Angel Carrasco Vs Gator 4601 Nw 199Th St, Llc

Case Number: 22STCV26458 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 27 Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27 Petition To Approve Minors Compromise Hearing Date: 7/16/24 Claimant Name: Sophia Gozukuchikyan, a minor CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV26458 SOPHIA GOZUKUCHIKYAN, et al. vs ACE PARKING MANAGEMENT Ruling: Deny TENTATIVE The Court excuses the personal appearance of Claimant and the guardian ad litem. Counsel may appear by telephone or video conference call. The Court has reviewed the Petition to Approve Compromise of Pending Action of Sophia Gozukuchikyan, a minor . The application is denied for the following reasons: · Items under 12a of the application need to be revised to ensure all the numbers are correctly totaled. · Items 12b(5)(b) and 12(a) need to be revised to ensure the numbers are consistent with each other. Petitioner is hereby ordered to correct the deficiencies noted above no less than 5 days prior to the new court date set below. Failure to do so may result in sanctions. ¿ ¿¿ THE COURT SETS NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW RE: MINOR COMPROMISE ON _______ , 2024 , IN DEPARTMENT 27 AT 4:00 PM. NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED IF RECEIPT IS FILED IN ADVANCE. ¿¿ Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 22STCV40016 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER 22STCV40016 MOTION (1) Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint as to the Third Alleged Cause of Action (2) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Complaint Regarding the Prayer for Punitive Damages MOVING PARTY Defendant Enedino Espinoza OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Joseph Buddenberg MOTION On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff Joseph Buddenberg (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Target Corporation, Allied Universal, John Doe, and Does 1 to 50 for various causes of action including, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2022, he was exiting the premises at 735 S. Figueroa St. Los Angeles, when John Doe, a security guard, physically attacked and assaulted him. (Complaint ¶ 8.) On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Enedino Espinoza as John Doe. Defendant Enedino Espinoza (Defendant) now demurs to the third cause of action in the complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress arguing it is uncertain and fails to state a cause of action. Defendant also separately moves to strike Plaintiffs punitive damages claim in the first and second causes of action. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. ( Donabedian , 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. ( Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to determine whether or not the & complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. ( Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. ( Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. ( Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist . (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. ( Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). MEET AND CONFER Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).) According to the Declaration of Loni K. Harada-Orosz, Defendants counsel met by telephone with Plaintiffs counsel and sent a meet and confer letter in April 2024 regarding this demurrer. (Harada-Orosz Decl. ¶ 56.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement is met. ANALYSIS As an initial matter, upon reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that the pleadings are not so uncertain that Defendant cannot reasonably respond. Therefore, the Court will address the argument that the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action does not state sufficient facts. The elements for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress.¿ ( Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)¿ ¿ The tort calls for intentional, or at least reckless conductconduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result. ( Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 210.) It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware. ( Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) A defendants conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 234, 257 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. ( Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 597 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) Rather, the requirements for satisfying the element of extreme and outrageous conduct are rigorous and difficult to satisfy. ( Okorie , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at 597.) On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous conduct is that which is the most extremely offensive. ( Id. ) (quoting Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1129).) Depending on the idiosyncrasies of the plaintiff, offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of the spectrum may be irritating, insulting or even distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be endured without resort to legal redress. ( Ibid. ) In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with great[ ] specificity the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) Here, the complaint alleges the following: As Plaintiff was exiting the subject premises and using his cellphone, he was approached and questioned by Defendant JOHN DOE. Defendant JOHN DOE, suddenly and without warning, physically attacked and assaulted Plaintiff with such force that Plaintiff suffered injuries and damages. The force of Defendant JOHN DOE'S assault to Plaintiff's body caused Plaintiff to suffer physical injuries and damages. (Complaint ¶¶ 89.) Plaintiff also describes the incident as the following: Defendant JOHN DOE aggressively approached the Plaintiff, leaning forward and getting within inches of his person, and in a loud bellicose manner threatened to touch and/or grab Plaintiff in a harmful manner such that it reasonably appeared that Defendant JOHN DOE was about to carry out the threat. ( Id. ¶ 15.) The complaint further alleges: Defendant JOHN DOE acted with the intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress when Defendant JOHN DOE, suddenly and without warning, physically attacked and assaulted Plaintiff with such force that plaintiff suffered injuries and damages. Defendant JOHN DOE'S conduct as set forth above was so outrageous as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community. As a result of Defendant JOHN DOE's socially unacceptable conduct set forth above the Plaintiff has suffered severe and extreme emotional distress including, but not limited to, highly unpleasant mental suffering and anguish that entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that no reasonable person in a civilized society would be expected to endure. (Complaint ¶¶ 2729.) The complaint alleges a physical attack of such force that it caused physical injury. The complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer. Motion to Strike California law authorizes a partys motion to strike matter from an opposing partys pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. ( Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.) Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiffs rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. [Citation.] (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs interests. The additional component of despicable conduct must be found. ( College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.) The statutes reference to despicable conduct represents a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards. (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime. ( Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further, [t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiffs interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences. ( Flyers Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. ( Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award for punitive damages. ( Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Lastly, [t]he mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. ( Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) The complaint alleges a physical attack of such force that it caused physical injury. The complaint states a prima facie claim for punitive damages. The motion to strike is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court overrules Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court denies Defendants motion to strike with leave to amend. Defendant shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file a proof of service of such.

22CV02834 JOHN ROE 1 et al. v. MOUNTAIN VIEW WHISMAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR STAY, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO CONTINUE TRIAL SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION TO COMPEL MENTAL EXAMINATION AND TESTING OF PLAINTIFF ROE 3 AND PLAINTIFF ROE 4 The motion to continue trial is denied. The motion to compel is granted. Motion to continue trial While Dr. Scott has another trial appearance slated for early October 2024, the parties and trial court can fashion a witness schedule to accommodate his other trial and conference commitments. Motion to compel mental exam and testing of plaintiffs Page 1 of 4 The parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the length of time which should be permitted for evaluation by psychiatrist Dr. Charles Scott. Plaintiffs assert a total of 8 hours per plaintiff is sufficient for examinations by both Drs. Hooker and Scott. Defendant contends Dr. Scott requires up to 8 hours of testing and Dr. Hooker requires up to 4 hours of testing. In support of this position, Dr. Scott provided a declaration explaining why up to 8 hours is required. Having reviewed his declaration, the court finds it sufficient to establish good cause to compel examination and testing of Roes 3 and 4 with Dr. Scott for up to 8 hours and for up to 4 hours with Dr. Hooker. That is, a total of 12 hours for each plaintiff. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2032.320, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs also assert they do not want to sign the document titled “Informational/Agreement For Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation” from UC Davis Health, School of Medicine before Dr. Scott’s evaluation, because it “may cause them to waive certain fundamental rights.” (Opp at pg. 7.) A copy of the form is attached to Dr. Scott’s declaration as exhibit C-2. The court reviewed the form and did not find it contained any waivers except the doctor-patient relationship and the duty of confidentiality that accompanies the relationship, which is expected given the context of the evaluation. Plaintiffs did raise any specific issues with the form, so the court is unable to further address their concerns regarding this form. Defendant SCCS’s Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request for the court take judicial notice of the first amended complaint and certificates of merit for Defendant Does 1 and 2 are denied since the court need not take judicial notice of records in its own file. Defendants SCCC’s Second Request for Judicial Notice 1. Court order in Doe v. Familiesfirst Inc. 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 36211. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 2. Court order in Jaber v. Cal. Envtl. Sys., 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 61456. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 3. Court order in Aguilar v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles 2021 Cal.Super. LEXIS 42435. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 4. Order on defendants SCCS’s Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Alternative, to Continue Trial Date, dated May 15, 2025. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of its own court records. Page 2 of 4 5. Oral Argument Notice from Court of Appeal First Appellate District dated June 25, 2024, appellate case no. A169314. Granted. 6. Temporary Stay Order from Court of Appeal Second Appellate District filed June 26, 2024, appellate case no. B334707. Granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Re: Singh v. Singh Superior Court Case No. 22CECG01712 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 (Dept. 503) Motion: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Tentative Ruling: The court intends to deny plaintiff counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel, without prejudice. Explanation: Counsel’s declaration indicates the current address for his client was confirmed by mailing communications to his last known address and to the client’s email that has been used to communicate with him throughout the representation. (Declaration, Item 3b.(1)(d).) The declaration indicates none of these communications have been returned. The declaration does not confirm any additional efforts to locate the current address for the client. Counsel has not adequately confirmed the client’s current address. “As used in this rule, ‘current’ means that the address was confirmed within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. Merely demonstrating that the notice was sent to the client's last known address and was not returned or no electronic delivery failure message was received is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the address is current.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362, subd. (d).) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: jyh on 7/16/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/17/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice filed by VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. formerly known as VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. (Defendant) in Department 18 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Patrick McKinney The Motion to Be Admitted Pro Hac Vice filed by VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. formerly known as VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. on 07/01/2024 is Dropped. This Second Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission for attorney Michael Brown is DROPPED. This appears to be a duplicate copy of the same motion.

Case Number: 21STCV44649 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Reclassify to Limited Jurisdiction Moving Party: Richard Cartier (Defendant) Responding Party: N/A Tentative Ruling: Deny BACKGROUND Plaintiff Bayron Enriquez Vazquez (Plaintiff) filed this action on December 8, 2021, for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident on July 28, 2020, alleging negligence. Plaintiff seeks special damages for the medical treatment he received as a result, amounting to a $8,525.00, in addition to $3,500 in damages his vehicle sustained. Plaintiff also estimates he will incur between $1,500 to $3,000 in medical costs for future treatment. (Motion to Reclassify, Exh. A Response to Interrogatory Form 1.1.) MOVING PARTY POSITION Defendant Richard Cartier (Defendant) filed this motion to reclassify the action as a limited jurisdiction action, arguing that Plaintiff does not seek relief for costs above the $35,000.00 threshold for unlimited jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to this motion. ANALYSIS I. Defects As a preliminary matter, the court notes Defendants notice was untimely. Defendants notice (p. 7) to Plaintiff reflects that service was provided to Plaintiff via email on June 2516 court days before the July 18 hearing. Because service made via email extends the notice period by 2 court days, Defendant was untimely. ( (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6(a)(3)(B).) II. Motion to Reclassify this Action as a Limited Jurisdiction Action CCP § 403.040 governs reclassification of civil cases. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification. (Code Civ. Proc.,, § 403.040(a).) A case should only be reclassified from unlimited to limited if the jurisdictional amount necessarily cannot be reached. (See Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270-71.) This is a high standard that amounts to a legal certainty. ( Id. at 270) The court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount which he has demanded. ( Id. ) CCP § 86(a)(1) classifies civil cases as limited when the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to thirty-five thousand ($35,000) or less. A. Amount in controversy The court initially notes the jurisdictional amount increased to $35,000 at the beginning of this year, but it does not appear the new statute is retroactive. ( See Civ. Code §§ 85-86.) Thus, the central issue to determine whether to reclassify this action as limited jurisdiction is whether it is a legal certainty that Plaintiff cannot recover over $25,000.00 from this case. ( Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270.) Whether the new jurisdictional amount is retroactive and applicable to this case is immaterial, as Defendant still would not meet their burden for the reasons discussed below. Defendant points to Plaintiffs responses to form 1.1 interrogatories to assert that the total relief sought does not reach the jurisdictional amount required. Namely, Defendant indicates that Plaintiff incurred $12,025.00 in medical expenses and vehicle damage so far, and estimates up to $3,000.00 in additional costs for future medical expenses. (Motion to Reclassify, Exh. A Response to Interrogatory Form 1.1.) Defendant argues that because these total costsamounting to $15,025.00fall below the minimum requirement for unlimited jurisdiction, this action should be reclassified. ( Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Reclassification p. 3.) Here, it is not a legal certainty that Plaintiff will not recover over the jurisdictional minimum. Plaintiffs response to interrogatory no. 6.7 indicates that a healthcare provider advised Plaintiff that they will have between $1,500 to $3,000 in future medical costs attributable to Defendant, it does not speak directly to the issue of damages Plaintiff is seeking in this action. More specifically, Plaintiffs response to interrogatory no. 9.1 lists that he requests recovery for general damages, pain and suffering, and future medical expenses, all of which in the amount to be determined. Defendant has not addressed the potential for Plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering, nor the possibility that Plaintiffs future medical expenses will exceed the estimate his healthcare provider provided. Because of the especially uncertain nature of personal injury cases, failing to address all of Plaintiffs bases for recovery is especially problematicas Defendant did not conclusively show Plaintiff cannot receive above threshold required for unlimited jurisdiction. In turn, Defendant has not met the burden of showing the legal certainty required to reclassify the case to limited jurisdiction. RULING Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Reclassify is denied.

Case Number: 20STCV00666 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: A 20STCV00666 Tinisha Clay v. Watts Healthcare, et al. Tuesday, July 16, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER TO THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT, ALEXANDER STEIN, M.D. i. BACKGROUND The fourth amended complaint (4AC) alleges claims for medical negligence arising from the alleged failure to care and treat Alberta Childress for lung and breast cancer. Decedent died on December 14, 2019.Tinisha Clay, decedents daughter, alleged a survival action on behalf of decedents estate, wrongful death, and breach of informed consent. II. ARGUMENTS Defendant, Alexander Stein, M.D. (Dr. Stein or Defendant) demurs to the third cause of action for breach of informed consent allegedly arising from Dr. Steins failure to inform decedent of alternative, non-surgical treatment of lung cancer. Dr. Stein argues the claim is duplicative of the medical negligence claim, is unnecessary, superfluous and adds nothing to alleged claims. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that a claim for lack of informed consent is different from medical negligence, the latter of which arises from Defendants alleged failure to meet the applicable standard of care. The claim for lack of informed consent arises from a defendants duty to disclose material information which is a breach of fiduciary duty. If the court sustains demurrer, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend. In reply, Defendant contends that the opposition refers to pleadings no longer at issue, identifies other defendants who have not demurred, and is otherwise confusing and replete with errors. Plaintiff cannot split a negligence cause of action into two claims. III. LEGAL STANDARDS The bases for demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for failure to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 ). A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706). The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) A demurrer reaches defects that appear on the face of the complaint. The court does not go beyond the four corners of the pleading. The court considers the allegations and matters that are subject to judicial notice. All facts are accepted as true. ( Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4 th 832, 838.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the Plaintiffs ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. ( Id. at 840.) IV. DISCUSSION A claim based on lack of informed consent, which sounds in negligence, arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. ( Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324 .) To support a claim for medical negligence, Plaintiff must establish (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.' ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606 .) The claim for lack of informed consent is not duplicative of the first cause of action for negligence. The negligence claim alleges that Dr. Stein and a co-defendant did not perform lung resection surgery until nine months after detection, when the tumors had spread. (4AC ¶ 30.) The 4Ac alleges that the standard of care required Defendants to perform a different radiotherapy for patients with inoperable cancer. (4AC, ¶ 31. In contrast, the claim for lack of informed consent, which also arises from Defendants failure to properly perform the resection surgery, additionally alleges that Defendant concealed important potential results of alternatives to the resection surgery and the aortic valve replacement surgery. (4AC ¶ 59.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Stein deliberately did not disclose alternative treatments with which he was familiar and that were in effect. (F4AC, ¶ 61.) Each claim arises from a different set of alleged facts. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the fourth amended complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant Dr. Stein is ordered to file an answer forthwith.

23CV034015: WILLIAMS vs MODIVCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by Modivcare Solutions, LLC (Defendant) in Department 17 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Frank Roesch The Motion to Compel Discovery (not Further Discovery) - 1 moving party, 1 motion filed by Modivcare Solutions, LLC on 06/12/2024 is Granted. Defendant Modivcare Solutions, LLC’s (“Defendant”) Unopposed Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Plaintiff Gale Williams (“Plaintiff”) is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (a); 2031.300, subds. (a); (b).) Plaintiff is ordered to serve verified code-compliant discovery responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Request for Production of Documents (Set One) without objections on Defendant within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. As this motion was unopposed, no sanctions are issued. If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.