Preview
Filed In Office Jun-@2-2014 13511308
1D% 2614-6677997-CV
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SUPERIOR COURT OF COBB cau eer
STATE OF GEORGIA gion o¢ aaict SP coy
Eleanor Spratlin Crawford;
Jeff Crawford;
CAN No. 13-1-10463-49
Plaintiff.
v.
WRI Capital Group, LLC A/A/F
CoflinAI-GA 1, LLC;
+e ee Ft He HF HH
Defendant
PLAINTIEF’S 2“! RENEWED MOTION
TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE DUE TO LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
Comes now Plaintiffs Eleanor Spratlin Crawford (Mrs. Crawford), and Jeff
Crawford (Mr. Crawford), and file this Plaintiff’s 2“ Renewed Motion to Dismiss
With Prejudice Due To Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Superior
Court Rule 6.7 and 28 USC 157(B)(2)(G).
After repeated demand for same by these Plaintiffs, all presiding judges in
both Cobb Magistrate Court as well as cobb Superior Court, have refused to
provide one iota of legal authority in support of either court’s claim that it has or
had jurisdiction to act in violation of the automatic stay granted Plaintiff Jeff
Crawford (Crawford), except for both court’s general, repeated and tired refrain,
which amounts to no more than claiming that since Crawford dismissed his
bankruptcy (just as ALL bankruptcies inevitably are), that the automatic stay1ID# 2614—-0077997-CV
Page 2
having made the foreclosure sale VOID AB INITIO is somehow magically
annulled.
This entire charade has been little more than an ever so slightly veiled
attempt to cause these Plaintiffs as much financial and emotional harm as possible;
to steal Plaintiffs’ home out from under them and force them to fight what is
obviously a battle they win, but from under a dumpster lid, and both courts do so
only in effort and under color of law, e.g., color of jurisdiction; and color of office,
to deprive them of their constitutionally protected rights to due process, and to do
what could not be done if these courts followed the law, and that is to force these
Plaintiffs into an untenable position from which these Cobb courts can hopefully
guarantee that these Plaintiffs will lose their case along with their home. Who
could possibly fight such a legal battle while living under a dumpster lid?
Actually, the more important question, is what kind of people would
stoop so low as to abuse their judicial power to do that to other human
beings? Disgusting...
Again; both courts refuse to provide legal authority in support of this absurd
position that they both have authority to usurp jurisdiction from the federal
bankruptcy court — and let there be no mistake — these Plaintiffs understand
EACTLY why no legal authority has. been given, and it is two-fold:ID# 2014-6077997-CV
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Firstly, the Cobb courts know they have no such legal authority, and
secondly and most importantly, at the end of it all, when the bankruptcy court
chastises them for stepping on its jurisdiction, both of these backwater tribunals
want to try to hide behind the false claim “we didn’t know!”
In effort to strip both Cobb Courts of that false fagade they hide behind,
Plaintiffs show this Court legal authority in the form of the following two cases:
1. Both Cobb courts claim that since Crawford dismissed his bankruptcy, that
that effort somehow magically annulled the automatic stay which caused the
foreclosure sale WRI claims its standing to bring these actions rises out of.
However, In re Madjid Ebadi, Debtor. No. 10-73702-ast. USBC, E.D., New
York. 448 BR 308 (2011) clearly held otherwise:
“The fact that the bankruptcy case was dismissed does not render the stay violation moot.
As this Court has recently stated, in the Second Circuit, an action in violation of the
automatic stay is void ab initio. See In re Olejnik, No. 09-76714-AST, 2010 WL
4366183, at *5 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. Oct.28, 2010); see also E. Refractories Co. v. Forty
Eight Insulations Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1998); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v.
Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir.1994) (citing 48th St, Steakhouse, Inc. v.
Rockefeller Grp., Inc. (In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir.1987))
("[A]ny proceedings or actions described in section 362(a)(1) are void and without
vitality if they occur after the automatic stay takes effect."); In re MarketXT Holdings
Corp., No. 04-12078(ALG), 2009 WL 2957809, at *3 & n. 3 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. July 20,
2009) (noting split among circuits, stating "the Second Circuit adheres to the view that
3ID# 2014—-0077997-CV
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stay violations are void"); In re WorldCom, Inc., 325 B.R. 511, 519 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.2005) ("When an action has been commenced in violation of the stay, that
action can only be made legitimate by an order retroactively validating the action.")
(citing In re Enron Corp., 306 B.R. 465, 477 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2004)). Contra Dott v.
Metz, No. CV 96-5462(RJD), 1998 WL 427555, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.21, 1998)
(addressing question whether actions in violation of stay are void or voidable in Second _
Circuit, concluding they are merely voidable).”
This should sufficiently clear it up for both Cobb Courts— the automatic stay
was in place; the sale was VOID; the fact that Crawford dismissed the
bankruptcy in NO WAY annuls the stay; WRI had and has no standing to bring
this or any other action relative to Crawfords’ property, such that rises out of
that void sale; neither this Court nor the Cobb Magistrate Court have or had
ANY jurisdiction in this matter other than to dismiss with prejudice, which the
Crawfords have now PATIENTLY moved this Court to do THREE TIMES,
and the magistrate Court ONE TIME. The very first pleading the Crawfords
filed in Cobb Magistrate Court, in response to being served with that action by
WRI, was a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and that court should
have dismissed immediately, and most certainly, neither court should have
dragged the Crawfords through this process, as both courts clearly are aware of
the fact that both have been acting without jurisdiction, all this time.ID# 2014-0077997-CV
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2. While neither Cobb court has referenced anything other than the fact
that Crawford dismissed his bankruptcy as basis for their supposed jurisdiction,
we feel it necessary to “head off at the pass” any subsequent effort by either
court to claim any such jurisdiction may rise out of some theory relative to the
Rooker Feldman Doctrine, we offer this Court the following controlling case,
such that should sufficiently and succinctly leave both this and the Cobb
Magistrate Court with absolutely no doubt that neither have any jurisdiction in
this matter: In re Robert Gruntz, Debtor. Robert Gruntz, Plaintiff-Appellanit, v.
County of Los Angeles; Los Angeles District Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-55379. USCA 9" Cir. (Feb. 3 2000).
The automatic stay is a “core proceeding” and therefore “original and exclusive
jurisdiction” lie with the bankruptcy court.
“Congress's plenary power over bankruptcy derives from the constitutional imperative "[t]o
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8. "The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy
and under this power Congress can limit that jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can
exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law." Kalb,
308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. In furtherance of this charge, jurisdiction and authority over
bankruptcies has been vested, from the beginning of the Republic, in the federal district courts.
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 2, 2 Stat. 19, 21; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 6, 5 Stat. 440,IbD# 2614-0077997-CV
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445; Bankruptey Act of 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517; Bankruptey Act of 1898, § 2, 30 Stat.
544, 545,
The current bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, expands the historic role of the
federal district courts in bankruptcy. District courts have "original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (emphasis added). By the plain wording of the
statute, Congress has expressed its intent that bankruptcy matters be handled exclusively in a
federal forum. See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir.1996).
In short, "Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so
that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the
bankruptcy estate.'" Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d
403 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)).”
“Central to the bankruptcy "case" as to which exclusive Article I federal jurisdiction lies is the
automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Congress has declared that actions to "terminate,
annul, or modify" the automatic stay are core bankruptcy proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(G).”
“The automatic stay is self-executing, effective upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(a); The Minoco Group of Companies v. First State Underwriters Agency of New
England Reinsurance Corp. (In re The Minoco Group of Companies), 799 F.2d 517, 520 (9th
Cir.1986). The automatic stay sweeps broadly, enjoining the commencement or continuation of
any judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against the debtor, enforcement of prior
judgments, perfection of liens, and "any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the
debtor that 1082* 1082 arose before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).”
61ID# 2614-—-60677997-CV
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“The automatic stay is an injunction issuing from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and
bankruptcy court orders are not subject to collateral attack in other courts. See Celotex Corp.,
514 USS. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 1493. That is so not only because of the "comprehensive jurisdiction"
vested in the bankruptcy courts, see id. at 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, but also because "‘persons
subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree
until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order." Id. at
306, 115 S.Ct. 1493 (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445
US. 375, 386, 63 L.Ed.2d 467, 100 S.Ct. 1194 (1980)).”
The state courts, including Cobb Superior and Cobb Magistrate Courts, have
absolutely no jurisdiction to retroactively modify the automatic stay.
“Any state court modification of the automatic stay would constitute an unauthorized
infringement upon the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enforce the stay. "While Congress has
seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some
special circumstances," such as the automatic stay, "it has in no way relaxed the old and well-
established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain
federal-court proceedings in in personam actions." Donovan y. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,
412-13, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964) (footnote omitted). Although Donovan discussed
this rule as applied to in personam actions, its holding applies even more strongly to federal in
rem proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, in which a "federal court having custody of such
property has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed." Jd. at 412, 84 S.Ct. 1579; see also Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.1998).IbD# 2614—-6077997-CV
Page 8
For these reasons, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. See Schwartz v.
United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, "{jJudicial
proceedings in violation of th{e] automatic stay are void." Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v.
Shamblin (In re Shamblin), 890 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis added). As the
Supreme Court explained in Kalb, discussing the weaker predecessor statute to 11 U.S.C. §
362(a), "[b]ecause that State court had been deprived of all jurisdiction or power to proceed with
the foreclosure, [all acts in aid of collection]-to the extent based upon the court's actions-were all
without authority of law." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 443, 60 S.Ct. 343. We reached a similar conclusion
in Noli v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.1988), reasoning that,
"because only an order of the bankruptcy court can authorize any further progress in the stayed
proceedings, it follows that the continuation of the [stayed] proceeding can derive legitimacy
- only from the bankruptcy court order." Id. at 1525 (quoting Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas
Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 114 (Sth Cir.1987)).”
“In sum, by virtue of the power vested in them by Congress, the federal courts have the final
authority to determine the scope and applicability of the automatic stay.!”! "The States cannot, in
the exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest State courts with power to violate the
supreme law of the land." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is not implicated by collateral challenges to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.” A
bankruptcy court simply does not conduct an improper appellate review of a state court when it
enforces an automatic stay that issues from its own federal statutory authority. In fact, a reverse
Rooker-Feldman situation is presented when state courts decide to proceed in derogation of the
stay, because it is the state court which is attempting impermissibly to modify the federal court's
injunction.”ID# 2614-6677997-CV
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“fn sum, bankruptcy courts have the ultimate authority to determine the scope of the automatic
stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), subject to federal appellate review. A state court does not
have the power to modify or dissolve the automatic stay. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not render a state court judgment modifying the automatic stay binding on a
bankruptcy court. Thus, if it proceeds without obtaining bankruptcy court permission, a state
court risks having its fina judgment declared void.”
In conclusion, the Crawfords have clearly shown this Court that the
dismissal of Crawford’s bankruptcy case in no way renders the stay violation
moot; that the automatic stay is a core bankruptcy proceeding which only the
bankruptcy court can claim jurisdiction to act upon, and that neither Cobb court
has any jurisdictional claim WHATSOEVER to take any action other than to
dismiss this action WITH PREJUDICE, and to do so IMMEDIATELY.
In consideration of the within and foregoing, Plaintiffs for the fourth
time, move this Court to do what it should have done already, and dismiss this
action with prejudice.
Submitted this 2 day of June, 2014 by:
E Lends Sofas Ingub . Crag)
Eleanor Spratlin Crawford rawford
3149 Saddleback Mountain Road 3149 Saddleback Mountain Road
Marietta GA 30067 Marietta GA 30067ID# 2614-607 7
. EXt(eiT Ae 201 eee 7997 cy
202 F.3d 1074 (2000)
In re Robert GRUNTZ, Debtor.
Robert Gruntz, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
County of Los Angeles; Los Angeles District Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-55379.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted August 6, 1998.
Opinion Filed February 4, 1999.
Amended Opinion Filed May 19, 1999.
Withdrawn and Rehearing Granted July 20, 1999.
Argued and Submitted on Rehearing September 23, 1999.
Filed February 3, 2000.
1075*1075 1076* 1076 1077*1077 Robert C. Moest, Redondo Beach, California; Fritz Furman,
Law Offices of Joseph A. Weber, Costa Mesa, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Calvin House, Gutierrez & Preciado, Pasadena, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Margarita Padilla, Deputy Attorney General, Oakland, California; Michael D. Reynolds,
Soliciter General, Portland, Oregon; James J. Gold, Gold and Hammes, San Jose, California, for
the amici.
Before: HUG, Chief Judge, PREGERSON, BRUNETTI, O'SCANNLAIN, TROTT, T. G.
NELSON, THOMAS, SILVERMAN, GRABER, WARDLAW, and FLETCHER, Circuit
Judges.
Withdrawn and Rehearing En Banc Granted July 20, 1999.
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we consider (1) whether a state court modification of the bankruptcy automatic
stay binds federal courts; and (2) whether the automatic stay enjoins a criminal prosecution for
the willful failure to pay child support. We hold that federal courts are not bound by state court
modifications of the automatic stay, but that the automatic stay does not enjoin state criminal
prosecutions.
I
It is not an inspirational tale. A divorce decree obligated Robert Gruntz to pay the relatively
modest sum of $300 a month in child support. He failed to do so and ultimately filed a ChapteribD#® 2614-—-6077997-CV
Page ii
13 petition in bankruptcy. Under his confirmed reorganization plan, he was to pay $300 per
month as continuing child support, plus $291 a month toward the discharge of an accrued $5,100
in past due child support payments. Gruntz began making the payments to the trustee, but the
case was converted to Chapter 11. Accordingly, the Chapter 13 trustee did not disburse the child
support payments to Gruntz's exspouse. Frustrated, she took her complaints to the Los Angeles
District Attorney, who filed a misdemeanor criminal complaint charging Gruntz with violation of
California Penal Code § 270 (failure to support dependent children). A jury convicted Gruntz.
After conviction, Gruntz filed an adversary complaint against the County of Los Angeles
("County") in bankruptcy court and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the state
court from proceeding with sentencing. The bankruptcy court declined the invitation to restrain
the state proceedings, and Gruntz received a sentence of 360 days in jail. The California Court of
Appeal affirmed his conviction. See People v. Gruntz, 29 Cal.App.4th 412, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 55
(1994). While Gruntz’s criminal appeal was pending, he suffered a second conviction for
violating California Penal Code § 270 and was also convicted for violating California Penal
Code § 166.4 (failure to obey a state court order).
Subsequently, Gruntz filed the instant adversary proceeding against the County in bankruptcy
court, requesting the court to declare the state criminal proceedings void as violative of the
automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint
as collaterally estopped by the state judgment. On appeal, the district court affirmed 1078*1078
the dismissal on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine."
A divided three-judge panel of this court reversed, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did
not preclude the bankruptcy court from determining whether the conviction was void because
the criminal proceedings violated the automatic stay. See Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles, 177
F.3d 728 (9th Cir.1999). We vacated the panel's decision and agreed to rehear the appeal en
banc.
i
Because Rooker-Feldman arises from federal jurisdictional statutes, the threshold question is
whether the doctrine allows federal courts to entertain these adversary proceedings at all. In this
appeal, the County contends that the state court's judgment included a determination that the
automatic stay did not enjoin the state criminal proceedings. Therefore, the County reasons, if a
state court has concluded that the bankruptcy automatic stay does not apply, the resulting state
judgment divests federal courts of jurisdiction to consider that question. Deciding whether the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has such an effect is not a simple matter and requires an examination
of the federal district court's general, bankruptcy, and habeas corpus jurisdiction.
At its core, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the unremarkable proposition that federal
district courts are courts of original, not appellate, jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Thus, it follows that federal district courts have "no authority to review the final determinations
of a state court in judicial proceedings." Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890
(9th Cir.1986). Direct federal appellate review of state court decisions must occur, if at all, in the
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.ID#® 2614-0677997-CV
Page i2
Rooker-Feldman is not a constitutional doctrine. Rather, the doctrine arises out of a pair of
negative inferences drawn from two statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes the district
court's "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States"; and 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which allows Supreme Court review of "[f]inal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had."
Rooker itself relied upon "the legislation of Congress," namely the predecessors of these statutes
in the Judicial Code. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (construing 1079*1079 Judicial
Code, § 237, ch, 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (1916)) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988)), and
Judicial Code, § 24, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (1911) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1980)); see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1257); of.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989) ("The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct review in the
lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest state court. . . ."). Since Feldman, the
Supreme Court has declined opportunities to extend, or even apply, the doctrine.©!
Of course, the statutes that form the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine co-exist among other
federal jurisdictional laws. To derive a coherent theory of federal jurisdiction, one must consider
the entire federal jurisdictional constellation. In this case, aside from the statutes of general
jurisdiction, two other fixed jurisdictional stars draw our attention: the federal law of habeas
corpus and bankruptcy.
It is well-settled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not touch the writ of habeas corpus. See
Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir.1997); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th
Cir.1993); Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 n. 2 (3d Cir.1992). Indeed, federal habeas-
corpus law turns Rooker-Feldman on its head. Rather than leaving state court judgments
undisturbed, it provides expressly for federal collateral review of final state court judgments, see,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and requires exhaustion of state remedies as a precondition for federal
relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). As we shall discuss when examining the merits of this
appeal, through the statutory writ of habeas corpus Congress has created a comprehensive system
of federal collateral review of state court criminal judgments. Thus, habeas corpus is not an
"exception" to Rooker-Feldman, but a procedure with roots in statutory jurisdiction parallel to-
and in no way precluded by-the doctrine.
So, too, it is with bankruptcy law. In apparent contradiction to the Rooker-Feldman theory,
bankruptcy courts are empowered to avoid state judgments, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547,
548, 549; to modify them, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325; and to discharge them, see, e.g., 11
U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1328. By statute, a post-petition state judgment is not binding on the
bankruptcy court to establish the amount of a debt for bankruptcy purposes. See 11 U.S.C. §
109(e); Slack v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (In re Slack), 187 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1999), as amended
1999 WL 694990 (Sept. 9, 1999).
Thus, final judgments in state courts are not necessarily preclusive in United States bankruptcy
courts. Indeed, the rule has long stood that "[a] state court judgment entered in a case that falls
within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack in the federalID# 2614-66077997-CV
Page 13
courts." Gonzales v. Parks (In re Gonzales), 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir.1987). The United
States Supreme Court explained in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84
L.Ed. 370 (1940):
It is generally true that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction bears a presumption of
regularity and is not thereafter subject to collateral attack. 1080*1080 But Congress, because its
power over the subject of bankruptcy is plenary, may by specific bankruptcy legislation create
an exception to that principle and render judicial acts taken with respect to the person or property
of a debtor whom the bankruptcy law protects nullities and vulnerable collaterally.
As Representative Kastenmeier further noted in discussing the Bankruptcy Code:
State law rights arising in core bankruptcy proceedings are functionally equivalent to
congressionally created rights, because Congress has the power to modify State law rights in
bankruptcy proceedings. Unlike the States, Congress may impair the obligation of contracts
through the bankruptcy clause. Indeed, the very purpose of bankruptcy is to modify the rights
of debtors and creditors, and the bankruptcy code authorizes the bankruptcy court to abrogate
or modify State-created obligations in many ways.
130 Cong. Rec. H1110 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984).
Congress's plenary power over bankruptcy derives from the constitutional imperative "[t}]o
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8. "The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy
and under this power Congress can limit that jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can
exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law." Kalb,
308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. In furtherance of this charge, jurisdiction and authority over
bankruptcies has been vested, from the beginning of the Republic, in the federal district courts.
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 2, 2 Stat. 19, 21; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 6, 5 Stat. 440,
445; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2, 30 Stat.
544, 545.
The current bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, expands the historic role of the
federal district courts in bankruptcy."! District courts have "original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (emphasis added). By the plain wording of the
statute, Congress has expressed its intent that bankruptcy matters be handled exclusively in a
federal forum. See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir.1996).
In short, ""Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so
that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the
bankruptcy estate." Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d
403 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)).
Not all matters related to bankruptcies fall within the orbit of those subject to federal plenary
power. In this respect, the distinctions made between "core" and "non-core" proceedings in the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 340,
are instructive. The 1984 Act was passed, in part, in response to Northern Pipeline ConstructionID# 2614-0077997-CV
1 Page 14
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), which
distinguished between the "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power," and "the adjudication of state-created private rights." As to the latter
function, the Court held that Congress did not have the power to grant jurisdiction to the Article I
bankruptcy courts over proceedings related to a bankruptcy case involving rights "created by
state law" and "independent of and antecedent to the reorganization petition 1081* 1081 that
conferred jurisdiction upon the Bankruptcy Court." /d. at 84, 102 S.Ct. 2858. However, as to the
former, the Court noted that "[o]f course, bankruptcy adjudications themselves, as well as the
manner in which the rights of debtors and creditors are adjusted are matters of federal law." Id. at
84 n. 36, 102 S.Ct. 2858.
Thereafter, Congress defined and distinguished "core" and "non-core" proceedings in the 1984
Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 157.5) In general, a "core proceeding" in bankruptcy is one that "invokes a
substantive right provided by title 11 or . . . a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in
the context of a bankruptcy case." Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir.1987).
"Non-core proceedings" are those not integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations and
not involving a cause of action arising under title 11. See Windsor Communications Group, Inc.
v. Grant (In re Windsor Communications Group), 75 B.R. 713, 721 (E.D.Pa.1985). Under the
1984 Act, bankruptcy judges may hear and decide core proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
However, bankruptcy judges may only propose findings of fact and conclusions of law to
federal district courts as to non-core proceedings related to a case under title 11. See 28 U.S.C. §
157(c)(1). Thus, the separation of "core" and "non-core" proceedings in the 1984 Act creates a
distinction between those judicial acts deriving from the plenary Article I bankruptcy power
and those subject to general Article III federal court jurisdiction.
Central to the bankruptcy "case" as to which exclusive Article I federal jurisdiction lies is the
automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Congress has declared that actions to "terminate,
annul, or modify" the automatic stay are core bankruptcy proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(G). The "automatic stay gives the bankruptcy court an opportunity to harmonize the
interests of both debtor and creditors while preserving the debtor's assets for repayment and
reorganization of his or her obligations." MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 755
F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir.1985). By halting all collection efforts, the stay affords the debtor time to
propose a reorganization plan, or simply "to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy." Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enters., Inc. (In re Conejo Enters.), 96 F.3d 346,
351 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5840-41). The automatic stay also "assures creditors that the debtor's other creditors are
not racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor's assets."
Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir.1995); see also H.R.Rep. No.
95-595, at 340, reprinted in part in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6297.
The automatic stay is self-executing, effective upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(a); The Minoco Group of Companies v. First State Underwriters Agency of New
England Reinsurance Corp. (In re The Minoco Group of Companies), 799 F.2d 517, 520 (9th
Cir.1986). The automatic stay sweeps broadly, enjoining the commencement or continuation of
any judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against the debtor, enforcement of priorID# 2614-0077997-CV
Page 15
judgments, perfection of liens, and "any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the
debtor that 1082*1082 arose before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).
The automatic stay is an injunction issuing from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and
bankruptcy court orders are not subject to collateral attack in other courts. See Celotex Corp.,
514 USS. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 1493. That is so not only because of the "comprehensive jurisdiction"
vested in the bankruptcy courts, see id. at 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, but also because "‘persons
subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree
until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order.'" Id. at
306, 115 S.Ct. 1493 (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445
USS. 375, 386, 63 L.Ed.2d 467, 100 S.Ct. 1194 (1980)). In this case, as in most bankruptcy
cases, the bankruptcy court notified the creditors, including the complaining witness in the
criminal proceedings, of the applicability of the stay.
Any state court modification of the automatic stay would constitute an unauthorized
infringement upon the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enforce the stay. "While Congress has
seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some
special circumstances," such as the automatic stay, "it has in no way relaxed the old and well-
established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain
federal-court proceedings in in personam actions." Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,
412-13, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964) (footnote omitted). Although Donovan discussed
this rule as applied to in personam actions, its holding applies even more strongly to federal in
rem proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, in which a "federal court having custody of such
property has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed.” Id. at 412, 84 S.Ct. 1579; see also Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.1998).
For these reasons, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. See Schwartz v.
United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, "[j]udicial
proceedings in violation of th{e] automatic stay are void." Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v.
Shamblin (In re Shamblin), 890 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis added).'! As the
Supreme Court explained in Kalb, discussing the weaker predecessor statute to 11 U.S.C. §
362(a), "[bJecause that State court had been deprived of all jurisdiction or power to proceed with
the foreclosure, [all acts in aid of collection}-to the extent based upon the court's actions-were all
without authority of law.” Kalb, 308 U.S. at 443, 60 S.Ct. 343. We reached a similar conclusion
in Noli v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.1988), reasoning that,
“because only an order of the bankruptcy court can authorize any further progress in the stayed
proceedings, it follows that the continuation of the [stayed] proceeding can derive legitimacy
only from the bankruptcy court order." /d. at 1525 (quoting Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas
Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 114 (Sth Cir.1987)).
Because of the bankruptcy court's plenary power over core proceedings, the County's argument
that states have concurrent jurisdiction over the automatic stay under 1083*1083 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b) is unavailing. That section provides that the district courts "have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to a
case under title 11." Of course, nothing in that section vests the sfafes with any jurisdiction over
acore bankruptcy proceeding, including "motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automaticID# 2614-6077997-CV
Page 16
stay." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G). The only grant of jurisdiction to do so involves the exercise of
federal bankruptcy power. Indeed, the purpose of this section is not to create jurisdiction in
non-bankruptcy courts, but to allow district courts in which the bankruptcy case is filed to
adjudicate bankruptcy-related actions in which jurisdiction has been vested in other courts. See
1 Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01[4), at 3-14, 3-15 (15th ed.1999),
However, even assuming that the states had concurrent jurisdiction, their judgment would have
to defer to the plenary power vested in the federal courts over bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed,
that was precisely the issue in Kalb, in which the state was proceeding within its jurisdictional
powers as to the subject matter, but in derogation of the federal bankruptcy stay. "A
Congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts includes the implied power to
protect that grant." Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1036.
In sum, by virtue of the power vested in them by Congress, the federal courts have the final
authority to determine the scope and applicability of the automatic stay.!” "The States cannot, in
the exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest State courts with power to violate the
supreme law of the land." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is not implicated by collateral challenges to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.) A
bankruptcy court simply does not conduct an improper appellate review of a state court when it
enforces an automatic stay that issues from its own federal statutory authority. In fact, a reverse
Rooker-Feldman situation is presented when state courts decide to proceed in derogation of the
stay, because it is the state court which is attempting impermissibly to modify the federal court's
injunction.
The rule urged by the County would undermine the principle of a unified federal bankruptcy
system, as declared in the Constitution and realized through the Bankruptcy Code. If state
courts were empowered to issue binding judgments modifying the federal injunction created by
the automatic stay, creditors would be free to 1084* 1084 rush into friendly courthouses around
the nation to garner favorable relief. The bankruptcy court would then be stripped of its ability
to distribute the debtor's assets equitably, or to allow the debtor to reorganize financial affairs.
"Such an exercise of authority would be inconsistent with and subvert the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts by allowing state courts to create their own standards as to when persons
may properly seek relief in cases Congress has specifically precluded those courts from
adjudicating.” Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1035. It is but slight hyperbole to say that chaos would
reign in such a system.
This is not to say that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the related concepts of res judicata and
collateral estoppel are wholly inapplicable in bankruptcy law. Preclusive effect is often
extended to prepetition state judgments as to identical issues raised in subsequent bankruptcy
proceedings. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755
(1991); Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir.1995). When the
bankruptcy court has lifted the stay, federal courts have given subsequent state decisions full
faith and credit, "as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see
Gajkowski, 888 F.2d at 299 (holding that, once the stay was lifted, the state court was free to
proceed and its decision on the merits was binding on the bankruptcy court, but noting that the
proceedings would have been void if bankruptcy court consent had not been obtained). In non-1D# 2@14-8077997-CV
, Page 17
core proceedings that do not implicate substantive rights granted under title 11 or affect the
administration of the bankruptcy case, the normal rules of preclusion, including the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, apply.
However, modifying the automatic stay is not the act of a state court merely interpreting federal
law; it is an intervention in the operation of an ongoing federal bankruptcy case, the
administration of which is vested exclusively in the bankruptcy court. Rooker-Feldman does
not allow a state court to interfere with the core administrative functions of an operative
bankruptcy. Just as federal district courts are not part of the state appellate system, neither are
state courts granted supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over federal courts. Thus, Rooker-
Feldman does not nullify federal courts' authority to enforce the automatic stay, nor does it strip
us of jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
Il
Having concluded that the final decision concerning the applicability of the automatic stay must
rest with the federal courts, we proceed to the merits of whether the stay applied to the criminal
prosecution of Gruntz."! In examining this question, we turn to the other side of the jurisdictional
coin: the proper role of federal bankruptcy courts, if any, in state criminal proceedings.
We maintain the "deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the
results of state criminal proceedings." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93
L.Ed.2d 216 (1986). This rule reflects a "fundamental policy against federal interference with
state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669
(1971). It also recognizes that "[t]he right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an
important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States." Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47, 107 S.Ct. 353.
With that philosophy in mind, we begin with an analysis of the statute. Although the automatic
stay is extremely broad in scope, there are a number of statutory exceptions. Relevant to our case
is the 1085*1085 exception provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), which provides:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title, or of an application under
section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 does not operate as a stay—
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal
action or proceeding against the debtor[.]
This exception would seem to end the argument because, under its plain wording, the automatic
stay would not apply to the criminal action initiated against Gruntz. However, Gruntz claims that
the purpose of the criminal actions against him is debt collection, thus falling within the
protection afforded by Hucke v. Oregon, 992 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.1993). Hucke held that, if a
criminal proceeding has the collection of a debt as its underlying aim, then the automatic stay
imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) would apply and the criminal action would be enjoined. See
id, at 953. This is in accordance with the views of several commentators, who regard the
exception contained in § 362(b)(1) as being limited to those proceedings "brought for theID# 2614—-6077997-CV
Page 18
purpose of enforcing the criminal law." See, e.g., 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 362-48 (15th
ed.1999).091
Although Hucke was well within the mainstream of thought at the time, it is time to reexamine
it""] Other circuits have declined to follow our lead and, as this case demonstrates, it is a
doctrine difficult to apply in practice. Most importantly, it is at odds with the plain words of the
statute. Quite simply, the Bankruptcy Code declares that § 362 does not stay "the
commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.” On its
face, it does not provide any exception for prosecutorial purpose or bad faith. If the statutory
command of the Bankruptcy Code is clear, we need look no further: it must be enforced
according to its terms. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109
S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). Indeed, to do otherwise would insert phrases and concepts
into the statute that simply are not there.
Interpreting § 362(b)(1) as rendering the automatic stay as inapplicable to all criminal
ings is consistent with "the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."
Kelly, 479 US. at 43, 107 S.Ct. 353. Not only does our notion of cooperative federalism caution
against interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings, but the theory of bankruptcy law
does as well. "The purpose of bankruptcy is to protect those in financial, not moral, difficulty."
Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.1982). The Bankruptcy Code reflects this
philosophy. Although most state civil actions are subject to removal to bankruptcy courts,
actions brought pursuant to a government's police powers are not. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452. Federal
bankruptcy original, but non-exclusive, jurisdiction is limited to "civil proceedings." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) (emphasis added).
Gruntz contends that the purpose of bankruptcy would be thwarted if a criminal prosecution
were allowed as a means of debt collection for dissatisfied creditors. However, there is "no
rationale or justification for severing economic and noneconomic ramifications of the debtor's
criminal 1086* 1086 conduct." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 362-48 (15th ed.1999). Further, in the
case of the automatic stay, Congress has specifically subordinated the goals of economic
rehabilitation and equitable distribution of assets to the states' interest in prosecuting criminals.
The State of California has chosen to criminalize a parent's failure to support a dependent child.
See Cal.Penal Code § 270. That is a judgment reserved to the state; it is not for the bankruptcy
court to disrupt that sovereign determination because it discerns an economic motive behind the
criminal statute or its enforcement. In the automatic stay exception, Congress clearly has
instructed federal courts not to allow bankruptcy proceedings to impede such an exercise of
state police powers.)
Further, any criminal prosecution of the debtor is on behalf of all the citizens of the state, not on
behalf of the creditor. See Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir.1982).
Once the state has made an independent decision to file criminal charges, the prosecution
belongs to the government, not to the complaining witness. We cannot, and should not, "require
a prosecutor to conduct a searching inquiry into the public spirit of the victim of a crime before
proceeding with what appears to be an otherwise valid criminal prosecution." Id. at 179.03) "In
our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed
an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file orID# 2014-0077997-CV
Page 19
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
US. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). As the Supreme Court noted in Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985), "[t}his broad
discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited
to judicial review." This admonition applies with special force to federal enjoinment of state
criminal actions, such as that urged by Gruntz, because the stay would interdict state prosecution
at its inception, based upon a bankruptcy court's surmise of the prosecutor's "true" motives.
There is, of course, a federal remedy for state court convictions obtained in violation of
Constitution or statute: a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. The federal
habeas corpus statute was “explicitly and historically designed to provide the means for a state
prisoner to attack the validity of his confinement." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475. 489, 93
S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). An adversary proceeding in bankruptcy is not."“! Indeed,
the Supreme 1087*1087 Court rejected a similar attempt to propagate additional avenues of
federal relief for state prisoners in Preiser, holding that,
when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and
the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release . . . his
sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827.
Congress has provided for a comprehensive legislative scheme to provide state prisoners a post-
conviction federal remedy to challenge their confinement. Any alternative relief that one might
conjure from the general provisions of bankruptcy law must yield to specific habeas remedy
that Congress created. Cf id. at 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (noting that the § 1983 actions could not be
employed to replace a true habeas remedy).
There also is a procedural avenue to forfend state actions that are not subject to the automatic
stay but that threaten the bankruptcy estate: a request for an injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105.
The bankruptcy court's injunctive power is not limited by the delineated exceptions to the
automatic stay, nor confined to civil proceedings."*! However, the only fair reading of the
Bankruptcy Code is that Congress did not intend the § 362(a) stay to enjoin all state criminal
proceedings automatically. "The bankruptcy courts were not created as a haven for criminals."
Barnette, 673 F.2d at 1251. The fresh start afforded debtors in bankruptcy does not include
release from jail.
In the end, this is not a chronicle of creditor and debtor, but of crime and punishment. Gruntz
was lawfully prosecuted, convicted, and ordered to be incarcerated. As a matter of law, the
automatic stay did not apply to prevent this course of events. The words of the statute mean
what they say: all criminal proceedings, including those to which Gruntz was subject, are
excepted from the reach of the automatic stay. Thus, unless a specific § 105 injunction applies,
state trial courts need not seek bankruptcy court approval before commencing criminal
proceedings. To the extent that it conflicts with this interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1),
Hucke is overruled.ID# £2614—-6077997-CV
Page 28
IV
In sum, bankruptcy courts have the ultimate authority to determine the scope of the automatic
stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), subject to federal appellate review. A state court does not
have the power to modify or dissolve the automatic stay. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not render a state court judgment modifying the automatic stay binding on a
bankruptcy court. Thus, if it proceeds without obtaining bankruptcy court permission, a state
court risks having its final judgment declared void. In this case, the state court proceeded
properly because the automatic stay does not apply to enjoin state criminal actions, even if the
prosecution is motivated by the complaining witness's desire to collect a debt.
The veneer of this case suggested jurisdictional discord among the bankruptcy, fede
Preview
Filed In Office Jun-@2-2014 13511308 1D% 2614-6677997-CV Page 1 SUPERIOR COURT OF COBB cau eer STATE OF GEORGIA gion o¢ aaict SP coy Eleanor Spratlin Crawford; Jeff Crawford; CAN No. 13-1-10463-49 Plaintiff. v. WRI Capital Group, LLC A/A/F CoflinAI-GA 1, LLC; +e ee Ft He HF HH Defendant PLAINTIEF’S 2“! RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE DUE TO LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Comes now Plaintiffs Eleanor Spratlin Crawford (Mrs. Crawford), and Jeff Crawford (Mr. Crawford), and file this Plaintiff’s 2“ Renewed Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Due To Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Superior Court Rule 6.7 and 28 USC 157(B)(2)(G). After repeated demand for same by these Plaintiffs, all presiding judges in both Cobb Magistrate Court as well as cobb Superior Court, have refused to provide one iota of legal authority in support of either court’s claim that it has or had jurisdiction to act in violation of the automatic stay granted Plaintiff Jeff Crawford (Crawford), except for both court’s general, repeated and tired refrain, which amounts to no more than claiming that since Crawford dismissed his bankruptcy (just as ALL bankruptcies inevitably are), that the automatic stay1ID# 2614—-0077997-CV Page 2 having made the foreclosure sale VOID AB INITIO is somehow magically annulled. This entire charade has been little more than an ever so slightly veiled attempt to cause these Plaintiffs as much financial and emotional harm as possible; to steal Plaintiffs’ home out from under them and force them to fight what is obviously a battle they win, but from under a dumpster lid, and both courts do so only in effort and under color of law, e.g., color of jurisdiction; and color of office, to deprive them of their constitutionally protected rights to due process, and to do what could not be done if these courts followed the law, and that is to force these Plaintiffs into an untenable position from which these Cobb courts can hopefully guarantee that these Plaintiffs will lose their case along with their home. Who could possibly fight such a legal battle while living under a dumpster lid? Actually, the more important question, is what kind of people would stoop so low as to abuse their judicial power to do that to other human beings? Disgusting... Again; both courts refuse to provide legal authority in support of this absurd position that they both have authority to usurp jurisdiction from the federal bankruptcy court — and let there be no mistake — these Plaintiffs understand EACTLY why no legal authority has. been given, and it is two-fold:ID# 2014-6077997-CV Page 3 Firstly, the Cobb courts know they have no such legal authority, and secondly and most importantly, at the end of it all, when the bankruptcy court chastises them for stepping on its jurisdiction, both of these backwater tribunals want to try to hide behind the false claim “we didn’t know!” In effort to strip both Cobb Courts of that false fagade they hide behind, Plaintiffs show this Court legal authority in the form of the following two cases: 1. Both Cobb courts claim that since Crawford dismissed his bankruptcy, that that effort somehow magically annulled the automatic stay which caused the foreclosure sale WRI claims its standing to bring these actions rises out of. However, In re Madjid Ebadi, Debtor. No. 10-73702-ast. USBC, E.D., New York. 448 BR 308 (2011) clearly held otherwise: “The fact that the bankruptcy case was dismissed does not render the stay violation moot. As this Court has recently stated, in the Second Circuit, an action in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio. See In re Olejnik, No. 09-76714-AST, 2010 WL 4366183, at *5 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. Oct.28, 2010); see also E. Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1998); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir.1994) (citing 48th St, Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Grp., Inc. (In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir.1987)) ("[A]ny proceedings or actions described in section 362(a)(1) are void and without vitality if they occur after the automatic stay takes effect."); In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., No. 04-12078(ALG), 2009 WL 2957809, at *3 & n. 3 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (noting split among circuits, stating "the Second Circuit adheres to the view that 3ID# 2014—-0077997-CV Page 4 stay violations are void"); In re WorldCom, Inc., 325 B.R. 511, 519 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2005) ("When an action has been commenced in violation of the stay, that action can only be made legitimate by an order retroactively validating the action.") (citing In re Enron Corp., 306 B.R. 465, 477 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2004)). Contra Dott v. Metz, No. CV 96-5462(RJD), 1998 WL 427555, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.21, 1998) (addressing question whether actions in violation of stay are void or voidable in Second _ Circuit, concluding they are merely voidable).” This should sufficiently clear it up for both Cobb Courts— the automatic stay was in place; the sale was VOID; the fact that Crawford dismissed the bankruptcy in NO WAY annuls the stay; WRI had and has no standing to bring this or any other action relative to Crawfords’ property, such that rises out of that void sale; neither this Court nor the Cobb Magistrate Court have or had ANY jurisdiction in this matter other than to dismiss with prejudice, which the Crawfords have now PATIENTLY moved this Court to do THREE TIMES, and the magistrate Court ONE TIME. The very first pleading the Crawfords filed in Cobb Magistrate Court, in response to being served with that action by WRI, was a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and that court should have dismissed immediately, and most certainly, neither court should have dragged the Crawfords through this process, as both courts clearly are aware of the fact that both have been acting without jurisdiction, all this time.ID# 2014-0077997-CV Page 5 2. While neither Cobb court has referenced anything other than the fact that Crawford dismissed his bankruptcy as basis for their supposed jurisdiction, we feel it necessary to “head off at the pass” any subsequent effort by either court to claim any such jurisdiction may rise out of some theory relative to the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, we offer this Court the following controlling case, such that should sufficiently and succinctly leave both this and the Cobb Magistrate Court with absolutely no doubt that neither have any jurisdiction in this matter: In re Robert Gruntz, Debtor. Robert Gruntz, Plaintiff-Appellanit, v. County of Los Angeles; Los Angeles District Attorney, Defendants-Appellees. No. 97-55379. USCA 9" Cir. (Feb. 3 2000). The automatic stay is a “core proceeding” and therefore “original and exclusive jurisdiction” lie with the bankruptcy court. “Congress's plenary power over bankruptcy derives from the constitutional imperative "[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. "The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy and under this power Congress can limit that jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. In furtherance of this charge, jurisdiction and authority over bankruptcies has been vested, from the beginning of the Republic, in the federal district courts. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 2, 2 Stat. 19, 21; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 6, 5 Stat. 440,IbD# 2614-0077997-CV Page 6 445; Bankruptey Act of 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517; Bankruptey Act of 1898, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545, The current bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, expands the historic role of the federal district courts in bankruptcy. District courts have "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (emphasis added). By the plain wording of the statute, Congress has expressed its intent that bankruptcy matters be handled exclusively in a federal forum. See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir.1996). In short, "Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.'" Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)).” “Central to the bankruptcy "case" as to which exclusive Article I federal jurisdiction lies is the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Congress has declared that actions to "terminate, annul, or modify" the automatic stay are core bankruptcy proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G).” “The automatic stay is self-executing, effective upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); The Minoco Group of Companies v. First State Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. (In re The Minoco Group of Companies), 799 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir.1986). The automatic stay sweeps broadly, enjoining the commencement or continuation of any judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against the debtor, enforcement of prior judgments, perfection of liens, and "any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the debtor that 1082* 1082 arose before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).” 61ID# 2614-—-60677997-CV Page 7 “The automatic stay is an injunction issuing from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and bankruptcy court orders are not subject to collateral attack in other courts. See Celotex Corp., 514 USS. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 1493. That is so not only because of the "comprehensive jurisdiction" vested in the bankruptcy courts, see id. at 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, but also because "‘persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order." Id. at 306, 115 S.Ct. 1493 (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 US. 375, 386, 63 L.Ed.2d 467, 100 S.Ct. 1194 (1980)).” The state courts, including Cobb Superior and Cobb Magistrate Courts, have absolutely no jurisdiction to retroactively modify the automatic stay. “Any state court modification of the automatic stay would constitute an unauthorized infringement upon the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enforce the stay. "While Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances," such as the automatic stay, "it has in no way relaxed the old and well- established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions." Donovan y. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964) (footnote omitted). Although Donovan discussed this rule as applied to in personam actions, its holding applies even more strongly to federal in rem proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, in which a "federal court having custody of such property has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed." Jd. at 412, 84 S.Ct. 1579; see also Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.1998).IbD# 2614—-6077997-CV Page 8 For these reasons, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. See Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, "{jJudicial proceedings in violation of th{e] automatic stay are void." Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Shamblin (In re Shamblin), 890 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained in Kalb, discussing the weaker predecessor statute to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), "[b]ecause that State court had been deprived of all jurisdiction or power to proceed with the foreclosure, [all acts in aid of collection]-to the extent based upon the court's actions-were all without authority of law." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 443, 60 S.Ct. 343. We reached a similar conclusion in Noli v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.1988), reasoning that, "because only an order of the bankruptcy court can authorize any further progress in the stayed proceedings, it follows that the continuation of the [stayed] proceeding can derive legitimacy - only from the bankruptcy court order." Id. at 1525 (quoting Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 114 (Sth Cir.1987)).” “In sum, by virtue of the power vested in them by Congress, the federal courts have the final authority to determine the scope and applicability of the automatic stay.!”! "The States cannot, in the exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest State courts with power to violate the supreme law of the land." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not implicated by collateral challenges to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.” A bankruptcy court simply does not conduct an improper appellate review of a state court when it enforces an automatic stay that issues from its own federal statutory authority. In fact, a reverse Rooker-Feldman situation is presented when state courts decide to proceed in derogation of the stay, because it is the state court which is attempting impermissibly to modify the federal court's injunction.”ID# 2614-6677997-CV Page 9 “fn sum, bankruptcy courts have the ultimate authority to determine the scope of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), subject to federal appellate review. A state court does not have the power to modify or dissolve the automatic stay. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not render a state court judgment modifying the automatic stay binding on a bankruptcy court. Thus, if it proceeds without obtaining bankruptcy court permission, a state court risks having its fina judgment declared void.” In conclusion, the Crawfords have clearly shown this Court that the dismissal of Crawford’s bankruptcy case in no way renders the stay violation moot; that the automatic stay is a core bankruptcy proceeding which only the bankruptcy court can claim jurisdiction to act upon, and that neither Cobb court has any jurisdictional claim WHATSOEVER to take any action other than to dismiss this action WITH PREJUDICE, and to do so IMMEDIATELY. In consideration of the within and foregoing, Plaintiffs for the fourth time, move this Court to do what it should have done already, and dismiss this action with prejudice. Submitted this 2 day of June, 2014 by: E Lends Sofas Ingub . Crag) Eleanor Spratlin Crawford rawford 3149 Saddleback Mountain Road 3149 Saddleback Mountain Road Marietta GA 30067 Marietta GA 30067ID# 2614-607 7 . EXt(eiT Ae 201 eee 7997 cy 202 F.3d 1074 (2000) In re Robert GRUNTZ, Debtor. Robert Gruntz, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. County of Los Angeles; Los Angeles District Attorney, Defendants-Appellees. No. 97-55379. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted August 6, 1998. Opinion Filed February 4, 1999. Amended Opinion Filed May 19, 1999. Withdrawn and Rehearing Granted July 20, 1999. Argued and Submitted on Rehearing September 23, 1999. Filed February 3, 2000. 1075*1075 1076* 1076 1077*1077 Robert C. Moest, Redondo Beach, California; Fritz Furman, Law Offices of Joseph A. Weber, Costa Mesa, California, for the plaintiff-appellant. Calvin House, Gutierrez & Preciado, Pasadena, California, for the defendants-appellees. Margarita Padilla, Deputy Attorney General, Oakland, California; Michael D. Reynolds, Soliciter General, Portland, Oregon; James J. Gold, Gold and Hammes, San Jose, California, for the amici. Before: HUG, Chief Judge, PREGERSON, BRUNETTI, O'SCANNLAIN, TROTT, T. G. NELSON, THOMAS, SILVERMAN, GRABER, WARDLAW, and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. Withdrawn and Rehearing En Banc Granted July 20, 1999. THOMAS, Circuit Judge: In this appeal, we consider (1) whether a state court modification of the bankruptcy automatic stay binds federal courts; and (2) whether the automatic stay enjoins a criminal prosecution for the willful failure to pay child support. We hold that federal courts are not bound by state court modifications of the automatic stay, but that the automatic stay does not enjoin state criminal prosecutions. I It is not an inspirational tale. A divorce decree obligated Robert Gruntz to pay the relatively modest sum of $300 a month in child support. He failed to do so and ultimately filed a ChapteribD#® 2614-—-6077997-CV Page ii 13 petition in bankruptcy. Under his confirmed reorganization plan, he was to pay $300 per month as continuing child support, plus $291 a month toward the discharge of an accrued $5,100 in past due child support payments. Gruntz began making the payments to the trustee, but the case was converted to Chapter 11. Accordingly, the Chapter 13 trustee did not disburse the child support payments to Gruntz's exspouse. Frustrated, she took her complaints to the Los Angeles District Attorney, who filed a misdemeanor criminal complaint charging Gruntz with violation of California Penal Code § 270 (failure to support dependent children). A jury convicted Gruntz. After conviction, Gruntz filed an adversary complaint against the County of Los Angeles ("County") in bankruptcy court and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the state court from proceeding with sentencing. The bankruptcy court declined the invitation to restrain the state proceedings, and Gruntz received a sentence of 360 days in jail. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. See People v. Gruntz, 29 Cal.App.4th 412, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 55 (1994). While Gruntz’s criminal appeal was pending, he suffered a second conviction for violating California Penal Code § 270 and was also convicted for violating California Penal Code § 166.4 (failure to obey a state court order). Subsequently, Gruntz filed the instant adversary proceeding against the County in bankruptcy court, requesting the court to declare the state criminal proceedings void as violative of the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint as collaterally estopped by the state judgment. On appeal, the district court affirmed 1078*1078 the dismissal on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." A divided three-judge panel of this court reversed, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude the bankruptcy court from determining whether the conviction was void because the criminal proceedings violated the automatic stay. See Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles, 177 F.3d 728 (9th Cir.1999). We vacated the panel's decision and agreed to rehear the appeal en banc. i Because Rooker-Feldman arises from federal jurisdictional statutes, the threshold question is whether the doctrine allows federal courts to entertain these adversary proceedings at all. In this appeal, the County contends that the state court's judgment included a determination that the automatic stay did not enjoin the state criminal proceedings. Therefore, the County reasons, if a state court has concluded that the bankruptcy automatic stay does not apply, the resulting state judgment divests federal courts of jurisdiction to consider that question. Deciding whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has such an effect is not a simple matter and requires an examination of the federal district court's general, bankruptcy, and habeas corpus jurisdiction. At its core, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the unremarkable proposition that federal district courts are courts of original, not appellate, jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Thus, it follows that federal district courts have "no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings." Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir.1986). Direct federal appellate review of state court decisions must occur, if at all, in the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.ID#® 2614-0677997-CV Page i2 Rooker-Feldman is not a constitutional doctrine. Rather, the doctrine arises out of a pair of negative inferences drawn from two statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes the district court's "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"; and 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which allows Supreme Court review of "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." Rooker itself relied upon "the legislation of Congress," namely the predecessors of these statutes in the Judicial Code. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (construing 1079*1079 Judicial Code, § 237, ch, 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (1916)) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988)), and Judicial Code, § 24, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (1911) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980)); see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1257); of. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct review in the lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest state court. . . ."). Since Feldman, the Supreme Court has declined opportunities to extend, or even apply, the doctrine.©! Of course, the statutes that form the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine co-exist among other federal jurisdictional laws. To derive a coherent theory of federal jurisdiction, one must consider the entire federal jurisdictional constellation. In this case, aside from the statutes of general jurisdiction, two other fixed jurisdictional stars draw our attention: the federal law of habeas corpus and bankruptcy. It is well-settled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not touch the writ of habeas corpus. See Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir.1997); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir.1993); Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 n. 2 (3d Cir.1992). Indeed, federal habeas- corpus law turns Rooker-Feldman on its head. Rather than leaving state court judgments undisturbed, it provides expressly for federal collateral review of final state court judgments, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and requires exhaustion of state remedies as a precondition for federal relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). As we shall discuss when examining the merits of this appeal, through the statutory writ of habeas corpus Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal collateral review of state court criminal judgments. Thus, habeas corpus is not an "exception" to Rooker-Feldman, but a procedure with roots in statutory jurisdiction parallel to- and in no way precluded by-the doctrine. So, too, it is with bankruptcy law. In apparent contradiction to the Rooker-Feldman theory, bankruptcy courts are empowered to avoid state judgments, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 549; to modify them, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325; and to discharge them, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1328. By statute, a post-petition state judgment is not binding on the bankruptcy court to establish the amount of a debt for bankruptcy purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e); Slack v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (In re Slack), 187 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1999), as amended 1999 WL 694990 (Sept. 9, 1999). Thus, final judgments in state courts are not necessarily preclusive in United States bankruptcy courts. Indeed, the rule has long stood that "[a] state court judgment entered in a case that falls within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack in the federalID# 2614-66077997-CV Page 13 courts." Gonzales v. Parks (In re Gonzales), 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir.1987). The United States Supreme Court explained in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370 (1940): It is generally true that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction bears a presumption of regularity and is not thereafter subject to collateral attack. 1080*1080 But Congress, because its power over the subject of bankruptcy is plenary, may by specific bankruptcy legislation create an exception to that principle and render judicial acts taken with respect to the person or property of a debtor whom the bankruptcy law protects nullities and vulnerable collaterally. As Representative Kastenmeier further noted in discussing the Bankruptcy Code: State law rights arising in core bankruptcy proceedings are functionally equivalent to congressionally created rights, because Congress has the power to modify State law rights in bankruptcy proceedings. Unlike the States, Congress may impair the obligation of contracts through the bankruptcy clause. Indeed, the very purpose of bankruptcy is to modify the rights of debtors and creditors, and the bankruptcy code authorizes the bankruptcy court to abrogate or modify State-created obligations in many ways. 130 Cong. Rec. H1110 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984). Congress's plenary power over bankruptcy derives from the constitutional imperative "[t}]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. "The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy and under this power Congress can limit that jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. In furtherance of this charge, jurisdiction and authority over bankruptcies has been vested, from the beginning of the Republic, in the federal district courts. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 2, 2 Stat. 19, 21; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545. The current bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, expands the historic role of the federal district courts in bankruptcy."! District courts have "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (emphasis added). By the plain wording of the statute, Congress has expressed its intent that bankruptcy matters be handled exclusively in a federal forum. See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir.1996). In short, ""Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate." Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)). Not all matters related to bankruptcies fall within the orbit of those subject to federal plenary power. In this respect, the distinctions made between "core" and "non-core" proceedings in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 340, are instructive. The 1984 Act was passed, in part, in response to Northern Pipeline ConstructionID# 2614-0077997-CV 1 Page 14 Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), which distinguished between the "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power," and "the adjudication of state-created private rights." As to the latter function, the Court held that Congress did not have the power to grant jurisdiction to the Article I bankruptcy courts over proceedings related to a bankruptcy case involving rights "created by state law" and "independent of and antecedent to the reorganization petition 1081* 1081 that conferred jurisdiction upon the Bankruptcy Court." /d. at 84, 102 S.Ct. 2858. However, as to the former, the Court noted that "[o]f course, bankruptcy adjudications themselves, as well as the manner in which the rights of debtors and creditors are adjusted are matters of federal law." Id. at 84 n. 36, 102 S.Ct. 2858. Thereafter, Congress defined and distinguished "core" and "non-core" proceedings in the 1984 Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 157.5) In general, a "core proceeding" in bankruptcy is one that "invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or . . . a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case." Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir.1987). "Non-core proceedings" are those not integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations and not involving a cause of action arising under title 11. See Windsor Communications Group, Inc. v. Grant (In re Windsor Communications Group), 75 B.R. 713, 721 (E.D.Pa.1985). Under the 1984 Act, bankruptcy judges may hear and decide core proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). However, bankruptcy judges may only propose findings of fact and conclusions of law to federal district courts as to non-core proceedings related to a case under title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). Thus, the separation of "core" and "non-core" proceedings in the 1984 Act creates a distinction between those judicial acts deriving from the plenary Article I bankruptcy power and those subject to general Article III federal court jurisdiction. Central to the bankruptcy "case" as to which exclusive Article I federal jurisdiction lies is the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Congress has declared that actions to "terminate, annul, or modify" the automatic stay are core bankruptcy proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G). The "automatic stay gives the bankruptcy court an opportunity to harmonize the interests of both debtor and creditors while preserving the debtor's assets for repayment and reorganization of his or her obligations." MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir.1985). By halting all collection efforts, the stay affords the debtor time to propose a reorganization plan, or simply "to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enters., Inc. (In re Conejo Enters.), 96 F.3d 346, 351 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840-41). The automatic stay also "assures creditors that the debtor's other creditors are not racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor's assets." Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir.1995); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 340, reprinted in part in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6297. The automatic stay is self-executing, effective upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); The Minoco Group of Companies v. First State Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. (In re The Minoco Group of Companies), 799 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir.1986). The automatic stay sweeps broadly, enjoining the commencement or continuation of any judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against the debtor, enforcement of priorID# 2614-0077997-CV Page 15 judgments, perfection of liens, and "any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the debtor that 1082*1082 arose before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). The automatic stay is an injunction issuing from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and bankruptcy court orders are not subject to collateral attack in other courts. See Celotex Corp., 514 USS. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 1493. That is so not only because of the "comprehensive jurisdiction" vested in the bankruptcy courts, see id. at 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, but also because "‘persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order.'" Id. at 306, 115 S.Ct. 1493 (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 USS. 375, 386, 63 L.Ed.2d 467, 100 S.Ct. 1194 (1980)). In this case, as in most bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy court notified the creditors, including the complaining witness in the criminal proceedings, of the applicability of the stay. Any state court modification of the automatic stay would constitute an unauthorized infringement upon the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enforce the stay. "While Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances," such as the automatic stay, "it has in no way relaxed the old and well- established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions." Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964) (footnote omitted). Although Donovan discussed this rule as applied to in personam actions, its holding applies even more strongly to federal in rem proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, in which a "federal court having custody of such property has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed.” Id. at 412, 84 S.Ct. 1579; see also Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.1998). For these reasons, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. See Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, "[j]udicial proceedings in violation of th{e] automatic stay are void." Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Shamblin (In re Shamblin), 890 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis added).'! As the Supreme Court explained in Kalb, discussing the weaker predecessor statute to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), "[bJecause that State court had been deprived of all jurisdiction or power to proceed with the foreclosure, [all acts in aid of collection}-to the extent based upon the court's actions-were all without authority of law.” Kalb, 308 U.S. at 443, 60 S.Ct. 343. We reached a similar conclusion in Noli v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.1988), reasoning that, “because only an order of the bankruptcy court can authorize any further progress in the stayed proceedings, it follows that the continuation of the [stayed] proceeding can derive legitimacy only from the bankruptcy court order." /d. at 1525 (quoting Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 114 (Sth Cir.1987)). Because of the bankruptcy court's plenary power over core proceedings, the County's argument that states have concurrent jurisdiction over the automatic stay under 1083*1083 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) is unavailing. That section provides that the district courts "have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to a case under title 11." Of course, nothing in that section vests the sfafes with any jurisdiction over acore bankruptcy proceeding, including "motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automaticID# 2614-6077997-CV Page 16 stay." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G). The only grant of jurisdiction to do so involves the exercise of federal bankruptcy power. Indeed, the purpose of this section is not to create jurisdiction in non-bankruptcy courts, but to allow district courts in which the bankruptcy case is filed to adjudicate bankruptcy-related actions in which jurisdiction has been vested in other courts. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01[4), at 3-14, 3-15 (15th ed.1999), However, even assuming that the states had concurrent jurisdiction, their judgment would have to defer to the plenary power vested in the federal courts over bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, that was precisely the issue in Kalb, in which the state was proceeding within its jurisdictional powers as to the subject matter, but in derogation of the federal bankruptcy stay. "A Congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts includes the implied power to protect that grant." Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1036. In sum, by virtue of the power vested in them by Congress, the federal courts have the final authority to determine the scope and applicability of the automatic stay.!” "The States cannot, in the exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest State courts with power to violate the supreme law of the land." Kalb, 308 U.S. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not implicated by collateral challenges to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.) A bankruptcy court simply does not conduct an improper appellate review of a state court when it enforces an automatic stay that issues from its own federal statutory authority. In fact, a reverse Rooker-Feldman situation is presented when state courts decide to proceed in derogation of the stay, because it is the state court which is attempting impermissibly to modify the federal court's injunction. The rule urged by the County would undermine the principle of a unified federal bankruptcy system, as declared in the Constitution and realized through the Bankruptcy Code. If state courts were empowered to issue binding judgments modifying the federal injunction created by the automatic stay, creditors would be free to 1084* 1084 rush into friendly courthouses around the nation to garner favorable relief. The bankruptcy court would then be stripped of its ability to distribute the debtor's assets equitably, or to allow the debtor to reorganize financial affairs. "Such an exercise of authority would be inconsistent with and subvert the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts by allowing state courts to create their own standards as to when persons may properly seek relief in cases Congress has specifically precluded those courts from adjudicating.” Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1035. It is but slight hyperbole to say that chaos would reign in such a system. This is not to say that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the related concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel are wholly inapplicable in bankruptcy law. Preclusive effect is often extended to prepetition state judgments as to identical issues raised in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir.1995). When the bankruptcy court has lifted the stay, federal courts have given subsequent state decisions full faith and credit, "as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see Gajkowski, 888 F.2d at 299 (holding that, once the stay was lifted, the state court was free to proceed and its decision on the merits was binding on the bankruptcy court, but noting that the proceedings would have been void if bankruptcy court consent had not been obtained). In non-1D# 2@14-8077997-CV , Page 17 core proceedings that do not implicate substantive rights granted under title 11 or affect the administration of the bankruptcy case, the normal rules of preclusion, including the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, apply. However, modifying the automatic stay is not the act of a state court merely interpreting federal law; it is an intervention in the operation of an ongoing federal bankruptcy case, the administration of which is vested exclusively in the bankruptcy court. Rooker-Feldman does not allow a state court to interfere with the core administrative functions of an operative bankruptcy. Just as federal district courts are not part of the state appellate system, neither are state courts granted supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over federal courts. Thus, Rooker- Feldman does not nullify federal courts' authority to enforce the automatic stay, nor does it strip us of jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Il Having concluded that the final decision concerning the applicability of the automatic stay must rest with the federal courts, we proceed to the merits of whether the stay applied to the criminal prosecution of Gruntz."! In examining this question, we turn to the other side of the jurisdictional coin: the proper role of federal bankruptcy courts, if any, in state criminal proceedings. We maintain the "deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986). This rule reflects a "fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). It also recognizes that "[t]he right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States." Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47, 107 S.Ct. 353. With that philosophy in mind, we begin with an analysis of the statute. Although the automatic stay is extremely broad in scope, there are a number of statutory exceptions. Relevant to our case is the 1085*1085 exception provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), which provides: (b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 does not operate as a stay— (1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor[.] This exception would seem to end the argument because, under its plain wording, the automatic stay would not apply to the criminal action initiated against Gruntz. However, Gruntz claims that the purpose of the criminal actions against him is debt collection, thus falling within the protection afforded by Hucke v. Oregon, 992 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.1993). Hucke held that, if a criminal proceeding has the collection of a debt as its underlying aim, then the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) would apply and the criminal action would be enjoined. See id, at 953. This is in accordance with the views of several commentators, who regard the exception contained in § 362(b)(1) as being limited to those proceedings "brought for theID# 2614—-6077997-CV Page 18 purpose of enforcing the criminal law." See, e.g., 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 362-48 (15th ed.1999).091 Although Hucke was well within the mainstream of thought at the time, it is time to reexamine it""] Other circuits have declined to follow our lead and, as this case demonstrates, it is a doctrine difficult to apply in practice. Most importantly, it is at odds with the plain words of the statute. Quite simply, the Bankruptcy Code declares that § 362 does not stay "the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.” On its face, it does not provide any exception for prosecutorial purpose or bad faith. If the statutory command of the Bankruptcy Code is clear, we need look no further: it must be enforced according to its terms. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). Indeed, to do otherwise would insert phrases and concepts into the statute that simply are not there. Interpreting § 362(b)(1) as rendering the automatic stay as inapplicable to all criminal ings is consistent with "the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Kelly, 479 US. at 43, 107 S.Ct. 353. Not only does our notion of cooperative federalism caution against interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings, but the theory of bankruptcy law does as well. "The purpose of bankruptcy is to protect those in financial, not moral, difficulty." Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.1982). The Bankruptcy Code reflects this philosophy. Although most state civil actions are subject to removal to bankruptcy courts, actions brought pursuant to a government's police powers are not. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452. Federal bankruptcy original, but non-exclusive, jurisdiction is limited to "civil proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (emphasis added). Gruntz contends that the purpose of bankruptcy would be thwarted if a criminal prosecution were allowed as a means of debt collection for dissatisfied creditors. However, there is "no rationale or justification for severing economic and noneconomic ramifications of the debtor's criminal 1086* 1086 conduct." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 362-48 (15th ed.1999). Further, in the case of the automatic stay, Congress has specifically subordinated the goals of economic rehabilitation and equitable distribution of assets to the states' interest in prosecuting criminals. The State of California has chosen to criminalize a parent's failure to support a dependent child. See Cal.Penal Code § 270. That is a judgment reserved to the state; it is not for the bankruptcy court to disrupt that sovereign determination because it discerns an economic motive behind the criminal statute or its enforcement. In the automatic stay exception, Congress clearly has instructed federal courts not to allow bankruptcy proceedings to impede such an exercise of state police powers.) Further, any criminal prosecution of the debtor is on behalf of all the citizens of the state, not on behalf of the creditor. See Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir.1982). Once the state has made an independent decision to file criminal charges, the prosecution belongs to the government, not to the complaining witness. We cannot, and should not, "require a prosecutor to conduct a searching inquiry into the public spirit of the victim of a crime before proceeding with what appears to be an otherwise valid criminal prosecution." Id. at 179.03) "In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file orID# 2014-0077997-CV Page 19 bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). As the Supreme Court noted in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985), "[t}his broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." This admonition applies with special force to federal enjoinment of state criminal actions, such as that urged by Gruntz, because the stay would interdict state prosecution at its inception, based upon a bankruptcy court's surmise of the prosecutor's "true" motives. There is, of course, a federal remedy for state court convictions obtained in violation of Constitution or statute: a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. The federal habeas corpus statute was “explicitly and historically designed to provide the means for a state prisoner to attack the validity of his confinement." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475. 489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). An adversary proceeding in bankruptcy is not."“! Indeed, the Supreme 1087*1087 Court rejected a similar attempt to propagate additional avenues of federal relief for state prisoners in Preiser, holding that, when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release . . . his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827. Congress has provided for a comprehensive legislative scheme to provide state prisoners a post- conviction federal remedy to challenge their confinement. Any alternative relief that one might conjure from the general provisions of bankruptcy law must yield to specific habeas remedy that Congress created. Cf id. at 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (noting that the § 1983 actions could not be employed to replace a true habeas remedy). There also is a procedural avenue to forfend state actions that are not subject to the automatic stay but that threaten the bankruptcy estate: a request for an injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105. The bankruptcy court's injunctive power is not limited by the delineated exceptions to the automatic stay, nor confined to civil proceedings."*! However, the only fair reading of the Bankruptcy Code is that Congress did not intend the § 362(a) stay to enjoin all state criminal proceedings automatically. "The bankruptcy courts were not created as a haven for criminals." Barnette, 673 F.2d at 1251. The fresh start afforded debtors in bankruptcy does not include release from jail. In the end, this is not a chronicle of creditor and debtor, but of crime and punishment. Gruntz was lawfully prosecuted, convicted, and ordered to be incarcerated. As a matter of law, the automatic stay did not apply to prevent this course of events. The words of the statute mean what they say: all criminal proceedings, including those to which Gruntz was subject, are excepted from the reach of the automatic stay. Thus, unless a specific § 105 injunction applies, state trial courts need not seek bankruptcy court approval before commencing criminal proceedings. To the extent that it conflicts with this interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), Hucke is overruled.ID# £2614—-6077997-CV Page 28 IV In sum, bankruptcy courts have the ultimate authority to determine the scope of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), subject to federal appellate review. A state court does not have the power to modify or dissolve the automatic stay. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not render a state court judgment modifying the automatic stay binding on a bankruptcy court. Thus, if it proceeds without obtaining bankruptcy court permission, a state court risks having its final judgment declared void. In this case, the state court proceeded properly because the automatic stay does not apply to enjoin state criminal actions, even if the prosecution is motivated by the complaining witness's desire to collect a debt. The veneer of this case suggested jurisdictional discord among the bankruptcy, fede