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Filing # 106762813 E-Filed 04/27/2020 11:10:19 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 18-4117 (AA)
IN RE: CIVIL COMPLAINT/ FORMER MARRIAGE
JAY R. SINGER
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
NOREEN SINGER,
Defendant/Petitioner
and
SALLY CHAZAN
Co-Defendant
EXHIBITS
FOR IMPOSITION OF
EQUITABLE LIEN
SECTION 1
CUCM. DAIAARCACUAAIINTY Cl CUADAND ANAY FLED AAINTINNAN 44-40-40 DAA
PILL. PAL DLAI BVUUINE TT, EL, OHI. DUUN, ULLIAN, Uterizuey 11. u. rg iveINDEX OF EXHIBITS DEMONSTRATING ENTITLEMENT TO RECOUP ATTORNEY FEES
AMENDED 3”? MOTION ON 2%? REMAND FOR FEES
ROSEN V ROSEN, FL. SUPREME COURT 1997
F.S.57.105 EXCERPT UNREA BLE DELAY
F.S. 57.105 COMPLETE
F.S. 95.11
ATTORNEY FEES IN MARITAL AND FAMILY LAW: AN UPDATE
MEMORANDUM OF LAW REGARDING FEE AWARDS, 1996
POLICY ARGUMENT
41 65 COMDTTNTT ATED ATT V ENEADCEN MCA ANT 1001 AGDEEN ODNLD
Ui, CUURL UNILA LORD GAD URUGY Ion ANY 1971 DGURGoY URUK
0.PET ATTORNEY SALVAGE 9-19-89 BELIES PET CENTRAL ARGUMENT THAT COHAB
CLAUSE UNRELATED TO ALIMONY, 6 WEEKS PRIOR TO MEDIATION
11. 11-30-1989 HAND-WRITTEN MEDIATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT PET
INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE FOR FJDM AS FAIR, CLEAR, UNDERSTOOD, AND FINAL.
(SEE 13)
12. MEDIATOR’S REPORT EVIDENCING COMPLETE AGREEMENT 11-30-89
13. PET MOTION TO ENFORCE MSA AS FAIR, FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND FINAL 1-23-90
14, FINAL JUDGMENT DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 2-5-90
15. PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY SALVAGE COVER LETTER FOR TYPED PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH ATTACHED PSA, POST JUDGMENT, “PURSUANT TO
WHAT WAS AGREED TO AT MEDIATION”, INCLUDING A COHABITIATION CLAUSE
TERMINATING ALIMONY UNDERMINING PETITIONER’S DEFENSE.
16. SALVAGE TYPED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREENT (PSA) PETITIONER REFUSED TO
SIGN CONTAINING EXPLICIT COHABITATION CLAUSE TERMINATING ALIMONY.
17. RESPONDENT’S MODIFIED PSA WITH CROSSOUTS DEMANDED BY PET FOR PROVISIONS
SHE DID NOT AGREE WITH, AT HEARING BEFORE ORIGINAL DIVORCE JUDGE. NO
OBJECTION OR CROSSOUTS TO COHABITATION CLAUSE.
18. JUDGE FOGEN ORDER (ORIGINAL JUDGE) COMPELLING EXECUTION OF PSA. 6-8-90
19. MOTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY AND FOR SEPARATE ACCOUNT UNTIL MOTION IS
HERAD SINCE PETITIONER WILL NOT VOLUNTARILY REPAY FOR HER BREACH OF
COHAB CLAUSE. IN FACT, SHE HAS NOT PAID AT ALL SINCE RETROACTIVE
TERMINATION IN 2009 AND MONEY JUDGMENT IN 2015. 9-19-90
20. ORDER SECURING REAL ESTATE FOR CONTINUATION OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS 12-26-90
21. PET PROPOSED AMENDED ORDER SECURING REAL ESTATE FOR CONTINUATION OF
ALIMONY PAYMENTS. 1-25-90
2NP INSTANCE OF FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT BY PET AND SUCESSOR JUDGES,
FRAUD UPON THE COURT, INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT BY ENCUMBERING
PROPERTY WITH MOTHER’S LIEN WITH FRAUDULENT BOGUS LOANS PRECLUDED
BY ORDER.
22. AGREED AMENDED ORDER SECURING PROPERTY, AUTHORIZING FILING OF LIS
TAMPA AAT DOTOTTIMMIA EAIcT nn Axton]
FENVENS AND PRDEULUULNU DINCUIWIDRANUDDS.
23. PRETRIAL STIPULATION, PET FALSELY CLAIMS COHAB CLAUSE NOT LINKED TO
ALIMONY. BRAZEN PET LIE #1: COHABITATION CLAUSE HAD NO PENALTY AND
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ALIMONY OR TERMINATION OF ALIMONY,
S YOON AW RWS24. ZIMMERMAN AFFIDAVIT: COHAB CLAUSE LINKED TO ALIMONY (RES DIVORCE
ATTORNEY)
25. REPORT OF GM LINKS COHAB CLAUSE TO ALIMONY, “CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS”
12-11-92
26. DELETED
27. REPORT OF GM WITH STIPULATION ADMITTING BREACH OF 90 DAY CUMULATIVE
DAYS OF COHABITATION. GM DENIES TERMINATING ALIMONY BY ADDING
UNAUTHORIZED TERMS TO FJDM AND PARTIES’ AGREEMENT TO RENDER CLAUSE
UNENFORCEABLE — MAKES 90 CUMULATIVE DAYS CONSECUTIVE 90 DAYS CONTRARY
TO OBVIOUS INTENT AND PLAIN LANGUAGE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. 4-8-93
28. 11° MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR INTERFERRRING WITH VISITATION 2-19-93
29. 11™ MOTION FOR CONTEMPT OF VISITATION, ORDER DEFERRED 2-22-93
30. RES MOTION TO RESUME PRIOR VISITATION AND FOR FEES 2-23-93
31. 12™ EMERGENCY MOTION CONTEMPT FOR VISITATION AND FOR FEES 3-10-93
32. PET MOTION TO TERMINATE VISITATION, FEES 6-10-93
33. JUDGE MUSSELMAN EXCERPT OF TRANSCRIPT WHERE HE FALSELY RULES PENALTY
OF TERMINATION OF ALIMONY WAS “NOT RESOLVED” ALTHOUGH “PROBABLY” WAS,
AND THAT THEREFORE BEING AN ESSENTIAL PROVISION, THE WHOLE FJDM MUST BE
RENEGOTIATED DE NOVO. 6-17-93. P 845 PET RECORD ON APPEAL 4D15-1002.
34. PET EMERGENCY MOTION TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF VISITATION 8-2-93 CHONIN
35. RES EMERGENCY MOTION TO STRIKE WIFE’S EMERG. MOT FOR TEMP SUSPENSION OF
VISITATION-CONTEMPT, FEES 8-4-93
26 AMENNEN 14TH MAT CAD CANTEMDT TEES @ A 02
OU. WIG MU PUR UU vi 1 Pa 0-7
37. MUSSELMAN ORDER GRANTING PET EXCEPTIONS 9-29-93 THAT THERE IS NO COHAB
CLAUSE MERELY BECAUSE EXACT LANGUAGE NOT AGREED TO BASED ON PET LIE
THAT COHAB NOT LINKED TO ALIMONY (DESPITE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AGREEMENT,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS, MEETING OF MINDS ON SUFFICIENT
TERMS, AND ELEVATION OF AGREEMENT TO A JUDGMENT UPON PET MOTION OF FAIR,
FINAL AND UNDERSTOOD TERMS.)
38.4DCA OPINION REVERSING MUSSELMAN, 3-22-95. “THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF THE
PROVISION IS TO PREVENT THE FORMER WIFE’S AVOIDING A TERMINATION OF HER
ALIMONY UPON REMARRIAGE SIMPLY BY LIVING WITH SOMEONE WITHOUT
MARRIAGE.” “THE AGREMENT WAS ELEVATED TO THE STATUS OF A JUDGMENT TO BE
INTERPRETED RATHER THAN A CONTRACT TO BE ENFORCED.”
39. FINAL JUDGMENT CHANGING CUSTODY FINDING PET RESPONSIBLE FOR
INTERFERRING WITH VISITATION THAT NEVER GOT ENFORCED, PARENTAL
ALIENATION, AND ORCHESTRATING A FALSE ALLEGATION OF SEX ABUSE OF
DAUGHTER AGAINST RES, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 3-23-95 PET LIE #2: THAT PET
NEVER INTERFERRED WITH VISITATION. PET LIE#3: THAT PET DID NOT ENGAGE
IN SEVERE PARENTAL ALIENATION #4: THAT RES SEXUALLY MOLESTED HIS
DAUGHTER.
40. MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZING FJ CUSTODY FINDINGS, GAL REPORT, AND
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES INVESTIGATION FINDINGS.41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
48.
49,
50.
DENYING ENTITLEMENT FEES TO PET FOR BASELESSLY LITIGATED CAUSING
“EXTENSIVE, VEXATIOUS, NEEDLESS AND EXPENSIVE LITIGATION” AND THAT TO
AWARD FEES WOULD BE A “CRIMINAL ACT”, 4-25-95
ORDER OF CLARIFICATION DENYING CLARIFIACTION RE CUSTODY-RELATED
TEMPORARY FEES PAID TO PET 5-17-95
JUDGE GREENE TRANS. 12-8-95 ZIMMERMAN RE SALVAGE LETTER AND PSA
JUDGE GREENE TRANS PART 1. 12-18-95 SALVAGE TESTIMONY RE COHAB PENALTY AS
EVIDENCED IN THE TRANSCRIPT PAGES (T) AND PET RECORD ON APPEAL (R) 4D15-1002,
(17 T, 2407 R) AND ALIMONY WAS NOT EQ DISTR (PGS 59, 63 T, 2449, 2453 R). JUDGE
REJECTS PET ARGUMENT THAT COHAB CLAUSE WAS A PROVISION TO REUNIFY AS A
WASTE OF COURT’S TIME. (P101 T, 2490 R).
JUDGE GREENE TRANS 12-18-95 Part 2, JUDGE CROSSES PET DIVORCE LAWYER SALVAGE
DIRECTLY RE PURPOSE OF COHAB CLAUSE = PERMANENT TERMINATION OF ALIMONY
(P17T)
JUDGE GREEN TRANS 12-21-95 RE EQ DISTRIBUTION, APPRAISE PRACTICE, SAVE
FORECLOSURE
. JUDGE GREENE ORDER CONSTRUING COHAB CLAUSE, REQUIRES READDRESSING THE
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION SCHEME TO REALLOCATE TERMINABLE SUPPORT
ALIMONY TO NON-TERMINATING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 6 YEARS AFTER FJDM,
DESPITE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF EQ DIST. IN MSA, UNIFORM TESTIMONY OF BOTH
DIVORCE ATTORNEYS, AND IN VIOLATION OF 4DCA DIRECTIONS ON REMAND, ALL
BASED ON PET LIE THAT ALIMONY WAS AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND NOT
STIDDADT 1.606 NOTMIENwoNC prT HE. ATTIMOANY WAC DADT OF TUT
SUEUR. ISU UU NG pe Toe FAUIYEUINE WW Ua
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, NOT SUBJECT TO TERMINATION UNDER THE
COHABITATION CLAUSE.
RES MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE GREENE 12-28-95
18T JUDGE KEONIG HEARING TO HEAR PROFFERS, TRANS. 2-12-96 WHERE JUDGE
REFUSES TO HEAR MOTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY AS DEFENSE TO CONTEMPT IN
THIS 6™ YEAR SEEKING ENFORECMENT OF SAME, NOW ON REMAND. DURING THE
HEARING, PET OBJECTIVELY ADMITS TO BREACHING THE 90 DAY COHABITATION
CLAUSE “FOR THE LAST FEW MONTHS” UNDER JUDICIAL INTERROGATION BUT
SUBJECTIVELY DENIES IT UNDER HER OWN MADE UP DEFINITION OF COHABITATION,
IRRELEVANT WHERE FINANCIAL IMPACT IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER ENFORCEMENT OF
AN AGREEMENT FOR AUTOMATIC TERMIATION UNDER CITED CASE LAW (GALE V
ROSE, ALFORD V ALFORD). JUDGE RECOGNIZES ADMISSION BUT NOT UNTIL 3 YEARS
LATER DURING THE 5-26-99 HEARING (SEE TRANSCRIPT BELOW) AND NOT UNTIL AFTER
COERCING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS IN OVERPAID ALIMONY AND
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND IMPOSING 30 DAYS OF INCARCERATION WITH FOLLOW
WEEKENDS, LIE #6: PET NEVER COHABITED WITH BOYFRIEND EVEN AFTER 6
YEARS _OF CONTINUOUS COHABITATION, STILL ENFORCING ALIMONY _ BY
CONTEMPT AND INCARCERATION AFTER 6 YEARS OF DILATORY STALL TACTICS,
AIDED BY _COURT’S_MISAPPLICATIONS OF _LAW, DISRESPECT FOR _4DCA
DIRECTIONS, AND DISRESPECT FOR RES RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREED FJDM.
EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY PENDING RECONSIDERATION FOR AUTOMATIC
TERMINATION OF ALIMONY TO PREVENT CONTINUED OVERPAYMENT, 2-19-96Si.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE INCARCERATION DUE TO PET NOW ORCHESTRATING
ANOTHER SEX ABUSE ALLEGATION AGAINST PATERNAL GRANDFATHER OF
DAUGHTER, AND CONTINUED POINSONING AND ALIENATION OF THE CHILDREN. 8-16-
96
GAL REPORT 9-2-96 CONCLUSION: “I HAVE GIVEN THIS CASE HOURS OF THOUGHT.
GIVEN THAT THERE IS ONE SUBVERSIVE PERSON DRIVING THIS WHOLE
CATASTROPHE I COULD SEE NO OTHER WAY TO HELP THIS FAMILY BUT TO
ELIMINATE AND CONTROL THE TROUBLEMAKER.”
RES EMERGENCY MOTIO TERMINATING UNSUPERVISED VISITATION. 10-6-96
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT BY FLORIDA PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEM ON PET
ALLEGATION THAT PATERNAL GRANDFATHER SEXUALY ABUSED GRANDAUGHTER.
7-27-91. “THERE ARE NO VERIFIED MALTREATMENTS IN THIS CASE. THEREFORE
THIS CASE IS CLOSED. THIS CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A LEVEL OF HARRASSENT.
IF THESE REPORTS CONTINUE IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE
EMOTIONAL ABUSE, OR FORMAL HARRASSMENT CHARGES UNDER THE NEW
PROCEDURES FOR FILING FLASE CHILD ABUSE REPORTS.”
JUDGE KEONIG ORDER STAYING ALL ECONOMIC ISSUES PENDING DECISION FROM
4DCA 6-9-97 ON TRIAL COURT’S 2“? ATTEMPT TO VOID COHABITATION CLAUSE FOR
SPURIOUS REASONS.
4DCA REVERSAL OF KEONIG ORDER FOR FAILING TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS TO
CONSTRUE COHABIATION CLAUSE 2-18-98
4DCA REVERSAL OF KEONIG ORDER FOR FAILING TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS TO
CONOTDIIE CALTADTA TION OT ATICN 9.19 00
VUINS DRUG UULIADIN LUIN ULAUSE 2710-70
JUDGE KEONIG TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 5-26-99. JUDGE NOW FINDS PET ADMISSIONS
FROM 2-12-96 HEARING CONSTITUTES AN ADMISSION OF SATISFYING THE 90 DAYS OF
COHABITATION BUT AGAIN JUDGE VIOLATES THE DIRECTIONS FROM THE 4DCA ON
REMAND AND ADDS NEW TERMS TO THE COHABITATION CLAUSE TO RENDER IT
PRACTICALLY UNENFOREABLE. ADDS FINANCIAL IMPACT REQUIREMENT (RELEVANT
ONLY UNDER MODIFICATIO PROCEEDINGS, NOT ENFORCEMENT OF A PROVISION IN FJ).
DENIES TERMINATION OF ALIMONY.
PET CHALLENGING RESPONDENT’S CUSTODY OF RES. JUDGE ENTERS ORDER
AFFIRMING CUSTODY.
. PET CONSPIRES WITH THE CHILDREN TO SABOTAGE RES CUSTODY. JUIDGE KOENING
ALLOWS PET TO KEEP CHILDREN DURING SUMMER VACATION CONTRARY TO
WARNING FROM CUSTODY TRIAL JUDGE THAT PETITIONER WILL RUIN PATERNAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHILDREN. ORDER OF 6-9-99 THIS ORDER HAD THE EFFECT OF
PERMANENTLY ENDING RES RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS CHILDREN WHO HE HAS
NOT SEEN OUTSIDE OF FAMILY FUNERALS SINCE 1999.
JUDGE KEONIG HEARING TRANSCRIPT 6-9-1999 INTRODUCING INTO EVIDENCE BOTH
PARTIES’ ATTORNEY LETTERS, CREATED AND MAILED TO PARTIES BOTH BEFORE AND
AFTER MEDIATION. LETTERS DEMONSTRATE COHABITATION CLAUSE TIED TO
ALIMONY. PET AGAIN FALSELY CLAIMS COHAB CLAUSE WAS TO REUNITE THE
PARTIES, HER ARGUMENT REJECTED BY JUDGE GREENE 4 YEARS EARLIER AS A WASTE
OF THE COURT’S TIME.62. JUDGE KEONIG ORDER 10-1-1999 ASCRIBING A MEANING TO THE COHABITATION
CLAUSE UNECESSARILY REQUIRING FINANCIAL IMPACT REQUIREMENT DEVIATING
FROM THE MANDATE.
63. JUDGE TUTOR SUA SPONTE RECUSAL BECAUSE HE MISINTERPRETED THE PLEADINGS
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE COHABITATION CLAUSE AS AN _ UNECESSARY
MODIFICATION PROCEEDING WHERE ALIMONY WAS NOT BEING ENFORCED, RATHER
THAN AN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING REQUIRING PAYBACK OF OVERPAID ALIMONY.
12-15-06. JUDGE’S CONCLUSION IS FALSIFIED BY RESPONDENT’S MONEY JUDGMENT
FOR OVERPAID ALIMONY.
64. TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS LANG AND DUNN- CONFIRMING
COHABITAITON. 7-26-07
65. SURVEILLANCE REPORT AND EVIDENCE OF COHABITATION AND DECEITFUL ACTS OF
PET AND BOYFRIEND TO CONSEAL AND COVER UP THE COHABITATION. EVIDENCE
AND TESTIMONY THAT BOYFRIEND DID IN FACT RECEIVE HIS MAIL AT HOME OF
PETITIONER DURING 1993 SURVEILLANCE, LIE #7: EVIDENCES PET PERJURY AT 2-12-
1996 HEARING THAT BOYFRIEND DID NOT RECEIVE MAIL AT PET HOUSE. RES
WRONGFULLY INCARCEREATED ON BASIS OF THIS PERJURY BY PET.
66. JUDGE BIRKEN SUA SPONTE RECUSAL BECAUSE HE MISINTERPRETED THE PLEADINGS
FALSELY STATING THAT THERE WAS NO GENINE MONETARY BASIS FOR PROCEDINGS,
JUST HARASSEMENT. JUDGE’S CONCLUSION IS FALSIFIED BY RESPONDENT’S MONEY
JUDGMENT FOR OVERPAID ALIMONY.
67. JUDGE HOROWITZ HEARING TRANSCRIPT 5-15-2009, CENSURING PETITIONER FOR
DDINGAING OOITNDEN TOA UTADING WINTT CONTINTING TOT DADENTAT
DININUING UNLUUALIT PU UDA Wy UU UG I
ALIENATION.
68. JUDGE HOROWITZ SUA SPONTE VACATION OF JUDGE KEONIG 10-1-1999 TEMPORARY
ORDER ENGRAFTING WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION A FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE
COHABITATION CLAUSE. CONTRARY TO FS. 61.14.
69. JUDGE HOROWITZ FINAL ORDER 5-26-2009:
a. VACATED JUDGE KEONIG ORDER STATING:
“THE COURT BELIEVES THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND CLAUSE OF THE
MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. IT IS
NOT THE ROLE OF THE COURTS TO CREATE AMBIGUITY OR CONFUSION TO
THAT WHICH HAS CLARITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE ORDER F JUDGE KEONIG
DATED OCTOBEI, 1999, Is HEREBY VACATED.”
b. THE ORDER FURTHER PROVIDED THAT THE ALIMONY WAS TERMINATED
RETROACTIVELY TO NOVEMBER 30, 1991. THUS, If TOOK 19 YEARS TO
CONSTRUE THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS PROVISION OF THE FJDM AND
ENFORCE THE 1990 MOTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY BECAUSE OF
PETIONER’S UNSUPPORTED CLAIMS AND BRAZEN LIES ENUMERATED
ABOVE.
70.MOTION TO AMEND JUDGE HOROWITZ ORDER WHICH DID NOT CONTAIN A
RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION TO RECOVER THE OVERPAID ALIMONY. 5-30-2009.
71. JUDGE HOROWITZ RECUSED BY PETITIONER. 6-10-199972.4DCA THIRD REVERSAL. JUDGE HOROWITZ REVERSED FOR NOT INCLUDING A
RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AS PLEAD FOR THE REFUND OF WRONFULLY
DEFRAUDED AND EXTORTED OVERPAID ALIMONY.
73. AMENDED MOTION ON REMAND FOR THE REPAYMENT OF OVERPAID ALIMONY WITH
INTEREST AND TO FIND ENTITLEMENT TO FEES. 6-21-2013.
74. JUDGE LOPANE ORDERS FOR REPAYMENT OF ALIMONY AND ENTITLEMENT TO FEES
RELATED TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE COHABITATION CLAUSE AND THE MARCH 23, 1995
CUSTODY CHANGE ORDER. 2-12-2015.
75. 4DCA DECISION AFFIRMING ALIMONY AWARD. CHALLENGE TO FEE ENTITLEMENT FOR
RESPONDENT WAS PREMATURE. REMAND FOR DETERMINATION OF PETITIONER’S
ENTITLEMENT TO FEES AND THE AMOUNT OF RESPONEDENT’S ENTITLEMENT. 3-1-2017
76. JUDGE FAHNESTOCK ORDER CLOSING CASE 3-16-2018
77. ADCA DECISION REVFERSING JUDGE FAHNESTOCK. 7-3-2019
78. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF JUDICIAL CODES OF ETHICS.
a. ITIS CERTAINLY A VIOLATION OF CODE 3B8 REQUIRING ALL JUDICIAL MATTERS
BE DISPOSED OF PROMPTLY, EFFICIEINTLY AND FAIRLY WHERE IT TAKES 19
YEARS TO ENFORCE A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS FROVISION IN A FINAL
JUDGEMENT, REPEATEDLY VOIDED AND ALTERED AS TO RENDER
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRARY TO THE DIRECTIONS FROM THE HIGHER COURT,
AND 30 PLUS YEARS TO UNWIND THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE FLAWED.
b. THE HISTORY OF THIS CASE WITH RESPECT TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE
COHABITAITON CLAUSE, FEES AND VISITATION EVIDENCES A PATTERN OF
PURPOSEFUL VIOLATION OF CODE 384 REQUIRING IMPARTIAL ADIUDICATION
WITHOUT REGARD TO SEX AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS. IN THIS CASE, THE
POST-DISSOLUTION ENFORCEMENT OF AN AGREED JUDGMENT AND ORDERS
WAS NECESSITATED WHOLLY BY THE EGREGIOUS AND OBVIOUSLY FRIVOLOUS,
BASELESS, VEXATIOUS, AND HARRASSING ASSERTIONS AND PLEADINGS OF THE
PETITIONER. DESPITE THIS FACT, THE RESPONDENT WAS PUNISHED
FINANCIALLY WHERE ABILITY TO PAY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RELEVANT,
AND SUFFERED THE ALIENATION OF HIS CHILDREN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE AND
BELATED PROTECTION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS.
c. THE MULTIPLE UNECESSARY SUA SPONTE RECUSALS IN THIS CASE, AFTER
WASTING SEVERAL HEARINGS INVOLVING WITNESSES, WAS A VIOLATION OF
CODES 3B1, 3B4, AND 3B8 REQUIRING HEARING AND DECISION OF CASES;
IMPARTIAL PERFORMANCE; AND PROMPT, EFFICIENT AND FAIR DISPOSITION OF
JUDICIAL MATTERS RESPECTIVELY.
d, THE ADDITIONS TO FLORIDA STATUTES 39.025 (1999), 57.105 (1997), 61.14 (1)B
(2005), AND THE CHILD CUSTODY REFORMS FOR TERMINOLOGY AND TIME
SHARING (2008) UNDERSCORE THE BAD POLICY AND ABUSE THE RESPONDENT
HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO IN THE MISADJUDICAITON OF FEES, THE
COHABITAITON CLAUSE, VISITATION AND IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ABUSE
ALLEGATIONS.
80. MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF FORECLOSUREFiling # 92887255 E-Filed 07/21/2019 01:03:12 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA
PAOD NIA. 00 £120 1962)
VASE INU. 09-0100 (29)
IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF:
NOREEN SINGER,
Petitioner/ Former Wife,
TAV PTICCHTT SINGER
RUS Suu SUN,
Respondent/ Former Husband
/
AMENDED THIRD MOTION, ON SECOND REMAND,
FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
COMES NOW THE FORMER HUSBAND (F/H) and moves this Honorable Court on a second
remand to enter an award of attorneys’ fees and costs based on fees expended to his own attorneys (paid
and still owing) and those to the former Wife’s (F/W) attorneys during this 30 year-long, 60-volume,
over-litigated case and as grounds states as follows:
1) This Court Noticed a special set hearing for March 18, 2018 to hear both parties’ respective motions
for fees and costs. The Notice also included F/H’s Motion to execute on his money judgment against
F/W’s real property on a reservation of jurisdiction for same. Exhibit 1.
2) Five days prior to the scheduled hearing, this Court sua sponte canceled the hearing and entered an
Order closing the case while finding that the 15" Judicial Circuit was the proper venue and a more
convenient forum. The Order was entered without notice or motion regarding convenience or
changing venue relating to the attorney fee motions (which both parties requested be held in the same
17" Circuit venue they litigated in since the inception of the case), and without a pending motion to
close the case. Exhibit 2.
3) The F/H filed a Motion for rehearing/reconsideration noting the above facts, while also pointing out
that the 60-volume record was in the present Broward Circuit, that the subpoenaed attorneys set to
14)
4)
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6)
7)
8)
testify all worked and/or lived in Broward, and that resetting their appearances in Palm Beach County
was not convenient to anyone. Nevertheless, the Motion was denied.
The Order was appealed and recently reversed with respect to the attorney fee motions. The 4DCA
opinion took pains to reference all the appeals and reversals that have been necessary to lawfully and
equitably adjudicate this case. Exhibit 3.
Tha Mandate dirante thie Canrt ta addeace B/W%o faa matiane in ananrdanca urith Hlarida Dulac of
Procedure, Florida law, and the opinion of the 4DCA. Exhibit 4.
Former Husband invokes all his allegations from his prior motions for fees and costs, and attaches
them hereto and incorporates them herein. Exhibits 6 and 7.
On February 12, 2015, a predecessor judge in this circuit entered an Order finding entitlement to fees
and costs due to the long history of the FW’s baseless and vexatious litigation. The Order reserved
jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees the Husband was entitled to on all matters relating to his
post-dissolution efforts to terminate alimony and to defend against F/W’s claims resulting in this
Court’s March 23, 1995 Final Order for Custody. Exhibit 5:
6. Furthermore Former Husband is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs on all
matters relating to his post-dissolution efforts to terminate alimony, and to defend against
the Former Wife’s claims resulting in this Court’s March 23, 1995 Final Judgment for
custody, due to Former Wife’s frivolous, vexatious, and litigious conduct. See Metler v.
Metler, 519 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4DCA 1988); §57.105, Florida Statutes, Former Wife’s
conduct resulted in needless litigation and legal fees.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
A. Jurisdiction is reserved for the Court to determine and award the Former Husband his
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on all matters relating to his post-dissolution
efforts to terminate alimony, and to defend against the Former Wife’s claims resulting
in this Court’s March 23, 1995 Final Judgment for custody.
The Petitioner Former Wife (F/W) appealed the February 12, 2015 Order and the 4DCA affirmed the
money judgment finding her arguments without merit. The panel also ruled that the order granting
F/H’s entitlement to fees was not appealable because the trial court had not yet determined the amount
that the F/H was entitled to. Singer v. Singer, 4D15-1002, (Also see reference in Exhibit 3 opinion).9) Accordingly, and for all the foregoing, F/H requests the resetting of the 2.5 hour hearing on fees and
costs, along with prejudgment interest, to be reset expeditiously, preferably on a Friday.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the F/H requests that this Honorable Court finds that the Wife
and her attorneys are mutually responsible and liable for their bad-faith, completely unsupported delay-
tactic litigation, with specificity under 57.105 and 61.16. The F/H seeks an Order for same and for the
Court to enter a judgment for fees and costs reimbursable to the Husband by the Former Wife and her
attorneys related to the enforcement of the Final Judgment/Divorce Decree provisions regarding the
alimony, cohabitation clause, equitable distribution, children “visitation”, and for the defense of the false
abuse allegations raised by the F/W as addressed in the March 23, 1995 Custody Judgment.
THEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by e-service to Noreen Singer,
21311 Millbrook Court, Boca Raton, FL 33434 at legalnornor@gmail.com, this 21" day of July, 2019.
Jay R. Singer, Pro Se
715 Pelican Lane,
Lantana FL 33462
W 954 757 6453
C954 254 9595
F 954 757 6161
drsinger@singersmiles.com
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BY /8_y >
JAY RUSSELL SINGEREXHIBIT 1IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORA
ae,
IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: CASENO: COCE 89-6168
NOREEN SINGER,
DIVISION: 35
Petitioner,
And JUDGE: FABIENNE E. FAHNESTOCK
JAY RUSSELL SINGER,
Respondent.
/
NOTICE OF HEARING
(SPRCTAT. SET PD 7 ARMY rarmo
Se nen ines Vase Asso Nae fz EO UERD,
TO: Noreen Singer
Jay Singer
‘YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the undersigned Judge will hear in’ Courtroom
11166 at the Broward County Courthouse, 201. S.E. 6" Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida on
Monday, March 19", 2018 at 1:30 p.m. the following:
1. FORMER HUSBAND’S MOTION FOR FEES & COSTS
2, FORMER HUSBAND’S MOTION ON REMAND FOR FEES & COSTS AND
TO DENY FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR FEES & COSTS
FORMER WirE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
APPELLATE ORDERS OF MARCH 1, 2017
be
4, AMENDED INTERRELATED MOTIONS ON REMAND FOR FORECLOSURE
’ OF EXTANT SECURITY LIEN AND IMPOSITION AND FORECLOSURE OF
*“ EQUITABLE LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY IN EXECUTION OF THIS COURT’S
FEBRUARY 12, 2015 MONEY JUDGMENT
Done and ordered in Chambers in Ft. Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this
of December, 2017.
CIRCUIT JUDGEEXHIBIT 2instr# 114950592 + Page 1 of' 1, Recorded 03/15/2018 ati
Broward, County Commission
#«** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY: FL: Breiida'D;.Fornidit? CLERK 3/14/2018'12:29:48 F
:IN THE CIRCUIT. COURT: OF: THE’
‘SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
‘AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA
‘CASE NO: CACE:89-006168 3}
NOREEN SINGER,
Petitionet/Former Wife,
VS
UJAY-SINGER,
‘Respondent/Former Husband:
1 -
‘ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION. TO CONSIDER THE...
_RELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICT! TON.REGARDING THE PALM BEACH COUNTY
HOMESTEAD PROPERTY MOTION TO RESET ALL MOTIONS SET FOR>
MARCH 19, 2018 FOR: a ONE-DAY OR ‘TWO-DAY OR THREE-DAY HEARING TO,
INALIZE ALL PENDING ISSUES:
THIS ‘CAUSE «was; considered by the: Court: onthe Petitionér's Motion to ‘Consider’ the
Relinquishment of Jurisdiction Regarding the: Palm Beach County Homestead Property Motion:to Reset
‘All. Motions ‘Set for: March 19,2018 for a One-Day or Two-Day or Three-Day Hearing, to Finalize All
Pending issues, ihe couRT having considered the grounds for the Motion; the court’s.file in Singer v.
Singer, Broward County Case no: CACE17-17137; and considered the applicable law, it'is
ORDERED AND. ADJUDGED 23 follows:
The Motion is GRANTED. ‘Pursuant to, Florida Statute sec..47-122, the Court finds that the’
Fiftcenth Judicial Circuit'in Palm Beach County is the proper.venue for this case and is a more convenient
forum for the dispute., This'case is ‘closed.
DONE:AND ORDERED i in Chambers at Broward: rch’ 14; 2018:
FABIENNE FAHNESTOCK, CIRCUIT.JUDGE:
Copies furnished: In Open Court
Filed tn: Open* Court,
“CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT:COURT iEXHIBIT 3Dramoram Caren omar An Trim Omamn On Dr anim.
DISINILE VUURL OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
JAY RUSSELL SINGER,
Appellant,
v.
NOREEN SINGER,
Appellee.
No. 4D18-1170
[July 3, 2019]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Fabienne Fahnestock, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-89-
006168(35).
Jay Russell Singer, Lantana, pro se.
Noreen Singer, Boca Raton, pro se.
Gross, J.
This appeal arises from an order entered after final judgment in a 1990
dissolution of marriage case.! On May 26, 2009, the circuit court found
that because the former wife had violated a cohabitation clause in the
marital settlement agreement, she should not have received alimony after
November 30, 1991.
Most of the litigation after 2009 has involved the former husband’s
attempt to recover the overpaid alimony. In February 2015, the circuit
court entered a final judgment for $285,412 of overpaid alimony; the court
also ruled that the former husband was entitled to recover attorney’s fees
under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2015), and reserved jurisdiction to
determine and award fees and costs.
1 This case has generated 25 proceedings in this court and six reported opinions.
See Singer v. Singer, 219 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Singer v. Singer, 211
So. 3d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Singer v. Singer, 38 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA
2010); Singer v. Singer, 706 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Singer v. Cochran,
685 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1995).The wifa annanled the Pahruarnr 9018 indamant We affirmed tha
ane Wue appeaca uit sCoruary avid juagmeni. we auimca uit
judgment but ruled that the attorney’s fee issue was not appealable
because the circuit court had not yet determined the amount of fees to
which the former husband was entitled. Singer, 211 So. 3d at 154-55.
By 2017, the case was back in the family court. The parties filed a
flurry of motions directed at attorney's a —_ other issues. Meanwhile,
counties which sought to collect on the February 2015 judgment. After
another round of motions, in March 2018, the family court judge
transferred the case to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County
because it was a “more convenient forum for the dispute,” and closed the
Broward County family court file.
Unen thnen wenn an mating (1) aanleine a whanen nfeein ION nAdennninn
Mee, WETE WAS HO MGUSN (41) SCEKINE a CHANE Si VETUE, (2) AGaTEssing
the issue of the most convenient forum, (3) requesting that the family court
case be closed, or (4) seeking the dismissal of any pending motion. The
former wife suggested only that the court “relinquish jurisdiction” over
motions directed at title to her home in Palm Beach County. The former
husband was not on notice that the circuit court was considering a forum
non conveniens issue or closing the case. Closing a case or ordering a
change Of Venue Without HOticE is 4 Gea of due process. Seé Grasso wv.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 204 So. 3d 139, 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); McDaniel
Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E Consultants, Inc. 39 So. 3d 504, 511
(Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Utilicore Corp. v. Bednarsh, 730 So. 2d 853
(Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461
So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Wei TEVETSE tne Maren 2018 or aer, rémana ine case to tne arcuit cour 1,
and direct that the circuit court hear and decide the former husband’s
pending motions pertaining to attorney’s fees. We affirm the remaining
issues on appeal without discussion.
May and Damoorcian, JJ., concur.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.EXHIBIT 4M A N D A T E
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
This cause having been brought to the Court by appeal, and after due
consideration the Court having issued its opinion;
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that such further proceedings be had in said
cause as may be in accordance with the opinion of this Court, and with the rules of
procedure and laws of the State of Florida.
WITNESS the Honorable Spencer D. Levine, Chief Judge of the District Court of
Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, and seal of the said Court at West Palm
Beach, Florida on this day.
DATE: July 19, 2019
CASE NO.: 18-1170
COUNTY OF ORIGIN: Broward
T.C. CASE NO.: CACE-89-006168 (35)
STYLE: JAY RUSSELLSINGER yv. NOREEN SINGER
Served:
cc: Noreen Singer Jay Russell Singer
Clerk Broward
krEXHIBIT 5ay
IN, THE, CIRCUIT'COURT. OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. IN.AND:
"FOR. BROWARD.COUNTY, FLORIDA
‘Petitioner/: Former’ Wife,
sand:
JAY RUSSELL SINGER,
: . Respondent/: ‘Former Husband:
FINAL ORDER:
THIS ‘MATTER! came: before “the: Court ion remand. from ‘the: 4th ‘District ‘Court: of '
counsel ‘Alan Jay Braverman; CPA Jolin Passariello + and the}
‘testimony, of the witnesses, having-reviewed ‘all-of the exhibit
notice‘of the entire file and’ Ye ed the nertinent items there
ed'the nertinent items ther
d'in the premises; the’ Court makes'the following:
FINDINGS Of FACT.AND CONCLUSIONS OF.LAW:
le
The certified report from the microfiche file from the Suipport Enforceniént Division for
Broward County, now Support Depository‘of the Broward: Clerk.of Court; for: December 1991-exactness.; The FormerHusband’s requ
shih following Novetnber 20, 19913):
“that StL 48 aiward
pre 1 dgment interest’on' support arrearages:
-4. Additionally, the:amount of iitérest dite, was con
lusively-provén from’ the.evidence:entei
trial, A; John’, Passariello’ testified:regarding:: interest” calculations: on the: principal! . He:
‘computed the'statutory simple interést accrucd through Jantiary:20, 2015"
thé Tontli Of December. 1991 10 be. $4,283! The“accrued interest ‘on'thevalinony: paid ini 1992,
1993, 1994, "1995, “and [1996 through January 20, 2015. wai
$48,775; $39,280; $40,156;'$5,350; and $40,793.’ Theso
“55 | THe total of:
id: ‘aliniony: ($106,775.00) atid interést’:on thé overpaid alimony;
of Jamiary 20,2015.
usions of lav, it isihereby:wt
1991 ‘authorization of:a-filing-of lis:pendens: precluding sale-or:
‘encumbrance of the Former Wi
é Shall remain in’ effect. pending:
dtéss: 18 715 Pelican’ Lane,.-Lantana;-
Florida; 33462;-shall' recover from: Petitioner’ Former; Wife, whose principle; address As:
21311 Millbrook Court, Boca ‘Raton, Florida 33498; the’ suin of-$285;412:00" which:
‘amount shall: bear-interest:at.the legal rate established pursuant:to section 55:03; Florida:
‘yi 2015. NICHOLAS R. LOPANE::
-A-TRUE COPY:
aoe ee FEB 2-20
Circuit Judge, NICHOLAS. LOPANE: 0
¢ it, Jay R: Singer; pro.s¢* er
“Counsel of-record for Petitioner/Former WifeEXHIBIT 6IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 89-6168 (35)
IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF:
NOREEN SINGER,
Petit
ner/ Former Wife,
JAY RUSSELL SINGER,
Respondent/ Former Husband
/
FORMER HUSBAND’S MOTIONS ON REMAND FOR FEES AND COSTS AND TO
DENY FORMER WIFE’S MOTIONS FOR FEES AND COSTS
FORMER HUSBAND moves for fees and costs and to deny Former Wife’s motions for fees
and costs dated April 7 2017 and states as follows:
1, The new judge on this case must initially understand that this case, 27 years old with over 60
volumes, is one of the most egregiously prosecuted, litigated and mis-adjudicated post-
dissolution enforcement cases in the circuit.
2. The travesty of what has occurred on this case has been due primarily to the utterly baseless,
vexatious, frivolous, bad-faith, fraudulent, vindictive, malicious, litigious and otherwise
inequitable conduct of the Former Wife as found by multiple predecessor judges.
3. The present posture of this case, on remand for the fourth time in favor of the Respondent,
[Singer v. Singer, 38 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 4DCA 2010); 4D15-1002] is for the execution on Former
Husband’s money judgment (February 12" , 2015 Order) to reimburse him for the overpayment
of alimany Alen an ramand ic far the trial eaurt ta detarmine tha amaunt of raimbhurcahle
Or Gumony, 450, Ch TemanG iS rr ure ida Cour iw Gciermine ure amouny C1 reimioursacie
attorneys’ fees and costs, the predecessor judge already having found entitlement in the February
12, 2015 order.
4. Also on remand from the 4D15-1002 appeal, is the Wife’s motion to determine entitlement to
fees which motion was denied by the predecessor judge but which ruling was reversed on a
technical procedural ground, not merit. All seven of Former Wife’s substantive points on appeal
were denied as having “no merit”. Fla. 4DCA Case number 4D15-1002, March 1, 2017.5. From 1990 to 2009, which latter date marks when the court finally terminated alimony
reiroactively to 1991, the Respondent overpaid approximaiely 500 thousand dollars in alimony
(300K+ with interest) and associated attorneys’ fees. The overpayment was caused by the fact
that the Petitioner repeatedly lied about the cohabitation clause as well as her breach thereof over
the course of many years, and zealously enforced the alimony while living with her long-term
paramour contrary to F.S. §61.149(1)(b) and despite her agreement to the cohabitation clause she
incorporated into the divorce decree.
6. The Respondent expended another approximately 500 thousand dollars to enforce his
visitation and defend a malicious and baseless child molestation allegation related to the parties’
daughter. Because of the frustration of visitation, parental alienation, and baseless abuse
allegation, the court awarded the Respondent full custody of the parties’ two children in 1995.
7. The Former Husband first filed his motion to terminate alimony in September of 1990. He
now has a money judgment but has been reimbursed zero. So far, there has been a 27-year delay
due directly to the misrepresentations, lies and dilatory tactics of the Former Wife. Florida
Statutes §57.105(3) contains the following language:
“At any tim
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any action taken by the
opposing party, including, but not limited to, the filing of any pleading or
part thereof, the assertion of or response to any discovery demand, the
assertion of any claim or defense, or the response to any request by any
other party, was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the
court shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, which may including attorney’s fees, and
other loss resulting from the improper delay.”
n anv civil nroc
nm any civil proc
ding or action in which the moving nartv
ding or action in which the moving party
8. Now despite the above, the Former Wife brazenly and shamelessly seeks fees and costs related
to her appeal and associated litigation, that she lost, related to the entry of the 2015 money
judgment. This is unconscionable where 1) the appeal was found to have no merit on all seven
YN a. DM 4.
2) we rw ae
through a series of meritless and unethical dilatory tactics, where 3) the money judgment
properly unwound decades of dishonest litigation on the part of the Former Wife, where 4) she
has paid nothing to satisfy the judgment, and when 5) she fraudulently conveyed her assets to
defraud the creditor Former Husband contrary to court orders. Awarding fees under these
circumstances would be tantamount to rewarding a fraud, upon a fraud upon a fraud.9. The predecessor judge found in his February 12, 2015 Order:
3. Additionally, irom an equity sianapoint, ine overpaymenis were wrongty
coerced, obtained, and retained by the Former Wife, over the course of
many years due to her very extensive pattern of baseless and vexatious
litigation, as found by the Court in the March 23, 1995 Final Judgment
for custody, as reflected by the court file, and as testified to by attorney
Braverman. (court’s emphasis)
4 Drvethrwe nen Downe Urchand in antitind tn nn nerned Af attnenatin frac
6, PuruiciMore Forme? MuSvaiG iS Chuuea 16 ai aWara Gi atlormey’S ices
and costs on all matters relating to his post-dissolution efforts to terminate
alimony, and to defend against the Former Wife’s frivolous, vexatious and
litigious conduct. See Mettler v Mettler, 519 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4DCA 1988);
§57.105 Florida Statutes. Former Wife’s conduct resulted in needless
litigation and legal fees.
10. In its April 25, 1995 Order denying Former Wife’s entitlement to fees related to the 3 week
child custody trial, this court found:
The Father replies that although that statute does exist and there are cases
in support of same, there are a trilogy of cases in the 4" District Court of
Appeal, as well as several other cases in the State of Florida, that
contravene this standard position when certain additional situation are
involved. These include, among other, situations where a party baselessly
litigates and causes unnecessary expenditures and fees or where a litigious
party’s conduct unnecessarily engenders a pattern of extensive, vexatious,
needless and expensive litigation. These cases go on to hold that the
requesting party should NOT [court’s emphasis] be entitled to fees and suit
monies even though that party’s earing capacity is poor and extremely
disproportionate to the opponents.
in this particular case, Mother sought to terminate the Father's visitation
rights with the children by legal means after having precluded the Father
from visitation with his son for a period of 2-1/2 years and after accusing
the Father of physically molesting his daughter and causing Court ordered
supervised visitation of the daughter, as well as attempting to alienate the
children form the Father.
The Father Counter-Petitioned for custody of the children. Fourteen days
Of fOD-JuiY tial OK place With ie Testi inal inis Court awaraed sole
custody of the children to the Father. [court’s emphasis]
The Mother has incurred fees approximating $130,000 and costs in
excess of $10,000 and now wishes to appeal this Courts Order.
Having been the trier of fact and having considered all of the above, this
Court reaches the conclusion that notwithstanding the alleged fact that the
Mother is incapable to (sic) paying her expenses, that it would be
ot fae thie Canet tr nedax tha Dathar ta catiofe tha
Dt kOr US VOUrL tO Oruer ule rauler vO Sauis1y ule
aamalatalyunfaie and 1
Compeicy unuair anaMother’s expenses and in this Court’s mind it would border on being a
criminal act to make such an award.
11. The Former Husband is seeking to mitigate the damages unjustly thrust upon him over the
course of these proceedings not aggravate them. The money judgment for overpaid alimony has
finally been adjudicated and held up on appeal and is now resolved in 2017 as the custody issue
was resolved in 1995, Now the Former Wife seeks a fee award on the alimony trial and appeal
as she did following the custody trial. To borrow a quote from the custody judge, “it would
border on being a criminal act to make such an award”.
11. In fact, entitlement is precluded under these circumstances under F.S. §61.16 and §57.105.
The correct standard is not ability to pay or financial ability as urged by the Former Wife, but
rather the fact that the Petitioner is the noncompliant party under multiple final judgments and
orders entered on this case (1990, 1991, 1995, 2010, 2015) and has litigated frivolously,
baselessly and vexatiously in both the trial and appellate levels. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697,
699 (Fla. 1997). All four appeals on the alimony issue on this case were entered in favor of the
Respondent and the fifth is pending.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Former husband requests the following:
1. To deny the Former Wife entitlement to any and all fees and costs associated with or
related directly or indirectly to the entry and appeal of the February 11th, and 12" 2015
orders of this court.
2. To award fees expended and costs incurred in the enforcement of the cohabitation clause
and the motion to terminate alimony, and related custody issues, that the Former Wife
and her attorneys be jointly held liable for their bad-faith litigation, and that fees already
paid to the Former Wife’s former attorneys be subject to partial or full refund consistent
with the evidence presented in a prospective evidentiary hearing.
3. That the Court reserve jurisdiction to enforce its ruling herein.ADDENDUM AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
1) The F/H was coerced to pay attorneys’ fees for the Wife and for himself totaling several
hundreds of thousands of dollars, both in the enforcement of the final judgment’s
cohabitation clause and the related issue of enforcing his visitation under the final
judgment. (See Final Judgment for custody change of March 25, 1995).
2) The baseless and vexatious nature of the defense waged by the Wife and her attorneys’
over the course of 27 years was aided and abetted by a series of unlawful and abusive
rulings as found by the May 26, 2009 final order:
This Court believes the Final Judgment and Clause of the
mediated settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous. It is
not the role of the Courts to create ambiguity or confusion to
that which has clarity. Accordingly, the order of Judge Koenig
dated October 1, 1999, is hereby vacated.
The initial alimony award was clearly subject to the cohabitation
clause. The Former Wife’s argument that she should not be
bound by the stipulations of her counsel as to her cohabitation is
without merit. An attorney may stipulate to matters on behalf of
a client and the parties are held to their counsel’s stipulation.
This is the case in every non-verified pleading that an attorney
filac an hohalf nf a oliant
TheS Of Cena OF 2 Cuca,
The Former Wife satisfies the clear language of the cohabitation
clause set forth in the mediated agreement per stipulation of her
then counsel.
3. While Florida Statute 61.16 establishes a general standard for entitlement to attorney’s fees
based on financial need and ability to pay, the applicable standard for enforcement actions’,
such as he instant case to enforce the final judgment cohabitation clause and visitation, is
' It is crucial in this regard, that the court recognizes that the automatic termination of alimony
under an agreed-upon cohabitation clause incorporated into the final judgment is an enforcement
nraceedina where the mera avictance of the enhahitatinn anvernc and nat a modificatinn
PLCCeCGng Walere ure Mere Caine Ci ure COnaonauon governs, ana Nov a MoGuicaucn
proceeding based on a material and substantial change in circumstances where financial impact
governs.prevailing party. Harrison v. Gattozzi, 992 So.2d 865 (2008), Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So, 2d 697
(Fla. 1997). Florida Statute § 61.16 provides in pertinent part that:
Attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. (1) The court may
from time to time, after considering the financial resources of
both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for
attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of
maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter,
including enforcement and modification proceedings and
appeals. In_those_cases_in which an action is brought for
enforcement and the court finds that the noncompliant party is
without justification in the refusal to follow _a court order, the
court may not award attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs to the
noncompliant nartv. An annlication for attornev’s fees. suit
gS Spas Un SRE 2 ASSES Soe
money, or costs, whether temporary or otherwise, shall not
require corroborating expert testimony in order to support an
award under this chapter. The trial court shall have continuing
jurisdiction to make temporary attorney’s fees and costs awards
reasonably necessary to prosecute or defend an appeal on the
same basis and criteria as though the matter were pending before
it at the trial ievei. in ali cases, the court may order that the
amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the
order in that attorney’s name.
4. Florida Statute §57.105 sets forth the law relating to attorney’s fees and sanctions for
Attorney’s fee; sanctions for raising unsupported claims or
defenses; exceptions; service of motions; damages for delay of
litigation.
(1)Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the
eauet chall award a raacnnahla attarnaw’e faa inaludina
court Snau award a rasonaoie attormey's ee, incicing
prejudgment interest, to be paid to the prevailing party in equal
amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney on
any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or
action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing
party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or
defense when initially presented to the court or at any time
before trial:(a)Was not supported by the material facts necessary to
establish the claim or defense: or
(b)Would not be supported by the application of then-
existing law to those material facts.
(2)At any time in any civil proceeding or action in which
the moving party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
any action taken by the opposing party, including, but not limited
to, the filing of any pieading or part thereof, the assertion of or
response to any discovery demand, the assertion of any claim or
defense, or the response to any request by any other party, was
taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the court
shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include
attorney’s fees, and other loss resulting from the improper delay.
5. The Wife’s attorneys knew of the Wife’s cohabitation and prior stipulated breach of the
cohabitation clause of July 23, 1992 during their meritless defense of the cohabitation clause
breach and were thus precluded from receiving fees directly from the F/H which was
awarded and paid. Attorneys who litigate in bad faith are precluded from receiving fees.
Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2002), Diaz v. Diaz, 727 So. 2d 954, (Fla.
1998)
6. Shaw v. Shaw, 816 So. 2d 540; 2002 Fla. is instructive:
The trial court has failed to articulate a sufficient basis for its award of
attorney's fees under Rosen. Further, since the father prevailed in
appealing from the erroneous initial ex parte relocation order, and has
only properly sought access to his child, the record clearly does not
support an award of fees applicable to that part of the litigation.
For these reasons, I would also disapprove the Fourth District's decision
insofar as it upholds the award of all attorney's fees to the mother in this
case, contrary to well-established law in this State. Here, the father is
being improperly punished contrary to any notion of justice because he
sought appellate review of an erroneous order and was successful in
having the error corrected. In my view, the record does not have even a
hint of support for an award of fees under Rosen.
e’s defense of the
7. it is now apparent, based on the May 26, 2009 Finai Order, that the
enforcement of the cohabitation clause and prosecution for alimony, contempt, and attorney’sfees, even subsequent to her admitted breach thereof, was unjustified as contemplated by F.S.
61.14(ij(b) and 57.105. The aitempis by the F/'W and her aitorneys io defeat ihe constrainis
of the cohabitation clause was uniformly in bad faith under statutes and case law. She and her
attorneys should be jointly held responsible for the attorney’s fees incurred by the F/H in this
enforcement action as well as being required to return fees already paid to the attorneys
directly by the F/H.
8. Florida Family Rule of Civil Procedure 12.525 that governs motions for costs and
attorney’s fees provides that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 (30 day rule) shall not
apply in Family Court proceedings.
9. The F/H_ is requesting entitlement of reimbursement from the former attorneys of the
former Wife of fees paid to them to enforce continuation of alimony payments, which they
did zealously despite their knowledge of the breach of the cohabitation clause. Although
those fee orders were entered in the 1990s by predecessor judges in this circuit, the lapse of
time does not preclude reimbursement with interest since the final judgment on the
cohabitation clause has yet to be entered and it is this latter judgment that triggers the rule
and starts the clock. Doug Hambel’s Plumbing, Inc. v. Conway, 883 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2004). In this latter case, although the motion for fees was filed more than 30 days after
the initial judgment, the Fourth District concluded that denial on that basis was improper
because the plaintiff did not have a right to fees until it was awarded the lien in the second
judgment, Similarly, in the present case, the amount of overnaid alimony and entitlement to
fees has yet to be adjudicated under remand. Therefore, this Motion by the F/H for
reimbursement of fees already court-ordered and paid by the F/H before the completion of
the adjudication of the underlying alimony/cohabitation case on the merits, is timely.
10. The inequitable conduct, baseless
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Filing # 106762813 E-Filed 04/27/2020 11:10:19 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO.: 18-4117 (AA) IN RE: CIVIL COMPLAINT/ FORMER MARRIAGE JAY R. SINGER Plaintiff/Respondent vs. NOREEN SINGER, Defendant/Petitioner and SALLY CHAZAN Co-Defendant EXHIBITS FOR IMPOSITION OF EQUITABLE LIEN SECTION 1 CUCM. DAIAARCACUAAIINTY Cl CUADAND ANAY FLED AAINTINNAN 44-40-40 DAA PILL. PAL DLAI BVUUINE TT, EL, OHI. DUUN, ULLIAN, Uterizuey 11. u. rg iveINDEX OF EXHIBITS DEMONSTRATING ENTITLEMENT TO RECOUP ATTORNEY FEES AMENDED 3”? MOTION ON 2%? REMAND FOR FEES ROSEN V ROSEN, FL. SUPREME COURT 1997 F.S.57.105 EXCERPT UNREA BLE DELAY F.S. 57.105 COMPLETE F.S. 95.11 ATTORNEY FEES IN MARITAL AND FAMILY LAW: AN UPDATE MEMORANDUM OF LAW REGARDING FEE AWARDS, 1996 POLICY ARGUMENT 41 65 COMDTTNTT ATED ATT V ENEADCEN MCA ANT 1001 AGDEEN ODNLD Ui, CUURL UNILA LORD GAD URUGY Ion ANY 1971 DGURGoY URUK 0.PET ATTORNEY SALVAGE 9-19-89 BELIES PET CENTRAL ARGUMENT THAT COHAB CLAUSE UNRELATED TO ALIMONY, 6 WEEKS PRIOR TO MEDIATION 11. 11-30-1989 HAND-WRITTEN MEDIATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT PET INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE FOR FJDM AS FAIR, CLEAR, UNDERSTOOD, AND FINAL. (SEE 13) 12. MEDIATOR’S REPORT EVIDENCING COMPLETE AGREEMENT 11-30-89 13. PET MOTION TO ENFORCE MSA AS FAIR, FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND FINAL 1-23-90 14, FINAL JUDGMENT DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 2-5-90 15. PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY SALVAGE COVER LETTER FOR TYPED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH ATTACHED PSA, POST JUDGMENT, “PURSUANT TO WHAT WAS AGREED TO AT MEDIATION”, INCLUDING A COHABITIATION CLAUSE TERMINATING ALIMONY UNDERMINING PETITIONER’S DEFENSE. 16. SALVAGE TYPED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREENT (PSA) PETITIONER REFUSED TO SIGN CONTAINING EXPLICIT COHABITATION CLAUSE TERMINATING ALIMONY. 17. RESPONDENT’S MODIFIED PSA WITH CROSSOUTS DEMANDED BY PET FOR PROVISIONS SHE DID NOT AGREE WITH, AT HEARING BEFORE ORIGINAL DIVORCE JUDGE. NO OBJECTION OR CROSSOUTS TO COHABITATION CLAUSE. 18. JUDGE FOGEN ORDER (ORIGINAL JUDGE) COMPELLING EXECUTION OF PSA. 6-8-90 19. MOTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY AND FOR SEPARATE ACCOUNT UNTIL MOTION IS HERAD SINCE PETITIONER WILL NOT VOLUNTARILY REPAY FOR HER BREACH OF COHAB CLAUSE. IN FACT, SHE HAS NOT PAID AT ALL SINCE RETROACTIVE TERMINATION IN 2009 AND MONEY JUDGMENT IN 2015. 9-19-90 20. ORDER SECURING REAL ESTATE FOR CONTINUATION OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS 12-26-90 21. PET PROPOSED AMENDED ORDER SECURING REAL ESTATE FOR CONTINUATION OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS. 1-25-90 2NP INSTANCE OF FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT BY PET AND SUCESSOR JUDGES, FRAUD UPON THE COURT, INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT BY ENCUMBERING PROPERTY WITH MOTHER’S LIEN WITH FRAUDULENT BOGUS LOANS PRECLUDED BY ORDER. 22. AGREED AMENDED ORDER SECURING PROPERTY, AUTHORIZING FILING OF LIS TAMPA AAT DOTOTTIMMIA EAIcT nn Axton] FENVENS AND PRDEULUULNU DINCUIWIDRANUDDS. 23. PRETRIAL STIPULATION, PET FALSELY CLAIMS COHAB CLAUSE NOT LINKED TO ALIMONY. BRAZEN PET LIE #1: COHABITATION CLAUSE HAD NO PENALTY AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ALIMONY OR TERMINATION OF ALIMONY, S YOON AW RWS24. ZIMMERMAN AFFIDAVIT: COHAB CLAUSE LINKED TO ALIMONY (RES DIVORCE ATTORNEY) 25. REPORT OF GM LINKS COHAB CLAUSE TO ALIMONY, “CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS” 12-11-92 26. DELETED 27. REPORT OF GM WITH STIPULATION ADMITTING BREACH OF 90 DAY CUMULATIVE DAYS OF COHABITATION. GM DENIES TERMINATING ALIMONY BY ADDING UNAUTHORIZED TERMS TO FJDM AND PARTIES’ AGREEMENT TO RENDER CLAUSE UNENFORCEABLE — MAKES 90 CUMULATIVE DAYS CONSECUTIVE 90 DAYS CONTRARY TO OBVIOUS INTENT AND PLAIN LANGUAGE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. 4-8-93 28. 11° MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR INTERFERRRING WITH VISITATION 2-19-93 29. 11™ MOTION FOR CONTEMPT OF VISITATION, ORDER DEFERRED 2-22-93 30. RES MOTION TO RESUME PRIOR VISITATION AND FOR FEES 2-23-93 31. 12™ EMERGENCY MOTION CONTEMPT FOR VISITATION AND FOR FEES 3-10-93 32. PET MOTION TO TERMINATE VISITATION, FEES 6-10-93 33. JUDGE MUSSELMAN EXCERPT OF TRANSCRIPT WHERE HE FALSELY RULES PENALTY OF TERMINATION OF ALIMONY WAS “NOT RESOLVED” ALTHOUGH “PROBABLY” WAS, AND THAT THEREFORE BEING AN ESSENTIAL PROVISION, THE WHOLE FJDM MUST BE RENEGOTIATED DE NOVO. 6-17-93. P 845 PET RECORD ON APPEAL 4D15-1002. 34. PET EMERGENCY MOTION TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF VISITATION 8-2-93 CHONIN 35. RES EMERGENCY MOTION TO STRIKE WIFE’S EMERG. MOT FOR TEMP SUSPENSION OF VISITATION-CONTEMPT, FEES 8-4-93 26 AMENNEN 14TH MAT CAD CANTEMDT TEES @ A 02 OU. WIG MU PUR UU vi 1 Pa 0-7 37. MUSSELMAN ORDER GRANTING PET EXCEPTIONS 9-29-93 THAT THERE IS NO COHAB CLAUSE MERELY BECAUSE EXACT LANGUAGE NOT AGREED TO BASED ON PET LIE THAT COHAB NOT LINKED TO ALIMONY (DESPITE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AGREEMENT, PERFORMANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS, MEETING OF MINDS ON SUFFICIENT TERMS, AND ELEVATION OF AGREEMENT TO A JUDGMENT UPON PET MOTION OF FAIR, FINAL AND UNDERSTOOD TERMS.) 38.4DCA OPINION REVERSING MUSSELMAN, 3-22-95. “THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF THE PROVISION IS TO PREVENT THE FORMER WIFE’S AVOIDING A TERMINATION OF HER ALIMONY UPON REMARRIAGE SIMPLY BY LIVING WITH SOMEONE WITHOUT MARRIAGE.” “THE AGREMENT WAS ELEVATED TO THE STATUS OF A JUDGMENT TO BE INTERPRETED RATHER THAN A CONTRACT TO BE ENFORCED.” 39. FINAL JUDGMENT CHANGING CUSTODY FINDING PET RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERFERRING WITH VISITATION THAT NEVER GOT ENFORCED, PARENTAL ALIENATION, AND ORCHESTRATING A FALSE ALLEGATION OF SEX ABUSE OF DAUGHTER AGAINST RES, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 3-23-95 PET LIE #2: THAT PET NEVER INTERFERRED WITH VISITATION. PET LIE#3: THAT PET DID NOT ENGAGE IN SEVERE PARENTAL ALIENATION #4: THAT RES SEXUALLY MOLESTED HIS DAUGHTER. 40. MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZING FJ CUSTODY FINDINGS, GAL REPORT, AND CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES INVESTIGATION FINDINGS.41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 48. 49, 50. DENYING ENTITLEMENT FEES TO PET FOR BASELESSLY LITIGATED CAUSING “EXTENSIVE, VEXATIOUS, NEEDLESS AND EXPENSIVE LITIGATION” AND THAT TO AWARD FEES WOULD BE A “CRIMINAL ACT”, 4-25-95 ORDER OF CLARIFICATION DENYING CLARIFIACTION RE CUSTODY-RELATED TEMPORARY FEES PAID TO PET 5-17-95 JUDGE GREENE TRANS. 12-8-95 ZIMMERMAN RE SALVAGE LETTER AND PSA JUDGE GREENE TRANS PART 1. 12-18-95 SALVAGE TESTIMONY RE COHAB PENALTY AS EVIDENCED IN THE TRANSCRIPT PAGES (T) AND PET RECORD ON APPEAL (R) 4D15-1002, (17 T, 2407 R) AND ALIMONY WAS NOT EQ DISTR (PGS 59, 63 T, 2449, 2453 R). JUDGE REJECTS PET ARGUMENT THAT COHAB CLAUSE WAS A PROVISION TO REUNIFY AS A WASTE OF COURT’S TIME. (P101 T, 2490 R). JUDGE GREENE TRANS 12-18-95 Part 2, JUDGE CROSSES PET DIVORCE LAWYER SALVAGE DIRECTLY RE PURPOSE OF COHAB CLAUSE = PERMANENT TERMINATION OF ALIMONY (P17T) JUDGE GREEN TRANS 12-21-95 RE EQ DISTRIBUTION, APPRAISE PRACTICE, SAVE FORECLOSURE . JUDGE GREENE ORDER CONSTRUING COHAB CLAUSE, REQUIRES READDRESSING THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION SCHEME TO REALLOCATE TERMINABLE SUPPORT ALIMONY TO NON-TERMINATING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 6 YEARS AFTER FJDM, DESPITE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF EQ DIST. IN MSA, UNIFORM TESTIMONY OF BOTH DIVORCE ATTORNEYS, AND IN VIOLATION OF 4DCA DIRECTIONS ON REMAND, ALL BASED ON PET LIE THAT ALIMONY WAS AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND NOT STIDDADT 1.606 NOTMIENwoNC prT HE. ATTIMOANY WAC DADT OF TUT SUEUR. ISU UU NG pe Toe FAUIYEUINE WW Ua EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, NOT SUBJECT TO TERMINATION UNDER THE COHABITATION CLAUSE. RES MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE GREENE 12-28-95 18T JUDGE KEONIG HEARING TO HEAR PROFFERS, TRANS. 2-12-96 WHERE JUDGE REFUSES TO HEAR MOTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY AS DEFENSE TO CONTEMPT IN THIS 6™ YEAR SEEKING ENFORECMENT OF SAME, NOW ON REMAND. DURING THE HEARING, PET OBJECTIVELY ADMITS TO BREACHING THE 90 DAY COHABITATION CLAUSE “FOR THE LAST FEW MONTHS” UNDER JUDICIAL INTERROGATION BUT SUBJECTIVELY DENIES IT UNDER HER OWN MADE UP DEFINITION OF COHABITATION, IRRELEVANT WHERE FINANCIAL IMPACT IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER ENFORCEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT FOR AUTOMATIC TERMIATION UNDER CITED CASE LAW (GALE V ROSE, ALFORD V ALFORD). JUDGE RECOGNIZES ADMISSION BUT NOT UNTIL 3 YEARS LATER DURING THE 5-26-99 HEARING (SEE TRANSCRIPT BELOW) AND NOT UNTIL AFTER COERCING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS IN OVERPAID ALIMONY AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND IMPOSING 30 DAYS OF INCARCERATION WITH FOLLOW WEEKENDS, LIE #6: PET NEVER COHABITED WITH BOYFRIEND EVEN AFTER 6 YEARS _OF CONTINUOUS COHABITATION, STILL ENFORCING ALIMONY _ BY CONTEMPT AND INCARCERATION AFTER 6 YEARS OF DILATORY STALL TACTICS, AIDED BY _COURT’S_MISAPPLICATIONS OF _LAW, DISRESPECT FOR _4DCA DIRECTIONS, AND DISRESPECT FOR RES RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREED FJDM. EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY PENDING RECONSIDERATION FOR AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF ALIMONY TO PREVENT CONTINUED OVERPAYMENT, 2-19-96Si. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE INCARCERATION DUE TO PET NOW ORCHESTRATING ANOTHER SEX ABUSE ALLEGATION AGAINST PATERNAL GRANDFATHER OF DAUGHTER, AND CONTINUED POINSONING AND ALIENATION OF THE CHILDREN. 8-16- 96 GAL REPORT 9-2-96 CONCLUSION: “I HAVE GIVEN THIS CASE HOURS OF THOUGHT. GIVEN THAT THERE IS ONE SUBVERSIVE PERSON DRIVING THIS WHOLE CATASTROPHE I COULD SEE NO OTHER WAY TO HELP THIS FAMILY BUT TO ELIMINATE AND CONTROL THE TROUBLEMAKER.” RES EMERGENCY MOTIO TERMINATING UNSUPERVISED VISITATION. 10-6-96 INVESTIGATIVE REPORT BY FLORIDA PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEM ON PET ALLEGATION THAT PATERNAL GRANDFATHER SEXUALY ABUSED GRANDAUGHTER. 7-27-91. “THERE ARE NO VERIFIED MALTREATMENTS IN THIS CASE. THEREFORE THIS CASE IS CLOSED. THIS CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A LEVEL OF HARRASSENT. IF THESE REPORTS CONTINUE IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE EMOTIONAL ABUSE, OR FORMAL HARRASSMENT CHARGES UNDER THE NEW PROCEDURES FOR FILING FLASE CHILD ABUSE REPORTS.” JUDGE KEONIG ORDER STAYING ALL ECONOMIC ISSUES PENDING DECISION FROM 4DCA 6-9-97 ON TRIAL COURT’S 2“? ATTEMPT TO VOID COHABITATION CLAUSE FOR SPURIOUS REASONS. 4DCA REVERSAL OF KEONIG ORDER FOR FAILING TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS TO CONSTRUE COHABIATION CLAUSE 2-18-98 4DCA REVERSAL OF KEONIG ORDER FOR FAILING TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS TO CONOTDIIE CALTADTA TION OT ATICN 9.19 00 VUINS DRUG UULIADIN LUIN ULAUSE 2710-70 JUDGE KEONIG TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 5-26-99. JUDGE NOW FINDS PET ADMISSIONS FROM 2-12-96 HEARING CONSTITUTES AN ADMISSION OF SATISFYING THE 90 DAYS OF COHABITATION BUT AGAIN JUDGE VIOLATES THE DIRECTIONS FROM THE 4DCA ON REMAND AND ADDS NEW TERMS TO THE COHABITATION CLAUSE TO RENDER IT PRACTICALLY UNENFOREABLE. ADDS FINANCIAL IMPACT REQUIREMENT (RELEVANT ONLY UNDER MODIFICATIO PROCEEDINGS, NOT ENFORCEMENT OF A PROVISION IN FJ). DENIES TERMINATION OF ALIMONY. PET CHALLENGING RESPONDENT’S CUSTODY OF RES. JUDGE ENTERS ORDER AFFIRMING CUSTODY. . PET CONSPIRES WITH THE CHILDREN TO SABOTAGE RES CUSTODY. JUIDGE KOENING ALLOWS PET TO KEEP CHILDREN DURING SUMMER VACATION CONTRARY TO WARNING FROM CUSTODY TRIAL JUDGE THAT PETITIONER WILL RUIN PATERNAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHILDREN. ORDER OF 6-9-99 THIS ORDER HAD THE EFFECT OF PERMANENTLY ENDING RES RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS CHILDREN WHO HE HAS NOT SEEN OUTSIDE OF FAMILY FUNERALS SINCE 1999. JUDGE KEONIG HEARING TRANSCRIPT 6-9-1999 INTRODUCING INTO EVIDENCE BOTH PARTIES’ ATTORNEY LETTERS, CREATED AND MAILED TO PARTIES BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER MEDIATION. LETTERS DEMONSTRATE COHABITATION CLAUSE TIED TO ALIMONY. PET AGAIN FALSELY CLAIMS COHAB CLAUSE WAS TO REUNITE THE PARTIES, HER ARGUMENT REJECTED BY JUDGE GREENE 4 YEARS EARLIER AS A WASTE OF THE COURT’S TIME.62. JUDGE KEONIG ORDER 10-1-1999 ASCRIBING A MEANING TO THE COHABITATION CLAUSE UNECESSARILY REQUIRING FINANCIAL IMPACT REQUIREMENT DEVIATING FROM THE MANDATE. 63. JUDGE TUTOR SUA SPONTE RECUSAL BECAUSE HE MISINTERPRETED THE PLEADINGS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE COHABITATION CLAUSE AS AN _ UNECESSARY MODIFICATION PROCEEDING WHERE ALIMONY WAS NOT BEING ENFORCED, RATHER THAN AN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING REQUIRING PAYBACK OF OVERPAID ALIMONY. 12-15-06. JUDGE’S CONCLUSION IS FALSIFIED BY RESPONDENT’S MONEY JUDGMENT FOR OVERPAID ALIMONY. 64. TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS LANG AND DUNN- CONFIRMING COHABITAITON. 7-26-07 65. SURVEILLANCE REPORT AND EVIDENCE OF COHABITATION AND DECEITFUL ACTS OF PET AND BOYFRIEND TO CONSEAL AND COVER UP THE COHABITATION. EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY THAT BOYFRIEND DID IN FACT RECEIVE HIS MAIL AT HOME OF PETITIONER DURING 1993 SURVEILLANCE, LIE #7: EVIDENCES PET PERJURY AT 2-12- 1996 HEARING THAT BOYFRIEND DID NOT RECEIVE MAIL AT PET HOUSE. RES WRONGFULLY INCARCEREATED ON BASIS OF THIS PERJURY BY PET. 66. JUDGE BIRKEN SUA SPONTE RECUSAL BECAUSE HE MISINTERPRETED THE PLEADINGS FALSELY STATING THAT THERE WAS NO GENINE MONETARY BASIS FOR PROCEDINGS, JUST HARASSEMENT. JUDGE’S CONCLUSION IS FALSIFIED BY RESPONDENT’S MONEY JUDGMENT FOR OVERPAID ALIMONY. 67. JUDGE HOROWITZ HEARING TRANSCRIPT 5-15-2009, CENSURING PETITIONER FOR DDINGAING OOITNDEN TOA UTADING WINTT CONTINTING TOT DADENTAT DININUING UNLUUALIT PU UDA Wy UU UG I ALIENATION. 68. JUDGE HOROWITZ SUA SPONTE VACATION OF JUDGE KEONIG 10-1-1999 TEMPORARY ORDER ENGRAFTING WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION A FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE COHABITATION CLAUSE. CONTRARY TO FS. 61.14. 69. JUDGE HOROWITZ FINAL ORDER 5-26-2009: a. VACATED JUDGE KEONIG ORDER STATING: “THE COURT BELIEVES THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND CLAUSE OF THE MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. IT IS NOT THE ROLE OF THE COURTS TO CREATE AMBIGUITY OR CONFUSION TO THAT WHICH HAS CLARITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE ORDER F JUDGE KEONIG DATED OCTOBEI, 1999, Is HEREBY VACATED.” b. THE ORDER FURTHER PROVIDED THAT THE ALIMONY WAS TERMINATED RETROACTIVELY TO NOVEMBER 30, 1991. THUS, If TOOK 19 YEARS TO CONSTRUE THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS PROVISION OF THE FJDM AND ENFORCE THE 1990 MOTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY BECAUSE OF PETIONER’S UNSUPPORTED CLAIMS AND BRAZEN LIES ENUMERATED ABOVE. 70.MOTION TO AMEND JUDGE HOROWITZ ORDER WHICH DID NOT CONTAIN A RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION TO RECOVER THE OVERPAID ALIMONY. 5-30-2009. 71. JUDGE HOROWITZ RECUSED BY PETITIONER. 6-10-199972.4DCA THIRD REVERSAL. JUDGE HOROWITZ REVERSED FOR NOT INCLUDING A RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AS PLEAD FOR THE REFUND OF WRONFULLY DEFRAUDED AND EXTORTED OVERPAID ALIMONY. 73. AMENDED MOTION ON REMAND FOR THE REPAYMENT OF OVERPAID ALIMONY WITH INTEREST AND TO FIND ENTITLEMENT TO FEES. 6-21-2013. 74. JUDGE LOPANE ORDERS FOR REPAYMENT OF ALIMONY AND ENTITLEMENT TO FEES RELATED TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE COHABITATION CLAUSE AND THE MARCH 23, 1995 CUSTODY CHANGE ORDER. 2-12-2015. 75. 4DCA DECISION AFFIRMING ALIMONY AWARD. CHALLENGE TO FEE ENTITLEMENT FOR RESPONDENT WAS PREMATURE. REMAND FOR DETERMINATION OF PETITIONER’S ENTITLEMENT TO FEES AND THE AMOUNT OF RESPONEDENT’S ENTITLEMENT. 3-1-2017 76. JUDGE FAHNESTOCK ORDER CLOSING CASE 3-16-2018 77. ADCA DECISION REVFERSING JUDGE FAHNESTOCK. 7-3-2019 78. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF JUDICIAL CODES OF ETHICS. a. ITIS CERTAINLY A VIOLATION OF CODE 3B8 REQUIRING ALL JUDICIAL MATTERS BE DISPOSED OF PROMPTLY, EFFICIEINTLY AND FAIRLY WHERE IT TAKES 19 YEARS TO ENFORCE A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS FROVISION IN A FINAL JUDGEMENT, REPEATEDLY VOIDED AND ALTERED AS TO RENDER UNENFORCEABLE CONTRARY TO THE DIRECTIONS FROM THE HIGHER COURT, AND 30 PLUS YEARS TO UNWIND THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE FLAWED. b. THE HISTORY OF THIS CASE WITH RESPECT TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE COHABITAITON CLAUSE, FEES AND VISITATION EVIDENCES A PATTERN OF PURPOSEFUL VIOLATION OF CODE 384 REQUIRING IMPARTIAL ADIUDICATION WITHOUT REGARD TO SEX AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS. IN THIS CASE, THE POST-DISSOLUTION ENFORCEMENT OF AN AGREED JUDGMENT AND ORDERS WAS NECESSITATED WHOLLY BY THE EGREGIOUS AND OBVIOUSLY FRIVOLOUS, BASELESS, VEXATIOUS, AND HARRASSING ASSERTIONS AND PLEADINGS OF THE PETITIONER. DESPITE THIS FACT, THE RESPONDENT WAS PUNISHED FINANCIALLY WHERE ABILITY TO PAY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RELEVANT, AND SUFFERED THE ALIENATION OF HIS CHILDREN DUE TO INEFFECTIVE AND BELATED PROTECTION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS. c. THE MULTIPLE UNECESSARY SUA SPONTE RECUSALS IN THIS CASE, AFTER WASTING SEVERAL HEARINGS INVOLVING WITNESSES, WAS A VIOLATION OF CODES 3B1, 3B4, AND 3B8 REQUIRING HEARING AND DECISION OF CASES; IMPARTIAL PERFORMANCE; AND PROMPT, EFFICIENT AND FAIR DISPOSITION OF JUDICIAL MATTERS RESPECTIVELY. d, THE ADDITIONS TO FLORIDA STATUTES 39.025 (1999), 57.105 (1997), 61.14 (1)B (2005), AND THE CHILD CUSTODY REFORMS FOR TERMINOLOGY AND TIME SHARING (2008) UNDERSCORE THE BAD POLICY AND ABUSE THE RESPONDENT HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO IN THE MISADJUDICAITON OF FEES, THE COHABITAITON CLAUSE, VISITATION AND IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ABUSE ALLEGATIONS. 80. MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF FORECLOSUREFiling # 92887255 E-Filed 07/21/2019 01:03:12 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA PAOD NIA. 00 £120 1962) VASE INU. 09-0100 (29) IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: NOREEN SINGER, Petitioner/ Former Wife, TAV PTICCHTT SINGER RUS Suu SUN, Respondent/ Former Husband / AMENDED THIRD MOTION, ON SECOND REMAND, FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS COMES NOW THE FORMER HUSBAND (F/H) and moves this Honorable Court on a second remand to enter an award of attorneys’ fees and costs based on fees expended to his own attorneys (paid and still owing) and those to the former Wife’s (F/W) attorneys during this 30 year-long, 60-volume, over-litigated case and as grounds states as follows: 1) This Court Noticed a special set hearing for March 18, 2018 to hear both parties’ respective motions for fees and costs. The Notice also included F/H’s Motion to execute on his money judgment against F/W’s real property on a reservation of jurisdiction for same. Exhibit 1. 2) Five days prior to the scheduled hearing, this Court sua sponte canceled the hearing and entered an Order closing the case while finding that the 15" Judicial Circuit was the proper venue and a more convenient forum. The Order was entered without notice or motion regarding convenience or changing venue relating to the attorney fee motions (which both parties requested be held in the same 17" Circuit venue they litigated in since the inception of the case), and without a pending motion to close the case. Exhibit 2. 3) The F/H filed a Motion for rehearing/reconsideration noting the above facts, while also pointing out that the 60-volume record was in the present Broward Circuit, that the subpoenaed attorneys set to 14) 4) ~) 6) 7) 8) testify all worked and/or lived in Broward, and that resetting their appearances in Palm Beach County was not convenient to anyone. Nevertheless, the Motion was denied. The Order was appealed and recently reversed with respect to the attorney fee motions. The 4DCA opinion took pains to reference all the appeals and reversals that have been necessary to lawfully and equitably adjudicate this case. Exhibit 3. Tha Mandate dirante thie Canrt ta addeace B/W%o faa matiane in ananrdanca urith Hlarida Dulac of Procedure, Florida law, and the opinion of the 4DCA. Exhibit 4. Former Husband invokes all his allegations from his prior motions for fees and costs, and attaches them hereto and incorporates them herein. Exhibits 6 and 7. On February 12, 2015, a predecessor judge in this circuit entered an Order finding entitlement to fees and costs due to the long history of the FW’s baseless and vexatious litigation. The Order reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees the Husband was entitled to on all matters relating to his post-dissolution efforts to terminate alimony and to defend against F/W’s claims resulting in this Court’s March 23, 1995 Final Order for Custody. Exhibit 5: 6. Furthermore Former Husband is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs on all matters relating to his post-dissolution efforts to terminate alimony, and to defend against the Former Wife’s claims resulting in this Court’s March 23, 1995 Final Judgment for custody, due to Former Wife’s frivolous, vexatious, and litigious conduct. See Metler v. Metler, 519 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4DCA 1988); §57.105, Florida Statutes, Former Wife’s conduct resulted in needless litigation and legal fees. Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: A. Jurisdiction is reserved for the Court to determine and award the Former Husband his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on all matters relating to his post-dissolution efforts to terminate alimony, and to defend against the Former Wife’s claims resulting in this Court’s March 23, 1995 Final Judgment for custody. The Petitioner Former Wife (F/W) appealed the February 12, 2015 Order and the 4DCA affirmed the money judgment finding her arguments without merit. The panel also ruled that the order granting F/H’s entitlement to fees was not appealable because the trial court had not yet determined the amount that the F/H was entitled to. Singer v. Singer, 4D15-1002, (Also see reference in Exhibit 3 opinion).9) Accordingly, and for all the foregoing, F/H requests the resetting of the 2.5 hour hearing on fees and costs, along with prejudgment interest, to be reset expeditiously, preferably on a Friday. WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the F/H requests that this Honorable Court finds that the Wife and her attorneys are mutually responsible and liable for their bad-faith, completely unsupported delay- tactic litigation, with specificity under 57.105 and 61.16. The F/H seeks an Order for same and for the Court to enter a judgment for fees and costs reimbursable to the Husband by the Former Wife and her attorneys related to the enforcement of the Final Judgment/Divorce Decree provisions regarding the alimony, cohabitation clause, equitable distribution, children “visitation”, and for the defense of the false abuse allegations raised by the F/W as addressed in the March 23, 1995 Custody Judgment. THEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by e-service to Noreen Singer, 21311 Millbrook Court, Boca Raton, FL 33434 at legalnornor@gmail.com, this 21" day of July, 2019. Jay R. Singer, Pro Se 715 Pelican Lane, Lantana FL 33462 W 954 757 6453 C954 254 9595 F 954 757 6161 drsinger@singersmiles.com mt Mae, Otc e nm BY /8_y > JAY RUSSELL SINGEREXHIBIT 1IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORA ae, IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: CASENO: COCE 89-6168 NOREEN SINGER, DIVISION: 35 Petitioner, And JUDGE: FABIENNE E. FAHNESTOCK JAY RUSSELL SINGER, Respondent. / NOTICE OF HEARING (SPRCTAT. SET PD 7 ARMY rarmo Se nen ines Vase Asso Nae fz EO UERD, TO: Noreen Singer Jay Singer ‘YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the undersigned Judge will hear in’ Courtroom 11166 at the Broward County Courthouse, 201. S.E. 6" Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida on Monday, March 19", 2018 at 1:30 p.m. the following: 1. FORMER HUSBAND’S MOTION FOR FEES & COSTS 2, FORMER HUSBAND’S MOTION ON REMAND FOR FEES & COSTS AND TO DENY FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR FEES & COSTS FORMER WirE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO APPELLATE ORDERS OF MARCH 1, 2017 be 4, AMENDED INTERRELATED MOTIONS ON REMAND FOR FORECLOSURE ’ OF EXTANT SECURITY LIEN AND IMPOSITION AND FORECLOSURE OF *“ EQUITABLE LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY IN EXECUTION OF THIS COURT’S FEBRUARY 12, 2015 MONEY JUDGMENT Done and ordered in Chambers in Ft. Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this of December, 2017. CIRCUIT JUDGEEXHIBIT 2instr# 114950592 + Page 1 of' 1, Recorded 03/15/2018 ati Broward, County Commission #«** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY: FL: Breiida'D;.Fornidit? CLERK 3/14/2018'12:29:48 F :IN THE CIRCUIT. COURT: OF: THE’ ‘SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ‘AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA ‘CASE NO: CACE:89-006168 3} NOREEN SINGER, Petitionet/Former Wife, VS UJAY-SINGER, ‘Respondent/Former Husband: 1 - ‘ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION. TO CONSIDER THE... _RELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICT! TON.REGARDING THE PALM BEACH COUNTY HOMESTEAD PROPERTY MOTION TO RESET ALL MOTIONS SET FOR> MARCH 19, 2018 FOR: a ONE-DAY OR ‘TWO-DAY OR THREE-DAY HEARING TO, INALIZE ALL PENDING ISSUES: THIS ‘CAUSE «was; considered by the: Court: onthe Petitionér's Motion to ‘Consider’ the Relinquishment of Jurisdiction Regarding the: Palm Beach County Homestead Property Motion:to Reset ‘All. Motions ‘Set for: March 19,2018 for a One-Day or Two-Day or Three-Day Hearing, to Finalize All Pending issues, ihe couRT having considered the grounds for the Motion; the court’s.file in Singer v. Singer, Broward County Case no: CACE17-17137; and considered the applicable law, it'is ORDERED AND. ADJUDGED 23 follows: The Motion is GRANTED. ‘Pursuant to, Florida Statute sec..47-122, the Court finds that the’ Fiftcenth Judicial Circuit'in Palm Beach County is the proper.venue for this case and is a more convenient forum for the dispute., This'case is ‘closed. DONE:AND ORDERED i in Chambers at Broward: rch’ 14; 2018: FABIENNE FAHNESTOCK, CIRCUIT.JUDGE: Copies furnished: In Open Court Filed tn: Open* Court, “CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT:COURT iEXHIBIT 3Dramoram Caren omar An Trim Omamn On Dr anim. DISINILE VUURL OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT JAY RUSSELL SINGER, Appellant, v. NOREEN SINGER, Appellee. No. 4D18-1170 [July 3, 2019] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Fabienne Fahnestock, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-89- 006168(35). Jay Russell Singer, Lantana, pro se. Noreen Singer, Boca Raton, pro se. Gross, J. This appeal arises from an order entered after final judgment in a 1990 dissolution of marriage case.! On May 26, 2009, the circuit court found that because the former wife had violated a cohabitation clause in the marital settlement agreement, she should not have received alimony after November 30, 1991. Most of the litigation after 2009 has involved the former husband’s attempt to recover the overpaid alimony. In February 2015, the circuit court entered a final judgment for $285,412 of overpaid alimony; the court also ruled that the former husband was entitled to recover attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2015), and reserved jurisdiction to determine and award fees and costs. 1 This case has generated 25 proceedings in this court and six reported opinions. See Singer v. Singer, 219 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Singer v. Singer, 211 So. 3d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Singer v. Singer, 38 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Singer v. Singer, 706 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Singer v. Cochran, 685 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).The wifa annanled the Pahruarnr 9018 indamant We affirmed tha ane Wue appeaca uit sCoruary avid juagmeni. we auimca uit judgment but ruled that the attorney’s fee issue was not appealable because the circuit court had not yet determined the amount of fees to which the former husband was entitled. Singer, 211 So. 3d at 154-55. By 2017, the case was back in the family court. The parties filed a flurry of motions directed at attorney's a —_ other issues. Meanwhile, counties which sought to collect on the February 2015 judgment. After another round of motions, in March 2018, the family court judge transferred the case to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County because it was a “more convenient forum for the dispute,” and closed the Broward County family court file. Unen thnen wenn an mating (1) aanleine a whanen nfeein ION nAdennninn Mee, WETE WAS HO MGUSN (41) SCEKINE a CHANE Si VETUE, (2) AGaTEssing the issue of the most convenient forum, (3) requesting that the family court case be closed, or (4) seeking the dismissal of any pending motion. The former wife suggested only that the court “relinquish jurisdiction” over motions directed at title to her home in Palm Beach County. The former husband was not on notice that the circuit court was considering a forum non conveniens issue or closing the case. Closing a case or ordering a change Of Venue Without HOticE is 4 Gea of due process. Seé Grasso wv. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 204 So. 3d 139, 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); McDaniel Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E Consultants, Inc. 39 So. 3d 504, 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Utilicore Corp. v. Bednarsh, 730 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Wei TEVETSE tne Maren 2018 or aer, rémana ine case to tne arcuit cour 1, and direct that the circuit court hear and decide the former husband’s pending motions pertaining to attorney’s fees. We affirm the remaining issues on appeal without discussion. May and Damoorcian, JJ., concur. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.EXHIBIT 4M A N D A T E DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT This cause having been brought to the Court by appeal, and after due consideration the Court having issued its opinion; YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that such further proceedings be had in said cause as may be in accordance with the opinion of this Court, and with the rules of procedure and laws of the State of Florida. WITNESS the Honorable Spencer D. Levine, Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, and seal of the said Court at West Palm Beach, Florida on this day. DATE: July 19, 2019 CASE NO.: 18-1170 COUNTY OF ORIGIN: Broward T.C. CASE NO.: CACE-89-006168 (35) STYLE: JAY RUSSELLSINGER yv. NOREEN SINGER Served: cc: Noreen Singer Jay Russell Singer Clerk Broward krEXHIBIT 5ay IN, THE, CIRCUIT'COURT. OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. IN.AND: "FOR. BROWARD.COUNTY, FLORIDA ‘Petitioner/: Former’ Wife, sand: JAY RUSSELL SINGER, : . Respondent/: ‘Former Husband: FINAL ORDER: THIS ‘MATTER! came: before “the: Court ion remand. from ‘the: 4th ‘District ‘Court: of ' counsel ‘Alan Jay Braverman; CPA Jolin Passariello + and the} ‘testimony, of the witnesses, having-reviewed ‘all-of the exhibit notice‘of the entire file and’ Ye ed the nertinent items there ed'the nertinent items ther d'in the premises; the’ Court makes'the following: FINDINGS Of FACT.AND CONCLUSIONS OF.LAW: le The certified report from the microfiche file from the Suipport Enforceniént Division for Broward County, now Support Depository‘of the Broward: Clerk.of Court; for: December 1991-exactness.; The FormerHusband’s requ shih following Novetnber 20, 19913): “that StL 48 aiward pre 1 dgment interest’on' support arrearages: -4. Additionally, the:amount of iitérest dite, was con lusively-provén from’ the.evidence:entei trial, A; John’, Passariello’ testified:regarding:: interest” calculations: on the: principal! . He: ‘computed the'statutory simple interést accrucd through Jantiary:20, 2015" thé Tontli Of December. 1991 10 be. $4,283! The“accrued interest ‘on'thevalinony: paid ini 1992, 1993, 1994, "1995, “and [1996 through January 20, 2015. wai $48,775; $39,280; $40,156;'$5,350; and $40,793.’ Theso “55 | THe total of: id: ‘aliniony: ($106,775.00) atid interést’:on thé overpaid alimony; of Jamiary 20,2015. usions of lav, it isihereby:wt 1991 ‘authorization of:a-filing-of lis:pendens: precluding sale-or: ‘encumbrance of the Former Wi é Shall remain in’ effect. pending: dtéss: 18 715 Pelican’ Lane,.-Lantana;- Florida; 33462;-shall' recover from: Petitioner’ Former; Wife, whose principle; address As: 21311 Millbrook Court, Boca ‘Raton, Florida 33498; the’ suin of-$285;412:00" which: ‘amount shall: bear-interest:at.the legal rate established pursuant:to section 55:03; Florida: ‘yi 2015. NICHOLAS R. LOPANE:: -A-TRUE COPY: aoe ee FEB 2-20 Circuit Judge, NICHOLAS. LOPANE: 0 ¢ it, Jay R: Singer; pro.s¢* er “Counsel of-record for Petitioner/Former WifeEXHIBIT 6IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO.: 89-6168 (35) IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: NOREEN SINGER, Petit ner/ Former Wife, JAY RUSSELL SINGER, Respondent/ Former Husband / FORMER HUSBAND’S MOTIONS ON REMAND FOR FEES AND COSTS AND TO DENY FORMER WIFE’S MOTIONS FOR FEES AND COSTS FORMER HUSBAND moves for fees and costs and to deny Former Wife’s motions for fees and costs dated April 7 2017 and states as follows: 1, The new judge on this case must initially understand that this case, 27 years old with over 60 volumes, is one of the most egregiously prosecuted, litigated and mis-adjudicated post- dissolution enforcement cases in the circuit. 2. The travesty of what has occurred on this case has been due primarily to the utterly baseless, vexatious, frivolous, bad-faith, fraudulent, vindictive, malicious, litigious and otherwise inequitable conduct of the Former Wife as found by multiple predecessor judges. 3. The present posture of this case, on remand for the fourth time in favor of the Respondent, [Singer v. Singer, 38 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 4DCA 2010); 4D15-1002] is for the execution on Former Husband’s money judgment (February 12" , 2015 Order) to reimburse him for the overpayment of alimany Alen an ramand ic far the trial eaurt ta detarmine tha amaunt of raimbhurcahle Or Gumony, 450, Ch TemanG iS rr ure ida Cour iw Gciermine ure amouny C1 reimioursacie attorneys’ fees and costs, the predecessor judge already having found entitlement in the February 12, 2015 order. 4. Also on remand from the 4D15-1002 appeal, is the Wife’s motion to determine entitlement to fees which motion was denied by the predecessor judge but which ruling was reversed on a technical procedural ground, not merit. All seven of Former Wife’s substantive points on appeal were denied as having “no merit”. Fla. 4DCA Case number 4D15-1002, March 1, 2017.5. From 1990 to 2009, which latter date marks when the court finally terminated alimony reiroactively to 1991, the Respondent overpaid approximaiely 500 thousand dollars in alimony (300K+ with interest) and associated attorneys’ fees. The overpayment was caused by the fact that the Petitioner repeatedly lied about the cohabitation clause as well as her breach thereof over the course of many years, and zealously enforced the alimony while living with her long-term paramour contrary to F.S. §61.149(1)(b) and despite her agreement to the cohabitation clause she incorporated into the divorce decree. 6. The Respondent expended another approximately 500 thousand dollars to enforce his visitation and defend a malicious and baseless child molestation allegation related to the parties’ daughter. Because of the frustration of visitation, parental alienation, and baseless abuse allegation, the court awarded the Respondent full custody of the parties’ two children in 1995. 7. The Former Husband first filed his motion to terminate alimony in September of 1990. He now has a money judgment but has been reimbursed zero. So far, there has been a 27-year delay due directly to the misrepresentations, lies and dilatory tactics of the Former Wife. Florida Statutes §57.105(3) contains the following language: “At any tim proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any action taken by the opposing party, including, but not limited to, the filing of any pleading or part thereof, the assertion of or response to any discovery demand, the assertion of any claim or defense, or the response to any request by any other party, was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the court shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may including attorney’s fees, and other loss resulting from the improper delay.” n anv civil nroc nm any civil proc ding or action in which the moving nartv ding or action in which the moving party 8. Now despite the above, the Former Wife brazenly and shamelessly seeks fees and costs related to her appeal and associated litigation, that she lost, related to the entry of the 2015 money judgment. This is unconscionable where 1) the appeal was found to have no merit on all seven YN a. DM 4. 2) we rw ae through a series of meritless and unethical dilatory tactics, where 3) the money judgment properly unwound decades of dishonest litigation on the part of the Former Wife, where 4) she has paid nothing to satisfy the judgment, and when 5) she fraudulently conveyed her assets to defraud the creditor Former Husband contrary to court orders. Awarding fees under these circumstances would be tantamount to rewarding a fraud, upon a fraud upon a fraud.9. The predecessor judge found in his February 12, 2015 Order: 3. Additionally, irom an equity sianapoint, ine overpaymenis were wrongty coerced, obtained, and retained by the Former Wife, over the course of many years due to her very extensive pattern of baseless and vexatious litigation, as found by the Court in the March 23, 1995 Final Judgment for custody, as reflected by the court file, and as testified to by attorney Braverman. (court’s emphasis) 4 Drvethrwe nen Downe Urchand in antitind tn nn nerned Af attnenatin frac 6, PuruiciMore Forme? MuSvaiG iS Chuuea 16 ai aWara Gi atlormey’S ices and costs on all matters relating to his post-dissolution efforts to terminate alimony, and to defend against the Former Wife’s frivolous, vexatious and litigious conduct. See Mettler v Mettler, 519 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4DCA 1988); §57.105 Florida Statutes. Former Wife’s conduct resulted in needless litigation and legal fees. 10. In its April 25, 1995 Order denying Former Wife’s entitlement to fees related to the 3 week child custody trial, this court found: The Father replies that although that statute does exist and there are cases in support of same, there are a trilogy of cases in the 4" District Court of Appeal, as well as several other cases in the State of Florida, that contravene this standard position when certain additional situation are involved. These include, among other, situations where a party baselessly litigates and causes unnecessary expenditures and fees or where a litigious party’s conduct unnecessarily engenders a pattern of extensive, vexatious, needless and expensive litigation. These cases go on to hold that the requesting party should NOT [court’s emphasis] be entitled to fees and suit monies even though that party’s earing capacity is poor and extremely disproportionate to the opponents. in this particular case, Mother sought to terminate the Father's visitation rights with the children by legal means after having precluded the Father from visitation with his son for a period of 2-1/2 years and after accusing the Father of physically molesting his daughter and causing Court ordered supervised visitation of the daughter, as well as attempting to alienate the children form the Father. The Father Counter-Petitioned for custody of the children. Fourteen days Of fOD-JuiY tial OK place With ie Testi inal inis Court awaraed sole custody of the children to the Father. [court’s emphasis] The Mother has incurred fees approximating $130,000 and costs in excess of $10,000 and now wishes to appeal this Courts Order. Having been the trier of fact and having considered all of the above, this Court reaches the conclusion that notwithstanding the alleged fact that the Mother is incapable to (sic) paying her expenses, that it would be ot fae thie Canet tr nedax tha Dathar ta catiofe tha Dt kOr US VOUrL tO Oruer ule rauler vO Sauis1y ule aamalatalyunfaie and 1 Compeicy unuair anaMother’s expenses and in this Court’s mind it would border on being a criminal act to make such an award. 11. The Former Husband is seeking to mitigate the damages unjustly thrust upon him over the course of these proceedings not aggravate them. The money judgment for overpaid alimony has finally been adjudicated and held up on appeal and is now resolved in 2017 as the custody issue was resolved in 1995, Now the Former Wife seeks a fee award on the alimony trial and appeal as she did following the custody trial. To borrow a quote from the custody judge, “it would border on being a criminal act to make such an award”. 11. In fact, entitlement is precluded under these circumstances under F.S. §61.16 and §57.105. The correct standard is not ability to pay or financial ability as urged by the Former Wife, but rather the fact that the Petitioner is the noncompliant party under multiple final judgments and orders entered on this case (1990, 1991, 1995, 2010, 2015) and has litigated frivolously, baselessly and vexatiously in both the trial and appellate levels. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997). All four appeals on the alimony issue on this case were entered in favor of the Respondent and the fifth is pending. WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Former husband requests the following: 1. To deny the Former Wife entitlement to any and all fees and costs associated with or related directly or indirectly to the entry and appeal of the February 11th, and 12" 2015 orders of this court. 2. To award fees expended and costs incurred in the enforcement of the cohabitation clause and the motion to terminate alimony, and related custody issues, that the Former Wife and her attorneys be jointly held liable for their bad-faith litigation, and that fees already paid to the Former Wife’s former attorneys be subject to partial or full refund consistent with the evidence presented in a prospective evidentiary hearing. 3. That the Court reserve jurisdiction to enforce its ruling herein.ADDENDUM AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW 1) The F/H was coerced to pay attorneys’ fees for the Wife and for himself totaling several hundreds of thousands of dollars, both in the enforcement of the final judgment’s cohabitation clause and the related issue of enforcing his visitation under the final judgment. (See Final Judgment for custody change of March 25, 1995). 2) The baseless and vexatious nature of the defense waged by the Wife and her attorneys’ over the course of 27 years was aided and abetted by a series of unlawful and abusive rulings as found by the May 26, 2009 final order: This Court believes the Final Judgment and Clause of the mediated settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous. It is not the role of the Courts to create ambiguity or confusion to that which has clarity. Accordingly, the order of Judge Koenig dated October 1, 1999, is hereby vacated. The initial alimony award was clearly subject to the cohabitation clause. The Former Wife’s argument that she should not be bound by the stipulations of her counsel as to her cohabitation is without merit. An attorney may stipulate to matters on behalf of a client and the parties are held to their counsel’s stipulation. This is the case in every non-verified pleading that an attorney filac an hohalf nf a oliant TheS Of Cena OF 2 Cuca, The Former Wife satisfies the clear language of the cohabitation clause set forth in the mediated agreement per stipulation of her then counsel. 3. While Florida Statute 61.16 establishes a general standard for entitlement to attorney’s fees based on financial need and ability to pay, the applicable standard for enforcement actions’, such as he instant case to enforce the final judgment cohabitation clause and visitation, is ' It is crucial in this regard, that the court recognizes that the automatic termination of alimony under an agreed-upon cohabitation clause incorporated into the final judgment is an enforcement nraceedina where the mera avictance of the enhahitatinn anvernc and nat a modificatinn PLCCeCGng Walere ure Mere Caine Ci ure COnaonauon governs, ana Nov a MoGuicaucn proceeding based on a material and substantial change in circumstances where financial impact governs.prevailing party. Harrison v. Gattozzi, 992 So.2d 865 (2008), Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So, 2d 697 (Fla. 1997). Florida Statute § 61.16 provides in pertinent part that: Attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. (1) The court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals. In_those_cases_in which an action is brought for enforcement and the court finds that the noncompliant party is without justification in the refusal to follow _a court order, the court may not award attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs to the noncompliant nartv. An annlication for attornev’s fees. suit gS Spas Un SRE 2 ASSES Soe money, or costs, whether temporary or otherwise, shall not require corroborating expert testimony in order to support an award under this chapter. The trial court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make temporary attorney’s fees and costs awards reasonably necessary to prosecute or defend an appeal on the same basis and criteria as though the matter were pending before it at the trial ievei. in ali cases, the court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in that attorney’s name. 4. Florida Statute §57.105 sets forth the law relating to attorney’s fees and sanctions for Attorney’s fee; sanctions for raising unsupported claims or defenses; exceptions; service of motions; damages for delay of litigation. (1)Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the eauet chall award a raacnnahla attarnaw’e faa inaludina court Snau award a rasonaoie attormey's ee, incicing prejudgment interest, to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial:(a)Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense: or (b)Would not be supported by the application of then- existing law to those material facts. (2)At any time in any civil proceeding or action in which the moving party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any action taken by the opposing party, including, but not limited to, the filing of any pieading or part thereof, the assertion of or response to any discovery demand, the assertion of any claim or defense, or the response to any request by any other party, was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the court shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include attorney’s fees, and other loss resulting from the improper delay. 5. The Wife’s attorneys knew of the Wife’s cohabitation and prior stipulated breach of the cohabitation clause of July 23, 1992 during their meritless defense of the cohabitation clause breach and were thus precluded from receiving fees directly from the F/H which was awarded and paid. Attorneys who litigate in bad faith are precluded from receiving fees. Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2002), Diaz v. Diaz, 727 So. 2d 954, (Fla. 1998) 6. Shaw v. Shaw, 816 So. 2d 540; 2002 Fla. is instructive: The trial court has failed to articulate a sufficient basis for its award of attorney's fees under Rosen. Further, since the father prevailed in appealing from the erroneous initial ex parte relocation order, and has only properly sought access to his child, the record clearly does not support an award of fees applicable to that part of the litigation. For these reasons, I would also disapprove the Fourth District's decision insofar as it upholds the award of all attorney's fees to the mother in this case, contrary to well-established law in this State. Here, the father is being improperly punished contrary to any notion of justice because he sought appellate review of an erroneous order and was successful in having the error corrected. In my view, the record does not have even a hint of support for an award of fees under Rosen. e’s defense of the 7. it is now apparent, based on the May 26, 2009 Finai Order, that the enforcement of the cohabitation clause and prosecution for alimony, contempt, and attorney’sfees, even subsequent to her admitted breach thereof, was unjustified as contemplated by F.S. 61.14(ij(b) and 57.105. The aitempis by the F/'W and her aitorneys io defeat ihe constrainis of the cohabitation clause was uniformly in bad faith under statutes and case law. She and her attorneys should be jointly held responsible for the attorney’s fees incurred by the F/H in this enforcement action as well as being required to return fees already paid to the attorneys directly by the F/H. 8. Florida Family Rule of Civil Procedure 12.525 that governs motions for costs and attorney’s fees provides that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 (30 day rule) shall not apply in Family Court proceedings. 9. The F/H_ is requesting entitlement of reimbursement from the former attorneys of the former Wife of fees paid to them to enforce continuation of alimony payments, which they did zealously despite their knowledge of the breach of the cohabitation clause. Although those fee orders were entered in the 1990s by predecessor judges in this circuit, the lapse of time does not preclude reimbursement with interest since the final judgment on the cohabitation clause has yet to be entered and it is this latter judgment that triggers the rule and starts the clock. Doug Hambel’s Plumbing, Inc. v. Conway, 883 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). In this latter case, although the motion for fees was filed more than 30 days after the initial judgment, the Fourth District concluded that denial on that basis was improper because the plaintiff did not have a right to fees until it was awarded the lien in the second judgment, Similarly, in the present case, the amount of overnaid alimony and entitlement to fees has yet to be adjudicated under remand. Therefore, this Motion by the F/H for reimbursement of fees already court-ordered and paid by the F/H before the completion of the adjudication of the underlying alimony/cohabitation case on the merits, is timely. 10. The inequitable conduct, baseless