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DOCKET NO. (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S
NANCY BURTON : SUPERIOR COURT
Plaintiff :
: COMPLEX LITIGATION
v. : DOCKET
: AT WATERBURY
DAVID PHILIP MASON, Et Al. :
Defendants : APRIL 5, 2022
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF STATE DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO STRIKE (ENTRY NO. 309.00)
Defendants, State of Connecticut Department of Agriculture (“Department”), Bryan P.
Hurlburt, Commissioner of Agriculture (“Commissioner”), and Charles DellaRocco, State
Animal Control Officer (hereinafter referred to collectively as “State Defendants”) filed a
Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Counts Seven and Eight (Entry No. 309.00), and Memorandum in
Support (Entry No. 310.00). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Motion (Entry No.
323.00) to oppose the State Defendants’ Motion to Strike. State Defendants file this Reply, in
support of State Defendants’ Motion to Strike and in response to Defendant’s Objection.
State Defendants’ Motion to Strike should be granted. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Objection
negates the fact that in her Complaint (Amended Complaint (Fourth) Entry No. 307.00) Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for constitutional violations, pursuant to the First, Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff has further failed to explain how her
Count Eight for False Arrest is applicable to State Defendants. 1 The additional allegations
contained in Plaintiff’s Objection do not make up for deficiencies in her Complaint and the Court
should not assume facts not necessarily implied by it. Furthermore, none of Plaintiff’s claims are
1
Plaintiff admits as much in her Objection. Plaintiff concedes that she “did not set forth specific claims
as regards these Defendants in Count Eight.” (Obj. to Mot. to Strike, Entry 323.00, at 24.) This Count
Eight is essentially abandoned, by Plaintiff’s own admission.
1
supported by a substantial showing of defects in the Application for Search and Seizure
(“Application”). 2 (Attachment A.) Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim against Commissioner Hurlburt still
relies on his position as Commissioner and not for his individual actions.
A. NEW ALLEGATIONS AS A DEFENSE TO A MOTION TO STRIKE
As a general matter, the abundant new allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Objection
cannot form a basis for denial of State Defendants’ Motion to Strike. “[A] motion to strike
challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by
the trial court.” Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). The facts
considered are those alleged in the complaint. Id. This Court may, however, consider facts that
are “necessarily implied” by the pleading. Id. at 318. Plaintiff’s Objection attempts to re-write
the Complaint and present numerous allegations that are nowhere to be found in her pleading.
Given that Plaintiff has already filed five complaints and is in the process of finalizing a sixth
complaint, there is absolutely no excuse for Plaintiff’s addition of copious new allegations in her
Objection in an effort to cure the defects in her operative complaint. These new allegations
cannot be considered in ruling on the Motion to Strike. Plaintiff also expects the Court to insert
facts, that are not remotely “necessarily implied,” in order to complete her narrative.
For example, Plaintiff alleges that State Defendants “chilled and froze her First
Amendment rights to collect her goats’ milk.” (Obj. at 14.) Aside from the failure of Plaintiff to
cite to any caselaw that supports the proposition that collecting goat milk is a First Amendment
protected activity, Plaintiff expects the Court to create a narrative to support this line of argument
2
While the Application is not part of the four corners of the Complaint, given that Plaintiff’s remaining
count entirely relies on the Court making a determination as to whether she has sufficiently alleged that
the warrant is defective, in determining whether she has stated a claim, the undersigned has attached the
Application hereto for the benefit of the Court.
2
from the scant facts alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiff does not explain how she has continued
to post on her blog and contribute to other online blogs related to anti-nuclear “activism” without
access to the goats. 3 Plaintiff does not disclose when, if ever, she collected goat milk for
radiation analysis 4 and why she did not publish those results as part of her First Amendment
activities. Simply put, Plaintiff fails to offer facts that demonstrate a causal nexus between her
lack of access to the goats 5 and her alleged inability to engage in anti-nuclear advocacy.
Additionally, because none of the facts that could demonstrate this causal nexus are necessarily
implied by the Complaint, the Court is not in a position to assume additional facts that could save
Plaintiff’s claim of a constitutional violation.
Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that the warrant “failed to present probable cause for the goat
seizure.” (Obj. at 18.) In her Objection, for the first time, Plaintiff actually references the
Application that is at the core of this claim. Plaintiff, without further detail, states that
“Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 should be deleted from the affidavit.” (Obj. at
21.) Plaintiff does not state what parts or what allegations in these paragraphs are problematic.
Rather, without actually supplying a copy of the Application, Plaintiff asks the Court to decide
which statements are false or misleading. Should the Court presume that the barn referenced in
Paragraph 13 is not “dilapidated”? (Attachment A at ¶ 13.) Should the Court presume that the
manure control referenced in Paragraph 12 is not “a major concern”? (Attachment A at ¶ 12.)
3
Nancy Burton, Mother’s Milk Project (Jan. 20, 2022, 1:51 PM),
https://www.mothersmilkproject.org/ALERTS.html.
4
There is no indication that Plaintiff has tested any milk from the goats in years, if not decades, based on
a review of Plaintiff’s websites: https://www.mothballmillstone.org/home,
https://www.mothersmilkproject.org/, http://www.katiethegoat.org.
5
The goats are being held pursuant to court order due to a finding of reasonable cause that Plaintiff
abused the goats by neglecting them and treating them cruelly in a number of ways. State ex rel. Dunn v.
Sixty-Five Goats, Docket No. CV216139702S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 483, at *5-6 (Super. Apr. 9,
2021).
3
Should the Court presume that the goat referenced in Paragraph 7 was not “unable to put her
hind leg down” and was not “limping around”? (Attachment A at ¶ 7.) Given that the
Complaint does not reference specific allegations of the Application and, more importantly,
Plaintiff does not affirmatively allege facts that contradict the Application with any specificity, it
cannot be said that any of these hypothetical presumptions are “necessarily implied” from the
pleadings. Again, the Court should not presume these facts in order to save Plaintiff’s claim of a
constitutional violation. The Court should also not consider allegations contained in the
Objection that do not appear in the Complaint.
Plaintiff’s Complaint asks the Court to be impermissibly generous in reading her
pleading. In order to survive State Defendants’ Motion to Strike, Plaintiff asks the Court to
presume numerous facts that are not explicitly contained in her pleading or are “necessarily
implied.”
B. ALL OF PLAINTIFF’S THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INJUNRY LACK A
SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING THAT THE WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE
Fundamentally, Plaintiff’s claim under § 1983 requires the Complaint to demonstrate that
the Application and warrant were in some way defective and without probable cause. 6 Further,
Plaintiff must then state a claim that she suffered First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
injuries as a result of that defective warrant. This requires a substantial preliminary showing that
a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
6
Plaintiff also acknowledges that deference should be given to the finding of probable cause in this case.
(Obj. at 18.) Plaintiff argues that because, in her view, this is a marginal case, deference should be given
to the issuing judge’s determination. Id. Applying the deference that Plaintiff advocates for means that
the finding of probable cause by Judge D’Andrea should not be disturbed and Count Seven should be
stricken as there is no actionable showing of defect in the application for the warrant.
4
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and that the allegedly false statement is necessary
to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (Fourth
Amendment context). The Complaint does not explicitly point to knowing, intentional, or
reckless false statements. Plaintiff fails to offer any substantial facts to explain specifically
which statements were false, whether they were made intentionally, and whether they were
necessary for a finding of probable cause. Plaintiff simply alleges that the goats were well cared
for and asks the Court to assume facts to help her meet the standard under Franks. The Court
cannot fill in the banks to remedy these defects in the pleading. If Plaintiff fails to make a
substantial preliminary showing, under a Franks analysis, the Complaint necessarily fails to state
a claim. That is because, as outlined in the Memorandum in Support, Entry No. 309.00, a claim
under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments all fail without demonstrating that the
Application was defective; rendering the subsequent search and seizure unlawful. 7 This pleading
requirement is a threshold issue because Plaintiff’s entire cause of action relies on the Court’s
willingness to disregard a warrant that is presumptively valid.
C. THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CANNOT CREATE A
FOUNDATION FOR A CLAIM UNDER § 1983
As to the constitutional claim against Commissioner Hurlburt, Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. This count must be stricken as Plaintiff continues to
rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior to form a basis for her claim. “It is well settled in this
Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
7
Perhaps an evidentiary hearing, under Franks, may be necessary in order to make a ruling upon the
Motion to Strike. While generally no factual findings are necessary to rule on a motion to strike, the
burden to make a substantial preliminary showing of a defective warrant must be overcome before
Plaintiff can properly state a claim that she has suffered a constitutional injury.
5
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.
1994) (Internal quotations omitted, citation omitted.) “The rule in this circuit is that when
monetary damages are sought under § 1983, the general doctrine of respondeat superior does not
suffice and a showing of some personal responsibility of the defendant is required.” Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1973). Despite the well-settled law in our circuit on this
issue, Plaintiff continues to point to the Commissioner’s status as the head of the Department as
the foundation of her claims for constitutional deprivation. In the Objection, Plaintiff frames the
Commissioner’s personal involvement as “awareness and allowance.” (Obj. at 8-11.) However,
most of the examples offered do not demonstrate any recognized constitutional violations, nor
does the Complaint actually support them. Plaintiff further alleges that her claim against the
Commissioner is based on actions that occurred “[u]nder his watch.” (Obj. at 12.) Because this
claim as it relates to the Commissioner clearly relies on an application of respondeat superior
this claim must fail on its face.
Plaintiff does correctly note that there are certain circumstances where supervisory
actions can rise to a level to constitute “personal involvement.” These circumstances may arise
where “[t]he defendant may have directly participated in the infraction . . . . A supervisory
official, after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, may have failed to remedy the
wrong . . . . A supervisory official may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom
under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue .
. . . Lastly, a supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in
managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.” Wright v. Smith, supra, 21
F.3d 501. Plaintiff fails, however, to identify any paragraph of her complaint that supports any
of those recognized exceptions.
6
Plaintiff acknowledges that there are insufficient supporting allegations in her complaint
by admitting that there are “new revelations” and conceding that there is a “need to amend the
complaint to incorporate these facts and circumstances.” (Obj. at 11.) Plaintiff’s Objection has
now been filed twice, and in the intervening time three complaints have been filed, yet none of
these “new revelations” have been added to the complaint or this objection. The question still
stands: when will the factual allegations that support this claim be revealed? Aside from failing
to describe any constitutional violation, Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against the
Commissioner because she has failed to demonstrate any supervisory actions that rise to the level
of “personal involvement” as required for claims under § 1983. Despite the suggestion of new
facts to support this claim, they continue to be a mystery on the face of the pleadings.
CONCLUSION
In sum, nothing in Plaintiff’s Objection negates the fact that her remaining claim has not
been sufficiently pleaded. Plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts and cannot ask the Court to
substitute presumed facts, not necessarily implied by the Complaint, in order to state a claim.
Additionally, and critically, Plaintiff must plead facts that constitute a substantial preliminary
showing that the Application was defective. Without this showing, all three alleged violations
must fail because they can only be “violations” if the execution of the warrant was unlawful.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim against the Commissioner clearly relies on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Plaintiff’s Objection only makes this clearer as it fails to point to any portion of the
Complaint that alleges supervisory actions that rise to the level of personal involvement. For the
foregoing reasons, and the reasons as more thoroughly set forth in the Memorandum in Support,
State Defendants’ Motion to Strike must be granted.
7
DEFENDANTS
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BRYAN P. HURLBURT, COMMISSIONER OF
AGRICULTURE
CHARLES DELLAROCCO, STATE ANIMAL
CONTROL OFFICER
WILLIAM TONG
ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ___434270_____________________________
Jonathan E. Harding
Assistant Attorney General
Juris No. 434270
165 Capitol Ave.
Hartford, CT 06106
8
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the forgoing Reply was delivered electronically to the
following counsel and self-represented parties April 8, 2022:
Nancy Burton
154 Highland Ave.
Rowayton, CT 06853
NancyBurtonCT@aol.com
Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq.
Howd & Ludorf, LLC
65 Wethersfield Avenue
Hartford, CT 06114
pnewbury@hl-law.com
Steve Stafstrom, Esq.
Pullman & Comley, LLC
850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
Bridgeport, CT 06601
sstafstrom@pullcom.com
James N. Tallberg, Esq.
Kimberly A. Bosse, Esq.
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC
500 Enterprise Dr., Suite 4B
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com
kbosse@kt-lawfirm.com
Michael D. Riseberg
Christine N. Parise
Rubin & Rudman, LLP
53 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
MRiseberg@rubinrudman.com
CParise@rubinrudman.com
____434270_________________________
Jonathan E. Harding
Commissioner of the Superior Court
9
ATTACHMENT A
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DOCKET NO. (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S NANCY BURTON : SUPERIOR COURT Plaintiff : : COMPLEX LITIGATION v. : DOCKET : AT WATERBURY DAVID PHILIP MASON, Et Al. : Defendants : APRIL 5, 2022 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE (ENTRY NO. 309.00) Defendants, State of Connecticut Department of Agriculture (“Department”), Bryan P. Hurlburt, Commissioner of Agriculture (“Commissioner”), and Charles DellaRocco, State Animal Control Officer (hereinafter referred to collectively as “State Defendants”) filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Counts Seven and Eight (Entry No. 309.00), and Memorandum in Support (Entry No. 310.00). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Motion (Entry No. 323.00) to oppose the State Defendants’ Motion to Strike. State Defendants file this Reply, in support of State Defendants’ Motion to Strike and in response to Defendant’s Objection. State Defendants’ Motion to Strike should be granted. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Objection negates the fact that in her Complaint (Amended Complaint (Fourth) Entry No. 307.00) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for constitutional violations, pursuant to the First, Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff has further failed to explain how her Count Eight for False Arrest is applicable to State Defendants. 1 The additional allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Objection do not make up for deficiencies in her Complaint and the Court should not assume facts not necessarily implied by it. Furthermore, none of Plaintiff’s claims are 1 Plaintiff admits as much in her Objection. Plaintiff concedes that she “did not set forth specific claims as regards these Defendants in Count Eight.” (Obj. to Mot. to Strike, Entry 323.00, at 24.) This Count Eight is essentially abandoned, by Plaintiff’s own admission. 1 supported by a substantial showing of defects in the Application for Search and Seizure (“Application”). 2 (Attachment A.) Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim against Commissioner Hurlburt still relies on his position as Commissioner and not for his individual actions. A. NEW ALLEGATIONS AS A DEFENSE TO A MOTION TO STRIKE As a general matter, the abundant new allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Objection cannot form a basis for denial of State Defendants’ Motion to Strike. “[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.” Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). The facts considered are those alleged in the complaint. Id. This Court may, however, consider facts that are “necessarily implied” by the pleading. Id. at 318. Plaintiff’s Objection attempts to re-write the Complaint and present numerous allegations that are nowhere to be found in her pleading. Given that Plaintiff has already filed five complaints and is in the process of finalizing a sixth complaint, there is absolutely no excuse for Plaintiff’s addition of copious new allegations in her Objection in an effort to cure the defects in her operative complaint. These new allegations cannot be considered in ruling on the Motion to Strike. Plaintiff also expects the Court to insert facts, that are not remotely “necessarily implied,” in order to complete her narrative. For example, Plaintiff alleges that State Defendants “chilled and froze her First Amendment rights to collect her goats’ milk.” (Obj. at 14.) Aside from the failure of Plaintiff to cite to any caselaw that supports the proposition that collecting goat milk is a First Amendment protected activity, Plaintiff expects the Court to create a narrative to support this line of argument 2 While the Application is not part of the four corners of the Complaint, given that Plaintiff’s remaining count entirely relies on the Court making a determination as to whether she has sufficiently alleged that the warrant is defective, in determining whether she has stated a claim, the undersigned has attached the Application hereto for the benefit of the Court. 2 from the scant facts alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiff does not explain how she has continued to post on her blog and contribute to other online blogs related to anti-nuclear “activism” without access to the goats. 3 Plaintiff does not disclose when, if ever, she collected goat milk for radiation analysis 4 and why she did not publish those results as part of her First Amendment activities. Simply put, Plaintiff fails to offer facts that demonstrate a causal nexus between her lack of access to the goats 5 and her alleged inability to engage in anti-nuclear advocacy. Additionally, because none of the facts that could demonstrate this causal nexus are necessarily implied by the Complaint, the Court is not in a position to assume additional facts that could save Plaintiff’s claim of a constitutional violation. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that the warrant “failed to present probable cause for the goat seizure.” (Obj. at 18.) In her Objection, for the first time, Plaintiff actually references the Application that is at the core of this claim. Plaintiff, without further detail, states that “Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 should be deleted from the affidavit.” (Obj. at 21.) Plaintiff does not state what parts or what allegations in these paragraphs are problematic. Rather, without actually supplying a copy of the Application, Plaintiff asks the Court to decide which statements are false or misleading. Should the Court presume that the barn referenced in Paragraph 13 is not “dilapidated”? (Attachment A at ¶ 13.) Should the Court presume that the manure control referenced in Paragraph 12 is not “a major concern”? (Attachment A at ¶ 12.) 3 Nancy Burton, Mother’s Milk Project (Jan. 20, 2022, 1:51 PM), https://www.mothersmilkproject.org/ALERTS.html. 4 There is no indication that Plaintiff has tested any milk from the goats in years, if not decades, based on a review of Plaintiff’s websites: https://www.mothballmillstone.org/home, https://www.mothersmilkproject.org/, http://www.katiethegoat.org. 5 The goats are being held pursuant to court order due to a finding of reasonable cause that Plaintiff abused the goats by neglecting them and treating them cruelly in a number of ways. State ex rel. Dunn v. Sixty-Five Goats, Docket No. CV216139702S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 483, at *5-6 (Super. Apr. 9, 2021). 3 Should the Court presume that the goat referenced in Paragraph 7 was not “unable to put her hind leg down” and was not “limping around”? (Attachment A at ¶ 7.) Given that the Complaint does not reference specific allegations of the Application and, more importantly, Plaintiff does not affirmatively allege facts that contradict the Application with any specificity, it cannot be said that any of these hypothetical presumptions are “necessarily implied” from the pleadings. Again, the Court should not presume these facts in order to save Plaintiff’s claim of a constitutional violation. The Court should also not consider allegations contained in the Objection that do not appear in the Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint asks the Court to be impermissibly generous in reading her pleading. In order to survive State Defendants’ Motion to Strike, Plaintiff asks the Court to presume numerous facts that are not explicitly contained in her pleading or are “necessarily implied.” B. ALL OF PLAINTIFF’S THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INJUNRY LACK A SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING THAT THE WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE Fundamentally, Plaintiff’s claim under § 1983 requires the Complaint to demonstrate that the Application and warrant were in some way defective and without probable cause. 6 Further, Plaintiff must then state a claim that she suffered First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment injuries as a result of that defective warrant. This requires a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was 6 Plaintiff also acknowledges that deference should be given to the finding of probable cause in this case. (Obj. at 18.) Plaintiff argues that because, in her view, this is a marginal case, deference should be given to the issuing judge’s determination. Id. Applying the deference that Plaintiff advocates for means that the finding of probable cause by Judge D’Andrea should not be disturbed and Count Seven should be stricken as there is no actionable showing of defect in the application for the warrant. 4 included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and that the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (Fourth Amendment context). The Complaint does not explicitly point to knowing, intentional, or reckless false statements. Plaintiff fails to offer any substantial facts to explain specifically which statements were false, whether they were made intentionally, and whether they were necessary for a finding of probable cause. Plaintiff simply alleges that the goats were well cared for and asks the Court to assume facts to help her meet the standard under Franks. The Court cannot fill in the banks to remedy these defects in the pleading. If Plaintiff fails to make a substantial preliminary showing, under a Franks analysis, the Complaint necessarily fails to state a claim. That is because, as outlined in the Memorandum in Support, Entry No. 309.00, a claim under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments all fail without demonstrating that the Application was defective; rendering the subsequent search and seizure unlawful. 7 This pleading requirement is a threshold issue because Plaintiff’s entire cause of action relies on the Court’s willingness to disregard a warrant that is presumptively valid. C. THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CANNOT CREATE A FOUNDATION FOR A CLAIM UNDER § 1983 As to the constitutional claim against Commissioner Hurlburt, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This count must be stricken as Plaintiff continues to rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior to form a basis for her claim. “It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a 7 Perhaps an evidentiary hearing, under Franks, may be necessary in order to make a ruling upon the Motion to Strike. While generally no factual findings are necessary to rule on a motion to strike, the burden to make a substantial preliminary showing of a defective warrant must be overcome before Plaintiff can properly state a claim that she has suffered a constitutional injury. 5 prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (Internal quotations omitted, citation omitted.) “The rule in this circuit is that when monetary damages are sought under § 1983, the general doctrine of respondeat superior does not suffice and a showing of some personal responsibility of the defendant is required.” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1973). Despite the well-settled law in our circuit on this issue, Plaintiff continues to point to the Commissioner’s status as the head of the Department as the foundation of her claims for constitutional deprivation. In the Objection, Plaintiff frames the Commissioner’s personal involvement as “awareness and allowance.” (Obj. at 8-11.) However, most of the examples offered do not demonstrate any recognized constitutional violations, nor does the Complaint actually support them. Plaintiff further alleges that her claim against the Commissioner is based on actions that occurred “[u]nder his watch.” (Obj. at 12.) Because this claim as it relates to the Commissioner clearly relies on an application of respondeat superior this claim must fail on its face. Plaintiff does correctly note that there are certain circumstances where supervisory actions can rise to a level to constitute “personal involvement.” These circumstances may arise where “[t]he defendant may have directly participated in the infraction . . . . A supervisory official, after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, may have failed to remedy the wrong . . . . A supervisory official may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue . . . . Lastly, a supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.” Wright v. Smith, supra, 21 F.3d 501. Plaintiff fails, however, to identify any paragraph of her complaint that supports any of those recognized exceptions. 6 Plaintiff acknowledges that there are insufficient supporting allegations in her complaint by admitting that there are “new revelations” and conceding that there is a “need to amend the complaint to incorporate these facts and circumstances.” (Obj. at 11.) Plaintiff’s Objection has now been filed twice, and in the intervening time three complaints have been filed, yet none of these “new revelations” have been added to the complaint or this objection. The question still stands: when will the factual allegations that support this claim be revealed? Aside from failing to describe any constitutional violation, Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against the Commissioner because she has failed to demonstrate any supervisory actions that rise to the level of “personal involvement” as required for claims under § 1983. Despite the suggestion of new facts to support this claim, they continue to be a mystery on the face of the pleadings. CONCLUSION In sum, nothing in Plaintiff’s Objection negates the fact that her remaining claim has not been sufficiently pleaded. Plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts and cannot ask the Court to substitute presumed facts, not necessarily implied by the Complaint, in order to state a claim. Additionally, and critically, Plaintiff must plead facts that constitute a substantial preliminary showing that the Application was defective. Without this showing, all three alleged violations must fail because they can only be “violations” if the execution of the warrant was unlawful. Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim against the Commissioner clearly relies on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Plaintiff’s Objection only makes this clearer as it fails to point to any portion of the Complaint that alleges supervisory actions that rise to the level of personal involvement. For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons as more thoroughly set forth in the Memorandum in Support, State Defendants’ Motion to Strike must be granted. 7 DEFENDANTS STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE BRYAN P. HURLBURT, COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE CHARLES DELLAROCCO, STATE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER WILLIAM TONG ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ___434270_____________________________ Jonathan E. Harding Assistant Attorney General Juris No. 434270 165 Capitol Ave. Hartford, CT 06106 8 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that a copy of the forgoing Reply was delivered electronically to the following counsel and self-represented parties April 8, 2022: Nancy Burton 154 Highland Ave. Rowayton, CT 06853 NancyBurtonCT@aol.com Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq. Howd & Ludorf, LLC 65 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114 pnewbury@hl-law.com Steve Stafstrom, Esq. Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601 sstafstrom@pullcom.com James N. Tallberg, Esq. Kimberly A. Bosse, Esq. Karsten & Tallberg, LLC 500 Enterprise Dr., Suite 4B Rocky Hill, CT 06067 jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com kbosse@kt-lawfirm.com Michael D. Riseberg Christine N. Parise Rubin & Rudman, LLP 53 State Street Boston, MA 02109 MRiseberg@rubinrudman.com CParise@rubinrudman.com ____434270_________________________ Jonathan E. Harding Commissioner of the Superior Court 9 ATTACHMENT A 10