Thomas, Jacqueline Plaintiff Vs Santiago, Jonathan Et Al Defendant

22CV02834 JOHN ROE 1 et al. v. MOUNTAIN VIEW WHISMAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR STAY, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO CONTINUE TRIAL SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION TO COMPEL MENTAL EXAMINATION AND TESTING OF PLAINTIFF ROE 3 AND PLAINTIFF ROE 4 The motion to continue trial is denied. The motion to compel is granted. Motion to continue trial While Dr. Scott has another trial appearance slated for early October 2024, the parties and trial court can fashion a witness schedule to accommodate his other trial and conference commitments. Motion to compel mental exam and testing of plaintiffs Page 1 of 4 The parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the length of time which should be permitted for evaluation by psychiatrist Dr. Charles Scott. Plaintiffs assert a total of 8 hours per plaintiff is sufficient for examinations by both Drs. Hooker and Scott. Defendant contends Dr. Scott requires up to 8 hours of testing and Dr. Hooker requires up to 4 hours of testing. In support of this position, Dr. Scott provided a declaration explaining why up to 8 hours is required. Having reviewed his declaration, the court finds it sufficient to establish good cause to compel examination and testing of Roes 3 and 4 with Dr. Scott for up to 8 hours and for up to 4 hours with Dr. Hooker. That is, a total of 12 hours for each plaintiff. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2032.320, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs also assert they do not want to sign the document titled “Informational/Agreement For Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation” from UC Davis Health, School of Medicine before Dr. Scott’s evaluation, because it “may cause them to waive certain fundamental rights.” (Opp at pg. 7.) A copy of the form is attached to Dr. Scott’s declaration as exhibit C-2. The court reviewed the form and did not find it contained any waivers except the doctor-patient relationship and the duty of confidentiality that accompanies the relationship, which is expected given the context of the evaluation. Plaintiffs did raise any specific issues with the form, so the court is unable to further address their concerns regarding this form. Defendant SCCS’s Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request for the court take judicial notice of the first amended complaint and certificates of merit for Defendant Does 1 and 2 are denied since the court need not take judicial notice of records in its own file. Defendants SCCC’s Second Request for Judicial Notice 1. Court order in Doe v. Familiesfirst Inc. 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 36211. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 2. Court order in Jaber v. Cal. Envtl. Sys., 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 61456. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 3. Court order in Aguilar v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles 2021 Cal.Super. LEXIS 42435. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 4. Order on defendants SCCS’s Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Alternative, to Continue Trial Date, dated May 15, 2025. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of its own court records. Page 2 of 4 5. Oral Argument Notice from Court of Appeal First Appellate District dated June 25, 2024, appellate case no. A169314. Granted. 6. Temporary Stay Order from Court of Appeal Second Appellate District filed June 26, 2024, appellate case no. B334707. Granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

RODRIGUEZ, ET AL VS. HEDRICK, ET AL Case Number: CVPM22-0199069 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of bankruptcy. On January 16, 2024, at the Settlement Conference, the Court was informed that Herman Hedrick filed for bankruptcy, which the Court noted stays the civil action. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to provide the Court with a status of the bankruptcy.

Case Number: 23AHCV01104 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT PABLO MARTINEZS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION This negligence action arises from a slip and fall incident on property located at 21 Palmetto Drive in Alhambra, California. Plaintiff Jesus Manuel Guerra (Plaintiff) alleges that Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) owned the property, Defendant Palmetto Villas, Inc. (Palmetto) managed the property and Defendant Complete Landscape & Gardening Services maintained the property. Plaintiff, a resident of 21 Palmetto Drive, Unit D, alleges that on May 20, 2021, he slipped and fell while walking on a pathway at the locations entrance. Plaintiff further alleges that a puddle of water and/or accumulated algae cause this accident. On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint alleging causes of action for (1) general negligence as to all three Defendants and (2) premises liability as to Defendants Palmetto Villas, Inc. and Pablo Martinez. On September 27, 2023, Defendant Martinez filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint because Plaintiff only alleged that Defendant owned unit D, not the site where the slip and fall occurred. On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) On February 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC). On March 4, 2024, Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiffs FAC pursuant to CCP § 430.10, concurrently with notice and Declaration of John Fu, Esq., (Fu Decl.). On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants Demurrer with the Declaration of Thomas R. Burns, Esq., (Burns Decl.) and attached exhibits. Plaintiff has not filed a reply. A hearing is scheduled for July 18, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Demurrer Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded. Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247. A demurrer is treated as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. A ubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967. The general rule on demurrer is that the pleadings are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604. Questions of plaintiffs ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. A plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, no matter how improbable they are. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 ( Del E. Webb ). Allegations need not be accepted as true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474. Pleadings are to be broadly construed (Code Civ. Proc. §452) and demurrers are to be overruled where the facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38. A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the complaint or in judicially noticeable material but cannot be based on evidence. Speaking demurrers are not permitted. Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), §7.8. Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(f) provides for a demurrer where a pleading is uncertain. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible a defendant cannot reasonably respond. A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. III. ANALYSIS A. Demurrer On September 27, 2023, Defendant filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint on the grounds that it was a sham pleading because the original complaint did not identify Defendant as the owner of the entire property. Plaintiffs original complaint states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of Unit D located on the Premises. (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) The operative FAC states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of the Premises . (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On February 27, 2024, Defendant and Plaintiffs counsel met and conferred on the issue of Defendants ownership interest of the premises and did not reach a resolution, necessitating the instant motion. (Fu Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A; Motion, p. 5.) Based upon this, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. On March 4, 2024, Defendant filed another Demurrer, moving the Court to sustain the demurrer based on the argument that Plaintiffs original and amended complaints contain inconsistent factual allegations. Defendants position is that the FAC attempts to plead around the defect and therefore amounts to a sham pleading. (Motion, p. 3.) Defendant argues that when a plaintiff attempts to circumvent factual problems by pleading new inconsistent facts in an amended complaint, the plaintiff must provide explain why such a drastic change has occurred. If Plaintiff is unable to do so, the new pleading will be treated as a sham and be disregarded. ( Del E. Webh Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 593, 604; Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 379, 384; and Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 13, cited by 6 Cal. Prac. Guide, Civ. Proc. Bef-Trial, Sec. 7:48.) Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer because the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable when the facts change due to information obtained in discovery. (Oppn., p. 2.) Plaintiff argues that the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable because Co-Defendant Palmetto provided new information during discovery to support Plaintiffs amended allegation that Defendant Martinez owns the entire property, including the incident location. (FAC, ¶¶ 18, 24.) Pursuant to the sham pleading doctrine, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. ( Larson v. UHS of Rancho Spring s, Inc . (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343.) Courts will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts that are judicially noticed. ( Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400.) Given the information obtained through discovery, the Court finds that Plaintiff has appropriately explained the change in the allegations of ownership from the original complaint to the FAC. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories, Set One, on Defendant Palmetto. On October 30, 2023, Palmetto timely responded to the Special Interrogatories as follows: Special Interrogatory No. 1 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who owed the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 1: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 2 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who leased the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 4 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who controlled the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 4: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 6 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who owned the LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. (Oppn., Exh. B, pp. 2-3.) Plaintiff did not possess this information at the time he filed his original complaint. Plaintiff received this information on October 30, 2023. After the Court sustained Defendant Martinezs demurrer to the original complaint, Plaintiff relied on this information when filing the FAC. Therefore, the inconsistent facts between the initial complaint and the FAC are sufficiently explained to bypass an application of the sham pleading doctrine. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendants demurrer to the FAC. IV. ORDER Defendant Martinezs Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant to answer within 15 days. Counsel for Plaintiff to give notice of this order. Dated: July 18, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FCS057573 Motions for Contempt TENTATIVE RULING: Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied. No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to the court. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a contempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1

Case Number: 23AHCV01967 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 17, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Zhiwei Chen v. Verizon Wireless Services, LLC CASE NO.: 23AHCV01967 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Zhiwei Chen RESPONDING PARTY : Defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC OPPOSITION: NO OPPOSITION FILED REPLY: None filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Courts May 16, 2024 order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate ruling in favor of the defendants application for arbitration. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Zhiwei Chen filed this action against defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC on on August 28, 2023. Plaintiff has been self-represented since the outset of the suit. Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed an intentional tort wherein Defendant used technical means to take control of [Plaintiffs] phone ... [and] forged the plaintiffs signature with the intention of taking possession of plaintiffs property. (Compl., p. 4, ¶ IT-1.) On November 7, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motion to compel the parties to arbitrate their dispute. The Court stayed the action pending the completion of arbitration. On March 27, 2024, one hundred forty-one (141) days after the Courts November 2023 order, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Quash to vacate /quash the ruling of November 7, 2023, which he subsequently removed from calendar. On April 16, 2024, one hundred sixty-one (161) days after the Courts November 2023 order, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate ruling in favor of the defendants application for arbitration. On May 16, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion to vacate. On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the May 16, 2024 ruling. That motion is now before the Court. Defendant filed no opposition, although Plaintiff filed no proof of service indicating Plaintiff gave Defendant notice of his motion. Plaintiff filed no reply. TENTATIVE RULING The motion is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008 (c); see also Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1106-1107.) DISCUSSION As an initial matter: Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate was, in operation, a motion to reconsider, which the Court denied. (See 05-16-2024 Minute Order, p.2 [recharacterizing motion by relief sought].) The instant motion is a motion to reconsider the Courts ruling on a motion to reconsider. Any renewed motion, including a renewed motion for reconsideration, must be justified by new facts or law. (See Le Francois v. Goel , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1099.) Plaintiff objects that the Court did not consider evidence that was already available at the time of the May 16, 2024 ruling. This does not justify a renewed motion for reconsideration of the Courts November 2023 order, nor does it justify a motion to reconsider the motion to reconsider. For the same reason, reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a) is unwarranted. Plaintiff specified no new or different facts, circumstances etc. in his declaration(s) accompanying his motion. Reconsideration under section 1008(c) is similarly unwarranted. Plaintiff cites no relevant change in the law since November 2023, and the Court is aware of none. The Court declines to exercise its own discretion to reconsider either prior ruling. Plaintiffs motion is denied. Court to provide notice. Dated: July 17, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Tuesday, July 16, 2024, Line 5. DEFENDANT THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, A PUBLIC CORPORATION, ERRONEOUSLY SUED AS UCSF-MOFFITT-LONG's MOTION TO TAX COSTS. The motion is unopposed, and is granted. Harris is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to costs. The court has reviewed the pro per plaintiff's "Subject: cause of action for motion to vacate in favor of the plaintiff," filed June17, 2024, as well as the "Subject: Request for judicial Notice in support of the plaintiff," filed June 17, and "Subject: Defense expert testimony is void pursuant [to] California Evidence Code 801.1 as of 2024," filed June 21, 2024. These are not oppositions to the pending motion. They may be an attempt to seek a new trial, but they do not conform to the procedures specified for that sort of motion, and the court refers plaintiff to Code of Civil Procedure sections 656-663a. The court specifically refers plaintiff to section 659 which discusses the notice of intention to move for a new trial. There are deadlines for these sorts of motions, and the court expresses no opinion whether a motion for a new trial would be timely filed. The court also notes the defense lodging of an amended judgment reflecting costs in favor of the defense. If (1) the defense memorandum of costs has been filed and served, and (2) the time in which to move to tax or strike it has elapsed, then defense counsel may provide (a) a declaration stating the facts (1) and (2), as well as (b) a proposed amended judgment, all to Judge Karnow in Department 611 for his signature. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/CK)

Case Number: 21STCV26161 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, A.L. filed this action against Doe 1 for damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse. Plaintiff added LBUSD as a doe defendant. The Court consolidated 21STCV26161 with 22LBCV00364, Huggins v. LBUSD, which arises out of similar misconduct. LBUSD filed this motion to stay in the personal injury hub court, which then transferred the matter to this independent calendar court for all future proceedings. The matter was fully briefed prior to transfer. 2. Motion to Stay Proceedings a. Legal Standard Any party may file a motion for an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.5 staying the proceedings in any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination, or the court may stay the proceedings on its own motion. The motion for a stay may be included with a petition for coordination or may be served and submitted to the Chair of the Judicial Council and the coordination motion judge by any party at any time prior to the determination of the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515.) b. Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 451, 452, subds. (d) and (h), 453, Defendants request for judicial notice is granted as to Request Nos. 1 to 12. Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-35 is also granted. c. Analysis Defendant moves to stay the trial because (1) there are two pending writs before two different appellate courts to decide the constitutionality of California Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218) and (2) Defendant wants to be able to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations without fear that its relevant Board will violate the law to authorize payments for any settlement agreement. To elaborate, AB 218 authorized a three-year window beginning in January 1, 2020 that allowed claims of childhood sexual assault to be brought regardless of how long the abuse allegedly occurred. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (q).) AB 218 amended Government Code § 905 to retroactively strip statutory governmental immunities for public entities which violates Article XVI section 6 of the Constitution and its prohibition of gifts of public funds. Defendant states the first pending writ, West Contra Costa U.S.D. v. Superior Court (First Appellate District Case No. A16934), wherein the parties are awaiting the requested oral arguments and have submitted their respective briefs. (See RJN Nos. 1-8, Exhs. B,C.) In the second pending writ, Roe # 2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707), the court requested an informal response to the filed writ, granting the school district until May 17, 2024 to file an informal reply to the response. (See RJN Nos. 9-12, Exh. G.) In exercising its discretion [regarding stay] . . . the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions . . . [and] whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. (Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215.) First, Defendant argues that like Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 807-808 wherein a stay of a state court action involving the obligation to pay attorneys fees was justified because a broad action involving RICO was pending in federal court that would govern that case and other cases involving such fee obligations, here this case should be set aside because one or both of the two pending appellate writ proceedings could resolve the issue as to AB 218s unconstitutionality. Defendant further explains that staying this case is the only way to ensure the case will not conflict with the decisions reached in the two pending Appellate Court cases. Next, Defendant also asserts staying the action will not prejudice Plaintiffs rights because Plaintiff waited 17 years to file the lawsuit and any stay would toll the time within which Plaintiff is required to bring the case to trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) In opposition, Plaintiff responds that (1) no legal support exists to mandate a stay in similar contexts and (2) staying the action would prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that the Second District has summarily denied similar writ petitions. Plaintiff notes that, in the event the different courts of appeal split, this case will be in the same procedural posture it is in now. Plaintiff also notes that the issue will likely go to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the courts of appeal split, and this could take years. Plaintiff also argues the factors, set forth in Nken v. Holder (2009) 556 U.S. 418, 426, do not support a stay. Those factors are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. (Id., at p. 434.) Once an applicant satisfies the first two factors, the traditional stay inquiry calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Granting the instant motion would prejudice Plaintiff. There is no guarantee that the decisions made by the Court of Appeals in the pending writs would create a definitive ruling on the issue as it could always be further appealed to the Supreme Court, potentially taking years to resolve. The Court notes that the vast majority of trial courts have held against the District on this argument, and this trial court has consistently held against the District on this issue. The motion is therefore denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Thursday, July 18, 2024, Line 11. PLAINTIFF CHINA LIVE VENTURES LIMITED, L.P. A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, CHINA LIVE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY, CHINA LIVE, LLC AND GEORGE CHEN's MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER to Amended COMPLAINT. Off calendar. An amended notice of motion was filed that properly set this motion in department 501 per SF Local Rule 8.10A1. =(302/CK)