Parque Towers Condo Assn Inc Vs Parque Towers Developers Llc Et Al

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF ONE ENERGY ASSIGNMENT OF FUNDS AGAINST CVRI2306578 CONSULTING GROUP VS NEW PARADISE CONSTRUCTION, SALMERON INC. AND ALBERTO SALMERON Tentative Ruling: Grant motion for assignment order and motion for restraining order.

DATE: 07/16/24 TIME: 1:30 P.M. DEPT: A CASE NO: CV2200992 PRESIDING: HON. STEPHEN P. FRECCERO REPORTER: CLERK: Q. ROARY PLAINTIFF: ONE SILVER SERVE, INC. VS. DEFENDANT: COLORADO STRUCTURES INC., ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION —- LEAVE TO AMEND FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT RULING The motion for leave to file a second amended cross-complaint (“SACC”) by Monahan-Parker, Inc. and 1201 Fifth Avenue, LLC (“Owners”) is GRANTED. Background This cross-action arises out of the construction of anew AC Hotel by Marriott in San Rafael, California (the “Project”). Owners filed a cross-complaint against multiple parties involved in the construction after plaintiff One Silver Serve, Inc. (a sub-contractor) filed a complaint against Owners alleging it was not paid for work it performed on the Project. Owners’ first amended cross-complaint (“FACC”) alleges they hired DLR Group, Inc. (“DLR”) to be the architect for the Project and Colorado Structures, Inc. (“CSI”) to be the general contractor. (FACC, fff 16-17.) The FACC further alleges that Owners engaged Maroevich, O’Shea & Coghlan Insurance Services, Inc. (“MOC”) and MOC’s successor-in-interest, Symphony Risk Solutions Insurance Services, Inc. (“Symphony”)(collectively, “Broker”) to procure insurance for the Project. Owners allege they provided Broker with specifications for said insurance and paid Broker a fee for procuring the same. (FACC 4 18.) In October 2021, the Bay Area was hit with severe storms causing significant water damage to the Project. (FACC ff] 28-29.) Owners allege, among other things, that because of the various failures of DLR and CSI, including Broker’s failure to provide insurance coverage that complied with specifications provided by Owner, they are entitled to damages, including indemnity from CSI. (See FACC.) Currently before the Court, is Owners’ motion for leave to file a second amended cross- complaint ““SACC”), aa ee €V2200992 Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), the Court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding. As judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit, courts liberally permit amendments of the pleadings. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) Denial is rarely justified unless opposing parties demonstrate unreasonable delay plus prejudice if the motion is granted. A mere showing of unreasonable delay by the plaintiff without any showing of resulting prejudice to defendants is an insufficient ground to justify denial of the plaintiff's motion. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting loss of critical evidence or added costs of preparation, and an increased burden of discovery, inter alia. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Generally, courts allow the amendment and then let the parties test the legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings such as a demurrer. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, and Atkinson v. Elk Corp, (2003) 109 Cal. App.4th 739, 760; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) {| 6:644.) A party requesting leave to amend must also comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. Compliance with the Rules of Court is satisfied by including a copy of the proposed amended pleading, detailing what changes will be made from the previous pleading by stating what allegations are to be deleted or added as compared to the previous pleading including page, paragraph and line number, and attaching a declaration by plaintiff's counsel, as to: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier. Ultimately, as long as no prejudice to the defendant is shown, the liberal policy regarding the amendment prevails. (Mester v. Bragg Mgt. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-297.) Discussion Owners seek leave to file the SACC to add three sets of claims: 1) a violation of Business and Professions Code section 7031 against CSI for a failure to be properly licensed; 2) indemnity- related claims against DLR and Broker; and breach of contract and negligence claims against the subcontractors.' (See Declaration of Michael J. Betz, § 3.) Owners assert that discovery has revealed the additional claims and wrongdoers and that the indemnity claims were only realized after the filing of the FACC. (id. at { 5-7.) Only CSI opposes the proposed amendment. It argues, among other things, that at the October 2, 2023 Case Management Conference, Owners failed to disclose that it may later seek to amend the FACC. CSI argues that the motion is unreasonably late and would result in prejudice in light of the April 2025 trial date. However, CSI fails to adequately describe the prejudice to which it would be subjected if the Court grants the leave requested. Owners assert that the discovery of * Owners further propose additional stylistic revisions to “harmonize the SACC.” (See Amended Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended Cross-Complaint, p. 3:4-5; see also Declaration of Michael J. Betz, 8) Page 2 of 3 a C€V2200992 the additional claims and parties was not until after conducting discovery and taking depositions as of February 2024. CSI further opposes the motion arguing that “Undisputed Facts and California Law Confirm [Owners] Cannot Prevail On [their] Disgorgement Claim.” (Oppo., p. 9:12-13.) The standard for the Court’s consideration of whether an amendment should be allowed does not include an evaluation of the evidentiary and substantive merits of a case. The opposing party may test the legal sufficiency of the allegations in other proceedings. (See Kittredge Sports Co., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, and Atkinson, supra, 109 Cal-App.4th 739, 760.) Owners have satisfied the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. They provide a copy of the proposed amended cross-complaint including the allegations and addition of subcontractor cross-defendants. (See Betz Decl., 44, Notice of Motion Exhs. | & 2; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a); Dye v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1380.) Owners further include a declaration specifying why the amendment is now necessary, when facts giving rise to the amendment were discovered, and why the request was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b); Betz Decl., Jf 3, 5-9.) Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for leave to amend as proposed. Ail parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.10(B) to contest the tentative decision. Parties who request oral argument are required to appear in person or remotely by ZOOM. Regardless of whether a party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the prevailing party shall prepare an order consistent with the announced ruling as required by Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.11. The Zoom appearance information for July, 2024 is as follows: hittps://www.zoomgoy com/j/ 1602925171 I»wd=NUdsa ViabHNrNjZGZjFsVj VSTUVqQT09 Meeting ID: 160 292 5171 Passcode: 868745 If you are unable to join by video, you may join by telephone by calling (669) 254-5252 and using the above-provided passcode. Zoom appearance information may also be found on the Court’s website: https:/Avww.marin.courts.ca.go Page 3 of 3 a a

Motion to Compel Further Responses to WHITTED vs GENERAL Plaintiff's Requests for Production of CVRI2305542 MOTORS, LLC Documents Set One by MARIANA JESUS WHITTED Tentative Ruling: Factual / Procedural Context: This is a lemon law case. Plaintiff Mariana Jesus Whitted alleges that on March 19, 2021, she purchased a 2021 GMC Arcadia, manufactured and/or distributed by defendant General Motors, LLC. Plaintiff alleges that serious defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested within the applicable warranty period, which Defendant’s authorized facility was unable to repair. The alleged defects relate to the engine, transmission, electrical system, and infotainment system. On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed the complaint, alleging various claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act: (1) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(b); (3) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) breach of implied warranty (Civ. Code § 1791.1). On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff served the first set of requests for production of documents (“RFPs”) to which Defendant provided verified responses. Plaintiff contends the responses remain deficient despite meet and confer efforts, and now moves to compel further responses to RFP nos. 1-3, 7, 8, 15-20, 27, 28, 37, 38, 49, 50, 67-70, 78-79, 84, 86, 88, 97, 111-116, arguing the documents sought are highly relevant and Defendant’s objections meritless. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,000. Defendant opposes, arguing that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently meet and confer, Defendant produced further documents and/or agreed to produce further documents, and Defendant’s objections have merit. In the Replies, Plaintiff reiterates her moving arguments. Analysis: Where responses to document requests have been timely served but are deemed deficient by the requesting party (e.g., the response is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or too general), that party may file a motion compelling further responses. (CCP § 2031.310.) The motion must be served within 45 days after service of a verified response (CCP § 1010.6(a)(4)) and must be accompanied by a declaration showing “a reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve the issues informally outside of court. (CCP § 2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2).) The motion to compel further responses “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (Guess? Inc.) (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) To establish “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn.) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Once good cause is established, the responding party has the burden to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 98.) Here, Plaintiff failed to adequately meet and confer prior to filing the motion. Whether a “reasonable and good faith attempt” was made requires an “evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appears likely to bear fruit.” (Clement v. Alegra (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success. (Id.) In this case, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter on January 8, 2024 simultaneously with the document requests, before Defendant even had a chance to review much less respond to the requests. (Declaration of Nino Sanaia, Exs. 8, 10.) Defendant responded by letter on January 16, 2024, rightfully stating the meet and confer letter was premature but agreeing to have discussions regarding ESI discovery after responses have been provided. (Id., Ex. 11.) Defendant provided responses on February 6, 2024 with verifications on March 5, 2024. (Id., Ex. 9.) In response, on March 20, 2024, Plaintiff sent a boilerplate 29-page meet and confer form letter - not tailored to Defendant’s actual responses - explaining the relevance of all 131 document requests, demanding Defendant withdraw all of its objections and supplement its previous production. (Id., Ex. 12.) There is some evidence that the letter is merely a cut-and-paste job. Specifically, Plaintiff’s extensive discussion on the relevance of the documents to her fraud claim appears misplaced as, Plaintiff did not allege fraud in this case. (Id., at pp. 15-17.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant supplemented its document production on April 16, 2024. (Declaration of Ryan Kay, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff did not attempt to further meet and confer after this production. The 2- sentence email sent by Plaintiff on April 23, 2024, simultaneously with the filing of this motion, does not address Defendant’s supplemental production and does not support a finding of a good faith effort to meet and confer. Primarily at issue is whether Plaintiff is entitled to documents and information evidencing i) Defendant’s internal knowledge and investigation regarding “Engine Defects” and “MyLink Defects” in GMC Acadia vehicles; ii) policies and procedures for handling customer complaints and repurchase requests under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”); and iii) documents concerning communications with governmental agencies (e.g., the NHTSA and EPA) and suppliers regarding the “Engine Defects” and “MyLink Defects” in GMC Acadia vehicles. These are similar to the discovery issues at issue in most lemon law cases. Plaintiff also complains that responses related to Plaintiff’s vehicle are not code-compliant. The matter is continued, the parties are ordered to meet and confer. Additionally, the court offers these further suggestion as to the meet and confer process: To help the parties in their meet and confer efforts, the Court notes that the following documents are generally discoverable by an SBA plaintiff: • Defendant’s communications with dealer, factory representative and/or call center concerning the subject vehicle. • Warranty policies and claim-handling procedures published by Defendant and provided to its authorized repair facilities, within the State of California, for the period of the date of purchase to the date the lawsuit was filed. • Defendant’s internal analysis or investigation regarding defects alleged in plaintiff’s complaint in vehicles for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle, including recall notices and technical service bulletins. The Court preliminarily notes that Plaintiff’s definition of “Engine Defects” and “MyLink Defects” in the RFPs do not appear to match the defects allegedly experienced by Plaintiff in the subject vehicle (Sanaia Dec., ¶¶ 6-12), and the requests are not limited to vehicles of the same year as Plaintiff’s vehicle. • Documents evidencing policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests for repurchase pursuant to the SBA for the period of the date of purchase to the date the lawsuit was filed. Furthermore, considering the nature of this dispute, the Court is inclined to limit ESI discovery by balancing Plaintiff’s showing of good cause and Defendant’s showing of undue burden. (See CCP § 2031.310(g)(4); Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (Thiem Indus., Inc.)(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.) The parties shall meet and confer regarding appropriate search terms. The parties are to meet and confer meaningfully in person, by telephone or by videoconference within 10 days of this order. At least 7 days prior to the next hearing date, the moving party is to file a declaration describing the meet and confer process and identifying any remaining issues. The motion to compel is rescheduled to September 16, 2024 in D5 at 8:30 AM. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 21STCV32408 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Case Name: Adjamian v. Rosenthal, et al. Case No.: 21STCV32408 Matter: Motions to be Relieved as Counsel (3x) Moving Party: Michael N. Sofris, counsel for Defendants Magnifique Congregate Living, Inc., STJ, LP, and Tamara Rosenthal Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motions are granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Michael N. Sofris seeks to be relieved as counsel for Defendants Magnifique Congregate Living, Inc., STJ, LP, and Tamara Rosenthal The Motions are granted because they meet all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362. Moving party to give notice. Attorney is relieved as counsel of record for client effective upon the filing of the proof of service for the Court order (form MC-053) upon the client. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, July 19, 2024, line 5, PLAINTIFF OSCAR ANTONIO MENDEZ ESQUIVEL , AN INDIVIDUAL NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET TWO (PART 4 OF 4) Request No. 20, is entitled to the same ruling as No. 15 above, GRANTING the motion to compel further response and production of documents. The motion to compel re Request No. 21 is GRANTED. If there are any such Field Review Comm. reports re the SD definition, they should be produced. If defendant cannot link any reports to the SD definition, it should so respond. The Court has no idea what "customer concerns" re SD means, in plaintiff's Request No. 26. For that reason, the motion is DENIED. Finally, reaching Request No. 31, the defendant's objections are a classic example of a blunderbuss reply. The motion to compel is GRANTED, but the defendant need only respond if a search for the emails is possible and then, if so, what results were obtained. The contested merits of plaintiff's motion to compel, and defendant's objections thereto are such that no sanctions either way are awardable. Any such requests are DENIED. Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare a form of proposed order consistent with the foregoing and, in compliance with Rule 3.1312 of the Rules of Court, submit the form order to defense counsel. Then the proposed order should be forwarded to psw@hassard.com for review and signature. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to psw@hassard.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. = (302/JPT) (End of tentative ruling part 4 of 4) = (302/JPT)

23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Karin Schwartz The Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt on 03/08/2024 is Denied. Defendant Parthesh Brahmbhatt’s motion to challenge determination of good faith settlement is DENIED. BACKGROUND As to Defendant Kimberly White (“White”), Plaintiff Dipak Patel dba Pramukh Financial Services’ (“Plaintiff”) operative Second Amended Complaint alleges Negligent Misrepresentation and Professional Negligence. On February 13, 2024, Defendant Kimberly White (“White) filed a notice of conditional settlement and application for determination of good faith settlement. White and Plaintiff have agreed to settle Plaintiff’s claims as to White for $362,500. Defendant Parthesh Brahmbhatt (“Brahmbhatt”) moved to challenge the determination of good faith settlement on March 8, 2024. Although there is no proof of service as to the motion to challenge determination of good faith settlement, both Plaintiff and White have filed oppositions to the motion; as such, arguments regarding defective service are waived. On July 8, 2024, Brahmbhatt filed a cross-complaint, against Defendant Jonathan Wynn, White, and Plaintiff. As to White, Brahmbhatt alleges negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, equitable indemnification, contribution and declaratory relief. There is no proof of service on file indicating service of the Cross-Complaint on the Cross-Defendants. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, a court’s finding that a settlement between a claimant and one or more joint tortfeasors was entered into in good faith operates to discharge the settling defendant’s obligations to any remaining defendants for contribution or equitable indemnity. (See Civ. Proc. Code, § 877.6, subds. (a), (c).) The challenging party bears the burden of proving that the settlement was not in good faith. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 877.6, subd. (d); see also N. County Contractor’s Ass’n v. Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091.) The dual equitable goals of section 877.6 are the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault and the encouragement of settlements. (Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 865, 872.) The intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceedings among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (Id.) The determination as to whether a settlement is in good faith is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) Section 877.6 and Tech- Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith. (Id. at 1351.) DISCUSSION The Cross-Complaint is Procedurally Defective Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 428.50 subdivision (a), a party shall file a cross-complaint against a party who has filed a complaint against as the same time as the answer to the complaint. Under subdivision (b) of that section, any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date. Subdivision (c) of section 428.50 requires a party to obtain leave of the court to file any cross-complaint. Brahmbhatt’s cross-complaint is procedurally defective. Brahmbhatt filed a demurrer on May 6, 2024, in response to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint filed on April 9, 2024. Thus, his cross-complaint naming Plaintiff as a cross-defendant should have been filed as the same time as his demurrer. Further, Brahmbhatt failed to obtain leave of court prior to filing his cross- complaint on July 8, 2024. Brahmbhatt appeared to be aware of the requirement, as he stated his intention to move for leave to file a cross-complaint in the instant motion on March 8, 2024. (Motion at pp. 4,7; Brahmbhatt Dec. ¶ 5.) Brahmbhatt also failed to file a proof of service of his cross-complaint; it is unclear if any of the named cross-defendants have any notice of the cross- complaint brought against them. As Brahmbhatt has failed to obtain the court’s permission to file his cross-complaint, and service does not appear to have been affected on the cross-defendants, Brahmbhatt’s cross-complaint is not properly before the Court at this juncture and will be the subject of an OSC. Rough Approximation of Plaintiffs’ Total Recovery and Settlor’s Proportionate Liability Brahmbhatt argues that White’s settlement of $362,500 is disproportionate in light of the rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and White’s proportionate liability. Brahmbhatt argues that Plaintiff issued a recent demand for $2,500,000, but the details regarding the timing and recipient(s) of the demand are omitted. Brahmbhatt further argues that the parties reasonably relied upon White’s appraisals, the accuracy of which is relevant to Plaintiff’s misrepresentation SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 claims. White argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claims against Brahmbhatt are unrelated to those made against White. White contends that her involvement in this matter was limited to the appraisal report which was issued to a third party, not to any parties in this action. White acknowledges receipt of a policy limits demand from Plaintiff in the early stages of litigation. However, since that time, the parties have engaged in discovery and depositions, which has allowed the parties to assess the matter for prelitigation settlement. White also notes the absence of any cross-complaint and equitable indemnity claims against White. White provides sufficient evidence to weigh this factor in favor of good faith. Damages are often speculative, and probability of legal liability is often uncertain or remote. (Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 231, 238.) A plaintiff’s asserted damages are not determinative. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 964.) Thus, the $362,500 settlement is proportionate in light of the rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and White’s proportionate liability. Financial Condition and Insurance Brahmbhatt argues that the settlement is premature because he has been unable to conduct discovery as to White’s financial condition and insurance. Brahmbhatt further argues that White has not set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate if she has the ability to pay settlement in excess of the insurance policy limits. White states that Brahmbhatt has had sufficient time to conduct discovery as Plaintiff initiated this action in September 2022, Brahmbhatt answered in March 2023, and Brahmbhatt was represented by counsel until November 2023. She argues that Brahmbhatt has not served discovery in this action, nor did Brahmbhatt choose to participate in mediation in January 2024 with the other parties. Thus, any issues regarding lack of discovery on White’s financial condition and insurance policy coverage are due to Brahmbhatt’s lack of diligence. Neither White nor Plaintiff provide any representations regarding White’s insurance policy limit or White’s financial condition. However, the lack of this information does not support a finding that the settlement was not made in good faith. Brahmbhatt provides no authority requiring a party to provide this information in an application for determination of good faith settlement. Further, it is well established that a settlor should pay less in settlement than after trial. (Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1704.) Evidence of Collusion, Fraud, or Tortious Conduct Both White and Plaintiff state that the settlement was reached in good faith at a private mediation in January 2024. There is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or other tortious conduct by the settling parties aimed to injure the interest of the non-settling parties. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 Settling Defendant’s Potential Liability Compared to Non-Settling Defendants As noted above, there are no cross-complaints alleging equitable indemnity against White. Thus, White’s potential liability to the non-settling defendants is not a factor to consider in reaching a determination of good faith settlement, as there are no claims made against her. CONCLUSION Pursuant to foregoing, Brahmbhatt’s motion to challenge determination of good faith settlement is DENIED. The Court finds that the settlement entered between Plaintiff and White is made in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 877.76. All claims against White for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault are barred by the finding that the settlement is in good faith. (C.C.P. § 877.6(c).) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: DISMISSAL OF CROSS-COMPLAINT Brahmbhatt is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his cross-complaint should not be dismissed for failure to obtain leave of court to file the cross-complaint pursuant to C.C.P. §428.50. A response to this Order to Show Cause must be filed and served at least 15 calendar days before the hearing. Failure to timely file and serve a response and/or appear at the hearing will provide additional grounds for dismissal for failure to comply with a Court order. The Court SETS this matter for an Order to Show Cause why Brahmbhatt’s 7/8/24 cross- complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to C.C.P. § 428.50 for October 3, 2024 at 2:30 PM in Department 20. If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.

Case Number: 23NWCV00813 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C WILLIAM BROTHERS BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION v. ENG CASE NO.: 23NWCV00813 HEARING: 07/18/24 #6 Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant WILLIAM BROTHERS BUILDING & CONSTRUCTIONs Demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainants Cross-Complaint is OVERRULED . Opposing Party to give notice. This action for breach of contract was filed by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant WILLIAM BROTHERS BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION (Cross-Defendant) on March 16, 2023. On September 15, 2023, the subject Cross-Complaint was filed by Defendants/Cross-Complainants RATHA ENG and MARCUS MCGRATH. (Cross-Complainants) Cross-Defendants request for judicial notice of the Complaint, which attaches the Home Improvement Contracts and Settlement Agreement, is GRANTED with respect to the existence and legal effect of these documents. However, the Court does not take judicial notice of the reasonably disputable assertions of fact contained therein. Cross-Defendant generally demurs to each cause of action contained in Defendants/Cross-Complainants Cross- Complaint on the ground that Cross-Complainants released their right to enforce any causes of action against Cross-Complainants pursuant to a Settlement Agreement that contains a Covenant not to Sue, entered into on or about December 2022. Cross-Defendant argues that Cross-Complainants claims are barred under the Settlement Agreement. The demurrer is OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants allege that they signed the Settlement Agreement under duress, and were forced to sign [the] settlement. (XC ¶¶34-36.) Whether the settlement agreement serves to extinguish all of Cross-Complainants claims requires factual proof. Although Cross-Defendant is free to assert the Settlement Agreement as an affirmative defense, it does not bar the action, on demurrer, as a matter of law.