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PSUURIS
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fi Sane
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO (9
HILLARY CARLSON, ET AL., YY, RW :
Plaintiffs, ag 7 :
Za ms
-Vs- oy : Case No. 07 CV H 09 1117 & 3
= qn
HEATHER DUNN, oF =
crs 2
Defendant. 3 3
25 2
wu
= 6?
JUDGMENT ENTRY as
1 At all time material, the Plaintiffs, Hillary Carlson and Courtney Carlson
were in the business of providing horse boarding and training services
under the business name of “Wingate Farm”.
2. On February 1, 2007, the Defendant, Heather Dunn, helped the
Plaintiffs transport her registered Trakehner mare Kammy, herein after
referred to as “horse” to the Plaintiff's Wingate Farm for boarding.
3. The parties on February 1, 2007 entered into a written “stabling and
boarding” agreement. (Exhibit A).
4. At time of commencement of the boarding and training agreement,
Defendant had paid to Plaintiffs an $850.00 security deposit which
according to the agreement shall be refunded within 90 days after the
horse is removed. (Exhibit A, Section 2)
5. Under the written agreement, Defendant was to pay Plaintiffs $850.00
per month which included stabling and boarding of the horse, Kammy.
cenuanarzon cove Lela I
1
07 CV HOS
1117
00026184210
IDEN6. “Board” under the agreement included feed, maintenance and cleaning
“4 stalls.
y 7. Pursuant to Section | of the Agreement, “stabling” commenced February
1, 2007 and continued month to month unless either party notified the
other in writing by Certified Mail with Return Signature Receipt that
he/she elects to have the Agreement terminated at the end of a given
month, which notice must be given Sixty (60) days prior to the end of
the month. (Exhibit A, Section 1)
8. Plaintiffs had established Basic Rules and Regulations (Exhibit B) which
horse owners were to follow per Section 6 of the Agreement. (Exhibit B)
(Defendant claims she did not receive this document until Trial.)
9. The Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Agreement and Rules, forwarded invoices
to the Defendant for expenses such as farrier care and veterinary fees.
10. The Plaintiffs invoiced the Defendant, per the Agreement and the Barn
Rules and Regulations, and the Defendant paid the invoices, although
she consistently ran delinquent. The Defendant’s payments were as
follows:
February 3, 2007...sssssssesseeee $450.00
February 9, 2007... $870.00
March 1, 2007...ccsceseseseeeseees $500.00
March 7, 2007. ..sccsesseeseeesees $350.00
March 7, 2007 ..sssesseesessesseeeee $369.75
ADTil 3, 2007. ..esessseseessercsserenee $500.00
11. The Defendant did not pay on the invoices after April 3, 2007.12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Section 11 of the Stabling and Boarding Agreement provides that “in the
event that balances due are not paid within fifteen (15) days after they
become due and payable under this Agreement, Wingate Farm may
exercise its lien rights”...
On June 25, 2007 Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant referencing her
delinquent account and informing the Defendant of the Plaintiffs’
intent to exercise their lien rights for unpaid invoices (Exhibit D)
A dispute was asserted by the Defendant over the farrier fees,
veterinary fees for worming and leg-wrapping which had been included
in the invoices.
The Defendant visited the farm on July 1, 2007 after receiving the June
25, 2007 letter and found the horse was locked in a stall with two large
padlocks and chains.
On July 1, 2007 Defendant paid $1,000.00.
On July 20, 2007, the Defendant claims she attempted to terminate the
agreement by certified mail.
On July 26, 2007 she paid the sum of $2,456.17.
On July 26, 2007 Plaintiffs provided Defendant with a written receipt
signed by Plaintiffs’ office manager and Plaintiff Courtney Carlson
verifying that the Defendant’s account with Wingate Farm was paid in
full. (Exhibit F).
On July 29, 2007, Defendant visited Wingate Farm and her horse
remained locked in a stall with padlocks and log chains.
Plaintiffs refused to remove the padlocks and chains.faa
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
The Defendant called the Delaware County Sheriff's Department and a
deputy was dispatched to the scene.
The Plaintiffs informed the Deputy that the Defendant had failed to pay
for the horse’s stall and board but allowed the Defendant access to
groom the horse on this date.
On July 30, 2007 Defendant sent notice to Plaintiffs via regular mail, of
her intent to terminate the Agreement on or before September 20,
2007.
Later, on July 31, 2007, Defendant and another horse trainer met at
Wingate Farm for the purpose of removing Kammy from the premises
notwithstanding the Plaintiff's claimed “lien”.
The trainer’s husband removed pins from the hinges on the stall and
removed the horse, notwithstanding the padlocks and chains.
The Defendant, the new trainer and her husband loaded the horse on a
trailer and attempted to leave the premises, at which time the Plaintiffs
blocked the driveway, preventing the Defendant from leaving the
premises with the horse.
Asecond deputy sheriff responded to the scene and when Plaintiff,
Courtney Carlson refused to move her vehicle which was blocking the
driveway, she was arrested.
Defendant claims the Plaintiffs hampered the sale of the horse while in
Wingate Farms Stables causing her damages of $36,000.00, the
difference between the sale price of $4,000.00 plus one foal on AugustBuy
30.
4, 2007 and the reputed sale price of $40,000.00 the horse possibly
could bring on the Florida Show circuit.
The Plaintiffs have not refunded said deposit nor applied the sum to the
Defendant's account.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Breach of Contract (Asserted by both Plaintiff and Defendant)
1.
5.
The Agreement (Exhibit A) constituted a binding contract between the
parties.
The Basic Rules and Regulations were posted and both parties followed
the same and, by their actions, made them part of the Agreement.
The farrier, handling fees, deworming and leg-wrapping are commonly
charged in the horse business and were part of the stable boarding fees
and as set forth in Section 3, 4, and 5 of Exhibit A.
On July 26, 2007, upon the payment of the account balances, the account
was paid in full and the Plaintiffs were holding an $850.00 deposit.
(Exhibit F) By her actions, Defendant waived any argument about farrier,
worming or leg-wrapping charges. The only item outstanding was the “60
days” notice of termination and the liquidated damages of two (2) months
boarding fees.
The Court finds neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant to be in breach of
contract as of July 31, 2007.
The Court finds the Plaintiff's attempt to establish the charge of $850.00
per month for two months to be unreasonable. Liquidated damages must7
10.
relate realistically to out of pocket damages and can not be simply a
penalty. Here the Plaintiffs attempted to relate the claimed sum to bulk
purchases of feed, straw bedding and new stalls. The Court finds, based
upon the evidence presented, that the $850.00 per month for rent after
Defendant terminated the Agreement is not reasonable and is therefore a
penalty which the Court will not enforce. However the straw bedding and
feed was purchased in advance and if not used by Defendant's horse, was
used by other horses. There were no damages established by Plaintiffs as
to any loss during this two month period.
The Defendant is therefore entitled to receive a refund of the $850.00
deposit being held by Plaintiff along with statutory interest from October
29, 2007. (90 days after horse was removed).
Section 20 of the parties’ agreement provides: “If either party fails and/or
refuses to perform any of the obligations required of such part to be
performed as herein set forth and it becomes necessary to institute legal
proceedings to effectuate performance thereof, then in such case the party
found to be in default shall pay all expenses, including reasonable attorney
fees incurred in connection with such enforcement proceeding.”
Counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant submitted itemized statements
regarding their services.
“The time spent by an attorney and a reasonable rate to be charged for that
time are important factors to be considered by the court. But fees may not
always be awarded only on the basis of time and an hourly charge. The
trial court may disagree with the attorney as to the amount of timeWuRss:
Dee 1
sh
ratty
1.
reasonably required to perform the particular service. The court will give
the evidence such weight as is warranted under all the facts and
circumstances in a given case.” Drake v. Menczer (1980), 67 Ohio App.2d
122, 425 N.E. 2d 961. The various factors the court may consider include,
but are not limited to the time and labor, novelty, complexity and difficulty
of the questions and issues raised, ultimate result, amount of original
claim, hours spent at trial, the professional skill required to perform the
necessary legal services, the customary fees in the locality for similar
services, and the experience, reputation and ability of counsel. See
Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983), 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, Forquer v.
Colony Club (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 178, 499 N.E.2d 7, Villella v. Waikem
Motors, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 36, Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins.
Co. (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 195.
“Ohio follows the generally prevailing “American rule’ that absent a
statute of contractual provision allowing recovery of attorney fees, a party
is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.” Farmers State Bank & Trust
Co. Mikesell (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 69. Furthermore, although the parties
may contract to provide for an award of attorney fees, the court must still
determine the reasonableness of those fees. Nottingdale Homeowners’
Assn. Ine. v. Darby (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 32. Furthermore, if, in any
particular case, the claims may be separated into those for which fees are
recoverable and not recoverable, the court must award fees only for the
amount of time spent pursuing the claim for which fees may be awarded.
Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc, (1991), 58 Ohio St.gd 143. In thisparticular case, claims related to the contract itself can be separated from
non-contractual claims.
In reviewing the proposed attorney fees submitted by the Defendant, The
12,
Court finds thirty-three (33) hours to be reasonable to the Breach of
Contract claims, but not the remaining hours.
13. The Court finds the hourly rate of $175.00 to be related and approves
attorney fees for the Defendant in the amount of $5,775.00
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
14. The Court finds the Plaintiffs’ handling of farrier and veterinary services
along with a service charge to be customary in the horse boarding business
and was set forth in the Agreement (Exhibit A).
15. The Court finds no merits in the unjust enrichment claim and therefore
this claim is Dismissed.
BREACH OF DUTY AND FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH
16. The Court finds no merit in the breach of duty claim. The Defendant failed
to establish a duty breached by Plaintiffs or a failure to act in good faith.
These two causes of action are therefore Dismissed.
CONVERSION
17. Anaction for conversion of personal property is based upon the wrongful
possession by one party of the property of another.
18. Once the Defendant paid the account balance in full and received the
receipt (Exhibit F) signed by the Plaintiffs on July 26, 2007 the Plaintiffs
had NO lien under Ohio Revised Code Section 1311.48, “Lien for Care of
Animals”.Yor SSRIS
Said lien was for services which had been rendered and not for future
19.
services. (It is noted all of the liens created under Ohio Revised Code
Chapter 13 are for past services and not future services.)
20. When the Defendant visited Wingate on July 29, 2007 and found her
horse still padlocked, her cause of action for conversion accrued and
continued until July 31, 2007 when she was allowed to leave the premises
with her horse.
21, The Defendant however failed to establish by the preponderance of the
evidence any damages proximately caused by the Plaintiffs’ actions.
22. The Defendant is therefore entitled to a Judgment of $1.00 on this cause
of action.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
23. False imprisonment is to confine one intentionally without lawful privilege
and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time,
however short”. Felician v. Kreiger (1977) 50 Ohio St. 2d 69.
24. Here the Defendant was not confined but her horse was.
25. The Defendant could have left the premises without the horse. “A person
is not confined when (she) voluntarily appears at a premises and is free to
leave.” Condo v. B&R Tire Co. (May 29, 1996) 7" Dist. No. 95 C.A. 166.
26. The Defendant therefore has failed to establish her cause of action for false
imprisonment and this Claim is Dismissed.
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT AND
VIOLATION OF CONSUMER SALES ACTLED OS
27. The Defendant failed to establish any of the elements of these two causes
of action and therefore these claims are Dismissed.
Defendant, Heather Dunn is hereby awarded Judgment in the total
amount of $850.00 plus statutory interest of 5% on the principal balance of $850.00
from October 29, 2007 on the Breach of Contract claim plus an award of $5,775.00 in
attorney fees and a Judgment of $1.00 on the Conversion Claim. Costs of these
proceedings shall be paid by the Plaintiffs.
Dated: July 29, 2009.
. DUNCAN WHITNEY, JUDGE
The Clerk Of this Court is hereby Ordered to serve a copy of this Judgment Entry upon the
following by wKegular Mail, o Mailbox at the Delaware County Courthouse, 0 Facsimile transmission
ROBERT M. OWENS, OWENS LAW OFFICE LPA, 46 NORTH SANDUSKY STREET, DELAWARE, OHIO
43015,
LAURAJ. MARTIN, 131 NORTH LUDLOW STREET, SUITE 840, , DAYTON, OH, 45402
Te Sa SER —_—*|
itorney/party br
ary mai)
(torney mailbox
Re
10
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PSUURIS oo fi Sane IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO (9 HILLARY CARLSON, ET AL., YY, RW : Plaintiffs, ag 7 : Za ms -Vs- oy : Case No. 07 CV H 09 1117 & 3 = qn HEATHER DUNN, oF = crs 2 Defendant. 3 3 25 2 wu = 6? JUDGMENT ENTRY as 1 At all time material, the Plaintiffs, Hillary Carlson and Courtney Carlson were in the business of providing horse boarding and training services under the business name of “Wingate Farm”. 2. On February 1, 2007, the Defendant, Heather Dunn, helped the Plaintiffs transport her registered Trakehner mare Kammy, herein after referred to as “horse” to the Plaintiff's Wingate Farm for boarding. 3. The parties on February 1, 2007 entered into a written “stabling and boarding” agreement. (Exhibit A). 4. At time of commencement of the boarding and training agreement, Defendant had paid to Plaintiffs an $850.00 security deposit which according to the agreement shall be refunded within 90 days after the horse is removed. (Exhibit A, Section 2) 5. Under the written agreement, Defendant was to pay Plaintiffs $850.00 per month which included stabling and boarding of the horse, Kammy. cenuanarzon cove Lela I 1 07 CV HOS 1117 00026184210 IDEN6. “Board” under the agreement included feed, maintenance and cleaning “4 stalls. y 7. Pursuant to Section | of the Agreement, “stabling” commenced February 1, 2007 and continued month to month unless either party notified the other in writing by Certified Mail with Return Signature Receipt that he/she elects to have the Agreement terminated at the end of a given month, which notice must be given Sixty (60) days prior to the end of the month. (Exhibit A, Section 1) 8. Plaintiffs had established Basic Rules and Regulations (Exhibit B) which horse owners were to follow per Section 6 of the Agreement. (Exhibit B) (Defendant claims she did not receive this document until Trial.) 9. The Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Agreement and Rules, forwarded invoices to the Defendant for expenses such as farrier care and veterinary fees. 10. The Plaintiffs invoiced the Defendant, per the Agreement and the Barn Rules and Regulations, and the Defendant paid the invoices, although she consistently ran delinquent. The Defendant’s payments were as follows: February 3, 2007...sssssssesseeee $450.00 February 9, 2007... $870.00 March 1, 2007...ccsceseseseeeseees $500.00 March 7, 2007. ..sccsesseeseeesees $350.00 March 7, 2007 ..sssesseesessesseeeee $369.75 ADTil 3, 2007. ..esessseseessercsserenee $500.00 11. The Defendant did not pay on the invoices after April 3, 2007.12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. Section 11 of the Stabling and Boarding Agreement provides that “in the event that balances due are not paid within fifteen (15) days after they become due and payable under this Agreement, Wingate Farm may exercise its lien rights”... On June 25, 2007 Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant referencing her delinquent account and informing the Defendant of the Plaintiffs’ intent to exercise their lien rights for unpaid invoices (Exhibit D) A dispute was asserted by the Defendant over the farrier fees, veterinary fees for worming and leg-wrapping which had been included in the invoices. The Defendant visited the farm on July 1, 2007 after receiving the June 25, 2007 letter and found the horse was locked in a stall with two large padlocks and chains. On July 1, 2007 Defendant paid $1,000.00. On July 20, 2007, the Defendant claims she attempted to terminate the agreement by certified mail. On July 26, 2007 she paid the sum of $2,456.17. On July 26, 2007 Plaintiffs provided Defendant with a written receipt signed by Plaintiffs’ office manager and Plaintiff Courtney Carlson verifying that the Defendant’s account with Wingate Farm was paid in full. (Exhibit F). On July 29, 2007, Defendant visited Wingate Farm and her horse remained locked in a stall with padlocks and log chains. Plaintiffs refused to remove the padlocks and chains.faa 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. The Defendant called the Delaware County Sheriff's Department and a deputy was dispatched to the scene. The Plaintiffs informed the Deputy that the Defendant had failed to pay for the horse’s stall and board but allowed the Defendant access to groom the horse on this date. On July 30, 2007 Defendant sent notice to Plaintiffs via regular mail, of her intent to terminate the Agreement on or before September 20, 2007. Later, on July 31, 2007, Defendant and another horse trainer met at Wingate Farm for the purpose of removing Kammy from the premises notwithstanding the Plaintiff's claimed “lien”. The trainer’s husband removed pins from the hinges on the stall and removed the horse, notwithstanding the padlocks and chains. The Defendant, the new trainer and her husband loaded the horse on a trailer and attempted to leave the premises, at which time the Plaintiffs blocked the driveway, preventing the Defendant from leaving the premises with the horse. Asecond deputy sheriff responded to the scene and when Plaintiff, Courtney Carlson refused to move her vehicle which was blocking the driveway, she was arrested. Defendant claims the Plaintiffs hampered the sale of the horse while in Wingate Farms Stables causing her damages of $36,000.00, the difference between the sale price of $4,000.00 plus one foal on AugustBuy 30. 4, 2007 and the reputed sale price of $40,000.00 the horse possibly could bring on the Florida Show circuit. The Plaintiffs have not refunded said deposit nor applied the sum to the Defendant's account. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Breach of Contract (Asserted by both Plaintiff and Defendant) 1. 5. The Agreement (Exhibit A) constituted a binding contract between the parties. The Basic Rules and Regulations were posted and both parties followed the same and, by their actions, made them part of the Agreement. The farrier, handling fees, deworming and leg-wrapping are commonly charged in the horse business and were part of the stable boarding fees and as set forth in Section 3, 4, and 5 of Exhibit A. On July 26, 2007, upon the payment of the account balances, the account was paid in full and the Plaintiffs were holding an $850.00 deposit. (Exhibit F) By her actions, Defendant waived any argument about farrier, worming or leg-wrapping charges. The only item outstanding was the “60 days” notice of termination and the liquidated damages of two (2) months boarding fees. The Court finds neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant to be in breach of contract as of July 31, 2007. The Court finds the Plaintiff's attempt to establish the charge of $850.00 per month for two months to be unreasonable. Liquidated damages must7 10. relate realistically to out of pocket damages and can not be simply a penalty. Here the Plaintiffs attempted to relate the claimed sum to bulk purchases of feed, straw bedding and new stalls. The Court finds, based upon the evidence presented, that the $850.00 per month for rent after Defendant terminated the Agreement is not reasonable and is therefore a penalty which the Court will not enforce. However the straw bedding and feed was purchased in advance and if not used by Defendant's horse, was used by other horses. There were no damages established by Plaintiffs as to any loss during this two month period. The Defendant is therefore entitled to receive a refund of the $850.00 deposit being held by Plaintiff along with statutory interest from October 29, 2007. (90 days after horse was removed). Section 20 of the parties’ agreement provides: “If either party fails and/or refuses to perform any of the obligations required of such part to be performed as herein set forth and it becomes necessary to institute legal proceedings to effectuate performance thereof, then in such case the party found to be in default shall pay all expenses, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with such enforcement proceeding.” Counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant submitted itemized statements regarding their services. “The time spent by an attorney and a reasonable rate to be charged for that time are important factors to be considered by the court. But fees may not always be awarded only on the basis of time and an hourly charge. The trial court may disagree with the attorney as to the amount of timeWuRss: Dee 1 sh ratty 1. reasonably required to perform the particular service. The court will give the evidence such weight as is warranted under all the facts and circumstances in a given case.” Drake v. Menczer (1980), 67 Ohio App.2d 122, 425 N.E. 2d 961. The various factors the court may consider include, but are not limited to the time and labor, novelty, complexity and difficulty of the questions and issues raised, ultimate result, amount of original claim, hours spent at trial, the professional skill required to perform the necessary legal services, the customary fees in the locality for similar services, and the experience, reputation and ability of counsel. See Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983), 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, Forquer v. Colony Club (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 178, 499 N.E.2d 7, Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 36, Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 195. “Ohio follows the generally prevailing “American rule’ that absent a statute of contractual provision allowing recovery of attorney fees, a party is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.” Farmers State Bank & Trust Co. Mikesell (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 69. Furthermore, although the parties may contract to provide for an award of attorney fees, the court must still determine the reasonableness of those fees. Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn. Ine. v. Darby (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 32. Furthermore, if, in any particular case, the claims may be separated into those for which fees are recoverable and not recoverable, the court must award fees only for the amount of time spent pursuing the claim for which fees may be awarded. Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc, (1991), 58 Ohio St.gd 143. In thisparticular case, claims related to the contract itself can be separated from non-contractual claims. In reviewing the proposed attorney fees submitted by the Defendant, The 12, Court finds thirty-three (33) hours to be reasonable to the Breach of Contract claims, but not the remaining hours. 13. The Court finds the hourly rate of $175.00 to be related and approves attorney fees for the Defendant in the amount of $5,775.00 UNJUST ENRICHMENT 14. The Court finds the Plaintiffs’ handling of farrier and veterinary services along with a service charge to be customary in the horse boarding business and was set forth in the Agreement (Exhibit A). 15. The Court finds no merits in the unjust enrichment claim and therefore this claim is Dismissed. BREACH OF DUTY AND FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH 16. The Court finds no merit in the breach of duty claim. The Defendant failed to establish a duty breached by Plaintiffs or a failure to act in good faith. These two causes of action are therefore Dismissed. CONVERSION 17. Anaction for conversion of personal property is based upon the wrongful possession by one party of the property of another. 18. Once the Defendant paid the account balance in full and received the receipt (Exhibit F) signed by the Plaintiffs on July 26, 2007 the Plaintiffs had NO lien under Ohio Revised Code Section 1311.48, “Lien for Care of Animals”.Yor SSRIS Said lien was for services which had been rendered and not for future 19. services. (It is noted all of the liens created under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 13 are for past services and not future services.) 20. When the Defendant visited Wingate on July 29, 2007 and found her horse still padlocked, her cause of action for conversion accrued and continued until July 31, 2007 when she was allowed to leave the premises with her horse. 21, The Defendant however failed to establish by the preponderance of the evidence any damages proximately caused by the Plaintiffs’ actions. 22. The Defendant is therefore entitled to a Judgment of $1.00 on this cause of action. FALSE IMPRISONMENT 23. False imprisonment is to confine one intentionally without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short”. Felician v. Kreiger (1977) 50 Ohio St. 2d 69. 24. Here the Defendant was not confined but her horse was. 25. The Defendant could have left the premises without the horse. “A person is not confined when (she) voluntarily appears at a premises and is free to leave.” Condo v. B&R Tire Co. (May 29, 1996) 7" Dist. No. 95 C.A. 166. 26. The Defendant therefore has failed to establish her cause of action for false imprisonment and this Claim is Dismissed. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT AND VIOLATION OF CONSUMER SALES ACTLED OS 27. The Defendant failed to establish any of the elements of these two causes of action and therefore these claims are Dismissed. Defendant, Heather Dunn is hereby awarded Judgment in the total amount of $850.00 plus statutory interest of 5% on the principal balance of $850.00 from October 29, 2007 on the Breach of Contract claim plus an award of $5,775.00 in attorney fees and a Judgment of $1.00 on the Conversion Claim. Costs of these proceedings shall be paid by the Plaintiffs. Dated: July 29, 2009. . DUNCAN WHITNEY, JUDGE The Clerk Of this Court is hereby Ordered to serve a copy of this Judgment Entry upon the following by wKegular Mail, o Mailbox at the Delaware County Courthouse, 0 Facsimile transmission ROBERT M. OWENS, OWENS LAW OFFICE LPA, 46 NORTH SANDUSKY STREET, DELAWARE, OHIO 43015, LAURAJ. MARTIN, 131 NORTH LUDLOW STREET, SUITE 840, , DAYTON, OH, 45402 Te Sa SER —_—*| itorney/party br ary mai) (torney mailbox Re 10