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  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
  • MURDOCK, SHAE KRISTINE vs. HINSON, LEONARD FRANCISDISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT/OTHER document preview
						
                                

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Filing # 122085276 E-Filed 02/25/2021 02:52:13 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA SHAE KRISTINE MURDOCK, Plaintiff, vs. CASE NO.: 2019 CA 004417 CITY OF LYNN HAVEN, and LEONARD FRANCIS HINSON, individually, Defendants. a ——esesi‘“‘“‘i‘i‘i‘iéC DEFENDANT CITY OF LYNN HAVEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, Defendant City of Lynn Haven (‘City’) moves for summary judgment in its favor, and states: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The City of Lynn Haven Police Department’s (“Department”) mission is to serve all citizens with respect and it is committed to protecting life and property, to the enforcement of law in a fair and impartial manner. See https://www.cityoflynnhaven.com/151/Police (last visited February 16, 2021). Members of the Department serve with integrity, honesty, respect, fairness, and compassion to preserve peace, order and safety through a proactive approach that enhances the quality of life within the City. /d. Plaintiff began dating Leonard Francis Hinson (“Hinson”) in November 2014. Complaint at { 7. Hinson told her that he was in the final stages of a divorce, and the two engaged in a relationship that continued until January 2018. /d. In mid-May of 2018, the couple discussed reconciliation and Plaintiff confronted Hinson about an affair he was having with a co-worker. Id. at ¥ 8. After the confrontation, the Lynn Haven Police Department investigated claims made by Hinson. /d. at § 10. Lt. Charles Enfinger conducted an investigation and prepared an application for arrest warrant and a probable cause Affidavit. See attached as Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Charles Enfinger and Exhibit A to Enfigner Affidavit. Enfinger submitted the application and probable cause Affidavit to a judge for review. /d. Thereafter, the judge issued two warrants authorizing Plaintiff's arrest. /d. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested pursuant to the arrest warrants. /d. Plaintiff's sole allegation against the City is for false imprisonment/arrest. See Complaint at Count I. Plaintiff alleges the City’s officers unlawfully detained her and deprived her of her liberty without reasonable cause. Complaint at § 15. Plaintiff further claims she was restrained without any justification or arguable probable cause. Complaint at { 18. As a result of a plea negotiation, the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. Complaint at | 12. MEMORANDUM OF LAW 1. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions, together with any affidavits, show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). ““When the movant produces sufficient evidence to support summary judgment, it is the opponent’s burden to come forward with either counter-evidence or justifiable inferences from the evidence presented.” O’Donnel v. BellSouth Advertising & Pub. Corp., 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “It is not enough for the [party opposing summary judgment] merely to assert that an issue does exist.” Fla. Bar v. Mogil, 763 So. 2d 303, 307 (Fla. 2000)(quoting Landers v. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979)). Argument, rhetoric, speculation and theories of counsel for the non-moving party are not sufficient to prevent entry of a summary judgment. See Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc. v. Goforth, 545 So. 2d 482, 483 n. 1 (Fla. Sth DCA 1989). I. ARGUMENT The City is entitled to final summary judgment because: (1) Plaintiff's arrest was made pursuant to an arrest warrant, and (2) it is entitled to absolute immunity for executing the warrant. As a matter of Florida law, an arrest made pursuant to an arrest warrant cannot be false, and therefore, Plaintiffs claim is meritless and the City is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. A. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a False Arrest Claim Because She Was Arrested Pursuant to an Arrest Warrant The existence of an arrest warrant authorizing Plaintiff’s arrest is fatal to her false arrest claim. For the tort of false arrest, “all that is required are allegations that a person has been unlawfully restrained without color of authority.” Everett v. Florida Inst. of Technology, 503 So.2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). However, for over eighty years, the Florida Supreme Court has held that as a general rule, imprisonment, if based on valid process, cannot be false. See S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 180 So. 757 (Fla. 1938); Johnson v. Weiner, 19 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1944); Dodson v. Solomon, 183 So. 825 (Fla. 1938). Imprisonment, under “process regular and in legal form issued by lawful authority” is not false. Erp v. Carroll, 438 So.2d 31 (Fla. 5th DAC 1983). The question of probable cause is not material when the arrest is supported by a warrant because a judicial officer, in issuing an arrest warrant makes an initial determination based on the material presented, about whether sufficient facts exists to support a finding of probable cause. Because the judicial officer issuing the arrest warrant has determined that the warrant is supported by probable cause, the arresting officer is justified in relying on this determination and making the arrest. This is true, even when, as here, the person applying for the warrant is alleged to have presented the judicial officer with knowing misrepresentations of fact. See Salters v. Rocky Hanna, Superintendent of Leon County Schools, Case No. 4:20cv517-RH-MAF at 5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2021); Moody v. McElroy, 513 A.2d 5, 9 (R.I. (1986) (succinctly explaining why the arrest pursuant to a warrant is not false but a claim for malicious prosecution of a federal civil rights claim may lie). Thus, where an arrest ispursuant to lawful authority, i.e.an arrest warrant, itcannot be false, even where “the officer preparing the probable cause affidavit...assisted in the arrest, since the arrest was stillbased on the capias, and that precludes a false arrest claim.” See Jackson v. Navarro, 665 So.2d 340, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Willingham v. City of Orlando, 929 So.2d 43, 48-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); McCray v. State, 496 So.2d 919 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (although capias was mistakenly issued, arrest was valid since officers had no discretion to arrest defendant pursuant to outstanding capias). The Jackson Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in a false arrest claim where the arrest was a result of a capias. It recognized that a plaintiff cannot “do an end run around the more difficult burden of proof placed on a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case.” Jackson, 665 So. 2d at 342. Jackson binds this court and forecloses Plaintiff's false arrest claim. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992) (District court opinions bind other District’s trial courts absent contrary authority from the Florida Supreme Court or in the District in which the trial court is located). Nothing here compels a different result. The City is entitled to final summary judgment in its favor because Plaintiff’s arrest was pursuant to an arrest warrant. B. The City Is Entitled to Absolute Immunity If Plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a valid warrant, courts have held that the arresting agency “is entitled to an absolute grant of immunity springing from the judicial immunity of the judicial officer who issued the warrant.” Willingham v. City of Orlando, 929 So. 2d 43, 49 (Fla. Sth DCA 2006). The law enforcement agency/officer has no discretion when directed by a warrant to make an arrest. McCray v. State, 496 So, 2d 919, 919 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“The officers who learned of the outstanding capias had no discretion to do anything but arrest [plaintiff]’). The Florida Legislature even criminalized refusal to execute process generally: Failure to execute process generally. —- Any sheriff or other officer authorized to execute process, who willfully or corruptly refuses or neglects to execute and return, according to law, any process delivered to him or her, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree... § 839.19, Fla. Stat. The legislature also specifically criminalized the refusal to execute criminal process: Refusal to execute criminal process. — If any officer authorized to serve process, willfully and corruptly refuses to execute any lawful process to him or her directed and requiring him or her to apprehend and confine any person convicted or charged with an offense, or willfully and corruptly omits or delays to execute such process, whereby such person escapes and goes at large, the officer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree... § 839.20, Fla. Stat. If Plaintiff can bring a claim for false arrest, when the underlying arrest was ordered by a judge through a warrant, law enforcement departments and their officers across the state of Florida would be faced with absurd scenarios where they would have to choose between facing criminal penalties for refusing to execute valid process or possible civil liability for executing valid process. The law in the state of Florida, however, is settled, and law enforcement agencies, including municipalities and their police departments, are immune from false arrest actions when the underlying arrest was pursuant to valid process. Willingham, 929 So. 2d at 49. Defendant City of Lynn Haven, therefore, is absolutely immune from any suit for false arrest stemming from an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant. C. There is No Basis for The Recovery of Attorney Fees Notwithstanding the arguments set forth in Section IT (A-B), above which require summary judgment on Plaintiffs sole claim against the City, there is no statutory or other basis to recover attorney fees. It has been well-settled law for over 40 years that attorney’s fees are not recoverable unless a statute or a contract specifically authorizes their recovery, or unless equity allows attorneys’ fees from a fund or estate which has been benefitted by the rendering of legal services. Hampton’s Estate v. Fairchild-Florida Const. Co., 341 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1976). None ofthese exceptions to the general rule apply here. The award of attorney fees are in the absence of a statute or contract authorizing the award constitutes reversible error. E.g. Cadenhead v. Gaetz, 677 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Ist DCA 1996). Accordingly, the City is entitled to final summary judgment on Plaintiff's attorney fee claim pursuant to her allegation of false arrest. WHEREFORE, the City of Lynn Haven requests an order entering final summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff on the sole claim against it. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was served by e-Filing with the Clerk of Court and via Florida e-Filing Portal to the following, this 25th day of February, 2021. Marie A. Mattox Jeffrey S. Carter MARIE A. MATTOX, P.A. JEFF CARTER, P.A. 203 N. Gadsden Street P.O. Box 228 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Panama City, Florida 32402 marie@matoxlaw.com Tel: (850) 387-0787 katherine@mattoxlaw.com jeff@jeffcarterpa.com marlene@mattoxlaw.com service@Jeffcarterpa.com michelle@mattoxlaw.com (Counsel for Defendant, Hinson) (Counsel for Plaintiff) s/ J. David Marsey J. DAVID MARSEY Florida Bar No.: 0010212 E-mail: dmarsey@rumberger.com (primary) docketingorlando@rumberger.com and kradysecy@rumberger.com (secondary) KAYLA E. PLATT RADY Florida Bar No.: 0117896 E-mail: krady@rumberger.com (primary) docketingorlando@rumberger.com and kradysecy@rumberger.com (secondary) RUMBERGER, KIRK, & CALDWELL, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tel: 850.222.6550 Fax: 850.222.8783 Attorneys for Defendant, City of Lynn Haven