Meli Investment Corp Vs Eddie Segura

19CV02689 CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION V. PARADISE COMMUNITY GUILDS, AN ENTITY OF UNKNOWN FORM EVENT: Order of Examination (Paradise Community Guilds) The Court will swear in the Judgment Debtor for examination.

RG17874853: Tinsley VS Glaude 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Deutsche Bank in Department 25 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Jenna Whitman The hearing on the motion for summary judgment scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 09/05/2024 at 10:00 AM in Department 25 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.

Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-16-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. On June 10, 2024, Derrick Robinson filed a Request for Dismissal from the complaint. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 12.4, 12.7, and 13.1, from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with assurances of later production upon entry into a protective order, admission of certain unspecified documents or media, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of information. The responses are incomplete and fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows nine remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next set of motions to compel further responses begins with Noah Penn-El beginning on July 2, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

22CV-03537 Carlos Avila v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, et al. Demurrer by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation to third Amended Complaint and to each cause of action stated therein for failure to state a cause of action against Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation The unopposed Demurrer by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and to each cause of action stated therein for failure to state a cause of action against Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation Is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff has failed to plead around the defects in the complaint despite being given three opportunities to do so, and has not provided any indication that a further grant of leave to amend would not be futile.

Case Number: 23AHCV00325 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 26 7/18/24 Dept. 26 Rolf Treu, Judge presiding Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al. (21STCV09634) DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE CROSS-COMPLAINT (Filed by Cross-Defendants Maggie Ly Sien and Real Estate Elite Corporation on February 14, 2024) Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al. ( 23AHCV00325 ) DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Filed by Defendants Maggie Ly Sien and Real Estate Elite Corporation on April 2, 2024) Counsel for Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant Zhenya He (Opposing Party): Charles Pok, Esq. (Law Office of Charles Pok & Associates) Counsel for Defendants/Cross-Defendants Maggie Ly Sien aka Maggie Chan, Real Estate Elite Corporation (Moving/Demurring Parties): Fredric W. Trester, Linna Loangkote (Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP) TENTATIVE RULING Cross-Defendants demurrer to the cross-complaint in Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al., 21STCV09634, filed February 14, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. Defendants demurrer to the complaint in Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al., 23AHCV00325 , filed April 2, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. The motions to strike are denied as moot. Background On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff/Defendant/Cross-Defendant Zhenya He (He or Plaintiff) filed her complaint in case number 23AHCV00325, He v. Chen . She filed her operative second amended complaint (SAC) on January 10, 2024. On November 28, 2023, He filed a cross-complaint in a related suit, Ku v. He , case number 21STCV09634. The cross-complaint in Ku v. He is functionally identical to the complaint in He v. Chen . Defendants/cross-defendants Maggie Ly Sien (Ly) and Real Estate Elite Corporation (REEC) (together, Defendants) now challenge the functionally identical SAC and cross-complaint, each on the same grounds. Plaintiff alleges as follows in her 2024 SAC and her 2023 cross-complaint, accepted as true for purposes of demurrer and motion to strike (paragraph citations to the SAC unless otherwise noted): Plaintiff purchased the property located at 1400 Circle Drive, San Marino 91108 (the Property) around May 19, 2015. (¶ 17.) In June 2019, Plaintiff registered an LLC, Le Sky Group LLC, and transferred ownership of the Property to the newly-formed LLC. (¶¶ 19, 21.) Plaintiff had loaned defendant Ying Chen a large sum of money in 2017. (¶ 24.) Chen failed to promptly pay her back, and Plaintiff and Chen reached an agreement that Chen would pay the mortgage on the Property until Chen could repay the whole loan to Plaintiff. (¶¶ 24-26.) In December 2020, Chen informed Plaintiff she had repaid the mortgage and suggested to Plaintiff she could help Plaintiff sell the Property if she wanted. (¶ 27, edits to capitalization.) In late 2021, Plaintiff was in China. (¶ 29.) Her real estate agent informed her that the Property had been transferred unbeknownst to [Plaintiff] and Chen was somehow involved with the alleged transfer. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff contacted Chen, who informed her the Property had been transferred to a friend and Plaintiff would be paid full market value for it. ( Ibid .) The structure on the Property was subsequently torn down, and Plaintiff was never paid. (¶ 30.) As to defendants Maggie Ly Sien (Ly) and Real Estate Elite Corporation (REEC), the moving parties here: according to the SAC, around September and October 2020 defendant Ly, among others, inquired with a representative of Chicago Title Company regarding what documents would be needed in order for Chen to be able to authorize the sale and transfer of Plaintiffs [P]roperty. (¶ 34.) Ly and several of her co-defendants then instigated the creation and filing of a fraudulent Statement of Information as to Le Sky Group LLC, which added Chen as a Manager of the LLC, changed the agent for service of process, and changed the service address. (¶¶ 35-36.) They then created an Operating Agreement for Le Sky Group LLC and forged Plaintiffs signature. (¶ 38.) With their fraudulently-obtained authority over Le Sky Group LLC, the owner of the Property, Ly and her co-defendants then transferred title to the Property without Plaintiffs consent. (¶¶ 39-40.) On February 14, 2024, Ly and REEC demurred to and moved to strike portions of Hes cross-complaint in Ku v. He. Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and Ly and REEC no reply. On April 2, 2024, Ly and REEC demurred to and moved to strike portions from Plaintiffs SAC in He v. Chen . Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and Ly and REEC no reply. The demurrers and motions now come before the Court concurrently in the two related cases. The pleadings and motions are substantially identical, and the Court discusses them all together. Discussion In support of their demurrer, Ly and REEC argue: · The third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, only challenged in the demurrer to the SAC, not to the cross-complaint (one assumes erroneously) , fails because Plaintiff has not pled Ly or REEC was her agent, and therefore owed her any fiduciary duty. · The fourth cause of action for slander of title fails because o (1) Plaintiff does not allege Ly or REEC recorded a deed, nor did they, nor can anyone infer they did based on Plaintiffs allegations, because a real estate agent/company does not have a duty to record a deed related to a transaction; and o (2) Plaintiff does not allege any false deed was recorded, even if she alleges the underlying transaction was fraudulent; · The fifth cause of action for conversion fails because it only applies to personal property; and · The seventh cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants received any stolen property. The demurrer is sustained, so the motion to strike is moot. ANALYSIS A. Timeliness ; Meeting and Conference A demurrer or motion to strike must be filed within 30 days of being served with a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.40, 435 (b)(1).) Each must be accompanied by the moving partys declaration attesting to a good-faith effort to meet and confer prior to filing. ( Id. , §§ 430.41, 435.5.) Counsel confirms via declaration that the parties conferred about a timeline for challenging the related pleadings in each case. The demurrer and motion to strike are timely based on the parties agreement, and the parties met and conferred regarding their dispute. (See Loangkote Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.) B. Legal Standard for Demurrer Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) C. Analysis Third Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendants challenge Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in their demurrer to her SAC in He v. Chen , but not their demurrer to her cross-complaint in Ku v. He. The Court assumes this was administrative error; the ruling applies equally to both pleadings. To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty a plaintiff must plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach. ( Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) Plaintiff does not plead that Ly or REEC owed her a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary relationship is any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. ( Wolf v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 25, 29.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants owed a duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs based on their profession. The Court is not aware of authority stating that real estate professionals owe a fiduciary duty to the public writ large. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition citing any. Plaintiff has not pled facts showing Defendants owed a duty specifically to her , so she has not stated a claim against them for breach of fiduciary duty. Fourth Cause of Action for Slander of Title The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are (1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. ( Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051.) Defendants argue it is not the responsibility of a real estate agent to record or cause to be recorded title relating to real property ... . (MPA, 9:3-4.) The relevance of this argument is unclear. Whether or not it was Defendants responsibility to record a deed has no bearing on whether they actually did so, or whether the deed was true or false. Defendants also argue Plaintiff did not allege Defendants published anything false. On this point, the Court agrees. The general background facts in the SAC and cross-complaint do not contain a specific allegation that Ly or REEC made any publication. The allegations beneath the cause of action itself state generally that Defendants published a false statement. When the joint liability of multiple defendants is unclear, but a complaint fails to distinguish between them, the complaint may fail for uncertainty. (See Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 Cal.3d 901, 909.) Plaintiffs complaint fails for this reason. Without differentiating the nine (9) defendants and their purported involvement with the alleged false deed, none of the defendants can ascertain what she accuses them of, specifically. Plaintiffs claim for slander of title is fatally uncertain as to Ly and REEC. Fifth Cause of Action for Conversion Conversion is generally described as the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. [Citation.] The basic elements of the tort are (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant's disposition of the property in a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's property rights; and ( 3 ) resulting damages . [Citation.] ( Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 ( Fremont ).) Plaintiff does not allege Defendants disposed of any of her personal property. Her conversion claim fails. Seventh Cause of Action for Civil Theft To plead a cause of action for civil theft under Penal Code section 496, a plaintiff must allege three elements: (1) property stolen or obtained by theft or fraud; (2) defendants knowledge that it was so obtained; and (3) defendants receipt or possession of the property. ( Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 126.) Plaintiff accuses Ly and REEC, collectively with their co-defendants, of engaging in a scheme to take her property. The SAC implies that Defendants somehow profited from the scheme. But it does not allege Defendants actually received any stolen property. As a result, Plaintiff has not stated a claim. Defendants demurrer is sustained. D. Leave to Amend Where the complaint is defective, [i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his [or her] complaint&However, if the plaintiff's causes of action is [sic] not viable, leave to amend should not be granted if there is no basis for the court to conclude further amendment would cure the defects. ( Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 211, internal quotations omitted.) If the demurrer is sustained, plaintiff has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment. ( Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 173, citing Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79). Plaintiff filed no opposition to either demurrer. As a result, she made no effort to demonstrate she can cure her pleading by amendment. She has also amended her complaint twice already, but still fails to state claims against Ly or REEC. It is Plaintiffs burden to show she can amend her complaint to state a claim, and she has not done so. The Court must sustain both demurrers without leave to amend. E. Conclusion Cross-Defendants demurrer to the cross-complaint in Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al., 21STCV09634, filed February 14, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. Defendants demurrer to the complaint in Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al., 23AHCV00325 , filed April 2, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. The motions to strike are denied as moot.

CU23-05492 Motion to Confirm Sale of Rehabilitated Property TENTATIVE RULING Receiver Gerard F. Keena II moves for confirmation of the sale of 158 Baxter Street, Vallejo, California 94590 (the “Property”) following this court’s orders for abatement of the nuisance conditions at the Property, appointment of Receiver, and approval of Receiver’s rehabilitation plan. This court’s order required that any purchaser of the Property demonstrate ability and commitment to correct the deficiencies at the Property and abide by all laws in owning and/or managing the Property, show a management plan and background of successful property management if the Property is intended to be an investment and not owner-occupied, and not own any property in California that is subject to a pending notice of violation or abatement or other notice of violation of law. (Order Approving Rehabilitation Plan and Authorizing Listing and Sale dated 4/18/24.) Receiver declares that the proposed buyer Rolando Pineda was the only one of four offerors to meet the court’s requirements but does not provide supporting evidence. Page 1 of 2 (Declaration of Gerard F. Keena II in Support of Motion at ¶ 11.) Receiver states that other offers were for higher amounts, though the buyers were not qualified. (Ibid.) Receiver is to appear and demonstrate Mr. Pineda’s qualifications to purchase and rehabilitate the Property per the court’s order. The court is inclined to grant Receiver’s motion if satisfied that no qualified higher bidder can be found. SUSAN MAGLIANO v. JOHN CRAWFORD, et al. FCS053303 MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL TENTATIVE RULING The motion is granted with withdrawal effective only upon prompt service on the client’s successor-in-interest or representative of the signed order. Page 2 of 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Probate Notes 202300574382PRCE: In the Matter of Donald Emanuel Clemons 07/16/2024 in Department J6 Hearing on Petition For Authority to Move Conservatee; Pettion for Authority to sell Conservatee's Real Property etc. The Public Guardian, as conservator of the person and estate of Donald Emanuel Clemons, is authorized to move the Conservatee to the least restrictive appropriate placement to meet his care needs. Petitioner requests authority to sell the conservatee’s residence stating it is to his advantage, benefit and best interest. The Petition complies with Probate Code §2541. The Court notes that the Verification of the Petition at page 8 is not signed. Upon proper verification of the petition and filing of a Final Inventory & Appraisal to confirm the assets of the estate, the court intends to grant the Petition. PG also requests authority to enter into an exclusive listing agreement. (Probate Code § 2543(b); 10150(c).) PG states that it is necessary and to the advantage of the estate that such contract be executed because it is the most efficient method of marketing the property. Petitioner has provided the information required by Probate Code §10150(c) and CRC rule 7.453. The court intends to grant the request to enter into an exclusive listing agreement. Future dates to remain as previously ordered. The clerk shall give notice. __________________ The Court uses Zoom exclusively for remote appearances in Department J6. For information on the Zoom procedures, and for general information regarding Judge Lund and his courtroom rules and procedures, please visit: http://www.judgerogerlund.com.

Case Number: 23LBCV00238 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: S25 Background On February 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Fred Di Bernardo (erroneously sued as Fred Di Bernardo), Kathryn Vance (erroneously sued as Kathryn Vance) (collectively Defendants) and Does 1 through 20, alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of governing documents, (2) nuisance, (3) negligence and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiffs allege that they, at all relevant times, owned and resided at a condominium at 162nd Place Unit 303, Long Beach, CA 90803 and that Defendant Bernardo has, at all relevant times, owned Unit 403, located directly above Plaintiffs condominium. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiffs assert Defendant Vance resides at Unit 403 as a Tenant. (Compl., ¶ 4.) The two condominiums are part of the Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the HOA); Plaintiffs allege the HOA and each of its members, including Plaintiffs and Defendant Dibernardo, are bound by the Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations (the CC&Rs) recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on August 23, 1973 as well as the Bylaws of Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the Bylaws). (Compl., ¶¶ 10-14, Exhs. A-B.) Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 1, 2022, they discovered black mold along the baseboards of their master bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 19, Exh. C.) Plaintiffs contacted All-American Mold Remediation & Consulting LLC (AMR) to investigate, and AMR found extensive water damage in the master bedroom and vanity area, detected high moisture throughout the ceiling and walls, and discovered mold and moisture in other parts of the master bathroom. (Compl., ¶¶ 20-22, Exh. D.) After AMRs first property inspection, Plaintiffs emailed the HOA and Defendant Vance, notifying them of the mold issue; Defendant Vance agreed to have a leak detection service conduct an inspection. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-24, Exh. E.) On July 22, 2022, American Leak Detection (ALD) inspected Unit 403 and determined water was leaking from Unit 403 to Unit 303 through a bathtubs improperly sealed spout and cover plates. (Compl., ¶¶ 26, 27, Exh. F.) Plaintiff also asserts that on July 25, 2022, AMR returned to Unit 303 and confirmed the source of the water damage as a leak from Unit 403s bathtub. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that while the ceiling in the Unit 303s master bathroom was open, Plaintiffs and ALD observed and recorded water entering Unit 303 from Unit 403 when the Defendant Vance ran water upstairs in Unit 403s bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 29.) On July 28, 2022, Plaintiffs allegedly spoke with Defendant Dibernardo, who disputed the leak in Unit 403 and refused to further communicate with Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims Defendant Dibernardo will not provide Defendant Vance or the HOA with his insurance information. (Compl., ¶¶ 30-33.) Plaintiffs state Defendant Dibernardo allegedly hired a plumber to fix the leak in Unit 403, but no proof of work completion was provided to the HOA until around December 22, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs claim they were unable to live in Unit 303 as no assurances were made that the leak would not reoccur. (Ibid.) Legal Standard The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalfv. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1). When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).) Evidentiary Objections The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Michele Travis: Nos. 1, 3 and 4 (Overruled) and Nos. 2 and 5 (Sustained). The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of William Idleman. Nos. 1 and 2 (Overruled). Judicial Notice Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations recorded on August 23, 1973, as Instrument No. 3059 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County) is granted pursuant to Evidence Code, §§ 451, 452, subds. (c) and (g). Parties Arguments Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication on the following: (1) 1st Cause of Action (Breach of the Governing Documents); (2) whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; (3) whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and (4) whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property. Defendant Dibernardo opposes arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of the HOA Governing Documents is essentially a breach of contract claim and (2) triable issues of material facts exist. Analysis The existence of an issue of duty may be a proper subject for a motion for summary adjudication. Courts may summarily adjudicate that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. (CCP § 437c(f)(1); Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden Assocs. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 508, 518. Thus, theoretically, a motion for summary adjudication as to whether Defendant owed a duty under the CC & Rs would be appropriate. Plaintiffs characterize their motion as seeking adjudication as to whether Defendants owed a duty under the CC&Rs. However, the instant motion, as well as Plaintiffs separate statement of facts, it appears that Plaintiffs not only seek the Court to determine whether such a duty exists as a matter of law, but consequently, find that the Defendants breached their alleged duty and are liable for damages as a matter of law. (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Adjudication, p. 5:7-14, 9:28 10:1-5, 13:22-23.) The instant motion for summary adjudication as the 1st cause of action; Issue of Duty No. 1 - whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; Issue of Duty No. 2 - whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and Issue of Duty No. 3 -whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property are denied to the extent that the motion seeks adjudication of the elements of breach and causation. These are not proper matters for a motion for summary adjudication. (See Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 [where damages are an element of a cause of action, such as here in the cause of action for negligence, and the damages amount remains disputed, Plaintiff cannot obtain summary adjudication on the elements pertaining to liability]). Assuming arguendo that the Defendants are bound under the terms of the CR&Rs, which Defendants may not dispute (See DSSUF Nos. 7-9), the Court finds there are triable issues of material facts as to whether Defendants Dibernardo and Vance breach their duty of care under the CC&Rs, whether that breach resulted in the alleged water damage of Unit 303, and/or whether alternative sources within Unit 303s bathroom contributed to the claimed damage. (See DSSUF 2-7, 10; Daly Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6-11; Carpenter Decl., ¶¶ 6-12, 14, 15.)