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DOCKET NO.: HHB-CV20-6058330-S : SUPERIOR COURT
ANNIELY MORA : J.D. OF NEW BRITAIN
V. : AT NEW BRITAIN
STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC. : JULY 21, 2020
PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO SECOND REQUEST TO REVISE
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35 et seq., Defendant, Stanley Black & Decker,
Inc., hereby requests that Plaintiff, Anniely Mora, revise her Revised Complaint (Docket
Entry No. 102.00) as follows:
FIRST REQUESTED REVISION
Portions of the Complaint to Be Revised: The First Count in its entirety.
Requested Revision: Removal of the First Count in its entirety or the provision of
allegations pertaining to sexual harassment.
Reason(s) for Requested Revision: The First Count purports to allege a claim of sexual
harassment via hostile work environment. See Rev. Compl. ¶ 23; see also General
Statutes § 46a-60(b)(8).1 But the First Count contains no well-pleaded allegations of
harassment of a sexual nature—they all pertain to Plaintiff’s race and/or ethnicity. See,
e.g., Rev. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11, 14. Accordingly, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35(1),
Defendant requests that Plaintiff provide “a more complete or particular statement of the
allegations” undergirding her sexual harassment claim, or remove the count in its entirety
from the Revised Complaint. Defendant also requests that, should Plaintiff supply
1
Section 46a-60(b)(8) makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, by the employer or the
employer’s agent . . . to harass any employee . . . on the basis of sex or gender identity or
expression. . . . As used in this subdivision, ‘sexual harassment’ means . . . (C) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment . . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
allegations of sexual harassment as requested, she remove the allegations of race and/or
ethnicity harassment from the First Count as “unnecessary . . . immaterial or otherwise
improper . . . .” Practice Book § 10-35(2).
Response: The plaintiff has revised the First Count and filed it with the Court.
SECOND REQUESTED REVISION
Portions of the Complaint to Be Revised: The Second Count in its entirety.
Requested Revision: Separation of allegations sounding in racial/ethnic discrimination
and those sounding in sex/gender discrimination into distinct counts.
Reason(s) for Requested Revision: The Second Count alleges “discrimination” under
General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(1).2 See Rev. Compl. ¶ 48. Within that count, however,
there appears to be two distinct claims. First, Plaintiff appears to be alleging racial/ethnic
discrimination. See, e.g., id. ¶ 32. Additionally, the Second Count contains allegations that
Plaintiff was discriminated against because of her gender. See id. ¶¶ 46, 48. To the extent
that Plaintiff’s gender discrimination allegations in the Second Count are merely
duplicative of the First Count, they should be removed. Otherwise, the gender
discrimination allegations should appear in a separate count. It should be noted that
Defendant essentially made such request in its first Request to Revise (No. 101.00), but
Plaintiff failed to comply with or object to such request.
Response: The plaintiff objects to the defendant’s request to revise on the grounds
that Practice Book Section 10-26 provides that “[w]here separate and distinct
2
Section 46a-60(b)(1) makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, by the employer or the
employer’s agent . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color,
religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression . . . .”
causes of action, as distinguished from separate and distinct claims for relief
founded on the same cause of action or transaction, are joined, the statement of
the second shall be prefaced by the words Second Count, and so on for the others;
and the several paragraphs of each count shall be numbered separately beginning
in each count with the number one.”
‘This rule does not require separate counts in all cases where the
plaintiff declares on several causes of action, but only when these
are separate and distinct from each other. * * * Separate and distinct
causes of action, within the meaning of this rule, must be such as are
both separable from each other, and separable by some distinct line of
demarcation.’ Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing
Co., 63 Conn. 551, 563, 29 A. 76, 78, 25 L.R.A. 856. We have uniformly
approved the use of a single count to set forth the basis of a
plaintiff's claims for relief where they grow out of a single occurrence
or transaction or closely related occurrences or transactions, and it
does not matter that the claims for relief do not have the same legal
basis. It is only when the causes of action, that is, the groups of facts
upon which the plaintiff bases his claims for relief, are separate and
distinct that separate counts are necessary or indeed ordinarily
desirable. Purdy v. Watts, 91 Conn. 214, 216, 99 A. 496.
Veits v. City of Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 438–39 (Conn. 1948).
In this case, the plaintiff has claimed that she was wrongfully terminated for
discriminatory reasons in violation of Conn. Gen. Stats. Sec. 46a-60(b)(1). The
plaintiff has two distinct claims for relief, i.e. discrimination on the basis of gender,
and discrimination on the basis of ethnicty. However, the claims for relief are
founded upon the same cause of action, i.e. a violation of Conn. Gen. Stats. Sec.
46a-60(b)(1) prohibition against discrimination based upon one’s membership in a
distinct protected class. The plaintiff will be eligible for relief if she proves that
either her gender or her ethnicity was the reason for her termination from
employment. The cause of action alleged in the second count is for discrimination
in violation of Conn. Gen. Stats. Sec. 46a-60(b)(1). It is a singular cause of action for
which relief may be granted on proof of two separate bases for discrimination.
Such a claim does not require pleading in separate counts.
THE PLAINTIFF, ANNIELY MORA
/s/ Eric R. Brown – 408630
By: Eric R. Brown
Law Office of Eric R. Brown
P.O. Box 615 Watertown, CT 06795
Email: eric@thelaborlawyer.com
888-579-4222 (Phone and fax)
Firm Juris: 436049
CERTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of this document was or will immediately be mailed or
delivered electronically or non-electronically on 7/21/20 to all attorneys and self-
represented parties of record and to all parties who have not appeared in this
matter and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all
attorneys and self-represented parties receiving electronic delivery.
/s/ 408630
Eric R. Brown, Esq.
Nicholas N. Ouellette
Kurien Ouellette LLC
836 Farmington Avenue
Suite 221A West
Hartford, CT 06119
Tel.: (860) 523-0471
Fax: (860) 523-0472
pleadings@kurienouellette.com
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DOCKET NO.: HHB-CV20-6058330-S : SUPERIOR COURT ANNIELY MORA : J.D. OF NEW BRITAIN V. : AT NEW BRITAIN STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC. : JULY 21, 2020 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO SECOND REQUEST TO REVISE Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35 et seq., Defendant, Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., hereby requests that Plaintiff, Anniely Mora, revise her Revised Complaint (Docket Entry No. 102.00) as follows: FIRST REQUESTED REVISION Portions of the Complaint to Be Revised: The First Count in its entirety. Requested Revision: Removal of the First Count in its entirety or the provision of allegations pertaining to sexual harassment. Reason(s) for Requested Revision: The First Count purports to allege a claim of sexual harassment via hostile work environment. See Rev. Compl. ¶ 23; see also General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(8).1 But the First Count contains no well-pleaded allegations of harassment of a sexual nature—they all pertain to Plaintiff’s race and/or ethnicity. See, e.g., Rev. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11, 14. Accordingly, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35(1), Defendant requests that Plaintiff provide “a more complete or particular statement of the allegations” undergirding her sexual harassment claim, or remove the count in its entirety from the Revised Complaint. Defendant also requests that, should Plaintiff supply 1 Section 46a-60(b)(8) makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent . . . to harass any employee . . . on the basis of sex or gender identity or expression. . . . As used in this subdivision, ‘sexual harassment’ means . . . (C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment . . . .” (Emphasis added.) allegations of sexual harassment as requested, she remove the allegations of race and/or ethnicity harassment from the First Count as “unnecessary . . . immaterial or otherwise improper . . . .” Practice Book § 10-35(2). Response: The plaintiff has revised the First Count and filed it with the Court. SECOND REQUESTED REVISION Portions of the Complaint to Be Revised: The Second Count in its entirety. Requested Revision: Separation of allegations sounding in racial/ethnic discrimination and those sounding in sex/gender discrimination into distinct counts. Reason(s) for Requested Revision: The Second Count alleges “discrimination” under General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(1).2 See Rev. Compl. ¶ 48. Within that count, however, there appears to be two distinct claims. First, Plaintiff appears to be alleging racial/ethnic discrimination. See, e.g., id. ¶ 32. Additionally, the Second Count contains allegations that Plaintiff was discriminated against because of her gender. See id. ¶¶ 46, 48. To the extent that Plaintiff’s gender discrimination allegations in the Second Count are merely duplicative of the First Count, they should be removed. Otherwise, the gender discrimination allegations should appear in a separate count. It should be noted that Defendant essentially made such request in its first Request to Revise (No. 101.00), but Plaintiff failed to comply with or object to such request. Response: The plaintiff objects to the defendant’s request to revise on the grounds that Practice Book Section 10-26 provides that “[w]here separate and distinct 2 Section 46a-60(b)(1) makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression . . . .” causes of action, as distinguished from separate and distinct claims for relief founded on the same cause of action or transaction, are joined, the statement of the second shall be prefaced by the words Second Count, and so on for the others; and the several paragraphs of each count shall be numbered separately beginning in each count with the number one.” ‘This rule does not require separate counts in all cases where the plaintiff declares on several causes of action, but only when these are separate and distinct from each other. * * * Separate and distinct causes of action, within the meaning of this rule, must be such as are both separable from each other, and separable by some distinct line of demarcation.’ Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 563, 29 A. 76, 78, 25 L.R.A. 856. We have uniformly approved the use of a single count to set forth the basis of a plaintiff's claims for relief where they grow out of a single occurrence or transaction or closely related occurrences or transactions, and it does not matter that the claims for relief do not have the same legal basis. It is only when the causes of action, that is, the groups of facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claims for relief, are separate and distinct that separate counts are necessary or indeed ordinarily desirable. Purdy v. Watts, 91 Conn. 214, 216, 99 A. 496. Veits v. City of Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 438–39 (Conn. 1948). In this case, the plaintiff has claimed that she was wrongfully terminated for discriminatory reasons in violation of Conn. Gen. Stats. Sec. 46a-60(b)(1). The plaintiff has two distinct claims for relief, i.e. discrimination on the basis of gender, and discrimination on the basis of ethnicty. However, the claims for relief are founded upon the same cause of action, i.e. a violation of Conn. Gen. Stats. Sec. 46a-60(b)(1) prohibition against discrimination based upon one’s membership in a distinct protected class. The plaintiff will be eligible for relief if she proves that either her gender or her ethnicity was the reason for her termination from employment. The cause of action alleged in the second count is for discrimination in violation of Conn. Gen. Stats. Sec. 46a-60(b)(1). It is a singular cause of action for which relief may be granted on proof of two separate bases for discrimination. Such a claim does not require pleading in separate counts. THE PLAINTIFF, ANNIELY MORA /s/ Eric R. Brown – 408630 By: Eric R. Brown Law Office of Eric R. Brown P.O. Box 615 Watertown, CT 06795 Email: eric@thelaborlawyer.com 888-579-4222 (Phone and fax) Firm Juris: 436049 CERTIFICATION I certify that a copy of this document was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on 7/21/20 to all attorneys and self- represented parties of record and to all parties who have not appeared in this matter and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all attorneys and self-represented parties receiving electronic delivery. /s/ 408630 Eric R. Brown, Esq. Nicholas N. Ouellette Kurien Ouellette LLC 836 Farmington Avenue Suite 221A West Hartford, CT 06119 Tel.: (860) 523-0471 Fax: (860) 523-0472 pleadings@kurienouellette.com