Motion to Vacate in CORY NAROG VS ALLEN CLAYBAUGH| Trellis.Law

On September 10, 2010 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between Narog, Cory, and Claybaugh, Allen, for (43) Unlimited Other Petition (Not Spec) in the District Court of San Mateo County.

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Mr Cory Narog
P.O. Box 1871
Cupertino, CA 95015
Phone: (650 593-9333)
FI
SAN MaTEen ery INTY
(no email)
SFP 19 2p19
For Plaintiff, Cory Narog|( cuserag ]
| ie ot Motion and
Motion toVacate
ot Superior Court

ilitty Mt
Gk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OFTh
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
10

11 CORY NAROG, Case No. CIV 498746
12 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
TO VACATE PREFILIN
13 vs.

14 ALAN CLAYBAUGH

15,
+ Defendant
Date:
Time
Abtanser 2 Iolo
508 Aap
Dept. ao
16 Judge kagesw
17

18 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECOED:

19 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on __ //~ , 2019,at _7 or as soon thereafter as the
20 matter may be heard in Department.29_ of the above-captioned court, located 400 County Center
|
21 Redwoed City , California, Plaintiff CORY NAROG (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Narog”)
22 will move this Court to vacate its pre-filing order and overturn Judge Freeman’s findings
23 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.8(c).

24 Mr. Narog’s motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion to Vacate Pre-filing

25 Order, the accompanying Memorandum of Points andAuthorities, the attached dectartions and

26 such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this motion; and all

27 papers and records on file in this action.

28
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OFFICES OF Plaintiff CORY NAROG.

Dated: enfin pie /7, 2019
By:
‘or Py tiff Z6ry Narog

26
27

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+ ®

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2010, Attorney Matthew E. Coleman pursued a vexaticus litigant motion against Mr.

Narog claiming that Mr. Narog was involved in 61 different litigetions around the Bay Area
Counties. This number of litigations was over-inflated in that it counted litigations that Mr.
Narog’s son was actually involved in and most of the cases that Mr. Narog were involved in were
small claims actions for collection. This alleged number of litigacions was misleading and unduly

10 influenced the court in its consideration. 5

il Of all of the cases ever filed by Mr. Narog, 32 were small claims cases based on unpaid

12 acccunts receivable from Mr. Narog’s landscaping business. Pricr to his disability partially

13 caused by his accident in the Barajas Case addressed below, Mr. Warog was a state licensed
landscape contractor (CSLB No. C27 800 477). By Jaw, Mr. Narog’s small claims’ cases had to
14
be pursued in pro per by Mr. Narog. Outside of small claims cases, Mr. Narog, in his entire life,
15
has only ever filed four civil cases (each of which is addressed below) and the five restraining
16 :
order cases against his neighbors in Redwood Shores upon which the vexatious litigant motion
17
was brought. Of the civil cases, Mr. Narog was represented by counsel in two of the civil cases
18
and in all of the restraining order cases. Further in the two cases that Mr. Narog was not
19
represented by counsel, he met with and consulted counsel regarding those cases, as well.
20
The vexatious litigant motion brought against Mr. Narog came as a surprise in that Mr.
21
Narog and his counsel did not receive service of the motion and were caught off guard. Had they
22 received adequate notice, they would have been able to demonstraze that at least three of the five
23 cases cited by the opposition as frivolous were by no means in fact frivolous. Moreover the
24 attorneys who brought the motion were either deliberate in their atcempts to mislead the Court or
25 grossly negligent in their research of the facts and circumstances that were involved in the cases
26 they deemed frivolous.

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j hey
A.
BARAJAS CASE

On September 23, 2010, Attorney Thomas Feeney, who represented Edmund Estolas in
San Mateo County in the case of Narog v. Barajas Docket number CIV 442860 only told half the
story in his declaration in support of the original motion deeming Mr. Narog avexatious litigant,
(See Declaration of Attorney Thomas Feeney attached to the Deckaration of Cory Narog as
Exhibit Qvé:,.) Feeney was also present in San Joaquin County wien his client, Edmund Estolas,
Mr. Narog ‘and Mr. Narog’s son settled an interpleader action witk Ms. Barajas. It should be
noted that Thomas Feeney’s firm represented both the Estolas and Ms, Barajas in San Joaquin

10 County, as well as, San Mateo County. Mr. Narog received the demages for both personal injury

11 and property damage to his vehicle.

12 Narog v. Barajas was a bonafide personal injury lawsuit in which Mr. Narog and his son

13 were both paid damages from Ms. Barajas’ insurance policy with Topa Insurance Company. Mr.
Narog injuries included a broken back (transverse fractures of the L2 and L3) which to today
14
causes him daily pain and suffering. (A true and correct copy of Mr. Narog’s MRI of his Cervical
15
Spine and Lumbar Spine dated November 16, 2002 is attached to theDeclaration of Cory Narog
16
as Exhibit Ove)
17
‘On November 16, 2002, Mr. Narog was stopped on the side ofHighway 205 in rural San
18
Joaquin County. Mr. Narog’s vehicle was parked in front of his scn’s truck approximately 20
19
feet from the side of the roadway. Mr. Narog’s son’s truck had broken down and Mr. Narog was
20
summoned to assist his son to attempt to get the truck moving agaia.
21
While Mr. Narog was attempting to start his son’s truck, he was struck by two cars that
22
had become entangled at some point before reaching Mr. Narog’s location and left the roadway. .
23 At some point prior to striking Mr. Narog in his son’s truck, Ms. Barajas had become entangled
24 with another driver by the name of Edmund Estolas and both cars collided with Mr. Narog’s son's
25 truck which subsequently smashed into and totaled Mr. Narog’s vericle. Mr.Narog sustained
26 both perscnal injuries and property damage.
27 Mrz. Narog retained experienced counsel, Vincent J. Scotto (SBN 87703), to initiate a

28 lawsuit. Because, at the time of filing, it was unclear which tortfeasor caused or contributed to
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the accident which led to Mr. Narog and his son’s vehicles being struck by Ms. Barajas and Mr.
Estolas, Mr. Scotto filed claims against both Barajas and Estolas in San Mateo County. It is
uncertain why Attorney Scotto chose to file in San Mateo County. After sufficient discovery, it

was determined that Ms. Barajas was 100% liable for the damage suffered by Mr. Narog because
she went into Mr. Estolas’ lane of travel, became entangled and forced his vehicle into Mr.

Norag’s son’s vehicle which subsequently collided with Mr. Narag’s vehicle.

Topa Insurance Company filed an interpleader action for the policy limits in San Joaquin
County under Docket number SV 251270 and the parties reached a settlement whereby Mr.
Narog and his son were paid the policy limits for their injuries and vehicles. (See a true and
correct copy of the Settlement Agreement, in the San Joaquin Docket number SV 251270 is
10
attached to the Declaration of Cory Narog as Exhibit Qysc, .) As the result of his physical
11
injuries, Mr. Narog was awarded $15,000.00. (A true and correct. copy of Topa Insurance
12
Company’s check number 99597 in the amount of $15,000.00 to Cory Narog Sr. is attached to the
13
Declaration of Cory Narog as Exhibit Gwe.) As the result of his property damage, Mr. Narog
14
was jointly awarded $9,200.00 with his son pursuant to settlement agreement. (A true and correct
15 copy of Topa Insurance Company's check number 107338 in the amount of $10,000.00 to Clerk
16 of the Superior Court and San Joaquin County is attached to the Declaration of Cory Narog as

17 Exhibit Qué.)
18 This was a case where plaintiff's counsel pursued joint tortfeasors which may have

19 contributed to both Mr. Narog’s physical injuries and property daraage. The case was not

20 initiated in pro per. An experienced attorney duly licensed by the State of California since 1979

21 analyzed the facts and circumstances of how Mr. Estolas’ vehicle came to ram into the rear of Mr.

22 Narog’s son’s vehicle and caused both severe physical injuries anc property damage to Mr.
Narog. After analyzing these facts, Mr, Scotto filed a complaint against both Ms.Barajas and Mr.
23
Estolas.
After discovery, it was determined that Ms. Barajas was the party solely liable for
25
damages to Mr. Narog. Topa Insurance Company initiated an interpleader case in San Joaquin
26
County and the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby both Mr. Narog and Mr. Estolas
27
received damages. In turn both Mr. Narog and Mr. Estolas agreed to dismiss their actions in San
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Maieo County. Both parties agreed to bear their own costs. (See Request for Dismissal filed by

Cory Narog on February 8, 2006 attached to the Declaration of Cory Narog as Exhibit 04g see.
alsc, Request for Dismissal filed by Thomas Feeney on behalf of Sdmund C. and Colleen Estolas
attached to the Declaration of Cory Narog as Exhibit Qué.) Attorney Thomas Feeney filed a
Reszonse To Order To Show Cause Statement By Defendants Estlas Re Status Of Complaint
And Cross-Complaint As To Nora R. Barajas. (See Response To Order To Show Cause attached
to the Declaration of Cory Narog as Exhibit Jue.)
At the hearing in which Judge Freeman deemed Mr. Narog avexatious litigant, herhonor
specifically reprimanded Mr. Narog’s counsel for not attaching a settlement agreement, stating:
“You haven’t given me the settlement document. You haven’t given me a copy of the transcript
10
to show there was a settlement. I don’t even have a declaration, do I, that sets anything out
il
(See Reporter’s Partial Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter “R.P.T.,” 14:12-16.] Judge
12
Freeman further concluded: “I doubt there is one. This is a minute entry, ‘Case dismissed with
13
prejudice as to entire action.’ There’s no explanation there’s no evidence that there was a
14 settlement.” [R.P.T. 15:24 — 16:1.]
15 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 391.8 (c) which reads in part: "A Court may
16 vacate a pre-filing order and order removal of a vexatious litigant's name from the Judicial
17 Counzil's list of Vexatious Litigant’s subject to pre-filing orders uton showing of a material
18 change in the facts upon which the order was granted and that the ends of justice would be served

19 by vacating the order.

20 Here, attorney Dara Tang used the declaration of Thomas Feeney to tell a half-truth.

21 While the case was dismissed with prejudice and the Estolas were not ordered to pay any

22 damages besides waiving fees, the case was far from frivolous. Mx. Narog sustained actually
physical injuries and his truck was totaled. The case was filed by a licensed attorney and
23
maintained for a period of time by that attorney. Although it was dismissed in pro per by Mr.
24
Narog himself, the dismissal was based on a large monetary settlement in the interpleader case.
25
Although attorneys must advocate zealously for their clients (see Davis v. State Bar
26
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 231, 238 [188 Cal.Rptr 441]). There are limits to an attorney’s conduct as set
27
forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Business and Prcfessions Code. (See Hawk v.
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4
Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 126 [116 Cal.Rptr. 713.] The duty of a lawyer is both

to her client and to the legal system is to represent her client zealously within the bounds of the
law. Business and Professions Code section 6068 requires, among other things, ‘that an attorney

“employ, for purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her those means only as are
consistent with truth.” (Business and Professions Code section 6068(d).) Attorneys must
“maictain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,” and cannot “seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.” Business
and Professions Code section 6080(b) and (d). If a judicial officer was presiding over the:
hearing, these rules prohibit the attorney from making a false statement of fact or law.
Under Business and Professions Code section 6106, an attomney who commits any act of
10
moral turpitude or dishonesty, whether or not in the course of the actorney’s conduct as an
ll
attorney, is subject to disbarment or suspension. (Business and Prcfessions Code section 6106.)
12
Further, Business and Professions Code section 6128(a) provides that “[e]very attorney is guilty
13
of a misdemeanor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or
14 collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party .. ..” (Business and Professions Code
15 section 6128.) Attorneys Dara Tang and Thomas Feeney perpetrated a fraud against the court,
16 Here, Attorney Dara Tang deceived this Court by presenting the declaration of
17 Thomas Feeney and not disclosing the full facts and circumstances of the underlying case. There
18 is absclutely no way that the Barajas Case should be considered frivolous under any
19 circumstances. There were actual physical and property damages incurred by Mr. Narog and he
20 was well within his rights to pursue claims against the joint tortfeasors. Simply because one

21 tortfeasor is found non-liable and subsequently dismissed, does not render the case frivolous.

22 Using Thomas Feeney’s declaration and not disclosing the material facts of the entire action
resulted in deceit upon this Court. The case was filed by an experienced attorney, Vincent Scotto,
23
to preserve the statute of limitations.
24
Here, this Court should vacate the pre-filing order because there is a showing of a material
25
change in the facts upon which the order was granted and that the ends of justice would be served
26
by vacating the order.
27

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B.
il

12 ANDERSON, CHEVROLET CASE teal Axtell Theae
13 LefEe ecot mf!" BS, RoCo
Mr. Narog Sones a truck from And on Chemctet He paid $5. ifs teed a5.2
14
the track. He then paid for the truck with two money orders that Anderson Chevrolet failed to
15 record on their books. (True and correct copies of Great Western Bank money orders No.
16 531458117 and No. 531458116 are attached to the Declaration of Cory Narog as Exhibit Foua.)
17 Anderson Chevrolet was under the belief that Mr. Narog had nevez paid for the truck. Anderson

18 Chevrolet filed a small claims case against Mr. Narog, but never served him with the Summons

19 and Complaint. Anderson Chevrolet filed a fraudulent proof of service and took Mr. Narog’s

20 default without his knowledge of the case. The proof of substituted service was to an address that

21 Mr. Narog had never lived at and the process server was under the impression that he substitute

22 served Mr. Narog’s alleged wife, “Melody.” (It should be noted that Mr. Narog never had a wife
named Melody. He was married to Patricia Fitz-Gibbons from 1979 to 1984. To date, he has had
23
no other marriages.) So substituted service on Mr. Narog’s wife on September 20, 1997 was a
24
factual impossibility.
25
Anderson Chevrolet matured the default and recorded a lier against Mr. Narog’s
26
residential property. -When Mr. Narog sold his house seven years later, he learned of the lien and
27
funds were withdrawn from the sales proceeds or else the sale woukin’t go through. When the
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1
lien was paid off, Mr. Narog had effectively paid to the same truck twice.

Armed with cancelled:checks from his original purchase of the truck, Mr. Narog sued
Anderson Chevrolet for reimbursement from the false lien in small claims. After the court

determined that jurisdiction was proper in Superior Court, Mr. Nerog dismissed his small claims
action without prejudice. After filing in Superior Court, Andersoa Chevrolet successfully
demurrered on statute of limitations grounds. Ultimately he was unable to rectify Anderson
Chevrolet’s error because the statute of limitations had run out on his time to challenge their

smail claims judgment.
a

Cc.
10 REDWOOD CITY POLICE DEPARMENT CASE
ML
Mr. Narog was the subject of apolice witch hunt that was the brainchild of several his
12
neighbors iri Redwood Shores. Several of these neighbors hired a high powered attorney to
13
attempt to have the police arrest Mr. Narog on trumped up charges. The result was a 23 page
14 memoranduni entitled “Possible Criminal Liability of Cory Narog™ with 398 pages of attached
15 exhibits. ‘

16 Attorney JimHartnett presented this binder to several city officials in hopes that Redwood
17 City would take action against Mr. Narog. The binder was later delivered to the Redwood City
18 Police who went back and forth with the District Attorney and finaily filed a single charge on
19 violating Penal Code section 148.5 for filing a false police Teport ir 2010. Mr. Narog reported

20 ‘suspected vandalism for damage done to his outdoor fountain and flower pots.

21 While Mr. Narog’s outdoor fountain and flower pots were actually damaged and he had

22 photographic evidence of neighbors creeping around his property, tae District Attorney issued
charges anyway. Mr. Narog expended copious amounts of money in his legal defense and the
23
case was marched to jury trial. Prior to actually calling in a jury, the District Attorney dismissed
24
the case citing that an officer had retired and moved to Florida. However, the officer that moved
25
to Florida was not the main investigating officer and Mr. Narog’s legal team suggested that foul
126
play was at foot. They suggested he find and attorney experienced in civil rights actions and
27
recover his damages for his legal defense.
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Mr. Narog consulted with Jikiva Candappa, an attorney that boasted ten years’ experience

and held himself out as an expert in pursuing federal civil rights claims. After taking $22,000.00
of Mr, Narog’s money and filing what he deemed “a strong federal civil rights case,” attorney
Candappa moved his office to Southern California and withdrew as counsel.
The federal civil rights law suit was a creature of attomey Candappa’s devising. Mr.
Candappa selected the legal theories and chose which officers would be named as defendants. He
decided not to name the District Attorney or the neighbors that pushed for the prosecution. He
conducted several depositions before moving and withdrawing as counsel.
After his withdrawal, Mr. Narog was unable to afford counsel to take over the litigation.
Although the litigationwas ultimately dismissed by Mr. Narog, it did result in one officer being
10
relieved of duty for filing a false police report and another making admissions that reports were
It
falsified at a settlement conference. After negotiations, the parties agreed to mutual dismissals of
12
all claims and counterclaims with a waiver of costs.
13 Regardless of Mr. Narog negotiated dismissal, the case was not frivolous or groundless
14 and should not have been consider under Code of Civil Procedure § 391.
15 As a result of the suspected vandalism and the measures taken by his neighbors, Mr.
16 Narog pursued several restraining orders which were the subject of the above captioned case.
17 Much like the federal civil rights claims, Mr. Narog’s restraining orders against his neighbors

18 were supported by facts and should not be deemed to be frivolous or counted for purposes of

19 California

20 California Code of Civil Procedure § 391. Moreover, Mr. Narog was represented by

21 counsel in each of the restraining orders from start to finish. His attorneys counseled him and
ensured him that he had a valid case against each of the offending neighbors.
22

23 I
ARGUMENT
24

25 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 391.8 (c) which reads in part: "A Court may

26 vacate a pre-filing order and order removal of a vexatious litigant's name from the Judicial

27 Council's list of Vexatious Litigant’s subject to pre-filing orders upon showing of a material

28 change in the facts upon which the order was granted and that the ends of justice would be served
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by vacating the order."

Vexatious litigation is legal action which is brought, regardless of itsmerits, solely to
harass or subdue an adversary. It may take the form of a primary =rivolous lawsuit or may be the
repetitive, burdensome, and unwarranted filing of meritless moticns in a matter which is

otherwise a meritorious cause of action. Filing vexatious litigation is considered an abuse of the
judicial process and may result in sanctions against the offender. :

“Under California Jaw a vexatious litigant is someone who -loes any of the following, most i
of which require that thelitigant be proceeding pro se, i.e., representing himself at least at some
point in the litigation:

1 In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or
10 maintained in propri ersona at least five litigations other than in a small claims
ll
court that have been @ finally determined adversely to the person or (ii)
unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been
brought to trial or hearing.
12
After a litigation has been finally determined against ths ie exson, repeatedly
13
de ih
relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria eC) rsona, eit er (i) the validity of the
determination against the same defendant or fencants as to whom the litigation
14 was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, c:aim, controversy, or any of the
issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against
1S the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined.

16 In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious
motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts. unnecessary discovery, or engages in
17 other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to Cause unnecessary delay.
Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal
18 court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially
similar facts, transaction, or occurrence.
19
Appeals of an existing action do not count as “final determ:nations.” Appeals and writs
20
that are related to a current action do not count as “final determinations” or additional
21
determinations, because until all avenues of appeal have been exhausted the determinations
22
cannot be construed as “final.” A judgment is final for all purposes when all avenues for direct
23
review have been exhausted. Interlocutory decisions before a judgment cannot be considered
24
“final determinations.” Docket lists show nothing about qualifying merit of interimmotions do
25 not support a finding of vexatious litigation.
26 To meet the unspecified criteria for "repeated" motions or litigations, the number must be
27 much more than two, and the rule based on case law seems to be around 12. “While there is no
28
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bright line rule as to what constitutes “repeatedly,” most cases aftirming the vexatious litigant
designation involve situations where litigants have filed dozens of motions either during the

pendency of an action or relating to the same judgment."
Repeated motions must be "so devoid of merit and be so frivolous that they can be
described as a flagrant abuse of the system, have no reasonable probability of success, lack
reasonable or probable cause or excuse, and are clearly meant to abuse the processes of the courts
and to harass the adverse party than other litigants." Evidence thet a litigant is a frequent plaintiff.
or defendant alone is insufficient to support a vexatious litigant designation. The moving party,
in addition to demonstrating that the plaintiff is vexatious, must make an affirmative showing
based on evidence that the case has little chance of prevailing on the merits. If the plaintiff is so
10
determined, a bond may be required, and if the bond requirement is not met within aspecified
ll
time period, a judgment of dismissal is ordered. A finding of vexatiousness is not an appealable
12
ordez, but a dismissal for failure to post a bond requirement based on a judgment of vexatiousness
13 ’
is appealable.
14
A. Although Mr. Narog was Involved in Lawsuits, All of theConas Pursued by Mr,
15 Narog had Merit and should not be Deemed Frivolous

16 In 2010, when Attorney Matthew E. Coleman pursued his vexatious litigant motion

17 against Mr. Narog, he claimed that Mr. Narog was involved in muatiple different litigations

18 around the Bay Area Counties. However, it should be noted such a claim without further
explanation was misleading and unduly misled the court in its consideration.
19
Of the actual cases noted in the moving papers, the overwhelming majority ofthese cases
20
were small claims cases based on unpaid accounts receivable from Mr. Narog’s landscaping
21
business. By law these small claims cases were pursued in pro per by Mr. Narog. Of the
22
remaining nine cases, Mr. Narog was represented by counsel in of those seven of those cases.
23
The remaining nine cases were comprised of one civil litigation an five restraining order
24
requests arising from issues he had with neighbors in the Redwood Shores community. Mr.
25
Narog eventually
26
Due to his physical handicaps, Mr. Narog was ostracized in his neighborhood by a group
27 of elder Asian ladies who reveled in his dysfunction often taunting him with gestures much of
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that of Donald Trump’s mimicking of the handicapped. The behavior escalated with several acts |
of vandalism perpetrated on Mr. Narog’s outdoor fountain, flower pots and other yard items. Mr.
Narog caught certain neighbors encroaching on his property on camera, however, once he spotted
their advances the neighbors refrained from carrying out any additional vandalism.
Outside of the five restraining orders against these neighbors and the federal civil rights
action deriving therefrom and the small claims actions for business debt, Mr. Narog has engaged
in very few litigations.

The Barajas case noted above involved an auto collision in which Mr. Narog sustained
permanent physical injury and property damage and was awarded a portion of the policy limits in
an interpleader action in another jurisdiction. Mr. Narog engaged an experienced attomey who
10
chose to pursue litigation in San Mateo County against two joint tortfeasors. As part of the
11
settlement agreement in San Joaquin County, the San Mateo claims against the torfeasor who was
12
later determined to have zero Percent of the comparative negligence were dismissed.
13
Attorneys Dara Tang and Thomas Feeney perpetrated a fraud against the court by leading
14 Judge Freeman to believe the case was somehow frivolous. By presenting Thomas Feeney’s
15 declaration that only revealed a sliver of the case facts, these attorneys failed in their duty of
16 candor te the court. Using the Barajas case in the determination of whether or not Mr. Narog
17 should be deemed a vexatious litigant is a travesty of justice. These attorneys should be
18 sanctioned for their lack of candor in this case. Attorney Scotto would have been derelict in his
19 duties not to include the joint tortfeasor in his complaint. Thomas Feeney’s declaration should

20 have been discredited and the Barajas case should not have been deemed a frivolous action under

21 any circumstance.

22 Likewise the Anderson Chevrolet case was not frivolous. Mr. Narog ended up paying for
his truck twice due to an error in Anderson Chevrolet’s accounting. The substituted service that
23
Anderson Chevrolet filed was to a wife that Mr. Narog never had. Mr. Narog only attempted to
24
undo this miscarriage of justice but was precluded by the statute of limitations. Such attempts to
25
undo such a miscarriage of justice should not be deemed frivolous.
26
//
27

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a

conctston
10
For the foregoing reasons address aboye, Mr. Narog respec-fully requests that he be 4
ll
removed from the Judicial Counsel Vexatious Litigantlist.
12

15
Offices of Plaintiff Cory Narog
16 Dated: Seyemate /9 209

17
By
18 For PI it ff Cor arog

26 aw

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Exhibit One
/
Exeniplification of Court Recore
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN
P. O. Box 201022
Stockton, CA 95201

Short Title: Case Number:
'Topa Insurance Company California Stal auto Ass. Inter-Insurance Bureau $V251270
I, Rosa Junqueiro, Court Executive Officer/Clerk of the Superior Court of California,
County of San Joaquin, hereby attest that I have carefully compared the attached
document (s) and certify that it is a full, true, and correct sopy of the original
case file
Seal on file or of record in my office regarding the above-captioned matter.

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the courf.this day of
2017
Ge
VINK GHA
ROSA JUNG
Court Executive Offi cer/Clerk of the Court

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN

I, José L. Alva, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of Califomia, County of San
Joaquin, hereby certify that Rosa Junqueiro, whose signature is affixed to the above,
and is the proper certifying officer of said court; with custody of the seal, and all
Seal records, books, documents, and papers of, or appertaining to, said court; and the
foregoing certification is in due and proper form as used in the State of California.

day of NESS
IN WITNESS
PEROT, REOF, I hereunto set my hand and seal of the court this -25 “~~
20

OSE L“ALVA
Presiding Judge of the Superior Court

I, Rosa Junqueiro, Court Executive Officer for the Superior Court of California,
County of San Joaquin, being the court of record, having a seal, hereby certify that the
Honorable José L. Alva, whose name is subscribed to the above certificate of
qualification was, on the date of signing, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of
California, County of San Joaquin, duly elected and qualified; that he is authorized to
Seal make such certificate; and that full faith and credit are due his official acts as such
Judge. I further certify that the signature of the Judge is genuine and executed
according to the laws of the State of California.

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the coi this I. day of
2007 6)
ZL AS (J
GAPE {0 Ly
ROSA JUNG HIRO
Court Executive Officer/Clerk of the Court
C
uy
<
C7 aa wy

J
DALE H. THAYER, SBN 46051
THAYER HARVEY GREGERSON
HEDBERG & JACKSON
1100 Fourteenth Street, Suite F
Post Office Box 3465 Filed APR 0 3 2006
Modesto, California 95354 ROSA JUNGUERO, CLERK
Telephone:: 209) 523-3300
Facsimile: 209) 523-3399 gine Ol. A wrwe
Attorneys for Plaintiff TOPA / DEPUTY
INS| ‘CE COMPANY

a
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN v9

10 TOPA INSURANCE COMPANY, / Case No.: SV 251270
% 0
11 Plaintiff(s),
12 vs. STIPULATION FOR JUDGMENT an
ORDER :
13 CALIFORNIA STATE AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION INTER-INSURANCE
14 BUREAU; CORY NAROG, SR., CORY
NAROG, JR., and DOES 1-50,
15
Defendant(s).
16 /
17 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties that:

18 1. On February 15, 2006, the parties agreed to settle this matter;

19 2. The settlement provides for a release of all claims for property damage only by Cory
20 Narog, Sr., Cory Narog, Jr., and the California State Automobile Association as the subrogee of

21 Edmund Estolas;

22 3. The terms of the settlement require payment of the $10,000.00 Previously deposited with

23 the court by TOPA Insurance Company as follows:

26
WHEREFORE, the parties stipulate and agree that the court shall order the clerk to make
27
payment in accordance with the terms of this stipulation. This stipulation may be signed in
28
GREGERSON HEDBERG
1100-14 SecaoF
Modesto, CA'95353,
1s Gay Seen STIPULATION FORTUDGMENT a1 ORDER
C ¢ ~

separate parts by the Parties and their representatives and shall be'effective only upon all
parties having signed the stipulation or separate parts of the stipulation.

F
DATED:9 - 27-06 — PTA RGERSON

/
ON)

ry | by

i
Date H]Thayer, Attorrey for
TOPA Insurarice Company

DATED: Xx w- o£ :

|
10
CORY OG, SR.
ll

12
DATED: A DG-0C
13 cowie ———
14

15 DATED: (F0¥ (oe CALIFORNIA STATE AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATIO IN INTER-INSURANCE
B U :
16

17
18 Eacret, Ts Attorney

19
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20
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21
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22
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23
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24
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25
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26
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28
‘THAYER HARVEY
1109-1 ‘Sire a 2.
Td, ssa,
CA 85353
323-3300 STIPULATION FOR JUDGMENT
aid ORDER
Fas ft 323.3389
(=

1
ORDER
2

3 Pursuant wo stipulation of the parties, IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of court
4 ||shall pay those funds previously deposited with the court by TOPA Insurance Company as
5 || follows:

6
a. To Cory Narog, Sr. and Co: Narog, I. $9,200.00
7 b To California State Automobile Assn. $800.00

10
var. ul 3, 2a JUDGE OF THE SUPERIO!} COURT
CARTER P.
il

12
13

17
18

19
20
21
22

28
GREGERSON SEDBERG
1100-14 Stet 3.
Te Gah a 95353, STIPULATION FOR JUDGMENT and ORDER
oe
( a

DALE H. THAYER, SBN 46051
THAYER HARVEY GREGERSON
x
HEDBERG & JACKSON, Filed MAR 2 8 2008
1100 Fourteenth Street, Suite F
Post Office Box 3465 ROSA JUNQUEIRO, CLERK
Modesto, California 95354 (
Telephone: 209 523-3300 B '
Facsimile: 209) 523-3399 DEPUTY
-
Attorneys for P

Case Info

Judge

Jonathan E. Karesh Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

September 19, 2019

Case Filing Date

September 10, 2010

County

Parties

CLAYBAUGH, ALLEN Defendant
D'Arcy, Sheryl Other (participant)
NAROG, CORY Plaintiff
SCOTT, STEPHEN A Attorney for the Defendant
sofer, avner Respondent/plaintiff (participant)
SOFER, AVNER D Attorney
Topa Insurance Company Other (participant)
Dara Tang Attorney
William Caspari Attorney
Andrew Azarmi Attorney
Dale Thayer Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Robert Cummings Attorneys for Defendants
Matthew Coleman
Harry Price Attorneys for Defendants
Andrew Parnes Attorney
Mark Bonino Attorneys for Defendants
Joseph McCarthy Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Gene Eacret Attorneys for Defendants
Mark Oto Attorney
Charles Smith Attorney

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Motion,Ex Parte: CORY NAROG VS ALLEN CLAYBAUGH

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