Miami Air West Trade Center Condo Assn Vs Major, Frances (Tr)

Case Number: 22AHCV00886 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT U&G CONSTRUCTION GROUP INC. , Plaintiff(s), vs. REAL PROSPERITY INVESTMENT LLC , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO: 23STCV01341 Related to Case No. 22AHCV00886 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 Plaintiffs U&G Construction Group, Inc. and Zhuoheng Gu (collectively, Plaintiffs) seek an order consolidating Case No. 22AHCV008866 with Case No. 23STCV01341 for all purposes including trial, contending the two actions arise out of the same real property and the same alleged scheme to induce Plaintiff to purchase and make improvements to said property during escrow . Plaintiffs also seek leave to file a proposed Second Amended Complaint in the consolidated action which would merge all allegations against the parties in both actions into a single pleading. Defendant CDMY Investment, LLC (CDMY), is named in both actions but has only appeared in Case No. 23STCV01341 to file demurrers, which have been sustained with leave to amend. CDMY does not oppose this motion to consolidate or the request to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the unopposed motion because there are overlapping issues of fact and the parties in both actions are identical. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048.) Plaintiffs are ordered to file the proposed complaint within 5 days of the date of this Order. Case No. 22AHCV00886 is the lead case. All future papers must be filed in Case No. 22AHCV00886 . All future hearing dates must be reserved in Case No. 22AHCV00886 . All future hearing dates currently pending in Case No. 23STCV01341 are vacated. The Court sets an OSC re: Failure to File Proof of Service for August 21, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice and file a notice of this order in both cases. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 23STCV17398 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Case Name: 7561 Melrose, LLC v. Wesley Scott Reardan , et al . Case No.: 23STCV17398 Motion: OSC re: Entry of Default Judgment Moving Party: Plaintiff 7561 Melrose, LLC Responding Party: Unopposed Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice. Background This is an unlawful detainer action which arises from the alleged non-payment of rent. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff 7561 Melrose, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a ComplaintUnlawful Detainer against Defendants Wesley Scott Reardan (Reardan), Tyler Steven Gonzalez (Gonzalez), and Does 1 to 10. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is seeking forfeiture of the lease, reasonable attorneys fees, and damages at the rate of $666.66 per day from July 13, 2023. (UD-100 at pp. 3-4.) On October 2, 2023, default was entered against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. (10/03/23 Minute Order.) On October 30, 2023, judgment by default was entered against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez for possession only. (10/30/23 Judgment.) On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Court Judgment form (CIV-100) seeking default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez in the sum of $196,301.50. Also, on such date, Plaintiff filed a Proposed Judgment and Declaration of Parviz Sarshar (Sarshar) in Support of Default Judgment. Legal Standard California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 sets forth the requirements for default judgments. In pertinent part, the rule dictates that a party must use form CIV-100 and file the following documents with the clerk: (1) except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3)¿interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5)¿a declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8)¿exhibits as necessary; and (9)¿a request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1800(a)(1)-(9).) Discussion Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 in order to obtain entry of default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. Plaintiff has failed to: (1) provide interest computations as necessary; and (2) dismiss parties against whom judgment is not sought as the Doe defendants have not been dismissed. Plaintiffs have also failed to substantiate the requested damages as no ledger or documentation is attached to the declaration of Ms. Sarshar showing the amount of past due rent, late fees, or holdover damages. Additionally, although requesting attorneys fees, Plaintiff has not indicated whether the requested attorneys fees are allowed by statute or agreement of the parties. The declaration of Ms. Sarshar fails to set forth the basis for the requested attorneys fees. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs default judgment application is denied without prejudice.

Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-11-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER DOCUMENTS MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family welling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to request for production of documents, numbers 4, 9, and 12 from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of references to other items. Such responses constitute an improper, factually incomplete answer. Responding Party may not refer to prior discovery. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The unopposed motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.210-2031.240 within 30 days of this order. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows three (3) remaining scheduled motions to compel further responses scheduled through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next motion to compel further responses as to Iyana Jackson set for July 16, 2024. Defendant to give notice. Dept. 68 Date: 7-11-24 c/f 7-10-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Jada Gradney RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 6.4, 6.7, 7.1, 9.1, 9.2, 10.3, and 12.4 from Plaintiff Jada Gradney. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with minimal answers, refusal to answer except under condition of a protective order, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of phone number and address information. The responses are incomplete in that they fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows three (3) remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next motion to compel further responses as to Iyana Jackson set for July 16, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

Delage, et al. v. Wall, et al. – Case No. 2023-12309 5/16/24 – Demurrer Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant JOSHUA DELAGE filed a Demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant MARK WALL’s Amended Answer on April 11, 2024. Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant DELAGE also filed a Reply on May 8, 2024. The Reply refers to an Opposition, however no Opposition was filed with the Court. It appears it may have been served, but not filed. As such, the Court continues Demurrer to July 16, 2024 at 9:00 am in Dept. 10B. Defendant/Cross-Complainant is ORDERED to file the Opposition served on Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant. No further briefing is allowed without leave of Court. Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court

MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT OF PARTITION BY SALE CVRI2303859 GARCIA VS STAMP AND APPOINTMENT OF PARTITION REFEREE BY KIMBERLY STAMP Tentative Ruling: Defendant’s Motion for Interlocutory Judgment and Appointment of Referee is denied. Defendant seeks an interlocutory judgment for partition under CCP § 872.720. However, a regularly noticed motion is not the appropriate procedural mechanism for said relief. The right to a partition is determined at trial. CCP § 872.710(a). “No partition can be had until the interests of all the parties have been ascertained and settled by a trial.” Bacon v. Wahrhaftig (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 603. “If the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to partition, it shall make an interlocutory judgment that determines the interest of the parties in the property and orders the partition of the property and, unless it is to be later determined, the manner of partition.” CCP § 872.720(a). Here, trial in this matter has not been conducted. There has been no motion for summary judgment heard. The Court has not yet determined at trial or summary judgment that there is a right to partition. Defendant treats this motion as a dispositive motion where none exists. Under CCP § 872.030, the rules of civil procedure apply to partition actions unless they are inconsistent with the partition statutes. As such, it is procedurally improper for the court to issue an order for partition through a regularly noticed “motion.” Defendant has provided no authority, other than singled out partition statutes, that nonetheless precludes a motion for such an interlocutory judgment. 3. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST KLEIN CVRI2305855 HEWITT VS KLEIN DEFENDANTS AND TO APPOINT PROVISIONSAL CORPORATE DIRECTOR Tentative Ruling: In light of Defendant’s conduct June 24-26, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is granted; the injunction shall follow the restrictions delineated in the June 28th Temporary Restraining Order. Motion for Provisional Director to run the Corporation is granted; Each party is to submit a list of three names subject to Corp. C. §308(c). A motion for preliminary injunction must show (1) a probability of prevailing on the merits, and (2) that the balance of hardships favors issuance of the injunction. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1463.) However, “[t]he applicant must demonstrate a real threat of immediate and irreparable injury.” (Triple A. Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of California (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 138.) “[A]n injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff.” (Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565 (quoting Witkin).) Plaintiff merely argues that his ownership interest has been devalued—but fails to explain why that cannot be compensated with damages. Nor does the 14th-15th causes of action support an injunction as the UCL claim seeks restitution and declaratory relief is another form of equitable relief. The 11th cause of action (Corporations Code §308) and the 16th cause of action (corporate dissolution). Under Corporations Code §1800(a), 50% or more of the directors in office, or a shareholder who holds shares representing not less than 33.3% of outstanding shares, or any shareholder if the ground for dissolution is that the period for which the corporation was formed has terminated without extension, or any person expressly authorized to do so in the articles of incorporation may file a complaint for involuntary dissolution. The grounds for involuntary dissolution are that the corporation has abandoned its business for more than one year, the corporation has an even number of directors who are equally divided and cannot agree to the management of its affairs, there is internal dissension and two or more factions of shareholders in the corporation are deadlocked such that the business can no longer be conducted, those in control are guilty or have engaged in persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or waste, in corporations with 35 of fewer shareholders, liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder(s), or the period for which the corporation has formed has terminated without extension of such period. (Corp. C. §1800(b).) After hearing, the court may grant orders or injunctions as justice and equity requires. (Corp. C. §1804.) Plaintiff is a shareholder of at least 33.3%. While the parties dispute whether or not Plaintiff sold an interest of 4%, that remains that he still has at least a 33.3% share. The next issue is grounds for involuntary dissolution. Plaintiff has asserted all the statutory grounds but the last. (FAC ¶195- 198.) The issue here is the formation process of the corporation. To start, the articles of incorporation must be personally signed by each of the incorporator, and each initial director (if any) along with a duly acknowledgment. (Corp. C. §§ 17.1, 149, 200.) The articles do not require the initial directors to be named. (Corp. C. §204.) If the articles do not identify the number of directors, the corporation must adopt bylaws that specify the number of directors. (Corp. C. § 212(a).) In this situation, the incorporators must adopt the bylaws and designate the directors prior to the first meeting of the board of directors. (Friedman, California Practice Guide: Corporations §§4:398 (Rutter Group 2023).) The articles of incorporation have not been provided. The only evidence of its existence is attached to the original verified complaint—but even then, it is the electronic filing certificate indicating a filing date of 1/31/22. It is unclear if there is a signed version. Plaintiff states that there was no meeting for the articles or bylaws, and was unaware of the copy of the bylaws. (Plaintiff’s Decl. ¶18-21.) Defendant Wesley states that he discussed with Plaintiff the corporate directors, and advised Landis to name Plaintiffs and Defendants as directors on the statement of information. (Wesley Decl. ¶7.) A corporation must file within 90 days after filing of the original articles and annually therefore, information about the corporation. (Corp. C. §1502.) But, he provides no information as to how the bylaws were approved—only a conclusory statement of discussions. The bylaws provided by Wesley are confusing. First, it states that it amends and restates the bylaws of the unincorporated association of the dispensary created on 8/19/16. (Wesley Decl., Ex. E.) At the top heading of each page, it states “Last updated May 5, 2021” but was then effective 5/5/21 by Wesley, but a document history indicates that the agreement was not e-signed and completed until 1/21/22. The articles were not effective until 1/31/22, so bylaws were created before the articles were submitted to the Secretary of State. It is not until the filing date of the articles that the corporation begins to exist. (Corp. C. §200(c).) Thus, it is unclear how the bylaws were created before the corporation existed. At this point, it appears that there are no valid directors for the corporation. Under Corporation Code §308(b), if shareholders are deadlocked such that directors cannot be elected, upon petition of a shareholder holding 50% of the voting power may petition the court to appoint a provisional director or directors. A provisional director is neither a shareholder nor creditor of the corporation. (Corp. C. §308(c).) Here, appearing to the court to be the most appropriate remedy as it is akin to a receiver. Both sides accuse each other of wrong doing. On the one hand, Plaintiff has provided evidence that Wesley is interfering in daily business operations. On the other hand, Defendant has provided evidence that under Plaintiff’s operation, there were outstanding taxes and evidence of some financial accounting issues—even if a full audit is not performed. Plaintiff points to Corporations Code §2003, which provides: “When the identity of the directors or their right to hold office is in doubt, or if they are dead or unable to act, or they fail or refuse to act or their whereabouts cannot be ascertained, any interested person may petition the superior court of the proper county to determine the identity of the directors or, if there are no directors, to appoint directors to wind up the affairs of the corporation, after hearing upon such notice to such persons as the court may direct.” However, the court has yet to order dissolution. This is premature. The court finds the most appropriate remedy is to appoint a provisional director. The parties should each submit a list of three persons to act as the proposed provisional director.

Case Number: 22STCV33738 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 61 ADMIRE 3377 FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs KI JONG OH, et al. TENTATIVE Plaintiff Admire 3377 Family Limited Partnerships Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Ki Jong Oh is GRANTED. Plaintiff to give notice. DISCUSSION A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment may meet their initial burden by prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) The defendant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Plaintiff Admire 3377 Family Limited Partnership (Plaintiff) moves for summary judgment on their sole cause of action for breach of lease against Defendant Ki Jong Oh (Defendant). [T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) Plaintiff presents Defendants responses to requests for admission, admitting the existence of the lease agreement in this action, admitting that Defendant vacated the premises in September 2022, admitting that Defendant at the time of vacating had failed to pay contract rent through the lease term, and that the record of payments attached to the requests for admission are an accurate reflection of the payments. (Robison Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs property manager testifies that Defendant vacated the premises with $976,085.96 due in unpaid rent, which after application of the security deposition, yields $940,805.96 due in unpaid rent. (Kim Decl. ¶¶ 57.) Plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden to show the absence of triable issues as to each element of its breach of lease claim. The burden now shifts to Defendant show triable issues exist as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff has failed to address any of the affirmative defenses raised in his answer. (Opposition at pp. 6, 1011.) But a plaintiff moving for summary judgment on their claims has no burden to disprove the listed defenses in the defendants answer to satisfy their initial burden. (Los Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 508.) These defenses furnish no basis to deny the motion except insofar as Defendant presents admissible evidence to show triable issues of fact exist as to his defenses. Defendant relies upon the defenses of contractual impossibility and Civil Code § 1511 as defenses to the present motion. (Opposition at p. 12.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the government-ordered closure of the premises during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an irresistible superhuman cause excusing performance of the lease. (Opposition at pp. 1217.) Defendant also argues that performance was excused by the defense of frustration of purpose. (Ibid.) The doctrine of frustration excuses contractual obligations where performance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event. A party seeking to escape the obligations of its lease under the doctrine of frustration must show: (1) the purpose of the contract that has been frustrated was contemplated by both parties in entering the contract; (2) the risk of the event was not reasonably foreseeable and the party claiming frustration did not assume the risk under the contract; and (3) the value of counter-performance is totally or nearly totally destroyed. Governmental acts that merely make performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not suffice to excuse a contractual obligation. (SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, 895, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted.) [W]here commercial frustration does apply, the legal effect ... is the immediate termination of the contract. . . . [T]he application of the doctrine of frustration under California law compels the termination of the contract, the law does not recognize the temporary frustration defense. (Id. at p. 896.) Simultaneously, Civil Code § 1511 states that performance of an obligation is excused [w]hen such performance or offer is prevented or delayed by the act of the creditor, or by the operation of law, and [w]hen it is prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary. (Civ. Code § 1511, sudb. (1), (2).) As an initial matter, it should be noted that Defendant submits no evidence in support of its affirmative defenses. Defendant provides links to a March 2020 Los Angeles County order in its separate statement directing the pandemic closure of [g]yms and fitness centers. (Defendants Separate Statement No. 2.) Another entry on the separate statement states that Defendants business was negatively affected not as a result of its own actions, but because of the supervening causes of the Pandemic and applicable regulations, citing for this purpose on Defendants unverified answer. (Defendants Separate Statement No. 4.) Defendant thus presents no actual evidence of negative effects resulting from the pandemic or closure orders. But assuming the truth of these assertions, Defendants affirmative defenses remain unsupported. The defense of impossibility under Civil Code § 1511 does not apply, because the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability applies to the partys obligations under the contract in this case to pay rent. (See SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) As such, impossibility does not apply, because [t]he government closure orders did not make it illegal for [Defendant] to pay rent. (Ibid.) Nor is there any basis for application of the doctrine of frustration of purpose, although this doctrine might excuse the performance of a rental contract based on the government-ordered closure of a business. This is because the effect of frustration of purpose is the immediate termination of the contract. (Id. at p. 896.) There is no such thing as temporary frustration of purpose in California. (Ibid.) Here, it is undisputed that Defendant remained in possession of the premises for the full duration of the lease term, even as the closure orders went into effect. (Robinson Decl. Exh. 2.) The frustration of purpose doctrine therefore did not excuse [Defendant] from its obligation to pay rent (even if the lease was an installment contract) because [Defendant] did not attempt to rescind the lease and instead remained in possession of the premises. (KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Intern., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1057.) There are therefore no triable issues as to the elements of Plaintiffs claims, or Defendants affirmative defenses. The motion is therefore GRANTED.

MCAULIFFE, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202994 Tentative Ruling on Review of Proposed Order: This is an action to quiet title to dormant mineral rights. Plaintiff P.J. McAuliffe Family Partnership, LP brought a Motion for Terminating Sanctions against Defendant John P. “Jack” McAuliffe pursuant to CCP 2023.030(d)(4), or in the alternative, for issue sanctions designating certain facts as established pursuant to CCP 2023.030(b), (d), and (e). On June 17, 2024, this Court heard Plaintiff’s Motion. After oral argument, the Court granted the Motion and ordered Plaintiff to prepare an alternative proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling. Today’s hearing is simply to confirm an appropriate proposed order has been filed. Proper proof of service is on file. The Court finds that the proposed order received June 18, 2024, comports with the Court’s ruling. The Court will execute the order. Today’s hearing is VACATED. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF COTTONWOOD CANYON SETTLEMENT OF ENTIRE CASE HILLS COMMUNITY TEC1204451 FILED ON JUNE 2, 2020, BY ASSOCIATION VS COTTONWOOD CANYON HILLS ARMENTA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION Tentative Ruling: No tentative will be given, appearances are required. Counsel should be prepared to address why this matter should not be dismissed pursuant to the CCP 664.6 provision in the settlement agreement.