Redmond, Joann (Pr) Vs Miami Jewish Home & Hospital For The Age

Case Number: 24SMCV01139 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 JOSEPH ARIEL HAZANI, Plaintiff, v. USG CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.: 2 4 SMCV0 1139 Hearing Date: Ju ly 10, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT This hearing is on Plaintiff Joseph Ariel Hazani s motion to amend complaint . The motion is 46 pages long and exceeds the page limit of 15 for an opening memorandum . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (d) ( Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. ).) A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these¿rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (g).) [A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers. ( Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker ¿(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 .) Accordingly , a trial court also has discretion to reject oversize briefs . The Court exercises its discretion to disregard Plaintiffs motion to amend. Even if Plaintiffs motion were not oversize, it is moot . The Court sustained Defendant USG Corporations demurrer to the complaint and gave Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend . (June 14, 2024 Minute Order.) Accordingly , there is no need for a separate motion to amend . Plaintiff also failed to properly serve Defendant with its motion . Plaintiff filed his motion on June 18, 2024 . There is no proof of service showing the motion was served . Based on Plaintiffs failure to serve, the Court cannot properly consider the motion without depriving Defendant of its due process rights . Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10 , 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCV04269 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Thursday, July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 24STCV04269 CASE NAME: Elana Cohen-Roth v. Direct Default Services, LLC, et al. MOVING PARTY: Defendants Direct Default Services, LLC and Esther Valenzuela OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Elena Roth TRIAL DATE: Not Set PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: Demurrer to First Amended Complaint OPPOSITION: 26 June 2024 REPLY: None filed as of 07/08/2024 at 11:44 am. TENTATIVE: Defendant DDSs demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Defendant DDS to give notice. Background On February 20, 2024, Elana Cohen-Roth (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Direct Default Services, LLC; Ester Valenzuela (collectively DDS); and Does 1 to 50. On March 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging four causes of action: (1) Conversion, (2) Negligence, (3) Financial Elder Abuse (Welf. & Ins. Code §15610.30); and (4) Declaratory Relief. On May 28, 2024, Defendant DDS filed a demurrer to the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. The matter is now before the court. request for JUDICIAL notice The court may take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States, [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States, and [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. ( Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) Defendant DDS requests judicial notice of the following: 1) Exhibit A : A true and correct copy of the Petition and Declaration Regarding Unresolved Claims and Deposit of Undistributed Surplus Proceeds of Trustees Sale filed on or about March 11, 2024, in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California as Case No. 24SMCP00138. 2) Exhibit B : A true and correct copy of a Homestead Declaration recorded December 12, 2022, as Instrument Number 20221158826 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County, California. 3) Exhibit C : A true and correct copy of a Notice of Attachment, Writ of Attachment, Right to Attach Order recorded on November 2, 2020, as Instrument Number 20201375621 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County, California. Defendants request for judicial notice is granted. Discussion I. Legal Standard Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.¿ (CCP, § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainants properly pled facts as true and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Moreover, the court does not consider whether a plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof. ( Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Ibid .) II. Demurrer [1] A. Summary of Allegations Plaintiff is 78 years old and was the former owner of a real property located in Marina del Rey (the Property). (FAC, ¶¶ 1,4, 5) On or about April 20, 2024, Defendant DDS conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure of the Property and paid off the foreclosing third trust deed holder but did not pay Plaintiff the surplus funds she was entitled to as the holder of the declared homestead trust. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 15, Ex. B.) Plaintiff asserts she is entitled to the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale in the sum of $ 844,824.07 due to her declared homestead interest recorded on December 12, 2022. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 17, Ex. A.) Plaintiff filed this action on February 20, 2024, due to DDS's failure to give Plaintiff the surplus funds. Defendant DDS now demurs to all causes of actions alleged in the FAC. B. Defendant DDSs Statutory Compliance Defendant DDS asserts that the FAC fails because DDS complied with its statutory obligations as outlined in Civ. Code § 2924j(c). Defendant DDS asserts that there were surplus funds but that after conducting due diligence, it received conflicting claims as to who is entitled to the remaining surplus funds: (RJN, Ex. A.) Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of Claim for Surplus Funds on July 25, 2023, in the amount of $845,174.07, based on a Declaration of Homestead recorded December 12, 2023. (RJN, Ex. B.) However, on August 22, 2022, Nancy Barr, a judgment creditor and third-party beneficiary submitted a conflicting claim for $1,566,664.45 based on a recorded writ of attachment dated November 2, 2020. (RJN, Ex. A, C.) As DDS was unable to determine the priority of the written claims as to the surplus, DDS filed a declaration of unresolved claims and deposited with the clerk of this court, a portion of the sales proceeds as outlined by Civ. Code § 2924j(c). (RJN, Ex. C.) Civ. Code § 2924j (c) and (d) state in relevant part: (c) If, after due diligence, the trustee is unable to determine the priority of the written claims received by the trustee to the trustees sale surplus of multiple persons or if the trustee determines there is a conflict between potential claimants, the trustee may file a declaration of the unresolved claims and deposit with the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the sale occurred, that portion of the sales proceeds that cannot be distributed, less any fees charged by the clerk pursuant to this subdivision. The declaration shall specify the date of the trustees sale, a description of the property, the names and addresses of all persons sent notice pursuant to subdivision (a), a statement that the trustee exercised due diligence pursuant to subdivision (b), that the trustee provided written notice as required by subdivisions (a) and (d), and the amount of the sales proceeds deposited by the trustee with the court. Further, the trustee shall submit a copy of the trustees sales guarantee and any information relevant to the identity, location, and priority of the potential claimants with the court and shall file proof of service of the notice required by subdivision (d) on all persons described in subdivision (a). The clerk shall deposit the amount with the county treasurer or, if a bank account has been established for moneys held in trust under paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 77009 of the Government Code, in that account, subject to order of the court upon the application of any interested party. The clerk may charge a reasonable fee for the performance of activities pursuant to this subdivision equal to the fee for filing an interpleader action pursuant to Chapter 5.8 (commencing with Section 70600) of Title 8 of the Government Code. Upon deposit of that portion of the sale proceeds that cannot be distributed by due diligence, the trustee shall be discharged of further responsibility for the disbursement of sale proceeds. A deposit with the clerk of the court pursuant to this subdivision may be either for the total proceeds of the trustees sale, less any fees charged by the clerk, if a conflict or conflicts exist with respect to the total proceeds, or that portion that cannot be distributed after due diligence, less any fees charged by the clerk. (d) . . .Within 90 days after deposit with the clerk, the court shall consider all claims filed at least 15 days before the date on which the hearing is scheduled by the court . . . (Italics added.) Plaintiffs opposition fails to address the judicially noticed fact that DDSs due diligence uncovered a competing claim to the surplus funds and, according to its statutory duties, deposited the surplus funds with the court. C. First Cause of Action Conversion To plead a cause of action for conversion, one must allege (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) defendants disposition of the property inconsistent with plaintiffs rights; and (3) resulting damages. ( Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) As the court may take judicial notice of the fact that Nancy Barr recorded a writ of attachment that precedes Plaintiffs declaration of homestead, the FAC fails to plead facts alleging she is the rightful owner or entitled to possession of the surplus proceeds. (RJN, Ex. B, C.) Moreover, after Plaintiff filed this action, DDS filed a Petition and Declaration Regarding Unresolved Claims and Deposit of Undistributed Surplus Proceeds of Trustees Sale and deposited the surplus funds with the Superior court of Los Angeles County. (RJN Ex. A.) This filing is the proper subject of judicial notice. Accordingly, the court may take judicial notice of the fact DDS exercised due diligence, found a competing claim to the surplus funds, and pursuant to Section 2924j(c), deposited the funds with the Superior Court. Plaintiff fails to show that DDS disposed of the surplus funds in a manner that was inconsistent with Plaintiffs rights. Plaintiff disputes that Nancy Barr has a valid completing claim but asserts that, even if this were true, DDS failed to timely comply with Civ. Code § 2924(j)(b). However, Civ. Code § 2924(j)(b) applies only if there is no competing claim: (b) The trustee shall exercise due diligence to determine the priority of the written claims received by the trustee to the trustees sale surplus proceeds from those persons to whom notice was sent pursuant to subdivision (a). In the event there is no dispute as to the priority of the written claims submitted to the trustee , proceeds shall be paid within 30 days after the conclusion of the notice period. If the trustee has failed to determine the priority of written claims within 90 days following the 30-day notice period, then within 10 days thereafter the trustee shall deposit the funds with the clerk of the court pursuant to subdivision (c) or file an interpleader action pursuant to subdivision (e). Nothing in this section shall preclude any person from pursuing other remedies or claims as to surplus proceeds. (2924(j)(b) [italics added].) As the surplus funds have been deposited with this court in LASC Case No. 24SMCP00138, the determination of who is entitled to the surplus proceeds transfers to the court. (Civ. Code, § 2924(j).) The FAC fails to allege facts showing DDS untimely deposited the surplus funds with the court and constitutes wrongful dominion over the surplus funds in a manner that is inconsistent with Plaintiffs rights. Therefore, the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. D. Second Cause of Action Negligence The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. ( Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [internal quotations omitted].) A duty may arise through statute, contract, or the relationship of the parties. ( Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc . (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914, 920 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court to decide. ( Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 265.) However, the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury's determination. ( Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc . (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 278.) The second cause of action for negligence hinges of DDSs failure to distribute the surplus funds as required by Civ. Code § 2924(K). Civ. Code § 2924(K) states in the relevant part: (a ) The trustee, or the clerk of the court upon order to the clerk pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 2924j, shall distribute the proceeds, or a portion of the proceeds, as the case may be, of the trustees sale conducted pursuant to Section 2924h in the following order of priority: (1) To the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of sale, including the payment of the trustees fees and attorneys fees permitted pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2924d and subdivision (b) of this section. (2) To the payment of the obligations secured by the deed of trust or mortgage which is the subject of the trustees sale. (3) To satisfy the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority. (4) To the trustor or the trustors successor in interest. In the event the property is sold or transferred to another, to the vested owner of record at the time of the trustees sale. As reflected above, Civ. Code § 2924(k) requires that DDS comply with Civ. Code § 2924(j). As the FAC is devoid of any references or allegations that DDS breached Civ. Code § 2924(j), the second cause of action fails due to Plaintiffs failure to show breach of duty. DDS depositing of the surplus funds with the court is a judicially noticed fact showing that DDS complied with the statutory requirements for disputed claims. (Civ. Code, § 2924(j)(c).) Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. E. Third Cause of Action Financial Elder Abuse Section 15610.30 states: Financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: (1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence . . . . (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.) As stated above, a genuine dispute exists as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to the surplus funds. Accordingly, by determining that competing claims to the surplus funds exist and depositing the surplus funds with this court, DDS complied with its statutory obligations, precluding the showing the finding that DDS [t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder for wrongful use or with the intent to defraud. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.) Based on the above, the demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. F. Fourth Cause of Action Declaratory Relief To state a declaratory relief claim, the plaintiff must allege a proper subject of declaratory relief and an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the partys rights or obligations. (See CCP § 1060; Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.) Where a trial court has concluded the plaintiff did not state sufficient facts to support a statutory claim and therefore sustained a demurrer as to that claim, a demurrer is also properly sustained as to a claim for declaratory relief which is wholly derivative of the statutory claim. ( Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794, 800.) The fourth cause of action asserts that a controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding the surplus funds and the parties' respective rights and obligations. (FAC, ¶ 46.) The relevant provision of Civ. Code § 2924(j)(c) states: Upon deposit of that portion of the sale proceeds that cannot be distributed by due diligence, the trustee shall be discharged of further responsibility for the disbursement of sale proceeds. As DDS has deposited the funds with this court, DDS is discharged of any responsibility related to the surplus funds. Accordingly, there is no present controversy between DDS and Plaintiff and the surplus funds. While Nothing in [Civ. Code § 2924j] shall preclude any person from pursuing other remedies or claims as to surplus proceeds, Plaintiff fails to show that she can continue to pursue claims against DDS after the surplus funds have been deposited with the court. (See Civ. Code, § 2924j.) Therefore, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Conclusion Defendant DDSs demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The case is dismissed. Defendant DDS to give notice. [1] Pursuant to CCP § 430.41, the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Nemovi Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.)

Case Number: 21STCV45322 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On December 13, 2021, Plaintiffs Alicia Lugo (Lugo) and German Frausto (Frausto) filed this action against Defendants Marshalls, The TJX Companies Inc., Marmaxx Operating Corp., and Does 1-100 for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium. On August 31, 2022, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to include Defendant Marshalls of CA, LLC (Marshalls) as Doe 1. On October 25, 2022, Marshalls filed an answer. On June 29, 2023, Marshalls filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, to be heard on September 12, 2023. On July 26, 2023, the Court continued the hearing on the motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication to November 20, 2023 based on the stipulation of Marshalls and Plaintiffs. On November 6, 2023, the Court continued the hearing to May 2, 2024 based on the stipulation of Marshalls and Plaintiffs. (The Courts order stating the hearing was continued to October 30, 2024 appears to be an error.) On May 2, 2024, the Court continued the hearing to July 9, 2024. On April 18, 2024, and June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. On April 26, 2024, Marshalls filed a reply. Trial is currently set for December 3, 2024. PARTIES REQUESTS Marshalls asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiffs ask the Court to deny the motion. LEGAL STANDARD A. Summary judgment and summary adjudication [F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 ( Aguilar )) [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. ( Aguilar , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. ( Aguilar , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. ( Id . at p. 854.) The defendant must present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. ( Ibid .) Thus, the defendant must support[ ] the motion with evidence including affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice must or may be taken. [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiffs cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidenceas through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing. ( Id . at p. 855, original emphasis.) Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits. ( Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) In addition, a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. ( Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co . (2006) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ( Parkview Villas ), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The party opposing the motion must file with the opposition papers a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) If either party fails to comply with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failure may in the courts discretion constitute a sufficient ground to decide the motion adversely to the offending party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3).) In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. ( Aguilar , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) B. Negligence and premises liability The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. ( Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.) Landowners under California law are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. ( Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663 ( Williams ), citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 ( Ann M .).) The underlying principle, set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), is that [e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . . ( Ibid .) This rule establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others. ( Ibid ., quoting Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 ( Vasilenko ); see Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214 ( Brown ).) Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act .... ( Williams , supra , 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Vasilenko , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) Our Supreme Court has explained that an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 must be clearly supported by public policy. ( Ibid ., quoting Vasilenko , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) Courts look to what are commonly called the Rowland factors in determining whether policy considerations favor such an exception. ( Ibid ., citing Vasilenko , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) These are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. ( Rowland [v. Christian (1968)] 69 Cal.2d [108,] 113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 [( Rowland )].) ( Ibid ., quoting Vasilenko , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) In considering the Rowland factors, the court determine[s] not whether they support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy. ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 629.) In addition, [c]ausation is an essential element of plaintiffs complaint. ( Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126 ( Christoff ).) Causation may be determined as a question of law if reasonable minds would not differ. ( Ibid .) If causation is lacking, the complaint cannot stand. ( Ibid . [the trial courts ruling of lack of causation disposes of the entire complaint and suffices to affirm summary judgment in favor of defendant].) C. Open and obvious conditions As a general rule, an owner or possessor of land owes no duty to warn of obvious dangers on the property. ( Christoff , supra , 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.) There is no duty to warn of an obvious danger but the possessor of land does have a duty to warn an invitee not only of conditions known by him to be dangerous but also of conditions which might have been found dangerous by the exercise of ordinary care. [Citation.] The invitor may assume that an invitee will perceive that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses. [Citation.] ( Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious. [Citation.] Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition. [Citation.] In that situation, owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will perceive the obvious and take action to avoid the dangerous condition. ( Montes v. Young Mens Christian Assn. of Glendale, California (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140 ( Montes ), quoting Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447 ( Jacobs ).) A defendant may owe a duty of care even where a dangerous condition is open and obvious, when it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it). ( Montes , supra , 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, quoting Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122 ( Osborn ).) In other words, the obviousness of the condition and its dangerousness ... will not negate a duty of care when it is foreseeable that, because of necessity or other circumstances, a person may choose to encounter the condition . ( Ibid ., quoting Jacobs , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.) Courts have found it was foreseeable that a plaintiff would choose to encounter an obviously dangerous condition when the plaintiffs employment required him to walk across an area to complete his work. ( Montes , supra , 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, citing Osborn , supra , 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 109110, 123 & Florez v. Groom Development Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 347, 358359.) In addition, the court in Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185, determined there was a practical necessity for the plaintiff to walk across wet pavement because the pavement was the principal if not sole access way from the street to defendant's building, which housed a government office serving the public. ( Ibid ., quoting Jacobs , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447448.) DISCUSSION A. The complaint The complaint alleges the following: Defendants were the owners, lessors, sub-lessors, managing agents, landlords, renters, managers, operators, marketers, inspectors, maintainers, and/or controllers, of a commercial property located at 28901 S. Western Avenue, Rancho Palos Verdes, State of California, 90275 (the premises), to which the general public is invited to come. On January 18, 2020, Lugo was lawfully on the premises to purchase miscellaneous items when, suddenly and without warning, she tripped due to the dangerous distribution of the premises and fell violently to the floor, causing her to sustain bodily injuries requiring medical attention and treatment. Defendants knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable care that the structures and/or components and/or other parts of the premises were in a dangerous and defective and unsafe condition and a menace to Lugo and others lawfully on the premises. Due to Defendants negligence, carelessness, and recklessness, a dangerously placed shelf that was not properly installed and maintained in the premises caused Lugos injuries. Lugo and Frausto are married. Defendants actions entitle Frausto to assert a loss of consortium claim against Defendants. B. The motion 1. Marshalls has carried its initial burden of proving the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious, shifting the burden to Plaintiffs Marshalls argues that the furniture platform on which Lugo tripped and fell was an open and obvious condition. Marshalls used the platforms to display furniture and other merchandise in the store. (See Tapia dec., exhs. 1 & 2.) Marshalls presented the following evidence: When Lugo visited Marshalls before the accident in 2018 and 2019, she noticed the platforms underneath the furniture. (Lugo depo p. 28.) The platforms could be seen from a distance. (Lugo depo pp. 29-30; see Opposition p. 14.) The platform on which Lugo tripped was grey, while the floor on which the platform rested was a different color. (Lugo depo p. 85; Lugos response to special interrogatory 16.) The platforms were four feet wide with a height of between 5 3/8 and 5 1/2 inches. (Froom dec. ¶¶ 4-5.) Based on this evidence, Marshalls has carried its initial burden of proving the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious, relieving Marshalls of any duty to Lugo. The burden shifts to Plaintiffs. 2. Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue of fact In opposition, Plaintiffs submit the declaration of Philip Rosescu, a forensic engineer serving as Plaintiffs safety and liability expert. Rosescu opines that, [f]rom a human factors standpoint, . . . the subject display platform would have been relatively difficult to perceive at the time of the incident. While considerable enough in height to cause a trip or misstep, the height differential was not easily perceivable. (Rosescu dec. ¶ 9.) This was because [t]he attention of customers within a retail environment is intentionally redirected away from the walking surface and towards merchandise such as the furniture atop the display platforms. Moreover, plaintiff describes tripping on the subject merchandise platform after attempting to take a step backwards to look at merchandise behind her, creating a line of site issue between Plaintiff and the platform, which ultimately caused her fall. The combination of these factors would have made the height differential created by the display platform difficult to perceive at the time of the incident and therefore caused and/or contributed to Plaintiffs trip and fall incident. (Rosescu dec. ¶ 9.) [T]he law does not accord to the expert's opinion the same degree of credence or integrity as it does the data underlying the opinion. Like a house built on sand, the expert's opinion is no better than the facts on which it is based. ( County of Sacramento v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd . (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 785, 797, quoting Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907, 923.) Here, Rosescus opinion does not raise a triable issue of fact because his reasons do not include facts that support the opinion. Rosescu's first reason Marshalls assumed attempt to direct customers attention away from the walking surface and toward merchandise is speculative and lacks evidentiary support. Rosescu's second reason Lugos backwards step to look at merchandise behind her has nothing to do with whether the platform was open and obvious but shows only that Lugo was looking somewhere else. The fact that a person looks away from an open and obvious condition does not make the condition any less open and obvious. Plaintiffs also assert that the platforms and floor were the same color and that they nearly disappear with all the furniture covering them. (Opposition p. 14.) But Plaintiffs rely on their counsels declaration to support these factual assertions. (See Farahi dec. ¶¶ 9, 13.) Plaintiffs counsel has not established that he is an expert or that he has personal knowledge of the facts of the accident. Therefore, his assertions do not raise a triable issue of fact. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue of fact concerning (1) whether the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious or (2) whether it was foreseeable that, because of necessity or other circumstances, a person might choose to encounter the open and obvious condition. As a result, Marshalls did not owe Lugo a duty to remedy or warn of the condition. The Court therefore grants Marshalls motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs negligence and premises liability claims. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS the motion for summary adjudication filed by Defendant Marshalls of CA, LLC and summarily adjudicates the claims for negligence and premises liability of Plaintiffs Alicia Lugo and German Frausto. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 22STCV27975 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING JYLA ELSA CORRAL, et al. , vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al. Case No.: 22STCV27975 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Defendant Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation s unopposed motion for leave to file a cross-complaint against Defendants International Service Center, Inc. and Edwin Torres is granted. Defendant Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation may file the proposed cross-complaint with the Court. Defendant Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation (Wabtec) (Moving Defendant) moves unopposed for an order granting leave to file a cross-complaint (CC) against Defendants International Service Center, Inc. (ISC) and Edwin Torres (Torres) (collectively, Defendants) on the grounds that the CC arises out of the same general facts as the operative Complaint (and cross-complaints) presently on file, that no prejudice will result to the Defendants by the granting of this motion, and that the CC, which Wabtec now seeks to file, will serve to protect the interests of Wabtec should a judgment be entered against it. (Notice of Motion, pg . 1.) Procedural Background This lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs Jyla Elsa Corral, Jonaven Hess Corral, Jazlyn Leilani Corral, Jayven Cali Corral, and Jocelyn Gianna Corral, by and through their GAL Rafal Corral, (collectively, Plaintiffs) individually and as successors in interest to Heather Susy Garcia (Decedent) arises from a fatal accident on January 22, 2022, wherein Decedent fell out of a moving party bus. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on August 26, 2022, against Ford Motor Company (Ford), ISC, and Torres (the owner and driver of the bus) (collectively, Plaintiffs). ISC filed a cross-complaint against Wabtec on October 20, 2023, which Wabtec answered on November 20, 2023. On October 5, 2023, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Wabtec as a Doe defendant. On December 15, 2023, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC), which this Court heard and granted on April 11, 2024. On July 2, 2024, this Court approved Fords applications for good faith settlement determination with Plaintiffs and Defendants Grech Motors Inc. and Edward P. Grech. Wabtec filed the instant motion on May 2, 2024. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed. Motion for Leave to Amend C.C.P. §426.50 provides: A party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article, whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith. This section shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. (C.C.P. §426.50.) California rules further provide authority to file a Cross-Complaint against a party who has filed a Complaint against the movant if the claims arise out of the same occurrences as the claims brought against it. ( See C.C.P. §§428.10(a)-(b).) At any time during the course of the lawsuit, the court retains power to permit defendant to file or amend a cross-complaint to avoid forfeiture of defendants related claim. ( See Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99 [stating even on eve of trial, leave to file compulsory cross-complaint mandatory absent bad faith].) CRC Rule 3.1324(a) requires that a motion to amend must: [i]nclude a copy of the proposed . . . amended pleading . . . [and] state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be [deleted and/or added], if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the [deleted and/or additional] allegations are located. CRC Rule 3.1324(b) provides, as follows: [a] separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify: (1) [t]he effect of the amendment; (2) [w]hy the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) [w]hen the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) [t]he reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Wabtecs motion substantially complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(a). The motion includes a copy of the proposed CC. (Decl. of Lohman ¶6, Exh. A.) Webtecs motion substantially complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(b). Wabtec submitted a separate declaration of its counsel that specifies the effect of the amendments and explains why the amendments are necessary and proper. (Decl. of Lohman ¶2.) Wabtec asserts the amendments are necessary because it determined that there are indemnification and apportionment claims it has against Defendants ISC and Torres which arise out of the same transactions and occurrences giving rise to this case. (Decl. of Lohman ¶2.) Wabtecs counsel states when the facts giving rise of the amended allegations were discovered and why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Wabtecs counsel declares, [h]aving participated in the March 27, 2024 inspection of the subject bus and participated in discovery, Wabtec would be prejudiced should the Court not grant leave for it to file its Cross-Complaint against ISC and Torres, as it would be barred from making these claims in a separate action. (Decl. of Lohman ¶5.) Plaintiffs counsel further declares, Wabtec did not file a Cross-Complaint against ISC initially at the time that it answered its Cross-Complaint against Wabtec, albeit in good faith, while it investigated the claims asserted in this matter. For the same reasons, Wabtec also did not file a Cross-Complaint against Torres. (Decl. of Lohman ¶¶3-4.) Based on the foregoing, Wabtecs motion for leave to file its CC against ISC and Torres is granted. Conclusion Wabtecs unopposed motion for leave to file its CC against ISC and Torres is granted. Wabtec may file the proposed CC with the Court. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV10883 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV10883 MOTIONS : Motion to be Relieved as Counsel MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jin Kim Hongs Counsel OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jin Kim Hongs (Plaintiff) counsel of record, Benjamin G. Berkley Esq. (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. Counsel contends relief is necessary because there are irreconcilable differences. No opposition has been filed for this motion. LEGAL STANDARD To be granted relief as counsel, counsel must comply with California Rules of Court (CRC) 3.1362. Even where grounds for termination exist, attorneys seeking to withdraw must comply with the procedures set forth in California Rule of Professional Conduct (CRPC) 3.700 and are subject to discipline for failure to do so. CRPC 3.700(B) lists various grounds for mandatory withdrawal. An attorney's right to terminate the attorney-client relationship and withdraw from a case is not absolute. (See Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 197; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) The decision whether to grant or deny an application for withdrawal is within the court's discretion, and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the application on the ground that the attorney's withdrawal would work injustice upon a third party. ( Hodcarriers, Bldg. and Common Laborers Local Union No. 89 v. Miller (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 391.) The rules have been liberally construed to protect clients. ( Vann v. Shilleh , supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 192.) An attorney, either with client's consent or court's approval, may withdraw from a case when withdrawal can be accomplished without undue prejudice to client's interests; however, an attorney shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, complying with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2).) A lawyer violates his or her ethical mandate by abandoning a client ( Pineda v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 753, 758 759), or by withdrawing at a critical point and thereby prejudicing the clients case. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2); Vann v. Shilleh , supra.) DISCUSSION Counsel has filed forms MC-051 and MC-052 and has lodged with the Court a copy of the proposed order on form MC-053 as required. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) Counsel states the instant motion is filed for the following reason: Benjamin G. Berkley, Esq. of Carpenter & Zuckerman and Plaintiff, Jin Kim Hong, have come to a point of irreconcilable differences with regards to further handling of this action. (MC-052.) ¿¿ The motion and supporting documents provide the incorrect address of the Court and department number, which does not provide proper notice of the hearing. In addition, counse l has not provided information for all future proceedings in this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to relieve counsel. Counsel shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file proofs of service of such.

Case Number: 22LBCV00979 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Eduardo Martinez filed this action against Defendants, Satvir Singh and Gobind Trucking, Inc. for damages arising out of an automobile accident. 2. Motion to Compel Further Responses a. Analysis On 12/15/23, Defendants filed this motion to compel further responses to SROGs, set one, setting it for hearing on 7/09/24. Any opposition to the motion was due on or before 6/25/24. Plaintiff has not filed timely opposition to the motion. However, on 12/11/23, four days before Defendants filed the motion on calendar today, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from discovery objections. Plaintiff set the motion for hearing on 8/27/24. The motion seeks relief from waiver of objections in connection with, in pertinent part, the same SROGs, set one, that form the basis of Defendants motion to compel further responses. Further complicating the matter, on 4/17/24, Plaintiff filed two motions to compel further responses one directed at Defendants responses to FROGs and the other directed at Defendants responses to SROGs, and set those motions for hearing on 9/17/24. The Court is hopeful the fact that the motion on calendar today is unopposed means the parties have been meeting and conferring in an attempt to resolve their issues. In the event that is incorrect, the Court finds todays motion to compel further responses and the 8/27/24 motion for relief from waiver of objections should be heard together. The hearing on todays motion to compel further responses is therefore continued to 8/27/24. If the parties have resolved their issues, they must take the motions off calendar using the online reservation management system. If the parties have not resolved their issues, they must both file timely opposition and reply papers. In the interest of efficiency, the Court is also advancing the 9/17/24 hearing date and continuing it to 8/27/24. Again, if the parties resolve their issues, they must take the motions off calendar. If they do not resolve their issues, they must file timely opposition and reply papers. If, between now and 8/27/24, additional discovery motions are filed, the Court will consider appointment of a discovery referee in lieu of ruling on the parties voluminous discovery disputes. If the parties wish to avoid appointment of a discovery referee, they must meet and confer in good faith in an attempt to resolve all outstanding disputes without the need for the 8/27/24 hearing. b. Final Note On 7/01/24, Plaintiff filed a grossly untimely opposition to the motion. The Court had already prepared the tentative ruling, above, before Plaintiff submitted the opposition. The Court wishes to note a number of incorrect statements in the opposition. The opposition incorrectly asserts that an IDC is mandatory, quoting the rules that apply in the personal injury hub courts. This case is assigned to an IC department in Long Beach, not the personal injury hub courts. Plaintiff also incorrectly states that the law does not permit imposition of sanctions when a motion becomes moot prior to resolution. CRC 3.1348(a) specifically permits the Court to impose sanctions even if there is no opposition, opposition is withdrawn, or the requested discovery is provided after the motion is filed. The Court is not inclined to change its tentative ruling in light of the untimely opposition papers. Defendants are ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

THE ESTATE OF JIMMIE CHARLES SNEED VS. PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES SHASTA LLC Case Number: 22CV-0199785 This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The Court finds this matter to be exempt from plan designation but intends to set the matter for trial no later than March 18, 2025. Defendant has posted jury fees but Plaintiff has not. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

CASE NUMBER: 22STCV11951 MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION AND PRODUCTION; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS (CCP § 2025.450 ) TENTATIVE RULING : Plaintiff Byron Walkers Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.s Person Most Qualified and Requests for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. ANALYSIS: I. Background On April 7, 2022, Plaintiff Byron Walker (Walker) filed an action against Defendants Sebastian Huesca, Luis Daniel Huesca, Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, Rasier-CA, LLC, Uber, Portier, LLC, Uber Eats, Postmates, Inc., Postmates, LLC, Postmates, and City of Rancho Palos Verdes (collectively Defendants) for (1) negligence, (2) negligent hiring/retention/supervision/training, (3) statutory liability/dangerous condition of public property, and (4) negligence-premises liability arising out of an alleged motor vehicle collision that took place on March 10, 2021. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.s Person Most Qualified and Requests for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions (Motion). Defendant filed an Opposition on June 26, 2024, and Plaintiff filed a Reply on July 2, 2024. On June 6, 2024, the matter was assigned to Judge Karen Moskowitz in Department B of the Van Nuys Courthouse East. II. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.450(a) provides: If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. The motion shall (1) set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice and (2) be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(b)(2).) Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.030(a) provides, in pertinent part, that the court may impose a monetary sanction on a party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. A misuse of the discovery process includes failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010(d).) In addition, a court shall impose monetary sanctions if a motion to compel a deposition is granted unless the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(g)(1).) III. Discussion Here, Plaintiff Walker moves for an order compelling Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.s (Uber Tech) Person Most Qualified to appear for a deposition on a date determined by the Court and for an order imposing sanctions in the amount of no less than $2,460. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Uber Tech is vicariously liable for the automobile collision between Plaintiff Walker and Defendant Sebastian Huesca because Defendant Sebastian Huesca was operating the vehicle in the course of providing food delivery services for Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. and other related entities named as Defendants. (Cole Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) In order to investigate the relationships between Defendants, policies and procedures related to hiring/retaining/training/supervising delivery drivers, and other pertinent facts, Plaintiff noticed the deposition of Defendant Uber Techs Person Most Qualified. ( Ibid. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also requested the production of documents relevant to these issues. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff states that he has been attempting to depose the instant witness for some time. ( Ibid. at ¶ 6.) On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant with the Second Amended Notice of Deposition, setting the deposition of the Person Most Qualified for May 13, 2024. ( Ibid. at ¶ 6, Ex. A.) Prior to setting the deposition, defense counsel provided May 13, 2024, as an available date, reassured that the deposition would take place, and served responses and objections to the deposition. ( Ibid. at ¶ 7, Ex. B.) Less than a week before the deposition, counsel for deponent indicated lack of availability due to a different trial. ( Ibid. at ¶ 8.). Plaintiffs counsel attempted to meet and confer via telephone calls and emails. ( Ibid. at ¶ 8.) On the day of the deposition, a Certificate of Non-Appearance was taken by the court reporter. ( Ibid. ) Although defense counsel did provide an alternative date for the deposition, Plaintiff proceeded with the instant Motion given the proximity of trial and the prior refusals to produce this witness. ( Ibid. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of no less than $2,460.00 as follows: six (6) hours to prepare the Motion and Reply and attend the hearing, at the hourly rate of $400, plus a $60 filing fee. ( Ibid. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff will provide additional details regarding costs associated with the May 13, 2024, deposition date at the hearing. ( Ibid. ) Defendant opposes the Motion. Defense counsel explains that he offered the May 13, 2024, date in a good faith effort after Plaintiff erroneously served the first Notice of Deposition to Defendants former attorneys. (Doody ¶ 7.) Defense counsel received the initial Notice setting the deposition date for March 21 on March 18, 2024, and could not make the witness available within three days. ( Ibid. ) On May 9, 2024, Plaintiff served written discovery requests containing 134 requests for production to each entity related to Uber Tech. ( Ibid. at ¶ 10.) On May 7, 2024, defense counsel informed Plaintiffs counsel that he would be unavailable on May 13 due to another ongoing trial. ( Ibid. at ¶ 11, Ex. B.) Counsel served timely written objections to the Notice of Deposition on May 8, 2024. ( Ibid. at ¶ 13, Ex. C.) A Certificate of Non-Appearance was taken as Plaintiff proceeded with the deposition on May 13, 2024. ( Ibid. at ¶ 14.) Defense counsel provided availability for June 20, 2024, and after Plaintiff noticed the deposition, Defendant served timely written objections on June 17, 2024. ( Ibid. at ¶ 14.) As soon as he learned that he would have to move forward with another trial at the U.S. District Court, defense counsel informed Plaintiffs counsel that he would be unavailable on June 20, 2024. ( Ibid. at ¶ 15.) Defendant opposes the Motion on the following grounds. First, the Second Amended Notice of Deposition makes requests that are beyond the scope of permissible discovery as it contains 39 topics of examination and 69 requests for production that are beyond what is relevant to the matter. This request is so broad and vague that compliance is both impracticable and burdensome for Defendant. Plaintiff has also propounded 134 requests for production on each entity related to Uber Tech, for a total of 536 requests for production. Many of the discovery requests in the Notice of Deposition duplicate the 536 requests for production. Second, Defendants requests for postponement have stemmed from its counsels involvement in other ongoing trials; counsel has timely notified Plaintiffs counsel of these conflicts prior to the dates set for deposition. Although, Plaintiffs counsel asserts that other attorneys at the firm can defend the deposition, Plaintiff has demanded 39 topics of examination and 69 requests for production, which require the attorney who is most familiar with the file and discovery in this matter. Therefore, defense counsel has acted with substantial justification in reasonably requesting Plaintiff postpone the deposition. (Oppos. p. 6.) In his Reply, Plaintiff states that he has made reasonable efforts to accommodate defense counsels schedule. However, he believes that this pattern of agreeing to a deposition date, followed by a unilateral cancellation of the deposition is a litigation tactic designed to frustrate [his] ability to conduct discovery. (Reply p. 2.) Plaintiff also contests Defendants contention that the requests exceed the scope of permissible discovery and are not directly relevant to the matter. The Court makes the following findings. The parties do not contest that Defendant has served valid objections to the Notices of the Deposition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.410. Given these objections, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court may compel the deposition of Defendants Person Most Qualified. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and the accompanying request for monetary sanctions. IV. Conclusion & Order For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Byron Walkers Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.s Person Most Qualified and Requests for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. Moving party is ordered to give notice.