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DOCKET NO. UWY-CV-20-6055309-S : SUPERIOR COURT
THOMAS BULL : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
v. : AT WATERBURY
SEASIDE WINE AND LIQUOR, LLC, et al. : JULY 17, 2020
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
The defendant Giuseppe Saverino (“Giuseppe”) hereby moves for entry of an order staying
all proceedings in this case until the resolution of his bankruptcy.
Giuseppe’s bankruptcy is currently proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Connecticut (Case No. 20-20773). As is further explained in the memorandum of
law submitted herewith, Giuseppe submits that the automatic stay created by Section 362 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.SC. §§ 101, et. seq., prohibits the “continuation” of these
proceedings, or, in the alternative, that this Court should exercise its discretion and stay these
proceedings pending completion of his bankruptcy so as to prevent further injustice to Giuseppe.
The proceedings in this case have a direct impact on Giuseppe’s ability to defend himself here and
in the consolidated proceedings. A stay is necessary to protect Giuseppe’s interests while his
bankruptcy is pending, and will avoid the need to duplicate discovery, dispositive motion practice,
and trial.
Given the language of the Bankruptcy Code, Giuseppe’s role in the case, the impact of
outstanding discovery and dispositive motions, and the balancing of the pertinent factors, a stay is
proper while the bankruptcy stay remains in effect. For these reasons, as explained more
thoroughly in the memorandum of law submitted herewith, Giuseppe Saverino respectfully
requests that the Court enter a stay of all proceedings until the resolution of his bankruptcy.
THE DEFENDANT,
GIUSEPPE SAVERINO
By: /s/ Joseph J. Blyskal (429001)
Joseph J. Blyskal
Kelcie B. Reid
Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP
95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Suite 206
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Phone: (860) 494-7555
Fax: (860) 560-0185
Email: jblyskal@grsm.com
Email: kreid@grsm.com
2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered
electronically or non-electronically on the date hereof, to all attorneys and self-represented
parties of record of all consolidated actions and to all parties who have not appeared in this
matter and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-
represented parties receiving electronic delivery.
Robert G. Fashjian
Fashjian & Falco, P.C.
66 Huntington Street
Shelton, CT 06484
Rgf.law@snet.net
Plaintiff Attorney for Thomas Bull
Richard A. Roberts, Esq.
Nuzzo & Roberts LLC
One Town Center
PO Box 747
Cheshire, CT 06410
recep@nuzzo-roberts.com
Attorney for Seaside Wine and Liquor LLC; Victor Saverino and Yesika Saverino
Maureen E. Burns, Esq.
Mulvey Oliver Gould & Crotta
2911 Dixwell Avenue, 4th Floor
Hamden, CT 06518
bums@moglaw.com
Attorney for Allison Loder
Adam J. Tusia, Esq.
Milano & Wanat
471 East Main Street
Branford, CT 06405
atusia@mwllc.us
Attorney for Allison Loder
Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq.
Marshall Dennehey
287 Bowman Avenue
Suite 404
Purchase, NY 10577
njtaylor@mdwcg.corn
Attorney for Grant Ciccarello
3
Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq.
Marshall Dennehey
287 Bowman Avenue
Suite 404
Purchase, NY 10577
njtaylor@mdwcg.corn
Attorney for Luke Ciccarello
Paula Bennett, Esq.
Gordon Muir and Foley LLP
1344 Silas Deane Highway
Suite 501
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
For Matthew Bull
Howard Kohn Sprague & Fitzgerald
P.O. Box 261798
Hartford, CT 06126-1798
For Ryan Capozziello
Park Package Store, Inc. non-appearing
Janelle Pompea non-appearing
Jon Pompea & ShirleyAnn Pompea non-appearing
/s/ Joseph J. Blyskal
Joseph J. Blyskal
4
DOCKET NO. UWY-CV-20-6055309-S : SUPERIOR COURT
THOMAS BULL : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
v. : AT WATERBURY
SEASIDE WINE AND LIQUOR, LLC, et al. : JULY 17, 2020
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
The defendant Giuseppe Saverino (“Giuseppe”) hereby moves for entry of an order staying
all proceedings in this case until the resolution of his bankruptcy, and in support states as follows:
Introduction
Giuseppe Saverino is a 74-year old immigrant that has littleto no understanding of the
English language whose own son, Victor Saverino, and daughter-in-law, Yesika Saverino,
converted funds from a home equity line of credit of $150,000.00 secured by Giuseppe’s home to
purchase a liquor store operated by Victor Saverino. Giuseppe did not own, operate, or manage
the store, and never served, sold, or otherwise purveyed alcohol at the store, yet he remains an
individual defendant in the consolidated proceedings and recently became a defendant in three
new suits arising from service of alcohol to a minor and a subsequent motor vehicle accident on
April 14, 2017. In fact, testimony of one of the plaintiffs, Allison Loder, confirmed that on that
date she purchased alcohol from Victor Saverino, not Giuseppe. As a direct result of the trickery
and deceit of his son in taking Giuseppe’s home equity funds to purchase the store Giuseppe
recently filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy because he is unable to pay the mortgage. His bankruptcy is
currently proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (Case
No. 20-20773). As is further explained below, Giuseppe submits that the automatic stay created
by Section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.SC. §§ 101, et. seq., prohibits the
“continuation” of these proceedings, or, in the alternative, that this Court should exercise its
discretion and stay these proceedings pending completion of his bankruptcy so as to prevent further
injustice to Giuseppe.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
These related cases arise from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 14, 2017 in
Redding, Connecticut.1 In general terms, the plaintiffs in each case allege that on that date each
was under the age of twenty-one and that Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC (“Seaside Wine”) and/or
“Seaside Liquors” sold or otherwise provided alcohol to one or more of them and caused their
intoxication, which resulted in the subject accident and injuries to plaintiffs Janelle Pompea, Ryan
Capozziello, Grant Ciccarello, Ryan Gombos, Allison Loder, and Thomas Bull. (Compl. Count 1
¶¶ 1, 11-16, 20-21.) Despite being intoxicated, one of the plaintiffs, Ryan Capozziello, allegedly
drove a Jeep Liberty with each of the other plaintiffs as passengers, lost control of the vehicle, and
drove it off the roadway into a tree. (Id. at ¶ 8-10.)
Each of the plaintiffs filed actions naming various defendants, primarily including Seaside
Wine, its members Yesika Saverino and Giuseppe Saverino,2 Victor Saverino, an entity known as
Seaside Liquors, LLC and its owner Robert Pambianchi, and the parents of plaintiff Janelle
Pompea who were the owners of or otherwise responsible for the residence where the minors
1
There are ten consolidated cases: UWY-CV19-6053485-S (Pompea v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et
al.); UWY-CV17-6053475S (Ciccarello v. Capozziello et al.); UWY-CV18-6053476S (Bull v. Capozziello
et al.;), UWY-CV19-6053478S (Gombos v. Capozziello et al.);UWY-CV19-6053479S (Pompea v.
Capozziello et al.); UWY-CV19-6053481S (Capozziello v. Pompea et al.); UWY-CV19-6053482S
(Ciccarello v. Bull et al.); UWY-CV19-6053483S (Pompea v. Ciccarello et al.); UWY-CV19-6053484S
(Loder v. Capozziello et al.); and UWY-CV19-6053486S (Pompea v. Saverino). There are also three
recently filed cases: UWY-CV-20-6055309-S (Bull v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.); UWY-CV20-
6055312 (Ciccarello v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.); and UWY-CV20-6055310-S (Gombos v.
Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.). The recently filed cases are the subject of a consolidation order, to
which Giuseppe objects simultaneously with the filing of this motion.
2
As set forth below, Giuseppe contests his membership status or any role in Seaside Wine.
2
gathered to consume alcohol. The plaintiffs further allege that Seaside Wine and/or Seaside Liquor
“operated” the liquor store and sold the alcohol to the minors. (Compl. at Count 1 ¶¶ 11-14, 21.)
The plaintiffs also assert that Victor Saverino, Yesika Saverino, and/or Giuseppe operated the
store. (Id. at Counts 3-8.) Giuseppe denies that he had any involvement with the liquor store, that
he sold alcohol to minors, or that he otherwise caused or contributed to the vehicle collision.
Rather, Giuseppe has raised by way of special defense that he was unknowingly made a
member of Seaside Wine by his son, Victor, and daughter-in-law, Yesika. (See, e.g., Pompea v.
Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al., Dkt. No. 139.00, at pp. 10-12.) He was further defrauded into
securing a home equity line of credit of $150,000.00 that Victor, unbeknownst to Giuseppe,
intended to use to purchase the subject liquor store. Giuseppe is also an unrepresented defendant
in a matter titled Robert Pambianchi v. Giuseppe Saverino, Case No. HHB-CV18-5022344-S,
currently pending in New Britain Superior Court, alleging that he failed to pay an $80,000.00 note
related to Seaside Wine.
As a direct result of the financial impossibility of Giuseppe having to pay a mortgage of
$150,000.00 created by Victor Saverino taking those funds and using them to purchase the subject
liquor store, on June 8, 2020 Giuseppe commenced a voluntary case under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The matter is pending at Case No. 20-20773 in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Connecticut, 450 Main Street, Hartford, Connecticut. In each of the instant
proceedings Giuseppe filed notice and an affidavit of bankruptcy pursuant to Connecticut Practice
Book § 14-1 on June 26, 2020. (Dkt. No. 110.00.)
II. ARGUMENT
The automatic stay of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the “continuation” of
any “action or proceeding against the debtor. . . .” The factual allegations and legal issues facing
3
each of the non-debtor defendants in each of the instant proceedings are so intertwined with the
factual and legal issues facing Giuseppe that any discovery, motion practice, or other continuation
of these cases as to the non-debtor defendants would constitute a “continuation” of these
proceedings against debtor Giuseppe in violation of the automatic stay. Therefore, none of the
current proceedings should continue pending resolution of the bankruptcy. In the alternative,
Giuseppe requests that this Court exercise its inherent discretion and stay these proceedings so as
to prevent Giuseppe from being prejudiced in his defense during the pendency of his bankruptcy.
A. Continuing These Cases Amounts to Continuation of a Judicial
Proceeding Against a Bankruptcy Debtor
Decisions issued by this Court, such as a ruling on the simultaneously filed objection to
consolidation or a ruling on a protective order as to discovery, discovery objections, or dispositive
motions, would constitute the continuation of a proceeding against Giuseppe and it would be
impossible for these cases to be stayed as to only Giuseppe and not the entirety of the non-debtor
defendants. On filing a bankruptcy petition Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an
automatic stay of, among other things, “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . .
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1). “The scope of the automatic stay is extremely
broad, and should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the
property of the estate.” In re Ormond Beach Assocs. Ltd. Pshp., 185 B.R. 408, 412 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). “The automatic stay provision
of the Bankruptcy Code, § 362(a), has been described as ‘one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws.’” Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-
4
595, p. 340 (1977)). It is “designed to provide the debtor with a breathing spell from his creditors.”
Koolik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567, 568 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs’ theory of liability rests on the claim that a liquor store sold alcohol to a
minor, that minor Ryan Capozziello consumed that alcohol before getting behind the wheel of the
Jeep, and that his intoxication caused the subject motor vehicle accident. This theory depends on
a series of events involving multiple defendants and plaintiffs-turned-defendants—such selling
alcohol to a minor, granting permission by the parents to allow consumption of alcohol at their
residence, and sharing of the alcohol by minors. The allegations implicate the liquor stores, its
owners and managers, and the plaintiffs-turned-defendants. The theory of liability intertwines
these parties such that any progress in the case—be it depositions, apportionment complaints,
summary judgment filings, or trial—affect Giuseppe. Because fact discovery and motion practice
bear on Giuseppe’s ultimate liability—which liability is questionable but all the more reason the
case should not proceed in his absence so as to avoid prejudicing his ability to develop a record to
support judgment in his favor—any further progress of this case would effectuate “continuation”
of proceedings against him. The automatic stay prevents this from occurring.
If the automatic stay does not apply to stay all proceedings it would place Giuseppe in the
untenable position of either waiving his rights to participate in discovery and motion practice
pending his bankruptcy, or participating in discovery and motion practice but being at risk of
encouraging a violation of the automatic stay. For instance, Giuseppe seeks to prevent
consolidation of the Bull, Gombos, and Ciccarello cases because those cases involve a statute of
limitations issues that will be the subject of motion practice, which is an issue not present in the
other consolidated cases. By objecting to consolidation he seeks to preserve his right to challenge
the ability of those plaintiffs to pursue their claims without the issue being clouded by different
5
factual and legal issues confronting the defendants in the consolidated cases. Were the Court to
overrule Giuseppe’s objection to consolidation of those cases it would constitute a continuation of
a judicial action against a debtor. Similarly, depositions of Thomas Bull and a representative of
the liquor store where he purchased liquor, Park Package Store, Inc., are scheduled to proceed in
August 2020. The deposition of Mr. Bull will necessarily explore: what kind of alcohol he
purchased; whether he provided it to any of the other plaintiffs; whether he ever met Giuseppe;
whether he has ever been to Seaside Wine and purchased alcohol; and whether he purchased the
alcohol on the date of the accident from Park Package. Prior to delays attributable to COVID-19
Victor Saverino was also scheduled to be deposed, and it is anticipated that he will be deposed as
restrictions lessen. Were Giuseppe to seek a protective order or otherwise object to discovery
topics or questions to be asked of Victor Saverino in order to, for instance, protect his defense in
the Seaside Wine business litigation and were those discovery issues ruled upon, it would likewise
constitute continuation of a judicial action against debtor Giuseppe. A bankruptcy stay is “designed
to give the debtor time to organize its affairs—which includes protection from having to defend
claims brought against the estate as well as continuing to pursue judicial proceedings on its own
behalf.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Asso v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1986).
These proceedings also implicate a potential asset of the bankruptcy estate: the liability
insurance coverage affording Giuseppe a defense to these cases. That policy is held by Seaside
Wine & Liquor, LLC, but is providing a defense to Giuseppe. Insurance policies owned by the
debtor, particularly those insurance policies that provide coverage for the debtor's liability, usually
constitute assets of the estate. See Insurance Bankruptcy, 36 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1025 (2001); In re
Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to reopen
debtors case because debtor failed to list insurance as an asset). In an abundance of caution
6
undersigned intends to seek relief from the automatic stay to permit Giuseppe’s defense to
continue, but Giuseppe submits that whether the insurance policy concerns the bankruptcy estate
is as yet an open question. To the extent that the policy is part of the estate proceeding with
litigation against the other defendants insured under that policy (Seaside Wine) has the potential
to diminish the indemnity coverage afforded to Giuseppe under the policy and would be
impermissible absent leave of the bankruptcy court.
Accordingly, Giuseppe submits that nearly every action taken in these cases, whether
attempting to settle with Seaside Wine under the shared insurance policy, a non-debtor opposing
Giuseppe’s objection to consolidation, a non-debtor seeking a ruling on a discovery objection
made by Giuseppe, or by this Court in ruling on consolidation, risks a violation of the automatic
stay because itcould result in “continuation” of a judicial proceeding or action against debtor
Giuseppe.3 Therefore, Giuseppe submits that the stay imposed by Section 362 prevents these
proceedings from continuing as to any defendant pending his bankruptcy.
B. The Court Should Exercise its Inherent Discretion and Authority to
Enter a Stay
Even if the Court finds that the automatic stay does not apply to stop all proceedings, the
Court should nevertheless exercise its inherent authority to stay the proceedings to protect
Giuseppe from being forced to choose between participating in litigation to protect, for instance,
his right to object to consolidation, seek apportionment, or otherwise challenge the claims against
him and waiting until his bankruptcy resolves.
“In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of an application or a motion for a stay
of an action or proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Lee v. Harlow, Adams
3
Section 362 also applies to stay “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (3) (emphasis added).
7
and Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn. App. 289, 311, 975 A.2d 715 (2009) (internal citation omitted.).
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh
competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Id. at 311-12 (citing Landis v. North American
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized this
inherent power. Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 514 U.S. 386, 411 (1995).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that in determining a motion to stay, the court
should apply “familiar equitable principles in the context of adjusting the rights of the parties
during the pendency of the litigation until a final determination on the merits.” Griffin Hospital v.
Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 458 (1985) (affirming the grant of a stay
of an administrative order pending appeal). Though no single appellate standard exists in
Connecticut for exercising discretion to stay proceedings, the courts generally consider factors
relevant to the manner of stay sought. For instance, in cases deciding whether to grant a stay
pending the outcome of a parallel action, the courts consider: “(i) similarity of subject matter
between actions; (ii) promotion of judicial economy; (iii) possibility of causing injustice or
prejudice to the plaintiff; (iv) whether the foreign suit was initiated to the forestall domestic suit;
(v) possibility of conflicting judicial decisions; and (vi) ability of the court to monitor parallel
litigation.” Arras v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. #14, No. UWYCV135016462S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2644, *3 (Nov. 19, 2013) (citing KI, Inc. v. KP Acquisition Partners, LLC, No. X05-CV-09
60027474, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2450 (Sep. 24, 2010)).
Similarly, the federal courts consider a variety of factors when determining whether to stay
proceedings in a case, including: “(1) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding
8
expeditiously with the civil litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed;
(2) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts; (4) the
interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.” Acton v.
Intellectual Capital Mgmt., No. 15-CV-4004, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172149, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 28, 2015) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Covidien Sales LLC v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-917 (JCH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147060, 39-40 (D. Conn. Oct. 15,
2014) (recognizing same factors). The Connecticut Appellate Court has cited with approval a
tailored version of these factors as the basis for deciding whether to stay a civil proceeding when
a collateral criminal proceeding is pending. See Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler, 115 Conn. App. 521
(2009) (citing state and federal cases, and holding that the trial court had not committed error when
granting the continuance of the civil case pending the outcome of a related civil case).
Thus, the different tests for deciding whether to stay proceedings weigh the same basic,
predominant factors: (1) the risk of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the interests and burden of the
movant; (3) the interest of the court; and (4) the interests of others, such as non-parties and the
public. Courts also consider the reasons for seeking the stay.
The various factors outlined in Acton and Arras, as outlined above, favor the entry of a
stay, though a court can impose a stay on its own authority even without weighing those factors.
See M.E.S., Inc. v. M.J. Favorito Elec., Inc., No. 08-CV-183 (JG) (JMA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23809 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) (exercising the court’s discretion to stay the remainder of the
proceedings in an action where one party was a debtor).
i. Lack of Prejudice to Plaintiff
A temporary stay will not prejudice the plaintiffs. No depositions have taken place for
months, and it is not clear that the August 2020 depositions will proceed in light of continued delay
9
related to COVID-19. Rather, the plaintiffs would benefit from not having to duplicate discovery,
pre-trial proceedings, and possibly even trials in this matter. The only potential prejudice would
be a delay of a final resolution of the case, which is already likely to occur in light of the restrictions
on jury trials currently in place due to COVID-19.
ii. The Potential for Prejudice to the Defendants
While the proposed temporary stay pending the outcome of bankruptcy will not result in
any meaningful delay or prejudice to the plaintiffs, as noted in the examples above relating to
motion practice and discovery, Giuseppe will be prejudiced if a stay of all proceedings is not
granted. If the case is stayed as to only Giuseppe and proceeds as to all other defendants it places
Giuseppe at risk of not being able to seek apportionment, file summary judgment on the statute of
limitations or other defenses, or meaningfully participate in other proceedings that impact his
interests in the defense of these cases. Even setting aside all of those pre-trial issues, the biggest
risk for prejudice to Giuseppe (as well as to the co-defendants) is if the underlying matter moves
to trial during the pendency of the bankruptcy, which would result in potentially inconsistent
results and piecemeal trials. The prejudice to Giuseppe weighs heavily in favor of a stay when
considered with the lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Stanley-Vidmar v. Marineland,
Inc., No. CV880296438S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3091 (Dec. 17, 1991) (denying a motion to
dissolve a stay of proceedings in a case where only one defendant was in bankruptcy, since the
claims between the debtor and non-debtor defendants were interrelated, and since “the claims
against the defendants are intertwined in some of the counts of the complaint.”); Luck v. McMahon,
No. 3:20-cv-516, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112882 (D. Conn. Jun. 26, 2020) (staying an action
among non-debtors until resolution of the non-party debtor’s bankruptcy, since the debtor was a
necessary party who would suffer prejudice if the case proceeded without him).
10
iii. Convenience to the Court and Judicial Economy
Judicial economy will also result if this motion is granted, for similar reasons that the
defendants’ interests would be protected if the Court grants the motion. The bankruptcy is
potentially dispositive of the entire liability of Giuseppe, which, as explained above, may bear on
future discovery, dispositive motions, and settlement discussions. The orderly treatment of
bankruptcy should precede resolution of any further motion practice, pre-trial proceedings,
discovery, and trial.
iv. The Interest of Others
The interest of the public as a whole will not feel the impact from this Court granting the
motion to stay proceedings. When the bankruptcy proceedings end, the plaintiffs and the remaining
defendants can then proceed in the ordinary course, and no parties or non-parties will have faced
any unnecessary harm or expense.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Giuseppe respectfully requests the Court to order a stay of all
matters and proceedings pending the resolution of Giuseppe’s bankruptcy.
THE DEFENDANT,
GIUSEPPE SAVERINO
By: /s/ Joseph J. Blyskal
Joseph J. Blyskal
Kelcie B. Reid
Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP
95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Suite 206
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Phone: (860) 494-7555
Fax: (860) 560-0185
Email: jblyskal@grsm.com
Email: kreid@grsm.com
11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered
electronically or non-electronically on the date hereof, to all attorneys and self-represented
parties of record of all consolidated actions and to all parties who have not appeared in this
matter and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-
represented parties receiving electronic delivery.
Robert G. Fashjian
Fashjian & Falco, P.C.
66 Huntington Street
Shelton, CT 06484
Rgf.law@snet.net
Plaintiff Attorney for Thomas Bull
Richard A. Roberts, Esq.
Nuzzo & Roberts LLC
One Town Center
PO Box 747
Cheshire, CT 06410
recep@nuzzo-roberts.com
Attorney for Seaside Wine and Liquor LLC; Victor Saverino and Yesika Saverino
Maureen E. Burns, Esq.
Mulvey Oliver Gould & Crotta
2911 Dixwell Avenue, 4th Floor
Hamden, CT 06518
bums@moglaw.com
Attorney for Allison Loder
Adam J. Tusia, Esq.
Milano & Wanat
471 East Main Street
Branford, CT 06405
atusia@mwllc.us
Attorney for Allison Loder
Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq.
Marshall Dennehey
287 Bowman Avenue
Suite 404
Purchase, NY 10577
njtaylor@mdwcg.corn
Attorney for Grant Ciccarello
12
Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq.
Marshall Dennehey
287 Bowman Avenue
Suite 404
Purchase, NY 10577
njtaylor@mdwcg.corn
Attorney for Luke Ciccarello
Paula Bennett, Esq.
Gordon Muir and Foley LLP
1344 Silas Deane Highway
Suite 501
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
For Matthew Bull
Howard Kohn Sprague & Fitzgerald
P.O. Box 261798
Hartford, CT 06126-1798
For Ryan Capozziello
Park Package Store, Inc. non-appearing
Janelle Pompea non-appearing
Jon Pompea & ShirleyAnn Pompea non-appearing
/s/ Joseph J. Blyskal
Joseph J. Blyskal
13
Preview
DOCKET NO. UWY-CV-20-6055309-S : SUPERIOR COURT THOMAS BULL : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET v. : AT WATERBURY SEASIDE WINE AND LIQUOR, LLC, et al. : JULY 17, 2020 MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS The defendant Giuseppe Saverino (“Giuseppe”) hereby moves for entry of an order staying all proceedings in this case until the resolution of his bankruptcy. Giuseppe’s bankruptcy is currently proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (Case No. 20-20773). As is further explained in the memorandum of law submitted herewith, Giuseppe submits that the automatic stay created by Section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.SC. §§ 101, et. seq., prohibits the “continuation” of these proceedings, or, in the alternative, that this Court should exercise its discretion and stay these proceedings pending completion of his bankruptcy so as to prevent further injustice to Giuseppe. The proceedings in this case have a direct impact on Giuseppe’s ability to defend himself here and in the consolidated proceedings. A stay is necessary to protect Giuseppe’s interests while his bankruptcy is pending, and will avoid the need to duplicate discovery, dispositive motion practice, and trial. Given the language of the Bankruptcy Code, Giuseppe’s role in the case, the impact of outstanding discovery and dispositive motions, and the balancing of the pertinent factors, a stay is proper while the bankruptcy stay remains in effect. For these reasons, as explained more thoroughly in the memorandum of law submitted herewith, Giuseppe Saverino respectfully requests that the Court enter a stay of all proceedings until the resolution of his bankruptcy. THE DEFENDANT, GIUSEPPE SAVERINO By: /s/ Joseph J. Blyskal (429001) Joseph J. Blyskal Kelcie B. Reid Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP 95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Suite 206 Glastonbury, CT 06033 Phone: (860) 494-7555 Fax: (860) 560-0185 Email: jblyskal@grsm.com Email: kreid@grsm.com 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on the date hereof, to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record of all consolidated actions and to all parties who have not appeared in this matter and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self- represented parties receiving electronic delivery. Robert G. Fashjian Fashjian & Falco, P.C. 66 Huntington Street Shelton, CT 06484 Rgf.law@snet.net Plaintiff Attorney for Thomas Bull Richard A. Roberts, Esq. Nuzzo & Roberts LLC One Town Center PO Box 747 Cheshire, CT 06410 recep@nuzzo-roberts.com Attorney for Seaside Wine and Liquor LLC; Victor Saverino and Yesika Saverino Maureen E. Burns, Esq. Mulvey Oliver Gould & Crotta 2911 Dixwell Avenue, 4th Floor Hamden, CT 06518 bums@moglaw.com Attorney for Allison Loder Adam J. Tusia, Esq. Milano & Wanat 471 East Main Street Branford, CT 06405 atusia@mwllc.us Attorney for Allison Loder Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq. Marshall Dennehey 287 Bowman Avenue Suite 404 Purchase, NY 10577 njtaylor@mdwcg.corn Attorney for Grant Ciccarello 3 Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq. Marshall Dennehey 287 Bowman Avenue Suite 404 Purchase, NY 10577 njtaylor@mdwcg.corn Attorney for Luke Ciccarello Paula Bennett, Esq. Gordon Muir and Foley LLP 1344 Silas Deane Highway Suite 501 Rocky Hill, CT 06067 For Matthew Bull Howard Kohn Sprague & Fitzgerald P.O. Box 261798 Hartford, CT 06126-1798 For Ryan Capozziello Park Package Store, Inc. non-appearing Janelle Pompea non-appearing Jon Pompea & ShirleyAnn Pompea non-appearing /s/ Joseph J. Blyskal Joseph J. Blyskal 4 DOCKET NO. UWY-CV-20-6055309-S : SUPERIOR COURT THOMAS BULL : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET v. : AT WATERBURY SEASIDE WINE AND LIQUOR, LLC, et al. : JULY 17, 2020 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS The defendant Giuseppe Saverino (“Giuseppe”) hereby moves for entry of an order staying all proceedings in this case until the resolution of his bankruptcy, and in support states as follows: Introduction Giuseppe Saverino is a 74-year old immigrant that has littleto no understanding of the English language whose own son, Victor Saverino, and daughter-in-law, Yesika Saverino, converted funds from a home equity line of credit of $150,000.00 secured by Giuseppe’s home to purchase a liquor store operated by Victor Saverino. Giuseppe did not own, operate, or manage the store, and never served, sold, or otherwise purveyed alcohol at the store, yet he remains an individual defendant in the consolidated proceedings and recently became a defendant in three new suits arising from service of alcohol to a minor and a subsequent motor vehicle accident on April 14, 2017. In fact, testimony of one of the plaintiffs, Allison Loder, confirmed that on that date she purchased alcohol from Victor Saverino, not Giuseppe. As a direct result of the trickery and deceit of his son in taking Giuseppe’s home equity funds to purchase the store Giuseppe recently filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy because he is unable to pay the mortgage. His bankruptcy is currently proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (Case No. 20-20773). As is further explained below, Giuseppe submits that the automatic stay created by Section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.SC. §§ 101, et. seq., prohibits the “continuation” of these proceedings, or, in the alternative, that this Court should exercise its discretion and stay these proceedings pending completion of his bankruptcy so as to prevent further injustice to Giuseppe. I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW These related cases arise from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 14, 2017 in Redding, Connecticut.1 In general terms, the plaintiffs in each case allege that on that date each was under the age of twenty-one and that Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC (“Seaside Wine”) and/or “Seaside Liquors” sold or otherwise provided alcohol to one or more of them and caused their intoxication, which resulted in the subject accident and injuries to plaintiffs Janelle Pompea, Ryan Capozziello, Grant Ciccarello, Ryan Gombos, Allison Loder, and Thomas Bull. (Compl. Count 1 ¶¶ 1, 11-16, 20-21.) Despite being intoxicated, one of the plaintiffs, Ryan Capozziello, allegedly drove a Jeep Liberty with each of the other plaintiffs as passengers, lost control of the vehicle, and drove it off the roadway into a tree. (Id. at ¶ 8-10.) Each of the plaintiffs filed actions naming various defendants, primarily including Seaside Wine, its members Yesika Saverino and Giuseppe Saverino,2 Victor Saverino, an entity known as Seaside Liquors, LLC and its owner Robert Pambianchi, and the parents of plaintiff Janelle Pompea who were the owners of or otherwise responsible for the residence where the minors 1 There are ten consolidated cases: UWY-CV19-6053485-S (Pompea v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.); UWY-CV17-6053475S (Ciccarello v. Capozziello et al.); UWY-CV18-6053476S (Bull v. Capozziello et al.;), UWY-CV19-6053478S (Gombos v. Capozziello et al.);UWY-CV19-6053479S (Pompea v. Capozziello et al.); UWY-CV19-6053481S (Capozziello v. Pompea et al.); UWY-CV19-6053482S (Ciccarello v. Bull et al.); UWY-CV19-6053483S (Pompea v. Ciccarello et al.); UWY-CV19-6053484S (Loder v. Capozziello et al.); and UWY-CV19-6053486S (Pompea v. Saverino). There are also three recently filed cases: UWY-CV-20-6055309-S (Bull v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.); UWY-CV20- 6055312 (Ciccarello v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.); and UWY-CV20-6055310-S (Gombos v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al.). The recently filed cases are the subject of a consolidation order, to which Giuseppe objects simultaneously with the filing of this motion. 2 As set forth below, Giuseppe contests his membership status or any role in Seaside Wine. 2 gathered to consume alcohol. The plaintiffs further allege that Seaside Wine and/or Seaside Liquor “operated” the liquor store and sold the alcohol to the minors. (Compl. at Count 1 ¶¶ 11-14, 21.) The plaintiffs also assert that Victor Saverino, Yesika Saverino, and/or Giuseppe operated the store. (Id. at Counts 3-8.) Giuseppe denies that he had any involvement with the liquor store, that he sold alcohol to minors, or that he otherwise caused or contributed to the vehicle collision. Rather, Giuseppe has raised by way of special defense that he was unknowingly made a member of Seaside Wine by his son, Victor, and daughter-in-law, Yesika. (See, e.g., Pompea v. Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC et al., Dkt. No. 139.00, at pp. 10-12.) He was further defrauded into securing a home equity line of credit of $150,000.00 that Victor, unbeknownst to Giuseppe, intended to use to purchase the subject liquor store. Giuseppe is also an unrepresented defendant in a matter titled Robert Pambianchi v. Giuseppe Saverino, Case No. HHB-CV18-5022344-S, currently pending in New Britain Superior Court, alleging that he failed to pay an $80,000.00 note related to Seaside Wine. As a direct result of the financial impossibility of Giuseppe having to pay a mortgage of $150,000.00 created by Victor Saverino taking those funds and using them to purchase the subject liquor store, on June 8, 2020 Giuseppe commenced a voluntary case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The matter is pending at Case No. 20-20773 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, 450 Main Street, Hartford, Connecticut. In each of the instant proceedings Giuseppe filed notice and an affidavit of bankruptcy pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 14-1 on June 26, 2020. (Dkt. No. 110.00.) II. ARGUMENT The automatic stay of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the “continuation” of any “action or proceeding against the debtor. . . .” The factual allegations and legal issues facing 3 each of the non-debtor defendants in each of the instant proceedings are so intertwined with the factual and legal issues facing Giuseppe that any discovery, motion practice, or other continuation of these cases as to the non-debtor defendants would constitute a “continuation” of these proceedings against debtor Giuseppe in violation of the automatic stay. Therefore, none of the current proceedings should continue pending resolution of the bankruptcy. In the alternative, Giuseppe requests that this Court exercise its inherent discretion and stay these proceedings so as to prevent Giuseppe from being prejudiced in his defense during the pendency of his bankruptcy. A. Continuing These Cases Amounts to Continuation of a Judicial Proceeding Against a Bankruptcy Debtor Decisions issued by this Court, such as a ruling on the simultaneously filed objection to consolidation or a ruling on a protective order as to discovery, discovery objections, or dispositive motions, would constitute the continuation of a proceeding against Giuseppe and it would be impossible for these cases to be stayed as to only Giuseppe and not the entirety of the non-debtor defendants. On filing a bankruptcy petition Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an automatic stay of, among other things, “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1). “The scope of the automatic stay is extremely broad, and should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the property of the estate.” In re Ormond Beach Assocs. Ltd. Pshp., 185 B.R. 408, 412 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). “The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, § 362(a), has been described as ‘one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.’” Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95- 4 595, p. 340 (1977)). It is “designed to provide the debtor with a breathing spell from his creditors.” Koolik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567, 568 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs’ theory of liability rests on the claim that a liquor store sold alcohol to a minor, that minor Ryan Capozziello consumed that alcohol before getting behind the wheel of the Jeep, and that his intoxication caused the subject motor vehicle accident. This theory depends on a series of events involving multiple defendants and plaintiffs-turned-defendants—such selling alcohol to a minor, granting permission by the parents to allow consumption of alcohol at their residence, and sharing of the alcohol by minors. The allegations implicate the liquor stores, its owners and managers, and the plaintiffs-turned-defendants. The theory of liability intertwines these parties such that any progress in the case—be it depositions, apportionment complaints, summary judgment filings, or trial—affect Giuseppe. Because fact discovery and motion practice bear on Giuseppe’s ultimate liability—which liability is questionable but all the more reason the case should not proceed in his absence so as to avoid prejudicing his ability to develop a record to support judgment in his favor—any further progress of this case would effectuate “continuation” of proceedings against him. The automatic stay prevents this from occurring. If the automatic stay does not apply to stay all proceedings it would place Giuseppe in the untenable position of either waiving his rights to participate in discovery and motion practice pending his bankruptcy, or participating in discovery and motion practice but being at risk of encouraging a violation of the automatic stay. For instance, Giuseppe seeks to prevent consolidation of the Bull, Gombos, and Ciccarello cases because those cases involve a statute of limitations issues that will be the subject of motion practice, which is an issue not present in the other consolidated cases. By objecting to consolidation he seeks to preserve his right to challenge the ability of those plaintiffs to pursue their claims without the issue being clouded by different 5 factual and legal issues confronting the defendants in the consolidated cases. Were the Court to overrule Giuseppe’s objection to consolidation of those cases it would constitute a continuation of a judicial action against a debtor. Similarly, depositions of Thomas Bull and a representative of the liquor store where he purchased liquor, Park Package Store, Inc., are scheduled to proceed in August 2020. The deposition of Mr. Bull will necessarily explore: what kind of alcohol he purchased; whether he provided it to any of the other plaintiffs; whether he ever met Giuseppe; whether he has ever been to Seaside Wine and purchased alcohol; and whether he purchased the alcohol on the date of the accident from Park Package. Prior to delays attributable to COVID-19 Victor Saverino was also scheduled to be deposed, and it is anticipated that he will be deposed as restrictions lessen. Were Giuseppe to seek a protective order or otherwise object to discovery topics or questions to be asked of Victor Saverino in order to, for instance, protect his defense in the Seaside Wine business litigation and were those discovery issues ruled upon, it would likewise constitute continuation of a judicial action against debtor Giuseppe. A bankruptcy stay is “designed to give the debtor time to organize its affairs—which includes protection from having to defend claims brought against the estate as well as continuing to pursue judicial proceedings on its own behalf.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Asso v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1986). These proceedings also implicate a potential asset of the bankruptcy estate: the liability insurance coverage affording Giuseppe a defense to these cases. That policy is held by Seaside Wine & Liquor, LLC, but is providing a defense to Giuseppe. Insurance policies owned by the debtor, particularly those insurance policies that provide coverage for the debtor's liability, usually constitute assets of the estate. See Insurance Bankruptcy, 36 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1025 (2001); In re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to reopen debtors case because debtor failed to list insurance as an asset). In an abundance of caution 6 undersigned intends to seek relief from the automatic stay to permit Giuseppe’s defense to continue, but Giuseppe submits that whether the insurance policy concerns the bankruptcy estate is as yet an open question. To the extent that the policy is part of the estate proceeding with litigation against the other defendants insured under that policy (Seaside Wine) has the potential to diminish the indemnity coverage afforded to Giuseppe under the policy and would be impermissible absent leave of the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, Giuseppe submits that nearly every action taken in these cases, whether attempting to settle with Seaside Wine under the shared insurance policy, a non-debtor opposing Giuseppe’s objection to consolidation, a non-debtor seeking a ruling on a discovery objection made by Giuseppe, or by this Court in ruling on consolidation, risks a violation of the automatic stay because itcould result in “continuation” of a judicial proceeding or action against debtor Giuseppe.3 Therefore, Giuseppe submits that the stay imposed by Section 362 prevents these proceedings from continuing as to any defendant pending his bankruptcy. B. The Court Should Exercise its Inherent Discretion and Authority to Enter a Stay Even if the Court finds that the automatic stay does not apply to stop all proceedings, the Court should nevertheless exercise its inherent authority to stay the proceedings to protect Giuseppe from being forced to choose between participating in litigation to protect, for instance, his right to object to consolidation, seek apportionment, or otherwise challenge the claims against him and waiting until his bankruptcy resolves. “In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of an application or a motion for a stay of an action or proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Lee v. Harlow, Adams 3 Section 362 also applies to stay “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (3) (emphasis added). 7 and Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn. App. 289, 311, 975 A.2d 715 (2009) (internal citation omitted.). “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Id. at 311-12 (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized this inherent power. Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 514 U.S. 386, 411 (1995). The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that in determining a motion to stay, the court should apply “familiar equitable principles in the context of adjusting the rights of the parties during the pendency of the litigation until a final determination on the merits.” Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 458 (1985) (affirming the grant of a stay of an administrative order pending appeal). Though no single appellate standard exists in Connecticut for exercising discretion to stay proceedings, the courts generally consider factors relevant to the manner of stay sought. For instance, in cases deciding whether to grant a stay pending the outcome of a parallel action, the courts consider: “(i) similarity of subject matter between actions; (ii) promotion of judicial economy; (iii) possibility of causing injustice or prejudice to the plaintiff; (iv) whether the foreign suit was initiated to the forestall domestic suit; (v) possibility of conflicting judicial decisions; and (vi) ability of the court to monitor parallel litigation.” Arras v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. #14, No. UWYCV135016462S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2644, *3 (Nov. 19, 2013) (citing KI, Inc. v. KP Acquisition Partners, LLC, No. X05-CV-09 60027474, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2450 (Sep. 24, 2010)). Similarly, the federal courts consider a variety of factors when determining whether to stay proceedings in a case, including: “(1) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding 8 expeditiously with the civil litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed; (2) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.” Acton v. Intellectual Capital Mgmt., No. 15-CV-4004, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172149, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Covidien Sales LLC v. Ethicon Endo- Surgery, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-917 (JCH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147060, 39-40 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2014) (recognizing same factors). The Connecticut Appellate Court has cited with approval a tailored version of these factors as the basis for deciding whether to stay a civil proceeding when a collateral criminal proceeding is pending. See Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler, 115 Conn. App. 521 (2009) (citing state and federal cases, and holding that the trial court had not committed error when granting the continuance of the civil case pending the outcome of a related civil case). Thus, the different tests for deciding whether to stay proceedings weigh the same basic, predominant factors: (1) the risk of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the interests and burden of the movant; (3) the interest of the court; and (4) the interests of others, such as non-parties and the public. Courts also consider the reasons for seeking the stay. The various factors outlined in Acton and Arras, as outlined above, favor the entry of a stay, though a court can impose a stay on its own authority even without weighing those factors. See M.E.S., Inc. v. M.J. Favorito Elec., Inc., No. 08-CV-183 (JG) (JMA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23809 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) (exercising the court’s discretion to stay the remainder of the proceedings in an action where one party was a debtor). i. Lack of Prejudice to Plaintiff A temporary stay will not prejudice the plaintiffs. No depositions have taken place for months, and it is not clear that the August 2020 depositions will proceed in light of continued delay 9 related to COVID-19. Rather, the plaintiffs would benefit from not having to duplicate discovery, pre-trial proceedings, and possibly even trials in this matter. The only potential prejudice would be a delay of a final resolution of the case, which is already likely to occur in light of the restrictions on jury trials currently in place due to COVID-19. ii. The Potential for Prejudice to the Defendants While the proposed temporary stay pending the outcome of bankruptcy will not result in any meaningful delay or prejudice to the plaintiffs, as noted in the examples above relating to motion practice and discovery, Giuseppe will be prejudiced if a stay of all proceedings is not granted. If the case is stayed as to only Giuseppe and proceeds as to all other defendants it places Giuseppe at risk of not being able to seek apportionment, file summary judgment on the statute of limitations or other defenses, or meaningfully participate in other proceedings that impact his interests in the defense of these cases. Even setting aside all of those pre-trial issues, the biggest risk for prejudice to Giuseppe (as well as to the co-defendants) is if the underlying matter moves to trial during the pendency of the bankruptcy, which would result in potentially inconsistent results and piecemeal trials. The prejudice to Giuseppe weighs heavily in favor of a stay when considered with the lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Stanley-Vidmar v. Marineland, Inc., No. CV880296438S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3091 (Dec. 17, 1991) (denying a motion to dissolve a stay of proceedings in a case where only one defendant was in bankruptcy, since the claims between the debtor and non-debtor defendants were interrelated, and since “the claims against the defendants are intertwined in some of the counts of the complaint.”); Luck v. McMahon, No. 3:20-cv-516, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112882 (D. Conn. Jun. 26, 2020) (staying an action among non-debtors until resolution of the non-party debtor’s bankruptcy, since the debtor was a necessary party who would suffer prejudice if the case proceeded without him). 10 iii. Convenience to the Court and Judicial Economy Judicial economy will also result if this motion is granted, for similar reasons that the defendants’ interests would be protected if the Court grants the motion. The bankruptcy is potentially dispositive of the entire liability of Giuseppe, which, as explained above, may bear on future discovery, dispositive motions, and settlement discussions. The orderly treatment of bankruptcy should precede resolution of any further motion practice, pre-trial proceedings, discovery, and trial. iv. The Interest of Others The interest of the public as a whole will not feel the impact from this Court granting the motion to stay proceedings. When the bankruptcy proceedings end, the plaintiffs and the remaining defendants can then proceed in the ordinary course, and no parties or non-parties will have faced any unnecessary harm or expense. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Giuseppe respectfully requests the Court to order a stay of all matters and proceedings pending the resolution of Giuseppe’s bankruptcy. THE DEFENDANT, GIUSEPPE SAVERINO By: /s/ Joseph J. Blyskal Joseph J. Blyskal Kelcie B. Reid Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP 95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Suite 206 Glastonbury, CT 06033 Phone: (860) 494-7555 Fax: (860) 560-0185 Email: jblyskal@grsm.com Email: kreid@grsm.com 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on the date hereof, to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record of all consolidated actions and to all parties who have not appeared in this matter and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self- represented parties receiving electronic delivery. Robert G. Fashjian Fashjian & Falco, P.C. 66 Huntington Street Shelton, CT 06484 Rgf.law@snet.net Plaintiff Attorney for Thomas Bull Richard A. Roberts, Esq. Nuzzo & Roberts LLC One Town Center PO Box 747 Cheshire, CT 06410 recep@nuzzo-roberts.com Attorney for Seaside Wine and Liquor LLC; Victor Saverino and Yesika Saverino Maureen E. Burns, Esq. Mulvey Oliver Gould & Crotta 2911 Dixwell Avenue, 4th Floor Hamden, CT 06518 bums@moglaw.com Attorney for Allison Loder Adam J. Tusia, Esq. Milano & Wanat 471 East Main Street Branford, CT 06405 atusia@mwllc.us Attorney for Allison Loder Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq. Marshall Dennehey 287 Bowman Avenue Suite 404 Purchase, NY 10577 njtaylor@mdwcg.corn Attorney for Grant Ciccarello 12 Nicholas J. Taylor, Esq. Marshall Dennehey 287 Bowman Avenue Suite 404 Purchase, NY 10577 njtaylor@mdwcg.corn Attorney for Luke Ciccarello Paula Bennett, Esq. Gordon Muir and Foley LLP 1344 Silas Deane Highway Suite 501 Rocky Hill, CT 06067 For Matthew Bull Howard Kohn Sprague & Fitzgerald P.O. Box 261798 Hartford, CT 06126-1798 For Ryan Capozziello Park Package Store, Inc. non-appearing Janelle Pompea non-appearing Jon Pompea & ShirleyAnn Pompea non-appearing /s/ Joseph J. Blyskal Joseph J. Blyskal 13