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NO.: (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S : SUPERIOR COURT
NANCY BURTON : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
v. : AT WATERBURY
DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL : OCTOBER 22, 2021
REPLACEMENT REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OCTOBER 7, 2021,
“CORRECTED” SUPERSEDING MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS (##210.00-220.00)
In accordance with the court’s order of September 13, 2021, the defendants,
Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons, hereby submit this reply to Ms. Burton’s
October 7, 2021, “corrected” superseding memorandum and exhibits (##210.00-
220.00) in opposition to their special motion to dismiss the claims against them
pursuant to the Connecticut Anti-SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a (#115.00
and #138.00).1
At the outset, the defendants note that the Corrected Superseding
Memorandum (#210.00 and #211.00) is directed to the defendants, David Philip
Mason, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons. As the court is aware, Mr. Mason has
filed his own special motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff should have filed a separate
memorandum in opposition thereto. Nevertheless, in the interest of bringing this
1 This reply is filed as a substitute for, the defendants’ reply briefs filed on July
21, 2021 (#147.00) and August 27, 2021 (#177.00).
matter to a conclusion, the defendants will address the arguments made by Ms. Burton
in her combined Corrected Superseding Memorandum.
There is no question that the defendants were exercising a protected right as to
a matter of public concern in reporting Ms. Burton’s abuse and neglect of her goats to
the authorities. Rather than refuting the defendants’ arguments in support of their
motion to dismiss, Ms. Burton simply makes the bald assertion that “the Special
Defendants utterly fail to make any showing whatsoever that the complaint ‘is based
on’ defendants’ exercise of their right of free speech, right to petition the government,
or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or he Constitution of
the state in connection with a matter of public concern.” (Corrected Superseding
Memorandum at p. 2). She conveniently ignores all of the points raised in the
defendants’ memorandum of law and supported by their affidavits (Exhibits A and B),
and the affidavits of Mr. DellaRocco (Exhibits C and D), as well as the numerous
complaints to the authorities produced by the defendants in response to her discovery
requests.2
2 Despite the fact that the defendants have produced 35 e-mails to various
governmental authorities and 46 complaints to the Redding Police Department,
complaining of Ms. Burton’s abuse and neglect of her goats (all of which support their
claim that this action is in retaliation for the exercise of their right to petition), Ms.
Burton continues to argue that there is not a “scintilla of evidence” to support their
motion. (Corrected Superseding Memorandum at p. 2). Since Ms. Burton has chosen
to ignore the vast majority of the defendants’ complaints, copies are attached hereto
as Exhibits E (e-mails) and F (police complaints), for the court’s reference.
2
Ms. Burton also asserts that there is no issue of “public concern” in this case.
See Plaintiff’s Corrected Superseding Memorandum (#210.00) at pp. 4-5. Nothing
could be further from the truth. The recent decision by Judge Genuario in the case of
Kaufmann v. Synnott, 2021 WL 4295356 (Conn.Super. 2021), is informative of this
issue:
The plaintiffs argue that the issues raised by Jarnstedt were not a “matter
of public concern.” A matter of public concern is also defined in 52-
196a(1) as “an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environment,
economic or community well being, (C) the government, zoning and other
regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an
audiovisual work.” The health and safety of animals constitute
components of environmental and community well being. The fact that
certain activity involving animal cruelty can result in felony charges is an
indication of the societal importance the Connecticut legislature has
placed upon the humane treatment of animals. The bringing to the
attention of public officials who are in a position to investigate allegations
and suspicions of animal abuse is an exercise of a party’s right to petition
a government official on a matter of public concern. Pursuant to C.G.S.
52-196a the test applicable to the first prong is not whether those initiated
investigations ultimately lead to the discovery of criminal activity, but
whether the communication is likely to lead an investigation of a matter of
public concern regardless of the outcome of that investigation. (Emphasis
added).
The facts of Kaufman are strikingly similar to the present case. The defendant,
Natalie Jarnstedt, wrote a letter to the Darien Police Department requesting that its
animal control officer launch an investigation into to whether Mr. Kaufman was
abusing or mistreating his dogs. Kaufman sued Jarnstedt for defamation and civil
3
conspiracy. Jarnstedt filed a special motion to dismiss. Although Jarnstedt did not
have first-hand knowledge of any abuse (but rather, relied on hearsay from the co-
defendants), the court nonetheless granted her special motion to dismiss.
This case is even stronger than Kaufman. Here, the defendants not only have
first-hand knowledge of Ms. Burton’s abuse and neglect of her goats, but as noted
above, they have filed numerous complaints with the authorities. (See Exhibits E and
F). Connecticut Superior Courts have consistently held that complaints to authorities
as to any matter of public concern fall within the Anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., Noble
v. Hennessey, 2021 WL 830014 (Conn.Super. 2021) (complaint as to public official);
Reid v. Harriman, 2019 WL 5960521 (Conn.Super. 2019) (complaint of sexual
assault); Chapnick v. DiLauro, 2019 WL 3249891 (Conn.Super. 2019) (complaint as to
dog owners’ failure to clean up pet waste); Day v. Dodge, 2019 WL 994532
(Conn.Super. 2019) (complaint of suspected child abuse); Cronin v. Pelletier, 2018
WL 3965004 (Conn.Super. 2018) (complaint as to public official). Although Ms.
Burton may not consider her goat problem to be a matter of public concern, the Anti-
SLAPP statute, and the cases interpreting it, say otherwise. Indeed, to even suggest
that there is no issue of public concern in this case borders on the absurd.
There can be no doubt that the real motive behind Ms. Burton’s lawsuit against
the defendants is retaliation. One need only read Ms. Burton’s affidavits to realize that
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she seeks to punish the defendants for exposing her abuse and neglect of her goats,
and reporting it to the authorities.
While the vast majority of the statements contained in the plaintiff’s affidavits
are devoted to irrelevant and self-serving background and “historical” information, her
true motives are revealed in several passages. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Special Motions to Dismiss of Defendants
David Philip Mason, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons filed July 12, 2021
(#139.00) (“Plaintiff’s Original Affidavit”), ¶ 33 (“Perhaps the most glaring and extreme
example is cited in ¶46k as follows; On August 19, 2020, Carmody anonymously
texted the following message to plaintiff at 8:13 PM: ‘Are you actually aware of how
much you are abusing these goats? They are screaming and desperate. You should
be ashamed. But you will pay. With their lives. You are a [expletive] nightmare.’”)3;
See also Plaintiff’s Original Affidavit ¶ 39 (“Engaging in 24-hour surveillance of
plaintiff and her property is an actionable invasion of privacy, as is posting a video of a
family member of the plaintiff by his car parked on plaintiff’s property on YouTube, as
3 By highlighting this text, Ms. Burton would have the court infer that Ms.
Carmody was threatening to kill her goats. The exact opposite is true. Ms. Carmody
was trying to make Ms. Burton aware that she was, in fact, killing her own goats by her
abuse and neglect—a fact borne out during Mr. DellaRocco’s inspection of her
property on March 10, 2021. See Defendant’s Exhibit D, p. D-12, ¶ 16.
5
defendant Carmody apparently did, 4 such video having apparently been taken by an
animal control officer in the course of his supposed investigation; such conduct falls
outside the scope of Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-196a.”); and ¶ 44 (“Defendants Mason,
Carmody and Gibbons, perhaps inadvertently, reveal in their motions and attachments
facts about their apparently extensive interactions with the Town and State defendants
in this case-facts and circumstances previously unknown to plaintiff. That the three
defendants accuse plaintiff of basing her complaint in large part on such interactions
which they have heretofore kept secret, and which they also claim are privileged,
exposes the fallacy and utter lack of merit of their theory underlying their motions to
dismiss that plaintiff retaliated against them for conduct concerning which they
concealed from plaintiff to attain anonymity.”).
Ms. Burton filed a second affidavit (“Plaintiff’s Supplemental Affidavit”) on
August 16, 2021 (#163.00). In it,she adds two paragraphs that further support the
defendants’ arguments. Paragraph 26 states:
A copy of the report appears in “Exhibits” at pages 21-22; the report was
withheld by DOAG from Ms. Burton until the Spring of 2021 at which time
she first became aware that the “anonymous” complaints leading to the
investigation had been filed by Defendants Mason, Carmody and Gibbons,
whose statements were also withheld by DOAG from Ms. Burton; it
contains numerous significant misstatements of fact , including that Ms.
Burton did not contact DOAG with requested vet information on
September 22, 2019 when in fact she did so; at no time have Defendants
Mason or Carmody notified me of any concerns they may have had
4 The defendants vehemently deny this allegation.
6
regarding the goats; Defendant Gibbons contacted me on one occasion
only.
Paragraph 27 states:
At the suggestion of the town animal control officer Mark DeLuca, plaintiff
hired two laborers on or about 2012 to construct additional wooden
shelters in enclosed fencing; when the work was complete, Mr. DeLuca
pronounced the shelters as suitable and sufficient for the number of goats
on the property which, at the time, was in the neighborhood of 50-60, with
ten adult males residing in the “red corral” shelter. See Affidavit of
Michael DeLuca, Exhibits at page 23; Since Mr. DeLuca’s visit in 2012, I
have created a huge corralled area with a new shelter on the westernmost
side of my property as well as refurbished and/or rebuilt the three shelters
constructed in 2012, in addition to making additional repairs to the central
“garden” shelter. The latter two shelters are not visible from the
“surveillance window” on the Carmody/Gibbons outbuilding from which
defendant Charles Dellarocco spied on me in February and March 2021,
according to DOAG witness testimony in Dunn v. 65 Goats.
The plaintiff filed a third affidavit in support of her “Corrected” Superseding
Memorandum on October 7, 2021 (#220.00) (“Plaintiff’s Third Affidavit”), in which she
simply states that: “All of the facts and statements set forth in the ‘Corrected
Superseding Memorandum’ are based upon my personal knowledge, investigation,
research, observation and belief, and they are true to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief.” See Plaintiff’s Third Affidavit, ¶ 4. While such an affidavit does
not satisfy the requirements of Practice Book § 17-46, the statements made in her
Corrected Superseding Memorandum, and the exhibits thereto, further support the
defendants’ special motion to dismiss.
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Ms. Burton’s vitriolic statements are all admissions that weigh heavily in the
defendants’ favor. It is readily apparent from her various statements that she seeks to
punish the defendants for reporting her abuse and neglect of her goats to the
authorities, and for cooperating with the Department of Agriculture in its investigation.
Clearly, Ms. Burton’s intent, as reflected in her own admissions, is retaliation against
the defendants for exercising their protected rights. In accordance with Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-196a(e)(3), the defendants have met their burden of showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Burton’s action is based on the defendants’
exercise of their right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of
association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state
in connection with a matter of public concern. See Kaufmann v. Synnott, supra, 2021
WL 4295356. Therefore, the burden shifts to Ms. Burton.
The defendants have already addressed the claims asserted against them in
the original complaint and repeated in the second amended complaint. Those claims
are: Cruelty to animals (Count One); Defamation (Count Two); Invasion of privacy
(Count Three); Harassment (Count Four); Elder abuse (Count Five);5 Illegal search
5 This court recently held that Counts Four and Five do not allege valid causes
of action under Connecticut law. See Memorandum of Decision on State of
Connecticut Defendants’ motion to dismiss (#232.00) at p. 13. This is now the law of
the case.
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and seizure (Count Six); Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Seven); and Intentional
infliction of emotional distress (Count Nine).
With regard to the additional claims asserted in her second amended complaint
(which was filed after the defendants filed their special motion to dismiss), the
defendants assert that none of those claims have merit as well. The additional claims
consist of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Ten); Conversion (Count
eleven); Intentional Spoliation of Evidence (Count Twelve); Deprivation of Equal Rights
and Privileges (Count Thirteen); and Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion (Count Fourteen).
1. Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress:
Count Ten incorporates all prior paragraphs and alleges that: “By such conduct
as is alleged hereinabove, defendants negligently inflicted emotional distress, which is
extreme, on plaintiff.”
[I]n order to prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and
that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily
harm. . . . Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 410, 876 A.2d 522
(2005). The elements of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress are as follows: (1) the defendant's conduct created an
unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the
plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe
enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the
defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress. Carrol v.
9
Allstate Ins. Co., [262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119 (2003)]. [T]he
elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress do not require proof of
any particular level of intent. In fact, intent need not be proven at all to
establish a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Stohlts v.
Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 645, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn.
930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005). (Internal quotation marks omitted).
Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn. App. 459, 497–98, 154 A.3d 1093 (2017).
Here, while it is apparent that the plaintiff is undoubtedly angry at the
defendants over the fact that her abuse and neglect of her goats was exposed, and
that she was ultimately arrested and charged with animal cruelty, that is not a sufficient
basis for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. There is no claim that the
plaintiff suffered distress of such severity that it might cause her illness or bodily harm.
Thus, her claim is legally insufficient. Indeed, if her claim is allowed, then every
criminal could sue their accuser for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
2. Conversion:
Count Eleven alleges that: "By such conduct as is alleged hereinabove,
defendants, some or all of them, engaged in the tort of conversion when plaintiff's
personal property was unlawfully removed from 147 Cross Highway, Redding,
Connecticut on or about March 10, 2021." Conversion "is an unauthorized assumption
and exercise of the right of ownership over property belonging to another, to the
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exclusion of the owner's rights." Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC,
284 Conn. 408, 418, 934 A.2d 227 (2007). Here, the defendants did not exercise
ownership over any of Ms. Burton’s goats. To the contrary, Ms. Burton’s goats
frequently trespassed onto the defendants’ property in search of food and water
because she was not properly caring for them, prompting the defendants to contact
the authorities. The seizure of the plaintiff’s goats on March 10, 2021, was done by
the State of Connecticut Animal Control Officer upon finding that they were living in
“deplorable” conditions. (See Exhibit D). Therefore, as to the defendants, the claim of
conversion is without any legal or factual basis.
3. Intentional Spoliation Of Evidence:
Count Twelve alleges intentional spoliation of evidence. On its face, this count
is directed to the State of Connecticut Department of Agriculture and the Town of
Redding. Therefore, it has no bearing on the defendants’ special motion to dismiss.
Even if the plaintiff were to claim that the defendants’ spoliated evidence, such a claim
would fail:
In defining the parameters of the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence
we look to the several states that currently recognize this tort. Intentional
spoliation of evidence is defined as ‘the intentional destruction, mutilation,
or significant alteration of potential evidence for the purpose of defeating
another person's recovery in a civil action. Hannah v. Heeter, supra, 213
11
W.Va. at 716, 584 S.E.2d 560, quoting Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,
supra, 120 N.M. at 649, 905 P.2d 185. Although no uniform body of case
law has developed regarding the precise contours of this tort, most states
that have adopted the tort agree that the elements of intentional spoliation
consist of: (1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2)
knowledge on the part of [the] defendant that litigation exists or is
probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence by [the] defendant designed to
disrupt the plaintiff's case, (4) disruption of the plaintiff's case, and (5)
damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) M.M. Koesel & T.L. Turnbull, supra, at pp. 88–89. In light
of the consensus among our sister states, we conclude that the tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following essential
elements: (1) the defendant's knowledge of a pending or impending civil
action involving the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's destruction of evidence;
(3) in bad faith, that is, with intent to deprive the plaintiff of his cause of
action; (4) the plaintiff's inability to establish a prima facie case without the
spoliated evidence; and (5) damages. (Internal quotation marks omitted).
Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 243–45, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006).
4. Deprivation Of Equal Rights And Privileges:
The thirteenth count alleges that: “The defendants, some or all of them, by the
conduct set forth hereinabove , have violated plaintiffs rights and privileges pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-571a.” That statute provides: “Any person aggrieved by a
violation of section 53-37b may apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief,
recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and equitable.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-37b provides: “Any person who, acting alone or in conspiracy
with another, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal
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protection of the laws of this state or the United States, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws of this state or the United States, engages in the use of
force or threat, as provided in section 53a-62, shall be guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a class
C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony.”
Put simply, the defendants did not intend to deprive Ms. Burton of her civil
rights. They were concerned for the welfare of her goats. In fact, it is the plaintiff who
is seeking to deprive the defendants of their rights by bringing this action.
5. Invasion Of Privacy—Intrusion:
The fourteenth count alleges an additional claim of invasion of privacy. This
claim is largely duplicative of Count Three in her original complaint. “The Connecticut
Appellate Courts have yet to interpret what constitutes an invasion of privacy [based
on] an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.” (internal quotation
marks omitted). Birge v. Medical Electronic Distributors, Inc., 2008 WL 5481157, at *3
(Conn.Super. 2008) (Abrams, J.). The Supreme Court, however, has often adopted
the Restatement when adjudicating an invasion of privacy claim; see Foncello v.
Amorossi, 284 Conn. 225, 234, 931 A.2d 924 (2007); Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982); and the
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Superior Court has consistently followed this practice when considering the tort of
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. See Birge v. Medical Electronic
Distributors, Inc., supra; Hellanbrand v. National Waste Associates, LLC, 2008 WL
442136, at *4 (Conn.Super. 2008) (Hale, J.); Bonanno v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, 2000
WL 192182, at *1 (Conn.Super. 2000) (Nadeau, J.).
According to the Restatement, “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, ifthe intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652B, p.
378 (1977). “This is said to consist of intentional interference with another's interest in
solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or to his private affairs or concerns.” W.
Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984) § 117, p. 854.
Here, there has been no intentional intrusion on the plaintiff’s seclusion by the
defendants. The fact that the defendants reported the plaintiff’s abuse and neglect of
her goats was not an invasion of her privacy. Indeed, as discussed above, the Anti-
SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a, specifically provides that conducted
protected by the First Amendment on a matter of public concern, cannot be the basis
of a civil action. Thus, by its very nature, any claim of invasion of privacy in this case
must fail.
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Thus, the plaintiff cannot meet her statutory burden of demonstrating that there
is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that she will prevail on the merits of
any of her claims against the defendants.
For these reasons, as well as for the reasons set forth in the defendants’
memorandum of law dated June 10, 2021 (#115.00) 6, it is respectfully requested that
the special motion to dismiss the claims against the defendants be granted, and that
they be awarded costs and attorneys’ fees under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a(f)(1).
DEFENDANTS,
ELINORE CARMODY AND DENNIS
GIBBONS
By_/s/ Philip T. Newbury, Jr. _________
Philip T. Newbury, Jr.
Howd & Ludorf, LLC
65 Wethersfield Avenue
Hartford, CT 06114-1121
(860) 249-1361
(860) 249-7665 (Fax)
Juris No.: 28228
E-mail: pnewbury@hl-law.com
6 Additionally, the defendants incorporate and adopt all of the arguments put
forth by the co-defendants in their respective motions to dismiss and/or motions to
strike.
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CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Replacement Reply to Plaintiff’s
October 7, 2021, Corrected Superseding Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants’ Special Motion to Dismiss (##210.00-220.00) was or will immediately
be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on October 22, 2021 to all
parties and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic
delivery was received from all attorneys and self-represented parties receiving
electronic delivery.
Nancy Burton Robert S. Hillson, II, Esquire
154 Highland Avenue Michael D. Riseberg, Esquire
Rowayton, CT 06853 Rubin and Rudman, LLP
NancyBurtonCT@aol.com 53 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
rhillson@rubinrudman.com
mriseberg@rubinrudman.com
James N. Tallberg, Esquire Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Esquire
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC Pullman & Comley, LLC
500 Enterprise Drive, Suite 4B 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
Rocky Hill, CT 06067 Bridgeport, CT 06601
jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com sstafstrom@pullcom.com
Jonathan E. Harding, Esquire Alexander W. Ahrens, Esquire
Matthew I. Levine, Esquire Melick & Porter
AG-Environment 900 Main Street South
165 Capitol Ave., 5th Floor Suite 102
Hartford, CT 06106 Southbury, CT 06488
Jonathan.harding@ct.gov aahrens@melicklaw.com
matthew.levine@ct.gov
/s/ Philip T. Newbury, Jr. ______________
Philip T. Newbury, Jr.
16
Gmail Elinore Carmody
Nancy Burton Docket DBD-CV19-5015276-S
14 messages
Elinore Carmody < elinore.carmody @ gmail.com> Tue , Aug 25, 2020 at 9:24 AM
To: Laura.Brundage@jud.ct. gov
Dear Ms. Brundage,
I understand that you are the civil caseflow coordinator in the Danbury Superior Court. I write in regard to a matter
currently pending before Judge Pavia captioned Nancy Burton v. Julia Pemberton, et al. (DBD-CV-19-50152076-SJ. I
am Ms. Burton's next door neighbor and I hope that you can forward this email to Judge Pavia prior to the hearing
scheduled for August 26th on this and a related matter. The situation has been deplorable for so long (5+ years) and it
grows exponentially worse each day.
-
It is not a benign problem. These poor goats have been subjected to multi generational abuse and neglect. I am attaching
a link to a recent video of the baby goats on my property screaming in distress as they are unable to find their way back
around the inadequate fencing Ms. Burton constructed.
It is not just the goats who suffer. My neighbors and I are subject to daily invasions onto our properties of the goats
foraging for food when not fed, a constant stench, and deafening screams. I’ ve attached a recent sound recording of what
we listen to day and night. In a nutshell, the situation is intolerable and while Ms. Burton files frivolous motion after
frivolous motion to delay enforcement of a cease and desist order entered three years ago, the animals and our
neighborhood suffer as our quality of life diminishes daily. This has to stop.
The goats pose a very real health and safety hazard not just to my neighbors and myself but to the Town of Redding.
There is no evidence of veterinary care or testing for disease. Some of the goats were tested 3 years ago by Animal
Nation Rescue and they all tested positive for C&L disease , an illness that causes abscesses on the organs and skin and
can transfer to humans.
Recently a goat was hit on Cross Highway on the way back from my neighbor, Dave Mason’s property totaling the truck ’s
front bumper. Yesterday and today there are multiple documented incidents of goats on the road.
I am imploring Judge Pavia to do whatever is necessary on Wednesday to allow a decision on the long- ago argued
motion for summary judgment to be decided. The constant intrusion on our well-being and the horrendous living
conditions these animals suffer have become overwhelming. It is a true nightmare. I would sincerely appreciate whatever
you can do to let Judge Pavia know how debilitating Ms. Burton's conduct has been. If appropriate, I would be more than
happy to testify this Wednesday as this situation is untenable and has deprived me , my husband, our neighbors and
ultimately the abused animals of the basic right to live peacefully in our community.
I thank you in advance for helping us allow our voices to be heard.
Sincerely, Elinore Carmody Gibbons
153 Cross Highway
Redding, CT 06896
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8IOOMHoe-bE&feature=youtu.be
Elinore Carmody
Cabana Magazine
917 796 1894
US Sales Director
elinore.carmody@ gmail.com
917 796 1894
EXHIBIT E, p. 1
2 attachments
imageOOl .png
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Brundage, Laura Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 10:12 AM
To: Elinore Carmody
Good Morning Ms .Carmody,
I cannot forward your email to the judge as it is inappropriate to do so but
suggest you forward any information to the town's attorney Steven
Stafstrom. I am attaching his information for your convenience.
Is /Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr.
Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr. , Town Counsel
EXHIBIT E, p. 2
Pullman & Comley, LLC
850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
Bridgeport , CT 06601-7006
Juris No. 47892
Telephone 203 330 2266
Facsimile 203 576 8888
sstafstrom@pullcom.com
Their Attorney
Best regards, Laura Brundage
Laura M. Brundage, J.D. Assistant Clerk
203- 207-8600 ext. 8645
From: Elinore Carmody
Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 9: 24 AM
To: Brundage, Laura
Subject: Nancy Burton Docket DBD-CV19-5015276- S
Dear Ms. Brundage
[Quoted text hidden]
Elinore Carmody
Cabana Magazine
917 796 1894
EXHIBIT E, p. 3
[Quoted text hidden]
Elinore Carmody Tue, Aug 25 , 2020 at 10: 34 AM
To: "Brundage, Laura"
Dear Ms. Brundage. Yes I am in touch with the Town Attorney. He is highly aware of all of this
information. And I am hoping awareness of how grave the situation is will FINALLY prompt proper
action from the Judge. Thanks for the response. My best, Elinore Carmody
Elinore Carmody
Cabana Magazine
917 796 1894
EXHIBIT E, p. 4
Gmail Elinore Carmody
Animal remains
1 message
Dennis Gibbons
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NO.: (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S : SUPERIOR COURT NANCY BURTON : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET v. : AT WATERBURY DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL : OCTOBER 22, 2021 REPLACEMENT REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OCTOBER 7, 2021, “CORRECTED” SUPERSEDING MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS (##210.00-220.00) In accordance with the court’s order of September 13, 2021, the defendants, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons, hereby submit this reply to Ms. Burton’s October 7, 2021, “corrected” superseding memorandum and exhibits (##210.00- 220.00) in opposition to their special motion to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to the Connecticut Anti-SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a (#115.00 and #138.00).1 At the outset, the defendants note that the Corrected Superseding Memorandum (#210.00 and #211.00) is directed to the defendants, David Philip Mason, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons. As the court is aware, Mr. Mason has filed his own special motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff should have filed a separate memorandum in opposition thereto. Nevertheless, in the interest of bringing this 1 This reply is filed as a substitute for, the defendants’ reply briefs filed on July 21, 2021 (#147.00) and August 27, 2021 (#177.00). matter to a conclusion, the defendants will address the arguments made by Ms. Burton in her combined Corrected Superseding Memorandum. There is no question that the defendants were exercising a protected right as to a matter of public concern in reporting Ms. Burton’s abuse and neglect of her goats to the authorities. Rather than refuting the defendants’ arguments in support of their motion to dismiss, Ms. Burton simply makes the bald assertion that “the Special Defendants utterly fail to make any showing whatsoever that the complaint ‘is based on’ defendants’ exercise of their right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or he Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern.” (Corrected Superseding Memorandum at p. 2). She conveniently ignores all of the points raised in the defendants’ memorandum of law and supported by their affidavits (Exhibits A and B), and the affidavits of Mr. DellaRocco (Exhibits C and D), as well as the numerous complaints to the authorities produced by the defendants in response to her discovery requests.2 2 Despite the fact that the defendants have produced 35 e-mails to various governmental authorities and 46 complaints to the Redding Police Department, complaining of Ms. Burton’s abuse and neglect of her goats (all of which support their claim that this action is in retaliation for the exercise of their right to petition), Ms. Burton continues to argue that there is not a “scintilla of evidence” to support their motion. (Corrected Superseding Memorandum at p. 2). Since Ms. Burton has chosen to ignore the vast majority of the defendants’ complaints, copies are attached hereto as Exhibits E (e-mails) and F (police complaints), for the court’s reference. 2 Ms. Burton also asserts that there is no issue of “public concern” in this case. See Plaintiff’s Corrected Superseding Memorandum (#210.00) at pp. 4-5. Nothing could be further from the truth. The recent decision by Judge Genuario in the case of Kaufmann v. Synnott, 2021 WL 4295356 (Conn.Super. 2021), is informative of this issue: The plaintiffs argue that the issues raised by Jarnstedt were not a “matter of public concern.” A matter of public concern is also defined in 52- 196a(1) as “an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environment, economic or community well being, (C) the government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work.” The health and safety of animals constitute components of environmental and community well being. The fact that certain activity involving animal cruelty can result in felony charges is an indication of the societal importance the Connecticut legislature has placed upon the humane treatment of animals. The bringing to the attention of public officials who are in a position to investigate allegations and suspicions of animal abuse is an exercise of a party’s right to petition a government official on a matter of public concern. Pursuant to C.G.S. 52-196a the test applicable to the first prong is not whether those initiated investigations ultimately lead to the discovery of criminal activity, but whether the communication is likely to lead an investigation of a matter of public concern regardless of the outcome of that investigation. (Emphasis added). The facts of Kaufman are strikingly similar to the present case. The defendant, Natalie Jarnstedt, wrote a letter to the Darien Police Department requesting that its animal control officer launch an investigation into to whether Mr. Kaufman was abusing or mistreating his dogs. Kaufman sued Jarnstedt for defamation and civil 3 conspiracy. Jarnstedt filed a special motion to dismiss. Although Jarnstedt did not have first-hand knowledge of any abuse (but rather, relied on hearsay from the co- defendants), the court nonetheless granted her special motion to dismiss. This case is even stronger than Kaufman. Here, the defendants not only have first-hand knowledge of Ms. Burton’s abuse and neglect of her goats, but as noted above, they have filed numerous complaints with the authorities. (See Exhibits E and F). Connecticut Superior Courts have consistently held that complaints to authorities as to any matter of public concern fall within the Anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., Noble v. Hennessey, 2021 WL 830014 (Conn.Super. 2021) (complaint as to public official); Reid v. Harriman, 2019 WL 5960521 (Conn.Super. 2019) (complaint of sexual assault); Chapnick v. DiLauro, 2019 WL 3249891 (Conn.Super. 2019) (complaint as to dog owners’ failure to clean up pet waste); Day v. Dodge, 2019 WL 994532 (Conn.Super. 2019) (complaint of suspected child abuse); Cronin v. Pelletier, 2018 WL 3965004 (Conn.Super. 2018) (complaint as to public official). Although Ms. Burton may not consider her goat problem to be a matter of public concern, the Anti- SLAPP statute, and the cases interpreting it, say otherwise. Indeed, to even suggest that there is no issue of public concern in this case borders on the absurd. There can be no doubt that the real motive behind Ms. Burton’s lawsuit against the defendants is retaliation. One need only read Ms. Burton’s affidavits to realize that 4 she seeks to punish the defendants for exposing her abuse and neglect of her goats, and reporting it to the authorities. While the vast majority of the statements contained in the plaintiff’s affidavits are devoted to irrelevant and self-serving background and “historical” information, her true motives are revealed in several passages. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Special Motions to Dismiss of Defendants David Philip Mason, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons filed July 12, 2021 (#139.00) (“Plaintiff’s Original Affidavit”), ¶ 33 (“Perhaps the most glaring and extreme example is cited in ¶46k as follows; On August 19, 2020, Carmody anonymously texted the following message to plaintiff at 8:13 PM: ‘Are you actually aware of how much you are abusing these goats? They are screaming and desperate. You should be ashamed. But you will pay. With their lives. You are a [expletive] nightmare.’”)3; See also Plaintiff’s Original Affidavit ¶ 39 (“Engaging in 24-hour surveillance of plaintiff and her property is an actionable invasion of privacy, as is posting a video of a family member of the plaintiff by his car parked on plaintiff’s property on YouTube, as 3 By highlighting this text, Ms. Burton would have the court infer that Ms. Carmody was threatening to kill her goats. The exact opposite is true. Ms. Carmody was trying to make Ms. Burton aware that she was, in fact, killing her own goats by her abuse and neglect—a fact borne out during Mr. DellaRocco’s inspection of her property on March 10, 2021. See Defendant’s Exhibit D, p. D-12, ¶ 16. 5 defendant Carmody apparently did, 4 such video having apparently been taken by an animal control officer in the course of his supposed investigation; such conduct falls outside the scope of Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-196a.”); and ¶ 44 (“Defendants Mason, Carmody and Gibbons, perhaps inadvertently, reveal in their motions and attachments facts about their apparently extensive interactions with the Town and State defendants in this case-facts and circumstances previously unknown to plaintiff. That the three defendants accuse plaintiff of basing her complaint in large part on such interactions which they have heretofore kept secret, and which they also claim are privileged, exposes the fallacy and utter lack of merit of their theory underlying their motions to dismiss that plaintiff retaliated against them for conduct concerning which they concealed from plaintiff to attain anonymity.”). Ms. Burton filed a second affidavit (“Plaintiff’s Supplemental Affidavit”) on August 16, 2021 (#163.00). In it,she adds two paragraphs that further support the defendants’ arguments. Paragraph 26 states: A copy of the report appears in “Exhibits” at pages 21-22; the report was withheld by DOAG from Ms. Burton until the Spring of 2021 at which time she first became aware that the “anonymous” complaints leading to the investigation had been filed by Defendants Mason, Carmody and Gibbons, whose statements were also withheld by DOAG from Ms. Burton; it contains numerous significant misstatements of fact , including that Ms. Burton did not contact DOAG with requested vet information on September 22, 2019 when in fact she did so; at no time have Defendants Mason or Carmody notified me of any concerns they may have had 4 The defendants vehemently deny this allegation. 6 regarding the goats; Defendant Gibbons contacted me on one occasion only. Paragraph 27 states: At the suggestion of the town animal control officer Mark DeLuca, plaintiff hired two laborers on or about 2012 to construct additional wooden shelters in enclosed fencing; when the work was complete, Mr. DeLuca pronounced the shelters as suitable and sufficient for the number of goats on the property which, at the time, was in the neighborhood of 50-60, with ten adult males residing in the “red corral” shelter. See Affidavit of Michael DeLuca, Exhibits at page 23; Since Mr. DeLuca’s visit in 2012, I have created a huge corralled area with a new shelter on the westernmost side of my property as well as refurbished and/or rebuilt the three shelters constructed in 2012, in addition to making additional repairs to the central “garden” shelter. The latter two shelters are not visible from the “surveillance window” on the Carmody/Gibbons outbuilding from which defendant Charles Dellarocco spied on me in February and March 2021, according to DOAG witness testimony in Dunn v. 65 Goats. The plaintiff filed a third affidavit in support of her “Corrected” Superseding Memorandum on October 7, 2021 (#220.00) (“Plaintiff’s Third Affidavit”), in which she simply states that: “All of the facts and statements set forth in the ‘Corrected Superseding Memorandum’ are based upon my personal knowledge, investigation, research, observation and belief, and they are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.” See Plaintiff’s Third Affidavit, ¶ 4. While such an affidavit does not satisfy the requirements of Practice Book § 17-46, the statements made in her Corrected Superseding Memorandum, and the exhibits thereto, further support the defendants’ special motion to dismiss. 7 Ms. Burton’s vitriolic statements are all admissions that weigh heavily in the defendants’ favor. It is readily apparent from her various statements that she seeks to punish the defendants for reporting her abuse and neglect of her goats to the authorities, and for cooperating with the Department of Agriculture in its investigation. Clearly, Ms. Burton’s intent, as reflected in her own admissions, is retaliation against the defendants for exercising their protected rights. In accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a(e)(3), the defendants have met their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Burton’s action is based on the defendants’ exercise of their right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern. See Kaufmann v. Synnott, supra, 2021 WL 4295356. Therefore, the burden shifts to Ms. Burton. The defendants have already addressed the claims asserted against them in the original complaint and repeated in the second amended complaint. Those claims are: Cruelty to animals (Count One); Defamation (Count Two); Invasion of privacy (Count Three); Harassment (Count Four); Elder abuse (Count Five);5 Illegal search 5 This court recently held that Counts Four and Five do not allege valid causes of action under Connecticut law. See Memorandum of Decision on State of Connecticut Defendants’ motion to dismiss (#232.00) at p. 13. This is now the law of the case. 8 and seizure (Count Six); Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Seven); and Intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Nine). With regard to the additional claims asserted in her second amended complaint (which was filed after the defendants filed their special motion to dismiss), the defendants assert that none of those claims have merit as well. The additional claims consist of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Ten); Conversion (Count eleven); Intentional Spoliation of Evidence (Count Twelve); Deprivation of Equal Rights and Privileges (Count Thirteen); and Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion (Count Fourteen). 1. Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress: Count Ten incorporates all prior paragraphs and alleges that: “By such conduct as is alleged hereinabove, defendants negligently inflicted emotional distress, which is extreme, on plaintiff.” [I]n order to prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. . . . Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 410, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). The elements of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress are as follows: (1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress. Carrol v. 9 Allstate Ins. Co., [262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119 (2003)]. [T]he elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress do not require proof of any particular level of intent. In fact, intent need not be proven at all to establish a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 645, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005). (Internal quotation marks omitted). Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn. App. 459, 497–98, 154 A.3d 1093 (2017). Here, while it is apparent that the plaintiff is undoubtedly angry at the defendants over the fact that her abuse and neglect of her goats was exposed, and that she was ultimately arrested and charged with animal cruelty, that is not a sufficient basis for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. There is no claim that the plaintiff suffered distress of such severity that it might cause her illness or bodily harm. Thus, her claim is legally insufficient. Indeed, if her claim is allowed, then every criminal could sue their accuser for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2. Conversion: Count Eleven alleges that: "By such conduct as is alleged hereinabove, defendants, some or all of them, engaged in the tort of conversion when plaintiff's personal property was unlawfully removed from 147 Cross Highway, Redding, Connecticut on or about March 10, 2021." Conversion "is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over property belonging to another, to the 10 exclusion of the owner's rights." Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 418, 934 A.2d 227 (2007). Here, the defendants did not exercise ownership over any of Ms. Burton’s goats. To the contrary, Ms. Burton’s goats frequently trespassed onto the defendants’ property in search of food and water because she was not properly caring for them, prompting the defendants to contact the authorities. The seizure of the plaintiff’s goats on March 10, 2021, was done by the State of Connecticut Animal Control Officer upon finding that they were living in “deplorable” conditions. (See Exhibit D). Therefore, as to the defendants, the claim of conversion is without any legal or factual basis. 3. Intentional Spoliation Of Evidence: Count Twelve alleges intentional spoliation of evidence. On its face, this count is directed to the State of Connecticut Department of Agriculture and the Town of Redding. Therefore, it has no bearing on the defendants’ special motion to dismiss. Even if the plaintiff were to claim that the defendants’ spoliated evidence, such a claim would fail: In defining the parameters of the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence we look to the several states that currently recognize this tort. Intentional spoliation of evidence is defined as ‘the intentional destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of potential evidence for the purpose of defeating another person's recovery in a civil action. Hannah v. Heeter, supra, 213 11 W.Va. at 716, 584 S.E.2d 560, quoting Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., supra, 120 N.M. at 649, 905 P.2d 185. Although no uniform body of case law has developed regarding the precise contours of this tort, most states that have adopted the tort agree that the elements of intentional spoliation consist of: (1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of [the] defendant that litigation exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence by [the] defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff's case, (4) disruption of the plaintiff's case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) M.M. Koesel & T.L. Turnbull, supra, at pp. 88–89. In light of the consensus among our sister states, we conclude that the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following essential elements: (1) the defendant's knowledge of a pending or impending civil action involving the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's destruction of evidence; (3) in bad faith, that is, with intent to deprive the plaintiff of his cause of action; (4) the plaintiff's inability to establish a prima facie case without the spoliated evidence; and (5) damages. (Internal quotation marks omitted). Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 243–45, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006). 4. Deprivation Of Equal Rights And Privileges: The thirteenth count alleges that: “The defendants, some or all of them, by the conduct set forth hereinabove , have violated plaintiffs rights and privileges pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-571a.” That statute provides: “Any person aggrieved by a violation of section 53-37b may apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief, recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and equitable.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-37b provides: “Any person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal 12 protection of the laws of this state or the United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the United States, engages in the use of force or threat, as provided in section 53a-62, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony.” Put simply, the defendants did not intend to deprive Ms. Burton of her civil rights. They were concerned for the welfare of her goats. In fact, it is the plaintiff who is seeking to deprive the defendants of their rights by bringing this action. 5. Invasion Of Privacy—Intrusion: The fourteenth count alleges an additional claim of invasion of privacy. This claim is largely duplicative of Count Three in her original complaint. “The Connecticut Appellate Courts have yet to interpret what constitutes an invasion of privacy [based on] an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.” (internal quotation marks omitted). Birge v. Medical Electronic Distributors, Inc., 2008 WL 5481157, at *3 (Conn.Super. 2008) (Abrams, J.). The Supreme Court, however, has often adopted the Restatement when adjudicating an invasion of privacy claim; see Foncello v. Amorossi, 284 Conn. 225, 234, 931 A.2d 924 (2007); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982); and the 13 Superior Court has consistently followed this practice when considering the tort of unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. See Birge v. Medical Electronic Distributors, Inc., supra; Hellanbrand v. National Waste Associates, LLC, 2008 WL 442136, at *4 (Conn.Super. 2008) (Hale, J.); Bonanno v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, 2000 WL 192182, at *1 (Conn.Super. 2000) (Nadeau, J.). According to the Restatement, “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, ifthe intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652B, p. 378 (1977). “This is said to consist of intentional interference with another's interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or to his private affairs or concerns.” W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984) § 117, p. 854. Here, there has been no intentional intrusion on the plaintiff’s seclusion by the defendants. The fact that the defendants reported the plaintiff’s abuse and neglect of her goats was not an invasion of her privacy. Indeed, as discussed above, the Anti- SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a, specifically provides that conducted protected by the First Amendment on a matter of public concern, cannot be the basis of a civil action. Thus, by its very nature, any claim of invasion of privacy in this case must fail. 14 Thus, the plaintiff cannot meet her statutory burden of demonstrating that there is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that she will prevail on the merits of any of her claims against the defendants. For these reasons, as well as for the reasons set forth in the defendants’ memorandum of law dated June 10, 2021 (#115.00) 6, it is respectfully requested that the special motion to dismiss the claims against the defendants be granted, and that they be awarded costs and attorneys’ fees under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a(f)(1). DEFENDANTS, ELINORE CARMODY AND DENNIS GIBBONS By_/s/ Philip T. Newbury, Jr. _________ Philip T. Newbury, Jr. Howd & Ludorf, LLC 65 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114-1121 (860) 249-1361 (860) 249-7665 (Fax) Juris No.: 28228 E-mail: pnewbury@hl-law.com 6 Additionally, the defendants incorporate and adopt all of the arguments put forth by the co-defendants in their respective motions to dismiss and/or motions to strike. 15 CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Replacement Reply to Plaintiff’s October 7, 2021, Corrected Superseding Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Special Motion to Dismiss (##210.00-220.00) was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on October 22, 2021 to all parties and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all attorneys and self-represented parties receiving electronic delivery. Nancy Burton Robert S. Hillson, II, Esquire 154 Highland Avenue Michael D. Riseberg, Esquire Rowayton, CT 06853 Rubin and Rudman, LLP NancyBurtonCT@aol.com 53 State Street Boston, MA 02109 rhillson@rubinrudman.com mriseberg@rubinrudman.com James N. Tallberg, Esquire Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Esquire Karsten & Tallberg, LLC Pullman & Comley, LLC 500 Enterprise Drive, Suite 4B 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006 Rocky Hill, CT 06067 Bridgeport, CT 06601 jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com sstafstrom@pullcom.com Jonathan E. Harding, Esquire Alexander W. Ahrens, Esquire Matthew I. Levine, Esquire Melick & Porter AG-Environment 900 Main Street South 165 Capitol Ave., 5th Floor Suite 102 Hartford, CT 06106 Southbury, CT 06488 Jonathan.harding@ct.gov aahrens@melicklaw.com matthew.levine@ct.gov /s/ Philip T. Newbury, Jr. ______________ Philip T. Newbury, Jr. 16 Gmail Elinore Carmody Nancy Burton Docket DBD-CV19-5015276-S 14 messages Elinore Carmody < elinore.carmody @ gmail.com> Tue , Aug 25, 2020 at 9:24 AM To: Laura.Brundage@jud.ct. gov Dear Ms. Brundage, I understand that you are the civil caseflow coordinator in the Danbury Superior Court. I write in regard to a matter currently pending before Judge Pavia captioned Nancy Burton v. Julia Pemberton, et al. (DBD-CV-19-50152076-SJ. I am Ms. Burton's next door neighbor and I hope that you can forward this email to Judge Pavia prior to the hearing scheduled for August 26th on this and a related matter. The situation has been deplorable for so long (5+ years) and it grows exponentially worse each day. - It is not a benign problem. These poor goats have been subjected to multi generational abuse and neglect. I am attaching a link to a recent video of the baby goats on my property screaming in distress as they are unable to find their way back around the inadequate fencing Ms. Burton constructed. It is not just the goats who suffer. My neighbors and I are subject to daily invasions onto our properties of the goats foraging for food when not fed, a constant stench, and deafening screams. I’ ve attached a recent sound recording of what we listen to day and night. In a nutshell, the situation is intolerable and while Ms. Burton files frivolous motion after frivolous motion to delay enforcement of a cease and desist order entered three years ago, the animals and our neighborhood suffer as our quality of life diminishes daily. This has to stop. The goats pose a very real health and safety hazard not just to my neighbors and myself but to the Town of Redding. There is no evidence of veterinary care or testing for disease. Some of the goats were tested 3 years ago by Animal Nation Rescue and they all tested positive for C&L disease , an illness that causes abscesses on the organs and skin and can transfer to humans. Recently a goat was hit on Cross Highway on the way back from my neighbor, Dave Mason’s property totaling the truck ’s front bumper. Yesterday and today there are multiple documented incidents of goats on the road. I am imploring Judge Pavia to do whatever is necessary on Wednesday to allow a decision on the long- ago argued motion for summary judgment to be decided. The constant intrusion on our well-being and the horrendous living conditions these animals suffer have become overwhelming. It is a true nightmare. I would sincerely appreciate whatever you can do to let Judge Pavia know how debilitating Ms. Burton's conduct has been. If appropriate, I would be more than happy to testify this Wednesday as this situation is untenable and has deprived me , my husband, our neighbors and ultimately the abused animals of the basic right to live peacefully in our community. I thank you in advance for helping us allow our voices to be heard. Sincerely, Elinore Carmody Gibbons 153 Cross Highway Redding, CT 06896 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8IOOMHoe-bE&feature=youtu.be Elinore Carmody Cabana Magazine 917 796 1894 US Sales Director elinore.carmody@ gmail.com 917 796 1894 EXHIBIT E, p. 1 2 attachments imageOOl .png 183K imageOOl .png 183K Brundage, Laura Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 10:12 AM To: Elinore Carmody Good Morning Ms .Carmody, I cannot forward your email to the judge as it is inappropriate to do so but suggest you forward any information to the town's attorney Steven Stafstrom. I am attaching his information for your convenience. Is /Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr. Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr. , Town Counsel EXHIBIT E, p. 2 Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006 Bridgeport , CT 06601-7006 Juris No. 47892 Telephone 203 330 2266 Facsimile 203 576 8888 sstafstrom@pullcom.com Their Attorney Best regards, Laura Brundage Laura M. Brundage, J.D. Assistant Clerk 203- 207-8600 ext. 8645 From: Elinore Carmody Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 9: 24 AM To: Brundage, Laura Subject: Nancy Burton Docket DBD-CV19-5015276- S Dear Ms. Brundage [Quoted text hidden] Elinore Carmody Cabana Magazine 917 796 1894 EXHIBIT E, p. 3 [Quoted text hidden] Elinore Carmody Tue, Aug 25 , 2020 at 10: 34 AM To: "Brundage, Laura" Dear Ms. Brundage. Yes I am in touch with the Town Attorney. He is highly aware of all of this information. And I am hoping awareness of how grave the situation is will FINALLY prompt proper action from the Judge. Thanks for the response. My best, Elinore Carmody Elinore Carmody Cabana Magazine 917 796 1894 EXHIBIT E, p. 4 Gmail Elinore Carmody Animal remains 1 message Dennis Gibbons