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Filing # 100329051 E-Filed 12/15/2019 03:50:43 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR WALTON COUNTY, FLORIDA
KRISTIN POND, CASE NO.: 19-CA-
FLA BAR NO.: 0739685
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL A. ADKINSON, JR. in his official
capacity s SHERIFF, WALTON COUNTY,
Defendant.
/
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, KRISTIN POND, hereby sues Defendant, MICHAEL A. ADKINSON, JR. in his
official capacity s SHERIFF, WALTON COUNTY, and alleges:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is an action brought under the Florida Whistleblower Act codified at Chapter
112, Florida Statutes’.
2. This action involves claims which are, individually, in excess of Fifteen Thousand
Dollars ($15,000.00), exclusive of costs and interest.
THE PARTIES
3. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff, KRISTIN POND, has been a resident of the
State of Florida and was employed by Defendant. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class due to
her submission of a grievance reporting and disclosing Defendant’s malfeasance, misfeasance
! Plaintiff intends to add additional claims upon her exhaustion of administrative
remedies on said claims.
Electronically Filed Walton Case # 19000577CAAXMX 12/15/2019 02:50:43 PMand/or gross misconduct. Plaintiff was retaliated against after reporting matters protected under
Chapter 112, Florida Statutes.
4. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, MICHAEL A. ADKINSON, JR. in his
official capacity s SHERIFF, WALTON COUNTY, has been organized and existing under the
laws of Florida as a law enforcement agency known as the WALTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE (“WCSO”). At all times pertinent to this action, Defendant has been an “employer” as
that term is used under the applicable laws identified above. Defendant was Plaintiff's employer
as it relates to these claims.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
5. Plaintiff has satisfied all conditions precedent to bringing this action, if any.
STATEMENT OF THE ULTIMATE FACTS
6. Plaintiff, a protected whistleblower, began her employment with Defendant on or
about October 15, 2012 and held the position of K-9 Sergeant/ Trainer at the time of her
wrongful termination on July 19, 2019.
7. Despite her stellar work performance during her employment with Defendant,
Plaintiff has been subjected to disparate treatment, different terms and conditions of
employment, and was held to a different standard because of her gender (female), and because
she reported misfeasance, malfeasance and gross misconduct by Defendant and was subject to
retaliation thereafter.
8. The disparate treatment and retaliation came at the hands of specifically but not
limited to Lieutenant (Lt.) Dustin Burlison, Major Tom Ring, Bureau Captain Robert Gray,
Internal Affairs (IA) Captain Jimmy Fannin and Major Donald Clark, all males.9. In 2014 Defendant ADKINSON spoke with Plaintiff and agreed that when the
single purpose K-9's retired the dual-purpose K-9's would be purchased to replace them due to
their significant benefits and relatively similar costs.
10. Plaintiff has been and continues to be subjected to less favorable treatment
because she is a woman and has been subjected to retaliation for reporting Defendant’s gender-
based treatment as well as Defendant’s malfeasance, misfeasance and/or gross misconduct.
Specifically, and without limitation, male employees treated more favorably than Plaintiff
include Steve Tector, a male K-9 Handler.
11. Plaintiff and other employees including without limitation Sergeant Paula
Pendleton have been treated less favorably by male commanding officers Lt. Burlison, Bureau
Captain Robert Gray, IA Captain Fannin and Major Donald Clark because of their gender.
Specifically, Defendant has a pattern and practice of labeling women with an opinion as
argumentative, difficult, and insubordinate. As evidence of this, Sergeant Wayne Grandstaff
even confided to Plaintiff that Lt. Burlison was a poor decisionmaker and felt threatened by more
experienced women telling him how to operate and so he is lashing out at her. Plaintiff was
further retaliated against for reporting Defendant’s pattern of behavior.
12. The mistreatment began almost immediately after Lt. Burlison was promoted to
the head of Plaintiff's department.
13. Shortly after being assigned under him, Lt. Burlison disagreed with Plaintiff that
Kayne needed to retire because he did well in agility, mistaking Kayne for dual-purpose K-9,
Jester, who placed second in agility (single-purpose dogs do not participate in agility training).
Lt. Burlison disagreed further that if Kayne were to retire, he should be replaced with another
single-purpose K-9.14. Lt. Burlison told Plaintiff to submit a report detailing why Kayne needed to retire
and why they should replace him with a dual-purpose K-9 and Plaintiff was under the impression
that they would sit down and discuss it before a decision was made.
15. On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff issued her written Memorandum to Lt. Burlison,
Captain Gray, and Major Clark highlighting Kayne’s condition and elaborating on the benefits of
dual-purpose over single-purpose K-9s.
16. Plaintiff reported that Kayne, who was eleven (11) years old, had been diagnosed
with Arthritis by Dr. Harris. In February of 2019, he began to develop a limp which was also
attributed to arthritis. On February 21, 2019, Kayne was prescribed Carprofen for pain and
multiple days of Adequan shots weekly by the Bluewater Bay Animal Hospital.
17. Single-purpose K-9s are only trained in location functions such as tracking and
detection of contraband, commonly narcotics or ammunition but not suspects. Dual-purpose K-
9s by contrast are additionally trained for apprehension functions such as tracking, intimidating,
and detaining a suspect.
18. Plaintiff reported in pertinent part that despite the fact Defendant’s employee
Nick Bearden had been purchasing K-9s at grossly overpriced rates between $12,000 and
$15,000 from Kasseburg Kennels, the procurement cost of a green single-purpose or dual-
purpose K-9 is the same, about $9,000 but the dual purpose K-9 has the added benefit of being
able to pursue suspects when requested which means it is crucial that as many K-9s as possible
are cross trained, especially when they have only three (3) K-9s for the county.
19. Plaintiff noted that the training standards for all K-9s procured by Defendant are
very strict due to federal and state case law governing the training standards and that having
cross trained dogs reduces liability for negligent training and negligent supervision should theneed ever arise where the department does not have a dual-purpose dog available and they send a
single-purpose dog out which injures a civilian.
20. Plaintiff also reported that the psychological effect of having a K-9 when
apprehending a suspect cannot be understated and it reduces liability costs as suspects are less
likely to not comply or run, therefore the officers are less likely to need to use force thus they are
better from an officer safety standpoint, suspect safety standpoint, and bystander safety
standpoint.
21. Plaintiff added that she was able to find a two (2)? year old male Belgian Malinois
named Toby for only $3,500 including training assistance from retired Pensacola Police
Department K-9 Officer Harry Barraclough who is a certified K-9 Trainer, FDLE K-9 Evaluator,
and United States Police Canine Judge. Plaintiff recommended Defendant hire Toby and that he
be cross trained as dual-purpose.
22. On March 11, 2019, Lt. Burlison emailed Plaintiff a purchase request for Toby as
a single purpose K-9. The reasons given were “... [Toby’s] age, the length of time you (Plaintiff)
have left with the agency, and that he (Toby) will be doing mostly school demonstrations/
searches and narcotic detention with you (Plaintiff).” Lt. Burlison also requested she come speak
with him about next years budget.
23. On March 12, 2019, Lt. Burlison met with Plaintiff while they were conducting
K-9 training and told Plaintiff that she needed to start grooming a replacement soon for when she
retires. Plaintiff asked why the department was against the dual-purpose trained dogs and could
not get an answer.
? The Memorandum list the age as “4years old” but this was corrected via the e-mail from
Plaintiff to Lt. Burlison sent March 22, 2019.24. On March 22, 2019 Plaintiff e-mailed Lt. Burlison correcting Toby’s age, stating
that she has plenty of time remaining to train Toby and would be willing to contribute off days so
that the training does not interfere with official duties, and noting that cross-trained dogs can still
perform the school demonstrations/ searches. Plaintiff urged for Defendant to reconsider Toby’s
training classification and stated she could answer anyone’s questions. Defendant never
responded.
25. On March 27, 2019, Lt. Burlison called Plaintiff into his office and scolded her,
stating that he didn’t care how HR wanted the letter done, he wanted it done differently and he
told her to do it his way. Lt. Burlison berated Plaintiff, calling her hard-headed, argumentative,
and telling her she needed to smile more as she always looks angry.
26. Lt. Burlison then accused Plaintiff of doing no work, asking why Defendant
needed to get her a dog because she doesn’t do anything. Lt. Burlison told her that she needed to
get her traffic stop numbers up and that she hadn’t advertised K-9 enough. Plaintiff responded by
stating that she had administrative duties, and because of her day shift hours and the fact that
Kayne is only single-purpose trained, she has been assigned more to school visits and jail checks
though and that Lt. Burlison could check her numbers which would reflect she in fact completes
her fair share of work. Plaintiff further corrected Lt. Burlison in that she and her subordinates
have been advertising the K-9 unit and its benefits to several sergeants and deputies.
27. During the hostile meeting, Lt. Burlison again asked who was going to replace
Plaintiff. Plaintiff notified Lt. Burlison that she was grooming Damon Byrd to take over which
Burlison did not like. She also told him that two unqualified employees applied and confirmed
that Lt. Burlison was aware that the employees were unqualified.28. Lt. Burlison then asked if they could apply and not go through all the training in
direct violation of Defendant’s policy which Plaintiff refused and stated that she would have to
train them pursuant to rules which further upset Lt. Burlison.
29. On April 2, 2019, Plaintiff reported to HR Generalist Sharon Byrd that she felt
she was experiencing a hostile work environment because Lt. Burlison gave preferential
treatment to her subordinate K-9 handler Tector with regard to work hours, and because Lt.
Burlison undermined Plaintiff by telling Tector that Plaintiff was grooming her other subordinate
employee Damon Byrd as her replacement which caused conflict on Plaintiff's team.
30. On April 4, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a 10x10 kennel from tractor supply to
separate Kayne and Toby until they became acclimated under the impression that Defendant
would be reimbursing her for said purchase. To date, defendant has not reimbursed Plaintiff the
$481.48.
31. On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff was admitted to the ER due to high blood pressure
from stress and a possible stroke caused by Defendant’s actions.
32. Things began to escalate after April 22, 2019 when Clay Smith, who is not an
FDLE certified K-9 evaluator mistakenly told Lt. Burlison that Deputy Byrd’s K-9 Jester barely
passed certification which was false and that he hesitated on the apprehension phase and failed to
explain that this would not fail a dog in USPCA or FDLE.
33. Due to Lt. Burlison’s lack of adequate training or knowledge of the K-9s, he
failed to comprehend that hesitation is a normal occurrence which does not disqualify a dog.
Plaintiff even tried to explain this and gave several examples.
34. Defendant began to pull Plaintiffs duties by giving her shared responsibilities,
having her train at the Santa Rosa facility and with Clay Smith as a co-trainer.35. On April 24, 2019, Plaintiff made verbal complaint to [A Captain Fannin who
violated General Orders in his reporting of the complaint.
36. On April 26, 2019 Lt. Burlison issued a frivolous and inaccurate memorandum
with significant distortions of fact and contradictory statements of fact. Specifically and without
limitation; all statements in the memo referencing Jester needing any extra work to qualify FDLE
are patently false as Jester was qualified; Lt. Burlison then claimed that Plaintiff failed to work
with the Santa Rosa facility which was also patently false as she worked with Clay Smith despite
voicing objections to doing same; Lt. Burlison’s statements on the dog’s regression are
misleading as to the significance of said regression, it is to be expected that a dog fresh out of the
academy will be more well honed than one training only once a week annually for 480 hours;
and the ironic claim by Lt. Burlison was that Plaintiff was untruthful to Sgt. Smith and was
immediately undercut by the fact that most of the statements given are factually contradictory.
By way of example, Lt. Burlison falsely stated that Plaintiff stated the K-9s do apprehension
training without cones, and that they only do this when conducting a building search inside the
Lane house. By way of further example, Lt. Burlison also said that Plaintiff falsely stated the K-
9s do training in different areas but that they only do this for tracking, meaning that Plaintiff was
accurate on both counts and it was Lt. Burlison making fictitious claims.
37. Asa result, these frivolous claims and Defendant’s blind acceptance thereof, Lt.
Burlison removed Plaintiffs training duties and transferred them to the Santa Rosa facility
originally allowing Plaintiff to still attend the training.
38. However, on May 22, 2019 Lt. Burlison e-mailed telling her not to come to the
Santa Rosa training anymore because her two employees were nervous and overly quiet because
they felt awkward about the situation created by Defendant.39. On May 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a written complaint about discrimination in the
workplace due to her gender and for reporting Defendant’s malfeasance, misfeasance and/or
gross misconduct. In the memo to Major Tom Ring, Plaintiff reported that she has “...been
hospitalized recently due to stress created by Lieutenant Burlison” feeling targeted because of
her stance regarding dual purpose K-9s.
40. On May 23, 2019, Plaintiff met with Major Ring who chastised Plaintiff for
videotaping the K-9 trainings, which she often did at SRCSO for posterity and future training
reference without punishment and is commonplace. Ring told Plaintiff that the Santa Rosa
facility did not want her recording. She stated that it is not uncommon to video training sessions,
she has done so in the past, and since it was a public location, anyone could’ve been recording
and she informed the trainers that she would be recording, had never been told she had to ask
permission before, and didn’t understand why it was being made into an issue.
41. On May 28, 2019, charges of “Harassment Based on Gender” were reported
unfounded by IA Captain Fannin because there were no “specific statement or any action that
indicated any gender bias or harassment” despite acknowledging that Captain Gray refers to all
females as "girlies", that Plaintiff had been left out of administrative decisions regarding her own
department because she is female, and that supervisors were making meritless decisions and
engaging in favoritism of male employees.
42. This five (5) day investigation of serious sexual harassment allegations
concerning continuous mistreatment by the very people investigating her further evidences
Defendant’s gender bias, especially when compared to the twenty-eight (28) days spent
investigating Plaintiff on frivolous charges.43. On May 30, 2019, Major Ring filed a complaint against Plaintiff stating “Based
upon Sergeant Kristen Pond's May 23, 2019 written complaint, a narrowly focused Preliminary
Inquiry was initiated to determine the viability of her concern of gender harassment. It was
unfounded.” And goes on to say that Plaintiff’s actions including her writing a complaint are
egregious behaviors for any member of the Agency and recommended she be investigated. This
language was parroted in the investigative summary of the investigation against Plaintiff on June
27, 2019.
44. As aresult, Plaintiff was placed on Administrative Leave by Chief Deputy Jerry
Bryan forbidding Plaintiff from “representing [her]self as an employee of the WCSO” or
“perform[ing] any law enforcement duties, including extra details, which remained in effect
through her dismissal.
45. As Plaintiff's counsel Stephen Webster noted, Chapter 112 requires Defendant to
interview all witnesses before Plaintiff yet Defendant waited until eight (8) days after
interviewing Plaintiff to interview Lt. Burlison, who was one of if not the key witness, other than
Plaintiff. This is yet another example of Defendant unlawfully extending a privilege to a male
supervisory employee over his female subordinate, this was an attempt to sabotage and undercut
Plaintiff’s interview testimony and rob her or her legal right of last word.
46. On May 31, 2019, Major Ring denied Plaintiffs request to wear her class III
uniform at a funeral in Louisiana, allowing her to attend only if not in uniform.
47.
48. On June 20, 2019, Defendant tried to further sabotage Plaintiff by giving her
barely 24 hours’ notice. Defendant in an e-mail sent at 3:41 pm told Plaintiff that she has “been
duly noted to be at the North Administration building of the Sheriff's Office... for a follow up
10Interview at 2:00 pm on Friday, June 21, 2019 and given more than 24 hours’ notice.” IA.
Captain Fannin seemingly does the impossible and has found a means of squeezing 24 hour
written notice out of only 22 hours 19 minutes.
49. On information and belief he may have provided oral notice with approximately
24.5 hour notice, however the timeframe itself is arbitrary, not found in any of Defendant’s rules
or procedures nor the laws of this state and was an attempt to give Plaintiff an unfairly short
amount of notice in order to increase the likelihood she would be unable to attend the second
interview Defendants wanted her conduct.
50. Plaintiff voiced these concerns at 3:46 pm via e-mail as well as concerns that
Defendant was not properly handling Plaintiff’s “request[s] for a compliance review hearing and
to compose a compliance review board in accordance with Florida State Statute 112.534(c)
and... [that Fannin] be removed from this internal investigation.”
51. Defendant did not address nor respond to these concerns when brought initially by
Plaintiff or subsequently by counsel Webster.
52. On June 27, 2019 charges of “Insubordination” and “Conduct Unbecoming a
Public Employee” were reported sustained by IA Captain Fannin who is biased against Plaintiff,
who mishandled Plaintiff’s initial complaint which Plaintiff reported, who denied Plaintiff’s
grievance, and who ignored Plaintiff's and her prior counsel’s request to conduct a compliance
review panel hearing within the 10 days required by law and to remove himself as the
investigator.
53. On July 3, 2019 Defendant notified Plaintiff of her proposed dismissal as a result
of the investigation.
1154. On July 9, 2019, a Predetermination Conference was held by Major Audie Rowell
and Plaintiff tried to present her version of events but Defendant was unwilling to listen.
55. On July 19, 2019 in continued disparate treatment and retaliation, Defendant
terminated Plaintiff under the pretense of the sustained “information received in the Internal
Affairs Investigation #2019-0007”.
56. Plaintiff has retained the undersigned to represent her interests in this cause and is
obligated to pay a fee for these services. Defendant should be made to pay said fee under the laws
referenced above.
COUNTI
PUBLIC WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION
57. Paragraphs | through 56 above are incorporated herein by reference.
58. This count sets forth a claim against Defendant under §112.3187, et seq., Florida
Statutes.
59. Plaintiff was a public employee protected under the provisions of Chapter 112,
Florida Statutes.
60. As stated more specifically in part above, Plaintiff reported and disclosed
violations of rules, regulations and laws, and/or malfeasance, misfeasance and/or gross
misconduct to persons both inside and outside of her normal chain of command, and to others
having the authority to investigate, police, manage and otherwise remedy the violations of rules,
regulations and laws that she reported. Plaintiff also disclosed this information when she
participated in investigations, hearings, or other agency inquiries. Plaintiff reported malfeasance,
misfeasance, and other acts specifically outlined in §112.3187(5), Florida Statutes.
1261. After reporting these matters and/or participating in investigations, hearings, or
other agency inquiries, as related in part above, Plaintiff was the victim of retaliatory actions set
forth in part above including without limitation her termination.
62. The adverse actions against Plaintiff including without limitation her termination
was the result of her reporting violations of rules, regulations or laws, and/or malfeasance,
misfeasance or gross misconduct, and/or her participating in investigations, hearings or other
inquiries, specified in part above.
63. The actions of all employees within Defendant who affected Plaintiff’s
employment adversely did so at least in part in retaliation against her for her "whistleblowing"
activities.
64. Asa direct and proximate result of the actions taken against her by Defendant,
Plaintiff has suffered injury, including but not limited to past and future wage losses, loss of
benefits, emotional pain and suffering, loss of the capacity for the enjoyment of life,
embarrassment, and other tangible and intangible damages. These damages have occurred in the
past, are occurring at present and will occur in the future. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for the following:
(a) that process issue and this Court take jurisdiction over this case;
(b) that this Court grant equitable relief against Defendant under the applicable
counts set forth above, mandating Defendant’s obedience to the laws
enumerated herein and providing other equitable relief to Plaintiff;
13(c)
(@)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff awarding all legally-
available general and compensatory damages and economic loss to Plaintiff
from Defendant for Defendant’s violations of law enumerated herein;
enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff awarding all legally-
available damages for emotional pain and suffering to Plaintiff from
Defendant for Defendant’s violations of law enumerated herein.
enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff permanently enjoining
Defendant from future violations of law enumerated herein;
enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff awarding Plaintiff
attorney's fees and costs;
award Plaintiff interest where appropriate; and
grant such other further relief as being just and proper under the
circumstances, including but not limited to reinstatement.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues herein that are so triable.
DATED this 15" day of December 2019.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Marie A. Mattox
Marie A. Mattox [FBN 0739685]
MARIE A. MATTOX, P. A.
203 North Gadsden Street
Tallahassee, FL 32303
Telephone: (850) 383-4800
Facsimile: (850) 383-4801
Marie@mattoxlaw.com
Secondary emails:
marlene@mattoxlaw.com
michelle@mattoxlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
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