Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Vs Charles S Knothe Esquire

Case Number: 22SMCV01685 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 22SMCV01685 MOTION Motion for Summary Judgment MOVING PARTY Plaintiff SM 10000 Property LLC OPPOSING PARTY none MOVING PAPERS: Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment Memorandum of Points and Authorities Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Declaration of Nicole Browne Declaration of Thomas F. Olsen BACKGROUND This breach of contract case arises from a dispute regarding the amount of back rent Defendants allegedly owe Plaintiff in connection with a residential property lease. On September 26, 2022, Plaintiff SM 10000 Property LLC (Plaintiff) brought suit against tenant Defendants Nicolai Bergman (Nicolai), Amanda McDermott-Bergmann (Amanda), and Nicolai Bergmann KK (Nicolai KK) (together, Defendants.) Amanda answered the complaint, but default was entered against Nicolai and Nicolai KK on August 10, 2023. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment against Amanda on the single breach of contract cause of action. Plaintiffs motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact . ( Ibid .) On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial. ( Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co . (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility. ( Id . at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party].) DISCUSSION To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. ( Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Plaintiff has provided evidence that on May 25, 2019, the parties entered into a 12-month lease agreement effective April 25, 2019 to April 24, 2020, and to become month-to-month thereafter. (UMF Nos. 1-3.) Pursuant to the terms of the lease, Defendants were to pay Plaintiff $11,850 in monthly rent. (UMF No. 4.) Defendants also agreed to pay a $150 monthly technology fee, a $22,400 refundable security deposit, a refundable club amenity deposit of $2,000, a $200 monthly storage fee, and a $150 annual club membership. (UMF No. 5.) Defendants were also required to pay 100% of the electricity service separately metered to the premises and billed by Plaintiff. (UMF No. 6.) After April 6, 2022, Defendants failed to make any payments for rent, utilities, or technology fees. (UMF Nos. 12-15, 18-19.) After Defendants vacated the premises, Plaintiff completed all repairs to the premises on December 6, 2023. (UMF Nos. 19-20.) The Lease further requires that if a resident fails to pay any portion of rent when due and it remains owing on the fifth following the due date, the resident owes liquidated damages of $400. (UMF No. 16.) And as of December 6, 2023, Defendants outstanding principal balance due for rent, utilities, technology fees, and late fees was $255,003.28. (UMF No. 20.) The Lease also contains an attorney fee provision, entitling the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys fees not to exceed $10,000. (UMF No. 24.) Plaintiff incurred $12,407.50 in reasonable attorneys fees and $2,421.97 in costs, and anticipates incurring reasonable attorneys fees in the total amount of $14,829.47. (UMF Nos. 27-30.) Plaintiff further calculated prejudgment interest owed in the amount of $31,828.76. (UMF No. 21.) Therefore, Plaintiff has met its initial burdens of establishing a prima facie case that a lease agreement exists, Plaintiff performed under the agreement by providing Defendants the premises, Defendants breached the agreement by failing to pay the rental amounts owed, and as a result, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $255,003.28. Because Amanda has not opposed the motion, she has not met her burden of production to raise a triable issue of material fact. Consequently, Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to damages in the amount of $255,003.28, attorneys fees in the amount of $10,000, costs in the amount of $2,421.97, and prejudgment interest in the amount of $31,828.76. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs unopposed motion for summary judgment. Further, the Court will enter the Order lodged on April 29, 2024, and orders Plaintiff to lodge a proposed Judgment in conformity with the Courts ruling on or before August 1, 2024. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 18, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

21CV00921 OLSON v. RYAN DEFENDANT RYAN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION The motion is denied. Within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, a party may make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. (CCP § 1008.) Defendant has not offered any new facts, law or circumstances warranting reconsideration of the court’s March 25, 2024, Final Judgment. The court also notes that the proceeds from the partition sale have been distributed to the parties. (Referee’s Post-Disposition Report, 5/14/24.) The court orders the check received by the referee for $148.50 distributed to the referee for his unpaid hours in handling the close of escrow. (Referee Declaration, 6/4/24.) The court also discharges the referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

24CV01737 Weinzinger, Robert D v. Baker, Dennis EVENT: Petition for Judgment of Abandonment (Civ. Code § 798.61) Petition for Judgment of Abandonment is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order.

Case Number: 22AHCV00548 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: PREF PASADENA COLLECTION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, v. PASADENA COLLECTION WEST PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a California mutual benefit corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive. CASE NO.: 22AHCV00548 MOTIONS TO QUASH BUSINESS RECORD SUBPOENA MOVING PARTY: Defendant Pasadena Collection West Property Owners Association RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Pref Pasadena Collection, LLC SERVICE: Filed May 10, 2024 and May 21, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed July 1, 2024 REPLY: Filed May 23, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendant moves to quash Plaintiffs deposition subpoena for production of business records to: (1) non-party Darryl Young; (2) non-party Jerry Acker, Jerry Acker Construction Consulting; (3) non-party All Pro Copper Repipes, Inc.; and (4) non-party James E. Vitale. BACKGROUND This case arises out of Plaintiff Pref Pasadena Collection, LLCs (Plaintiff) claim that Defendant Pasadena Collection West Property Owners Association (Defendant) failed to abide by the Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&R) for the Pasadena Collection West. Plaintiff filed this complaint on August 5, 2022, alleging three causes of action for (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants motions to quash business record subpoenas are DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 authorizes courts to quash a subpoena entirely, modify it, or direct compliance with it upon the courts own terms and conditions, including protective orders. In addition, the court may take other appropriate means to protect parties or nonparties from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) Discovery devices are meant to facilitate litigation, not wage it. ( Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221.) Where privacy rights are at stake, [t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. . . . Courts must instead place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies. . . . What suffices to justify an invasion will . . . vary according to the context. Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest. ( Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552-557 (internal citations omitted).) In instances in which the interests at stake are fundamental to personal autonomy, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate that the information is directly relevant to the issues in the action, and that there is a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the information that outweighs the right to privacy. ( Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525.) DISCUSSION Darryl Young On or about April 18, 2024, Plaintiff served a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Non-Party Darryl Yong. Defendant served objections to Plaintiffs subpoena on May 1, 2024. Defendant argues that the subpoena seeks records that are not relevant to the current case, are outside the statute of limitations from claims in a prior lawsuit, and impose an undue burden and expense on Yong. Defendant requests that the Court quash the subpoena because it is unreasonable and oppressive, including violations of the right to privacy, as protected under Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1. The subpoena seeks documents relating to the property, correspondence between the requester and the Board of the Pasadena Collection West Mixed-Use Condominium Project, and documents from 2004 to the present, including communications with HOA management companies, Board documents, and architectural review committee meeting minutes. Additionally, documents related to both the City of Pasadena, the Pasadena Planning Department, the Pasadena Building Department, and the Pasadena Business Licensing Department are requested. Further, documents concerning Association Board meetings, any Association Board member, Association Property Management companies and their employees, Association advisors, and Association attorneys are sought. Specific attention is given to the commercial condominium unit at 825 Cordova, Pasadena, California, and any construction activities on the Association Property. This includes documents concerning any construction that occurred or was planned, repairs of faulty water supply lines and valves, fire sprinkler lines, and any portion of the fire sprinkler system. The requests also extend to backup documents for payment requests related to these repairs, including receipts, daily logs, invoices, and material orders. Lastly, documents concerning the repair and construction activities in the Common Area of the Association Property are included. Plaintiff describes Yong as follows: Daryll Yong is a former Board Member of the Defendant Association, in the early years of the Boards existence. Interestingly, when Defendant produced records, some of their records were Bates stamped, with the name Yong in the production. Mr. Yongs records would tend to show if the Association treated the commercial unit unequally with respect to the one and only tenant that ever occupied the commercial unit, a Kut-n-Beauty hair salon that was in existence from about the time the mixed-use project was first occupied. (Nevin Decl., ¶ 24.) Of course, all of Mr. Yongs documents are discoverable because they could show the Board treated the commercial unit differently by prioritizing residential quiet over commercial needs, or any other type of unequal treatment. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Motions to Quash assert incorrect and irrelevant authority. Plaintiff highlights that discovery cannot be denied simply because the evidence might not be admissible at trial, as established in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1481. The Court agrees that the cases relied upon by Defendant, such as Terry v. SLICO (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, Fuentes v. Tucker (1941) 31 Cal.2d 1, and Dept. of Health Servs. v. Sup. Ct. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 80, discuss trial procedures and the admissibility of evidence, not the discovery process. Thus, the cited cases do not support the Defendants arguments for quashing the subpoenas. The Court also finds that the subpoenas are relevant as they seek records to prove unequal treatment by the Association, which is central to the case. Plaintiff explains that the documents requested are likely to show how the commercial unit was treated differently compared to residential units, both in terms of construction defects and subsequent repairs. Thus, the Court denies the motion to quash subpoena as to Yong. Jerry Acker, Jerry Acker Construction Consulting On or about April 18, 2024, Plaintiff served a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Non-Party Jerry Acker, Jerry Acker Construction Consulting. Defendant served objections to Plaintiffs subpoena on May 1, 2024. Defendant makes the same arguments as above. The subpoena seeks similar documents as above. Plaintiff describes Acker as follows: Jerry Acker was a construction consultant, who as the Associations agent was integrally involved in the construction defect litigation; his involvement included advising on the litigation and a post-defect litigation survey and questionnaire of unit owners related to construction defects throughout the mixed-use project. (Nevin Decl., ¶ 20.) His records would show if the Association treated the commercial unit unequally with respect to the defect, the lawsuit, the repairs, and the post-repair continuing problems. More importantly, Mr. Acker was also the Associations consultant and agent during the time Plaintiff was attempting to obtain the Associations approval for Magnailificent, a nail salon that signed a lease and then spent over three years trying to obtain Defendants approval, after which it gave up and cancelled its lease with Plaintiff. (Nevin Decl., ¶ 22.) For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies the motion to quash subpoena as to Acker. All Pro Copper Repipes, Inc. On or about April 18, 2024, Plaintiff served a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Non-Party All Prop Copper Repipes. Defendant served objections to Plaintiffs subpoena on May 1, 2024. Defendant makes the same arguments as above. The subpoena seeks similar documents as above. Plaintiff describes All Pro Copper Repipes as follows: All Pro Copper Repipes is a Corona, California company that appears to have completely re-piped the project. Their records would tend to show if the Association treated the commercial unit unequally with respect to the defect, the lawsuit, and the repairs. Equally importantly, the records produced thus far by Defendant show that the project suffered from further plumbing, water, and leak problems, both before and also after the construction defect repairs were performed. (Nevin Decl., ¶ 25.) The unequal treatment would potentially be shown not only by whether or not the commercial unit was repaired: all other communications between the Association and All Pro would be discoverable because it could show the Board treated the commercial unit differently. Moreover, the documents obtained thus far confirm that the project has experienced water, plumbing, and leak issues both before and after the construction defect was repaired. (Nevin Decl., ¶ 19.) For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies the motion to quash subpoena as to All Pro Copper Repipes. James E. Vitale On or about April 18, 2024, Plaintiff served a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Non-Party James E. Vitale. Defendant served objections to Plaintiffs subpoena on May 1, 2024. Defendant makes the same arguments as above. The subpoena seeks similar documents as above. Plaintiff describes James E. Vitale as follows: Jim Vitale was a construction consultant, who as the Plaintiffs consultant and agent was integrally involved during the time Plaintiff was attempting to obtain the Associations approval for Magnailificent, a nail salon that signed a lease and then spent over three years trying to obtain Defendants approval, after which it gave up and cancelled its lease with Plaintiff. (Nevin Decl., ¶ 23.) As he was Plaintiffs consultant, the Defendants Motion to Quash the subpoena directed to him is particularly meritless. His records will directly show the type of scrutiny the Defendant exhibited, the unreasonable delays caused by the Defendant that caused the nail salon approval process to be unresolved for over 3 years, and the unequal treatment the Defendant exhibited compared to residential tenants requests for approval of modifications and construction. For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies the motion to quash subpoena as to James E. Vitale. CONCLUSION Defendants motions to quash business record subpoenas are DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July 18, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24SMCV02485 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 24SMCV02485 MOTION Motion to Quash Service of Summons MOVING PARTIES Defendants Lajos Gerbino and Edith Molnar OPPOSING PARTY none BACKGROUND On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff Silver Block Holding Company, LLC (Plaintiff) filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Defendants Lajos Gerbino and Edith Molnar (Defendants.) On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff applied for an order to serve the summons by posting, which was granted the same day. The next day, on June 14, 2024, Defendants moved in pro per to quash service of the summons and complaint. The Court has not yet received an opposition, although because this is an unlawful detainer action, Plaintiff may file and serve a written opposition the day before the hearing or may make an opposition orally at the time of the hearing. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1327(b)-(c).) LEGAL STANDARDS A. SERVICE A summons in an action for unlawful detainer of real property may be served by posting if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in any manner specified in this article other than publication[.] (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.45, subd. (a).) The court shall order the summons to be posted on the premises in a manner most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served and direct that a copy of the summons and of the complaint be forthwith mailed by certified mail to such party at his last known address. ( Id. at subd. (b).) Service is complete on the 10 th day after posting and mailing. ( Id. at subd. (c).) On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff applied for an order to serve Defendants by posting. That application included a declaration of diligence, outlining several unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Defendants with a copy of the summons and complaint. Plaintiffs application to post was granted the same day. The following day, June 14, Defendants filed the instant motion to quash, arguing that Plaintiff only left a copy of the first page of the Complaint with one person, and without completing substitute service. (Motion at p. 3; Gerbino Decl. at lines 16-18.) As a threshold matter, the Court finds Defendants proof of service for the motion faulty. It indicates the declarant, Chelsea Cooper served a copy of the notice of motion and motion to Plaintiffs counsel AS FOLLOWS. I am readily familiar with the firms practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited within U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Diego, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date of postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. This does not indicate that the declarant actually left the notice of motion and motion anywhere for mailing, or otherwise deposited it in the mail. Further, declarant does not specify which firm or firms practice the declarant refers to. Further, to the extent that, at the time Defendants filed the instant motion, Defendants had only received the copy of the summons that had been posted, such conduct would be consistent with service by posting, but such service would not yet have been complete, as service by posting is not complete until 10 days after posting and mailing a copy of the summons and complaint. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court continues the hearing on the motion to September 23, 2024 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207. Defendants shall provide notice of the motion and continued hearing by either personal service or by mail (regular or overnight) on or before July 26, 2024. Thereafter, Defendants shall file the notice with the Court with a proof of service on or before August 9, 2024. DATED: July 16, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 20STCV13012 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 17, 2024 CASE NUMBER 20STCV13012 MOTION Motion to Reopen Discovery MOVING PARTY Plaintiff Guadalupe Encisco OPPOSING PARTY Defendant Avanti Hospitals, LLC MOTION Plaintiff Guadalupe Encisco (Plaintiff) moves to reopen discovery related to Plaintiffs recent surgeries. Defendant Avanti Hospitals, LLC (Defendant) opposes the motion. The court previously considered this matter and, in its order of June 25, 2024, continued it to July 17, 2024 for the parties to submit discovery plans in compliance with this courts March 1, 2024 order. ANALYSIS In determining whether to reopen discovery, the court must consider the necessity of and reasons for the additional discovery, the diligence or lack thereof by the party seeking to reopen discovery in attempting to complete discovery prior to the discovery cutoff date, whether permitting the discovery will prevent the case from going forward on the trial date or will otherwise prejudice any party, and any past continuances of the trial date. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050, subd. (b).) Plaintiff moves to reopen discovery as to surgeries Plaintiff underwent on January 8 and 11, 2024. (See March 17, 2024 Declaration of Raymond Ghermezian (in support of and attached to motion), Exhibit A.) This is a proper basis to reopen discovery. Plaintiff proposes to provide updated medical records to Defendant, to submit to a second session of deposition, and to respond to additional written discovery concerning Plaintiffs surgeries and updated medical issues. (Plaintiffs Proposed Discovery Plan.) Defendant agrees Plaintiffs proposed discovery is necessary but contends Defendant will also need to propound subpoenas for updated medical and pharmacy records, depose Plaintiffs surgeon regarding her surgical care, prognosis, and future care needs, and have Plaintiff sit for an updated orthopedic examination with Defendants expert. (Defendants Proposed Discovery Plan.) The court finds Defendants proposed discovery plan is reasonable and necessary for Defendant to fairly defend this action. However, the court notes Defendant did not include discovery in 2025 in its proposed deadlines, but rather jumped from November 30, 2024 to March 26, 2026. The court assumes this was a clerical error. The court, therefore, grants the motion, subject to Plaintiffs stipulation to submit to Defendants proposed discovery plan, with all proposed deadlines in 2026 corrected to reflect deadlines on the proposed dates in 2025. The court notes, pursuant to the courts order of December 5, 2023, the five-year date for this case is June 26, 2026. The court also conditions its grant of this motion on the parties stipulation to continue the trial date to a date prior to June 26, 2026. Plaintiff is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.

WILKINSON VS. WILKINSON, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202523 This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The matter is at issue. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for a court trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 23VECV05137 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: W ALLAN MARTIA, et al. vs S.B.S. TRUST DEED NETWORK (SBS), et al. demurrer to the cross-complaint of bryan russolesi and motion to strike Date of Hearing: July 17, 2024 Trial Date: None Set Department: W Case No.: 23VECV05137 BACKGROUND On November 16, 2023, Plaintiff Allan Martia and Knolton, Inc. filed a complaint against Defendants S.B.S. Trust Deed Network (SBS), Bryan Russolesi, Daymon Harris, Barbara Chiling, and Timothy Glasserand for (1) Violation of CC 2924.11 (d); (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (4) Tortuous Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; (5) Interference with Contract; (6) Quiet Title. (7) Declaratory Relief; (8) Temporary and Permanent Injunction; (9) Fraud; (10) Wrongful foreclosure (threatening to wrongfully foreclose); and (11) Cancellation of Instrument. On January 22, 2024, Bryan Russolesi filed aCross-Complaint against Allan Martia, Knolton, Inc., and Reel West, Inc. for (1) Fraud; (2) Judicial Foreclosure; (3) Breach of Contract; and (4) Declaratory Relief. [Tentative] Ruling I. Defendant Knolton, Inc.s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint of Bryan Russolesi and Motion to Strike is OVERRULED II. Cross-Defendant Reel West, Inc.s Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint of Bryan Russolesi is OVERRULED. ANALYSIS I. DEFENDANT KNOLTON, INC.S DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT OF BRYAN RUSSOLESI AND MOTION TO STRIKE Defendant Knolton, Inc. demurs to the cross-complaint of Bryan Russolesi on the grounds Russolesis complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for fraud against Knolton, Inc. Defendant also moves to strike the cross-complaint on the grounds it was filed without leave of court. [1] Fraud Defendant Knolton, Inc. demurs to the fraud cause of action on the grounds Cross-Complainant has failed to allege specific facts as to the elements of fraud. The elements of fraud are: (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. ( Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled with specificity. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) Knolton, Inc. argues the fraud cause of action is a mashup of general conclusory allegations with no reference to any representation. For example, Paragraph 12 alleges Martia on behalf of himself and other cross defendants misrepresented that he intends to comply with his obligation under the amended note and deed of trust that Martia executed &, and Cross Complainant contends that Martia had breached the terms the terms of the note. There are no allegations that Knolton had anything to do with the alleged misrepresentation by Martia. Similarly, Martia conspired with other persons unknown at this time &, of their intent not to pay the principal sum and other payment required by the note and amendment. (XC ¶13.) Knolton contends there is no allegation it was a party to or responsible for the Secured Note nor are there allegations all the Cross-Defendants are deemed agents of each other or conspirators is not specific enough. The court finds the fraud cause of action in the cross-complaint is sufficiently alleged for the purposes of a demurrer. Russolesi alleges on April 2021, Martia, on behalf of himself and the Cross-Defendants, including Knolton, misrepresented to Russolesi that Martia would repay the principal sum that he borrowed from Russolesi and the other lenders that are named in the Secured Promissory Note dated April 22, 2021. (XC ¶6.) Russolesi also alleges in May 2023, Martia, again on behalf of Cross-Defendants, misrepresented that he intended to comply with his obligations under the Amendment to Secured Promissory Note dated April 1, 2023 (XC ¶12.) The complaint alleges Martia and all the Cross-Defendants, including Knolton, were agents of one another. (XC ¶5.) The complaint goes on to allege the Note, 2021 Deed of Trust, Amendment, and the misrepresentations of Martia regarding them were used and intended by Cross-Defendants to fraudulently induce Russolesi and the Beneficiaries into agreeing to loan Martia the Principal Sum, and to agree to the Note, 2021 Deed of Trust, and Amendment, and cause them to delay enforcing their remedies thereunder. (XC ¶13.) Russolesi claims these Cross-Defendants conspired among themselves to deceive and conceal the true facts regarding their intention not to pay. (XC ¶13.) This sufficiently alleges Knolton along with Martia and the other Cross-Defendants were agents and/or co-conspirators of one another for the purposes of a demurrer. Accordingly, the demurrer to the fraud cause of action is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Knolton argues the cross-complaint should be stricken in its entirety because he filed his answer on December 29, 2023 and his Cross-Complaint on January 22, 2023. However, the court agrees with Plaintiff that Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10 is applicable as to Knolton and therefore, Russolesi did not need to file his cross-complaint against Knolton at the same time he filed his answer to Martias complaint. If Martia wanted to strike the cross-complaint, then they could. i. CROSS-DEFENDANT REEL WEST, INC.S DEMURRER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF BRYAN RUSSOLESI Cross-Defendant Reel West, Inc. demurs to the cross-complaint of Cross-Complainant Bryan Russolesi on the grounds Russolesi failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of fraud. For the reasons stated above, the court finds Russolesis fraud allegations sufficient for the purposes of a demurrer.