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STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Docket NO.: (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S
NANCY BURTON, SUPERIOR COURT
Plaintiff,
COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
v.
AT WATERBURY
DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL.
Defendants.
August 27, 2021
DEFENDANT DAVID MASON’S REPLY TO THE PLAINTIFF’S
OPPOSITION TO MASON’S SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant David Philip Mason (“Mason”) hereby submits the following Reply to the
Plaintiff’s opposition (#161.00) to Mason’s special motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-196a.
In the Plaintiff’s Opposition, she argues that Mason fails “to identify a single qualifying
allegation” in the Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) that is based on Mason’s exercise
of rights protected by the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute, C.G.S. § 52-196a. Consequently, the
Plaintiff contends, Mason has “failed at making an ‘initial showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence,’ as the statute requires, to avoid denial of the special motion to dismiss.” The Plaintiff’s
argument is meritless and contradicted by the numerous allegations set forth in her Complaint that,
on their face, clearly involve Mason’s exercise of rights protected by the Connecticut anti-SLAPP
statute, as argued in the memorandum of law in support of Mason’s special motion to dismiss the
Complaint. The Plaintiff’s argument, which simply ignores and contradicts the allegations clearly
set forth in her Complaint, which she has now amended twice, requiring Mason to file a second
and third special motion to dismiss, illustrates that this is the very type of harassing, vexatious, and
meritless lawsuit that the anti-SLAPP statute was intended to guard against. By way of example,
in her Opposition the Plaintiff disputes that she was aware that the Defendants were acting on their
constitutionally protected rights. Yet in Paragraph 46(d) of her Complaint she alleges that Mason
and the Defendants were involved in a campaign to spread information about her goats. In
Paragraph 46(g) she alleges that the Defendants were encouraging others to file police reports. In
Paragraphs 49 and 50, she alleges that Mason had been in contact with the Redding Police
Department and had provided statements that were part of the basis for the warrant that was signed
by Judge Robert A. D’Andrea. These allegations clearly show the Plaintiff’s knowledge of
Mason’s exercise of rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. As the Plaintiff’s Opposition
demonstrates, each of the claims against Mason in the Complaint is predicated on allegations of
conduct by Mason that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
The central new argument in the Plaintiff’s Opposition is her alleged discovery that Mason
recently sold his home for an amount in excess of what he paid for it. She contends that his desire
to sell his home was the motivation behind his allegedly unlawful conduct described in her
Complaint. Even if this allegation regarding his motivation were true, which Mason vehemently
disputes, it has no relevance to Mason’s special motion to dismiss. His motivation has no bearing
on whether his allegedly unlawful actions constitute an exercise of rights protected by the
Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute, C.G.S. § 52-196a, as argued above and in the special motion to
dismiss itself. The Plaintiff’s new argument regarding Mason’s alleged motivation, therefore, adds
nothing to defeat the special motion to dismiss.
2
Having met his burden to show that all of the claims against him are predicated on the
exercise of rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, as the Plaintiff has offered no legal or
factual basis to credibly dispute that showing, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that
her claims are supported by probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that she will prevail.
See C.G.S. § 52-196a(b); see also C.G.S. § 52-196a(e)(3). The Plaintiff has not and cannot meet
that burden for the reasons already set forth in Mason’s Special Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint.1 Mason provides no additional argument her regarding the Plaintiff’s
inability to demonstrate probable cause as to those claims.
In his special motion to dismiss, Mason did not argue for the dismissal of two counts in the
Second Amended Complaint -- Count Eight (False Arrest and Count Twelve (Intentional
Spoliation of Evidence) – because they did not appear to be asserted against him. In her
Opposition, however, the Plaintiff contends that this is incorrect and these claims are also being
asserted against Mason. Consequently, Mason now contends that these claims too are predicated
on the exercise of rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and the Plaintiff cannot meet her
burden to demonstrate probable cause that she will prevail on the claims.
The claim for False Arrest, to the extent it is asserted against Mason, is evidently predicated
on the contention that he made false statements to the police and the Department of Agriculture
that led to the Plaintiff’s arrest. On its face, this constitutes the right to petition the government
on a matter of public concern, which is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Similarly, the claim for Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, to the extent it is asserted
against Mason, is evidently based on Mason’s allegedly improper petitioning of the government
that led to the seizure of the Plaintiff’s goats. Again, this is conduct protected by the statute.
1
Additionally, Mason incorporates and adopts the arguments set forth by the co-defendants in their respective
motions to dismiss or strike the Plaintiff’s Complaint.
3
On a different substantive note, to demonstrate probable cause on her claim for animal
cruelty, the Plaintiff argues that contrary to Masons’ assertion, Connecticut does recognize a
private cause of action for animal cruelty. Opposition, p. 3. In support of this assertion, the
Plaintiff appears (without any citation) to rely on language in the criminal animal cruelty statute,
C.G.S. § 53-247, which appears to make the statute applicable to a veterinarian who intentionally
or maliciously injures an animal while not adhering to accepted professional standards of practice.
C.G.S. § 53-247(b). However, this recognition of a criminal cause of action against a veterinarian
lends no support to Plaintiff’s argument that the animal cruelty statute, or any authority, creates a
private cause of action under Connecticut law. Of course, even if Connecticut recognized a private
cause of action for animal cruelty against a veterinarian, it would be far from clear that such a
cause of action also applies outside a professional context. The Plaintiff has not and cannot
demonstrate that Connecticut recognizes such a claim and, therefore, she has not met her burden
to demonstrate probable cause.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to C.G.S. §
52-196a(e)(3) and Mason must be awarded costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to C.G.S.
§ 52-196a(f)(1).
Defendant,
David P. Mason
By his attorneys,
________________________________________
Robert S. Hillson II (#441402)
Michael D. Riseberg (#431023)
Rubin and Rudman LLP
53 State Street
4
Boston, MA 02109
(617) 330-7000
rhillson@rubinrudman.com
mriseberg@rubinrudman.com
5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Robert S. Hillson II, Esq. counsel for the Defendant David Mason do hereby certify that
on this 27th day of August 2021 I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing document(s)
via e-mail to the following counsel and pro se parties of record.
Nancy Burton Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Esq.
154 Highland Avenue Pullman & Comley, LLC
Rowayton, CT 06853 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
(203) 313-1510 Bridgeport, CT 06601
nancyburtonct@aol.com sstafstrom@pullcom.com
James N. Tallberg, Esq. Alexander W. Ahrens
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC Melick & Porter, LLP
500 Enterprise Drive, Suite 4B 900 Main Street South
Rocky Hill, CT 06067 Southbury, CT 06488
jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com aahrens@melicklaw.com
Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq. Jonathan E. Harding, Esq.
Kristan M. Jakiela, Esq. Matthew I. Levine, Esq.
Howd & Ludorf, LLC AG-Environmental
65 Wethersfield Avenue 165 Capitol Ave., 5th Floor
Hartford, CT 06114-1121 Hartford, CT 06106
pnewbury@hl-law.com jonathan.harding@ct.gov
kjakiela@hl-law.com matthew.levine@ct.gov
________________________________________
Robert S. Hillson II, Esq.
6
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STATE OF CONNECTICUT Docket NO.: (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S NANCY BURTON, SUPERIOR COURT Plaintiff, COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET v. AT WATERBURY DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL. Defendants. August 27, 2021 DEFENDANT DAVID MASON’S REPLY TO THE PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MASON’S SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant David Philip Mason (“Mason”) hereby submits the following Reply to the Plaintiff’s opposition (#161.00) to Mason’s special motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-196a. In the Plaintiff’s Opposition, she argues that Mason fails “to identify a single qualifying allegation” in the Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) that is based on Mason’s exercise of rights protected by the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute, C.G.S. § 52-196a. Consequently, the Plaintiff contends, Mason has “failed at making an ‘initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,’ as the statute requires, to avoid denial of the special motion to dismiss.” The Plaintiff’s argument is meritless and contradicted by the numerous allegations set forth in her Complaint that, on their face, clearly involve Mason’s exercise of rights protected by the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute, as argued in the memorandum of law in support of Mason’s special motion to dismiss the Complaint. The Plaintiff’s argument, which simply ignores and contradicts the allegations clearly set forth in her Complaint, which she has now amended twice, requiring Mason to file a second and third special motion to dismiss, illustrates that this is the very type of harassing, vexatious, and meritless lawsuit that the anti-SLAPP statute was intended to guard against. By way of example, in her Opposition the Plaintiff disputes that she was aware that the Defendants were acting on their constitutionally protected rights. Yet in Paragraph 46(d) of her Complaint she alleges that Mason and the Defendants were involved in a campaign to spread information about her goats. In Paragraph 46(g) she alleges that the Defendants were encouraging others to file police reports. In Paragraphs 49 and 50, she alleges that Mason had been in contact with the Redding Police Department and had provided statements that were part of the basis for the warrant that was signed by Judge Robert A. D’Andrea. These allegations clearly show the Plaintiff’s knowledge of Mason’s exercise of rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. As the Plaintiff’s Opposition demonstrates, each of the claims against Mason in the Complaint is predicated on allegations of conduct by Mason that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The central new argument in the Plaintiff’s Opposition is her alleged discovery that Mason recently sold his home for an amount in excess of what he paid for it. She contends that his desire to sell his home was the motivation behind his allegedly unlawful conduct described in her Complaint. Even if this allegation regarding his motivation were true, which Mason vehemently disputes, it has no relevance to Mason’s special motion to dismiss. His motivation has no bearing on whether his allegedly unlawful actions constitute an exercise of rights protected by the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute, C.G.S. § 52-196a, as argued above and in the special motion to dismiss itself. The Plaintiff’s new argument regarding Mason’s alleged motivation, therefore, adds nothing to defeat the special motion to dismiss. 2 Having met his burden to show that all of the claims against him are predicated on the exercise of rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, as the Plaintiff has offered no legal or factual basis to credibly dispute that showing, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that her claims are supported by probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that she will prevail. See C.G.S. § 52-196a(b); see also C.G.S. § 52-196a(e)(3). The Plaintiff has not and cannot meet that burden for the reasons already set forth in Mason’s Special Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.1 Mason provides no additional argument her regarding the Plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate probable cause as to those claims. In his special motion to dismiss, Mason did not argue for the dismissal of two counts in the Second Amended Complaint -- Count Eight (False Arrest and Count Twelve (Intentional Spoliation of Evidence) – because they did not appear to be asserted against him. In her Opposition, however, the Plaintiff contends that this is incorrect and these claims are also being asserted against Mason. Consequently, Mason now contends that these claims too are predicated on the exercise of rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and the Plaintiff cannot meet her burden to demonstrate probable cause that she will prevail on the claims. The claim for False Arrest, to the extent it is asserted against Mason, is evidently predicated on the contention that he made false statements to the police and the Department of Agriculture that led to the Plaintiff’s arrest. On its face, this constitutes the right to petition the government on a matter of public concern, which is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Similarly, the claim for Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, to the extent it is asserted against Mason, is evidently based on Mason’s allegedly improper petitioning of the government that led to the seizure of the Plaintiff’s goats. Again, this is conduct protected by the statute. 1 Additionally, Mason incorporates and adopts the arguments set forth by the co-defendants in their respective motions to dismiss or strike the Plaintiff’s Complaint. 3 On a different substantive note, to demonstrate probable cause on her claim for animal cruelty, the Plaintiff argues that contrary to Masons’ assertion, Connecticut does recognize a private cause of action for animal cruelty. Opposition, p. 3. In support of this assertion, the Plaintiff appears (without any citation) to rely on language in the criminal animal cruelty statute, C.G.S. § 53-247, which appears to make the statute applicable to a veterinarian who intentionally or maliciously injures an animal while not adhering to accepted professional standards of practice. C.G.S. § 53-247(b). However, this recognition of a criminal cause of action against a veterinarian lends no support to Plaintiff’s argument that the animal cruelty statute, or any authority, creates a private cause of action under Connecticut law. Of course, even if Connecticut recognized a private cause of action for animal cruelty against a veterinarian, it would be far from clear that such a cause of action also applies outside a professional context. The Plaintiff has not and cannot demonstrate that Connecticut recognizes such a claim and, therefore, she has not met her burden to demonstrate probable cause. CONCLUSION Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-196a(e)(3) and Mason must be awarded costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-196a(f)(1). Defendant, David P. Mason By his attorneys, ________________________________________ Robert S. Hillson II (#441402) Michael D. Riseberg (#431023) Rubin and Rudman LLP 53 State Street 4 Boston, MA 02109 (617) 330-7000 rhillson@rubinrudman.com mriseberg@rubinrudman.com 5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Robert S. Hillson II, Esq. counsel for the Defendant David Mason do hereby certify that on this 27th day of August 2021 I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing document(s) via e-mail to the following counsel and pro se parties of record. Nancy Burton Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Esq. 154 Highland Avenue Pullman & Comley, LLC Rowayton, CT 06853 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006 (203) 313-1510 Bridgeport, CT 06601 nancyburtonct@aol.com sstafstrom@pullcom.com James N. Tallberg, Esq. Alexander W. Ahrens Karsten & Tallberg, LLC Melick & Porter, LLP 500 Enterprise Drive, Suite 4B 900 Main Street South Rocky Hill, CT 06067 Southbury, CT 06488 jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com aahrens@melicklaw.com Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq. Jonathan E. Harding, Esq. Kristan M. Jakiela, Esq. Matthew I. Levine, Esq. Howd & Ludorf, LLC AG-Environmental 65 Wethersfield Avenue 165 Capitol Ave., 5th Floor Hartford, CT 06114-1121 Hartford, CT 06106 pnewbury@hl-law.com jonathan.harding@ct.gov kjakiela@hl-law.com matthew.levine@ct.gov ________________________________________ Robert S. Hillson II, Esq. 6