders counsel to obtain a copy of this order from the eCourt portal.