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Filing # 123628719 E-Filed 03/23/2021 04:48:51 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA
SHAE KRISTINE MURDOCK,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CASE NO.: 2019 CA 004417
CITY OF LYNN HAVEN, and
LEONARD FRANCIS HINSON, individually,
Defendants.
eae
DEFENDANT CITY OF LYNN HAVEN’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO FLORIDA STATUTE
SECTION 57.105 AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Defendant City of Lynn Haven (‘City’), by and through its undersigned attorneys, and
pursuant to § 57.105, Florida Statutes, files this Motion for Attorney Fees and in support thereof
states:
INTRODUCTION
This is a false arrest claim against the City arising from Lynn Haven Police Department
Lt. Charles Enfinger’s criminal investigation into Plaintiff's criminal conduct. It cannot be
contested that Lt. Enfinger, pursuant to a criminal investigation, prepared a probable cause
affidavit and presented it to the Court. The Court issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff for
aggravated stalking and extortion or threats. Although the criminal case was ultimately resolved
through plea negotiations, there is no question Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest
warrant. The law in Florida is clear, that where, as here, a person is arrested pursuant to an arrest
warrant, the claim of false arrest will not lie and the City is entitled to absolute immunity.
Plaintiff has alleged a single count of false arrest against the City. Despite clear authority
foreclosing the claim on multiple fronts, and the service of this motion more than 21 days prior
to filing, Plaintiff persist in prosecuting this legally insufficient and unsupported claim. Because
the sole pending claim against the City is not supported by existing facts or law, the City is
entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred in its defense.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I. Introduction
Plaintiff’s claims against the City are both legally and factually deficient because well-
settled, binding authority precludes Plaintiff from recovering against the City under a false arrest
theory when her arrest was pursuant to an arrest warrant. Plaintiff and/or her counsel know, or
should know through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the asserted claims lack legal
support and therefore are meritless. There are no new or novel theories asserted here and the
abundance of authority foreclosing Plaintiffs claims is or should have been known to Plaintiff
prior to filing the action. Alternatively, continued pursuit of the unsupported claim after
receiving actual notice of its foreclosure by binding law in this motion warrants the award of
sanctions.
II. Legal Standard to Assess Attorney Fees Pursuant to § 57.105
Under § 57.105, the losing party and the losing party’s attorney are liable for the
prevailing party’s attorney’s fees when the court finds that the losing party or its attorney knew
or should have known that a claim was not supported by the facts or was not supported by the
law. As set forth above, Plaintiff and her counsel knew, or should have known through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, that the facts and well-settled law did not support the positions
Plaintiff advances in his tort claim against the City. Plaintiff and her counsel know there is no
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factual or legal basis for their Complaint against the City and failed to exercise due diligence in
support thereof.
Florida Statute § 57.105(1) states in relevant part:
Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall
award a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid to the prevailing party
in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney
on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or
action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing
party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or
defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before
trial:
(a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to
establish the claim or defense; or
(b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing
law to those material facts.
§. 57.105, Florida Statutes (emphasis added); see also Forum v. Boca Burger Inc., 788 So. 2d
1055, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (noting under § 57.105, the “operative standard is now that the
party and counsel knew or should have known that any claim or defense was (a) not supported
by the facts or (b) not supported by an application of ‘then-existing’ law”); Gahn v. Holiday
Property Bond. Ltd., 826 So. 2d 423, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant
to § 57.105 where the defendants’ motion to dismiss was not supported by material facts,
“particularly after these facts, and others were disclosed during discovery”). See generally,
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron, 828 So. 2d 414, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“language of
section 57.105 plainly signifies that the court may award an attorney’s fees for a particular claim
or defense, even before the case has been concluded.”’). To determine whether a claim is without
factual or legal merit:
[t]he test is simply whether the ‘party or his counsel knew or
should have known, at the time of filing, [that the claims were] not
grounded in fact or were not warranted by existing law or by
reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. Importantly, section 57.105 ‘does not require a party
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seeking fees to show the complete absence of a justiciable issue of
fact or law, but permits fees to be recovered for any claim or
defense that is insufficiently supported.’
Long v. AvMed, Inc., 14 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); quoting Gopman vy. Dept. of Ed.,
974 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. Ist DCA 2008); see also Wendy’s of N.E. Fla., Inc. v. Vandergriff,
865 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Once the court has determined that a party and counsel knew or should have known that
its claim was not supported in either law or fact, it must award the prevailing party its attorney’s
fees. See §57.105, Fla. Stat. (“Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall
award a reasonable attorney’s fees”); Debra, Inc. v. Orange County, 445 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla.
5th DCA 1984); Visoly v. Security Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000)(“court shall award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party’). In fact, failure to do so
constitutes error. See e.g. Moral Majority, Inc. v. Broward County Chapter of Nat’l
Organization for Women, Inc., 606 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (reversing trial court’s
refusal to award attorney fees after the trial court concluded “that there was not a scintilla of
evidence to support” plaintiff-appellee’s allegations).
In Sykes v. St. Andrews School, 625 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), where a party
continued to press an appeal even after adverse resolution of the sole issue by the Florida
Supreme Court, the court encouraged the application of section 57.105:
We remind trial judges and the bar that our legislature said in
section 57.105 that courts ‘shall’ assess attorneys’ fees for the
bringing of frivolous litigation. In the present case defense counsel
vigorously attempted to dissuade plaintiffs counsel from bringing
this frivolous action against his client, but his efforts were to no
avail. When his prediction came to fruition he properly sought
attorney’s fees and vigorously defended them on this appeal. We
commend this and encourage it so that the intent of the statute is
effectuated.
4
Id. at 1319. Here, the City notified Plaintiff, through counsel, of her meritless claim and its
intention to seek recovery under § 57.105, Florida Statutes, through service of this Motion on
February 25, 2021. Despite this, Plaintiff did not retreat from her unsupported position. Plaintiff
counsel’s dogged pursuit of these unsupportable claims entitle the City to the recovery of all
costs of defense, including attorney fees.
Where a defendant is named in a lawsuit in which it is apparent the plaintiff's counsel
had no knowledge of any facts which could support the claim, the award of attorney fees
pursuant to § 57.105 is appropriate. Sykes v.St. Andrews, 625 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
“To us, filing a lawsuit with no factual basis is a classic situation in which fees should be
assessed under the statute.” /d. at 1218. In that case, defense counsel “vigorously attempted to
dissuade plaintiff's counsel from [maintaining] this action against his client, but his efforts were
to no avail.” /d. at 1319. When a claim is initiated without a good faith investigation, the award
of attorney fees is appropriate. In L.L. v. Zipperer, the plaintiff served a pre-suit notice of intent
to litigate an automobile accident to Orange County pursuant to Florida’s limited waiver of
sovereign immunity notice requirements. 484 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The plaintiff was
notified that the purported employee was not an employee of Orange County, yet the plaintiff
initiated a lawsuit anyway without conducting any further investigation. Trial counsel’s naming
of the County was based on a mere assumption, not an investigation. The award of sanctions
pursuant to § 57.105, Florida Statutes was affirmed.
Here, even a brief review of Florida law prior to filing the lawsuit would have revealed
that Plaintiffs claim for her false arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant is unsupported. Her claims
of some impropriety or conspiracy in the procurement of the warrant do not change the fact that
the existence of a warrant forecloses her false arrest claim under Florida law. Furthermore,
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Plaintiff was notified of the deficiencies regarding her tort claim when this Motion was served to
her on February 25, 2021, pursuant to the safe harbor provision of Section 57.105, Florida
Statutes, and again when the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 25, 2021.
Even if Plaintiff did not know of the legal deficiencies of her claims when the suit was filed,
there can be no question Plaintiff was on actual notice upon receipt of this motion.
I. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a False Arrest Claim Because She Was Arrested
Pursuant to an Arrest Warrant
The City incorporates herein Section IIA of its Motion for summary judgment and
memorandum of law establishing its entitlement to final judgment as a matter of law. The
binding authority cited therein demonstrates Plaintiffs false arrest claim is unsupported by fact
or law, and therefore, the City should be awarded its costs of defense, including attorney fees.
IV. The City Is Entitled to Absolute Immunity
The City incorporates herein Section IIB of its Motion for summary judgment and
memorandum of law establishing its entitlement to final judgment as a matter of law. The
binding authority cited therein demonstrates Plaintiffs false arrest claim is unsupported by fact
or law, and therefore, the City should be awarded its costs of defense, including attorney fees.
V. Plaintiff’s Attorney Fee Claim Is Meritless
The City incorporates herein Section IIC of its Motion for summary judgment and
memorandum of law establishing itsentitlement to final judgment on these damages as a matter
of law. The binding authority cited therein demonstrates there is no legal basis for the recovery
of attorney fees and the City should be awarded its costs of defense, including attorney fees.
VI. Conclusion
Clearly established, well-settled, binding legal authority establishes that Plaintiff cannot
recover against the City for false arrest where, as here, her arrest was based on an arrest warrant.
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In addition to the argument regarding the frivolous false arrest claim, Plaintiff’s attorney claim is
equally unsupported by fact or law. In the absence of any authority to the contrary, the City is
entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred to defend the unsupported and only claim against the
City.
WHEREFORE, the City of Lynn Haven, requests an order awarding it fees and costs for
the defense of Plaintiffs’ claims in an amount to be determined in a subsequent hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Kayla E. Platt Rady
J. DAVID MARSEY
Florida Bar No.: 0010212
E-mail: dmarsey@rumberger.com (primary)
docketingorlando@rumberger.com and
dmarseysecy@rumberger.com (secondary)
KAYLA E. PLATT RADY
Florida Bar No.: 0117896
E-mail: krady@rumberger.com (primary)
docketingorlando@rumberger.com and
kradysecy@rumberger.com (secondary)
RUMBERGER, KIRK, & CALDWELL, P.A.
101 North Monroe Street, Suite 120
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Tel: 850.222.6550
Fax: 850.222.8783
Attorneys for Defendant City of Lynn Haven
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was served by e-Filing with the
Clerk of Court and via Florida e-Filing Portal to the following, this 23 day of March, 2021.
7
Marie Mattox Jeffrey S. Carter
MARIE A. MATTOX, P.A. JEFF CARTER, P.A.
203 North Gadsden Street P.O. Box 228
Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Panama City, Florida 32402
marie@mattoxlaw.com Tel: (850) 387-0787
katherine@mattoxlaw.com jeff@jeffcarterpa.com
michelle@mattoxlaw.com service@Jeffcarterpa.com
(Counsel for Defendant, Hinson)
(Counsel for Plaintiff)
s/ Kayla E. Platt Rady
J. DAVID MARSEY
Florida Bar No.: 0010212
E-mail: dmarsey@rumberger.com (primary)
docketingorlando@rumberger.com and
dmarseysecy@rumberger.com (secondary)
KAYLA E. PLATT RADY
Florida Bar No.: 0117896
E-mail: krady@rumberger.com (primary)
docketingorlando@rumberger.com and
kradysecy@rumberger.com (secondary)
RUMBERGER, KIRK, & CALDWELL, P.A.
101 North Monroe Street, Suite 120
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Tel: 850.222.6550
Fax: 850.222.8783
Attorneys for Defendant City of Lynn Haven
8
14701900.v1
Preview
Filing # 123628719 E-Filed 03/23/2021 04:48:51 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA SHAE KRISTINE MURDOCK, Plaintiff, VS. CASE NO.: 2019 CA 004417 CITY OF LYNN HAVEN, and LEONARD FRANCIS HINSON, individually, Defendants. eae DEFENDANT CITY OF LYNN HAVEN’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 57.105 AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW Defendant City of Lynn Haven (‘City’), by and through its undersigned attorneys, and pursuant to § 57.105, Florida Statutes, files this Motion for Attorney Fees and in support thereof states: INTRODUCTION This is a false arrest claim against the City arising from Lynn Haven Police Department Lt. Charles Enfinger’s criminal investigation into Plaintiff's criminal conduct. It cannot be contested that Lt. Enfinger, pursuant to a criminal investigation, prepared a probable cause affidavit and presented it to the Court. The Court issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff for aggravated stalking and extortion or threats. Although the criminal case was ultimately resolved through plea negotiations, there is no question Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. The law in Florida is clear, that where, as here, a person is arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, the claim of false arrest will not lie and the City is entitled to absolute immunity. Plaintiff has alleged a single count of false arrest against the City. Despite clear authority foreclosing the claim on multiple fronts, and the service of this motion more than 21 days prior to filing, Plaintiff persist in prosecuting this legally insufficient and unsupported claim. Because the sole pending claim against the City is not supported by existing facts or law, the City is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred in its defense. MEMORANDUM OF LAW I. Introduction Plaintiff’s claims against the City are both legally and factually deficient because well- settled, binding authority precludes Plaintiff from recovering against the City under a false arrest theory when her arrest was pursuant to an arrest warrant. Plaintiff and/or her counsel know, or should know through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the asserted claims lack legal support and therefore are meritless. There are no new or novel theories asserted here and the abundance of authority foreclosing Plaintiffs claims is or should have been known to Plaintiff prior to filing the action. Alternatively, continued pursuit of the unsupported claim after receiving actual notice of its foreclosure by binding law in this motion warrants the award of sanctions. II. Legal Standard to Assess Attorney Fees Pursuant to § 57.105 Under § 57.105, the losing party and the losing party’s attorney are liable for the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees when the court finds that the losing party or its attorney knew or should have known that a claim was not supported by the facts or was not supported by the law. As set forth above, Plaintiff and her counsel knew, or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the facts and well-settled law did not support the positions Plaintiff advances in his tort claim against the City. Plaintiff and her counsel know there is no 2 factual or legal basis for their Complaint against the City and failed to exercise due diligence in support thereof. Florida Statute § 57.105(1) states in relevant part: Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial: (a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense; or (b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts. §. 57.105, Florida Statutes (emphasis added); see also Forum v. Boca Burger Inc., 788 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (noting under § 57.105, the “operative standard is now that the party and counsel knew or should have known that any claim or defense was (a) not supported by the facts or (b) not supported by an application of ‘then-existing’ law”); Gahn v. Holiday Property Bond. Ltd., 826 So. 2d 423, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 57.105 where the defendants’ motion to dismiss was not supported by material facts, “particularly after these facts, and others were disclosed during discovery”). See generally, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron, 828 So. 2d 414, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“language of section 57.105 plainly signifies that the court may award an attorney’s fees for a particular claim or defense, even before the case has been concluded.”’). To determine whether a claim is without factual or legal merit: [t]he test is simply whether the ‘party or his counsel knew or should have known, at the time of filing, [that the claims were] not grounded in fact or were not warranted by existing law or by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Importantly, section 57.105 ‘does not require a party 3 seeking fees to show the complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but permits fees to be recovered for any claim or defense that is insufficiently supported.’ Long v. AvMed, Inc., 14 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); quoting Gopman vy. Dept. of Ed., 974 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. Ist DCA 2008); see also Wendy’s of N.E. Fla., Inc. v. Vandergriff, 865 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Once the court has determined that a party and counsel knew or should have known that its claim was not supported in either law or fact, it must award the prevailing party its attorney’s fees. See §57.105, Fla. Stat. (“Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fees”); Debra, Inc. v. Orange County, 445 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Visoly v. Security Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(“court shall award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party’). In fact, failure to do so constitutes error. See e.g. Moral Majority, Inc. v. Broward County Chapter of Nat’l Organization for Women, Inc., 606 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (reversing trial court’s refusal to award attorney fees after the trial court concluded “that there was not a scintilla of evidence to support” plaintiff-appellee’s allegations). In Sykes v. St. Andrews School, 625 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), where a party continued to press an appeal even after adverse resolution of the sole issue by the Florida Supreme Court, the court encouraged the application of section 57.105: We remind trial judges and the bar that our legislature said in section 57.105 that courts ‘shall’ assess attorneys’ fees for the bringing of frivolous litigation. In the present case defense counsel vigorously attempted to dissuade plaintiffs counsel from bringing this frivolous action against his client, but his efforts were to no avail. When his prediction came to fruition he properly sought attorney’s fees and vigorously defended them on this appeal. We commend this and encourage it so that the intent of the statute is effectuated. 4 Id. at 1319. Here, the City notified Plaintiff, through counsel, of her meritless claim and its intention to seek recovery under § 57.105, Florida Statutes, through service of this Motion on February 25, 2021. Despite this, Plaintiff did not retreat from her unsupported position. Plaintiff counsel’s dogged pursuit of these unsupportable claims entitle the City to the recovery of all costs of defense, including attorney fees. Where a defendant is named in a lawsuit in which it is apparent the plaintiff's counsel had no knowledge of any facts which could support the claim, the award of attorney fees pursuant to § 57.105 is appropriate. Sykes v.St. Andrews, 625 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). “To us, filing a lawsuit with no factual basis is a classic situation in which fees should be assessed under the statute.” /d. at 1218. In that case, defense counsel “vigorously attempted to dissuade plaintiff's counsel from [maintaining] this action against his client, but his efforts were to no avail.” /d. at 1319. When a claim is initiated without a good faith investigation, the award of attorney fees is appropriate. In L.L. v. Zipperer, the plaintiff served a pre-suit notice of intent to litigate an automobile accident to Orange County pursuant to Florida’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity notice requirements. 484 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The plaintiff was notified that the purported employee was not an employee of Orange County, yet the plaintiff initiated a lawsuit anyway without conducting any further investigation. Trial counsel’s naming of the County was based on a mere assumption, not an investigation. The award of sanctions pursuant to § 57.105, Florida Statutes was affirmed. Here, even a brief review of Florida law prior to filing the lawsuit would have revealed that Plaintiffs claim for her false arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant is unsupported. Her claims of some impropriety or conspiracy in the procurement of the warrant do not change the fact that the existence of a warrant forecloses her false arrest claim under Florida law. Furthermore, 5 Plaintiff was notified of the deficiencies regarding her tort claim when this Motion was served to her on February 25, 2021, pursuant to the safe harbor provision of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, and again when the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 25, 2021. Even if Plaintiff did not know of the legal deficiencies of her claims when the suit was filed, there can be no question Plaintiff was on actual notice upon receipt of this motion. I. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a False Arrest Claim Because She Was Arrested Pursuant to an Arrest Warrant The City incorporates herein Section IIA of its Motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law establishing its entitlement to final judgment as a matter of law. The binding authority cited therein demonstrates Plaintiffs false arrest claim is unsupported by fact or law, and therefore, the City should be awarded its costs of defense, including attorney fees. IV. The City Is Entitled to Absolute Immunity The City incorporates herein Section IIB of its Motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law establishing its entitlement to final judgment as a matter of law. The binding authority cited therein demonstrates Plaintiffs false arrest claim is unsupported by fact or law, and therefore, the City should be awarded its costs of defense, including attorney fees. V. Plaintiff’s Attorney Fee Claim Is Meritless The City incorporates herein Section IIC of its Motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law establishing itsentitlement to final judgment on these damages as a matter of law. The binding authority cited therein demonstrates there is no legal basis for the recovery of attorney fees and the City should be awarded its costs of defense, including attorney fees. VI. Conclusion Clearly established, well-settled, binding legal authority establishes that Plaintiff cannot recover against the City for false arrest where, as here, her arrest was based on an arrest warrant. 6 In addition to the argument regarding the frivolous false arrest claim, Plaintiff’s attorney claim is equally unsupported by fact or law. In the absence of any authority to the contrary, the City is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred to defend the unsupported and only claim against the City. WHEREFORE, the City of Lynn Haven, requests an order awarding it fees and costs for the defense of Plaintiffs’ claims in an amount to be determined in a subsequent hearing. Respectfully submitted, s/ Kayla E. Platt Rady J. DAVID MARSEY Florida Bar No.: 0010212 E-mail: dmarsey@rumberger.com (primary) docketingorlando@rumberger.com and dmarseysecy@rumberger.com (secondary) KAYLA E. PLATT RADY Florida Bar No.: 0117896 E-mail: krady@rumberger.com (primary) docketingorlando@rumberger.com and kradysecy@rumberger.com (secondary) RUMBERGER, KIRK, & CALDWELL, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tel: 850.222.6550 Fax: 850.222.8783 Attorneys for Defendant City of Lynn Haven CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was served by e-Filing with the Clerk of Court and via Florida e-Filing Portal to the following, this 23 day of March, 2021. 7 Marie Mattox Jeffrey S. Carter MARIE A. MATTOX, P.A. JEFF CARTER, P.A. 203 North Gadsden Street P.O. Box 228 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Panama City, Florida 32402 marie@mattoxlaw.com Tel: (850) 387-0787 katherine@mattoxlaw.com jeff@jeffcarterpa.com michelle@mattoxlaw.com service@Jeffcarterpa.com (Counsel for Defendant, Hinson) (Counsel for Plaintiff) s/ Kayla E. Platt Rady J. DAVID MARSEY Florida Bar No.: 0010212 E-mail: dmarsey@rumberger.com (primary) docketingorlando@rumberger.com and dmarseysecy@rumberger.com (secondary) KAYLA E. PLATT RADY Florida Bar No.: 0117896 E-mail: krady@rumberger.com (primary) docketingorlando@rumberger.com and kradysecy@rumberger.com (secondary) RUMBERGER, KIRK, & CALDWELL, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tel: 850.222.6550 Fax: 850.222.8783 Attorneys for Defendant City of Lynn Haven 8 14701900.v1