Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Maryland

What is Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress?

“Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a cognizable tort in Maryland.” (See Abrams v. City of Rockville (1991) 88 Md. App. 588, 597.)

“The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was first formally recognized in Maryland in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).” (See Beye v. Bureau of National Affairs (1984) 59 Md. App. 642, 656-57.)

“Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises.” (See Harris v. Jones (1977) 281 Md. 560, 570-71.)

“The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.” (See id.)

Prima Facie Case for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

For “intentional infliction of emotional distress [cases], the Court of Appeals has identified four elements that a plaintiff must prove:

1. The conduct must be intentional or reckless;
2. The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
3. There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress;
4. The emotional distress must be severe.”

(See Beery v. Maryland Med. Lab (1992) 89 Md. App. 81, 96; Harris v. Jones (1977) 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611; Moniodis v. Cook (1985) 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212.)

“Liability is found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (See Beery v. Maryland Med. Lab (1992) 89 Md. App. 81, 96.)

Burden of Proof and Standard of Review for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“In recognizing this tort, the Harris Court essentially adopted the characteristics and contours of it as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46. It observed, from that source, that the defendant's conduct is intentional or reckless where he desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct; or where the defendant acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.” (See Abrams v. City of Rockville (1991) 88 Md. App. 588, 598; Harris v. Jones (1977) 281 Md. 560, 567.)

“As to the second element, the Court, again citing § 46, noted that [l]iability has been found only where the conduct had been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (See id.)

“In determining whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, it should not be considered in a sterile setting, detached from the surroundings in which it occurred. The personality of the individual to whom the misconduct is directed is also a factor.” (See Harris v. Jones (1977) 281 Md. 560, 568; Pakos v. Clark (1969) 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682.)

“It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous; where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” (See id; Restatement, supra, § 46, comment h; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

It is well settled that “emotional distress may form the basis for the recovery of actual damages where the emotional distress arises from an intentional tort, such as libel, slander, malicious prosecution, fraud, and the like.” (See Hoffman v. Stamper (2004) 155 Md. App. 247, 319-20; Laubach v. Franklin Square Hosp (1989) 79 Md. App. 203, 217; HR Block, Inc. v. Testerman (1975) 275 Md. 36, 48-49, 338 A.2d 48.)

It is also well settled that “the fourth element of the tort — that the emotional distress must be severe, …requires the plaintiff to show that he suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. The severity of the emotional distress is not only relevant to the amount of recovery, but is a necessary element to any recovery.” (See Harris v. Jones (1977) 281 Md. 560, 570.)