Motion for Continuance in Illinois

Background

“The rules governing continuances are specified in Supreme Court Rule 231.” (Vollentine v. Christoff (1975) 24 Ill. App. 3d 92, 94 citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 231).

Continuance for Evidence or Witness

“Cases generally establish that the moving party must show that the evidence sought is material and that due diligence had been exercised, but that nevertheless the party asking for the continuance has been unable to obtain the desired evidence or witness at the time of the motion.” (Id.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“Because of the potential inconvenience to the parties, the witnesses and the court, especially grave reasons for granting a delay must be given once a case has reached the trial stage.” (Parker v. Newman (1973) 10 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1022 [internal citation omitted].)

Indeed, “[o]nce a cause is reached for hearing, no motion for continuance is to be heard without sufficient excuse being shown for the delay in so moving, and the movant is then required to present especially grave reasons to support his request.” (Martinez v. Scandroli (1985) 130 Ill. App. 3d 712, 714-15 citing 87 Ill.2d R. 231(f); Teitelbaum v. Reliable Welding Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 651, 656.)

Affidavit Requirement

Where “the continuance [is] sought because of the absence of a witness [...], the continuance [is] properly denied [if] the motion [does] not contain the affidavit of that witness, describing the evidence to be adduced.” (Gallagher v. Swiatek (1982) 106 Ill. App. 3d 417, 421 citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 231(a); see also Mann v. People (1981) 98 Ill. App.3d 448, 452,[affidavit of the witness is mandatory in such a case].)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be overturned on appeal unless that discretion has been abused.” (Martinez v. Scandroli (1985) 130 Ill. App. 3d 712, 714 citing Huber v. Reznick (1982) 107 Ill. App.3d 529, 543; City of Chicago v. Southgate Corp. (1980) 86 Ill. App.3d 56, 59.) “A critical factor in the review of such rulings is whether the party which sought the continuance showed diligence in proceeding with the cause.” (Martinez v. Scandroli (1985) 130 Ill. App. 3d 712, 714 citing Trillet v. Bachman (1981) 96 Ill. App.3d 477, 481; Marshall v. Henning (1980) 91 Ill. App.3d 180, 182.)

The Court’s Decision

“The broad discretion conferred on a trial court in allowance or denial of continuances must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily and capriciously and the court should not refuse a continuance where the ends of justice clearly require it and an abuse of discretion in so doing will justify a reversal” (Reecy v. Reecy (1971) 132 Ill. App. 2d 1024, 1027 citing Adcock v. Adcock (1950) 339 Ill. App. 543.)

“In a number of cases it has been held that where no affidavit has been filed, or the affidavit does not meet the requirements of Rule 231, denial of a motion for continuance cannot be regarded as an abuse of discretion.” (Parker v. Newman (1973) 10 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1021-22 [internal citations omitted].)