arrow left
arrow right
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
  • Newton, Patsy et al  vs. Enloe Medical Center(35) Unlimited Other non-PI/PD/WD Tort document preview
						
                                

Preview

Sean R. Laird (SBN 214916) 1 The Law Firm of Sean R. Laird 2 805 16th Street Sacramento, CA 95814 6/2/2021 3 (916) 441-1636 4 (916) 760-9002 seanlairdlaw@gmail.com 5 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF BUTTE 9 10 PATSY NEWTON, individually; HAROLD Case No. 20CV01091 11 NEWTON; individually; SUZANNE BOLEN, individually. PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO 12 DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN Plaintiffs, LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE 13 ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED 14 vs. “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL 15 STATEMENTS. ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER; and DOES 1 - 16 50, inclusive, DATE: June 4, 2021 17 Defendants, TIME: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 1 18 Hon. Tamara L. Mosbarger 19 20 Complaint Filed: 5/29/2020 Trial Date: 6/7/2021 21 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 In Motion in Limine 4, without pointing to any evidence whatsoever, defendants seek an 25 order precluding plaintiff’s from making the argument of “profit over patient care.” In the body of 26 this motion, defendants seem to expand the motion’s breadth to extend to evidence of any kind 27 (rather than just arguments) supporting a theory that defendants operated their organization in a 28 manner that maximized profits at the expense of patient care. Defendants maintain that profits - 1! - PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 1 over patient care evidence is irrelevant to the only issue in the case as they frame it: “The issues 2 presented in this case are whether defendant complied with the applicable standard of care while 3 treating decedent.” Clearly this motion is a copy and paste of some other motion from a medical 4 malpractice case apparently where the plaintiff in that matter died. Mrs. Newton is very much 5 alive, though Enloe Medical Center nearly killed her. They further contend that reference to 6 defendants’ attempt to maximize profits would be more prejudicial than probative. 7 Defendants’ motion is meritless. Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the “standard of care” 8 is far from the only issue to be decided in this case. As plaintiff will repeatedly point out - this is 9 not a medical malpractice case like the one defendant’s copy and paste brief attempts to address. It 10 is an elder neglect and abuse case. As detailed below, this is an elder abuse action in which 11 plaintiffs will bear the burden of proving, among other things, that defendants acted with 12 recklessness, oppression, malice and/or fraud and that their conduct was engaged in or ratified by a 13 managing agent. Given this, plaintiffs are entitled to present evidence and testimony establishing 14 that the neglect of Mrs. Newton was the product of a plan by defendants to maximize profits at the 15 expense of patient care. 16 II. ARGUMENT 17 18 A. Plaintiffs’ Burden Of Proof Under The Elder Abuse Act Is Essentially Equivalent To What Is Required To Secure Punitive Damages 19 20 Under the Elder Abuse Act, to secure enhanced remedies, plaintiffs must prove that 21 defendants acted with recklessness, malice, oppression, or fraud. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657; 22 CACI 3104. Plaintiff must make this showing by the higher “clear and convincing evidence” 23 standard. Id. One acts with “recklessness” if he knows it is highly probable that his conduct will 24 cause harm and knowingly disregards this risk. CACI 3113. “Malice” is, among other things, 25 despicable conduct that is carried out with a willful and knowing disregard of the rights or safety 26 of another. Cal. Civ. Code 3294(c)(1); CACI 3114. A person acts with knowing disregard when 27 he or she is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and deliberately 28 fails to avoid those consequences. CACI 3114. “Oppression” means that conduct is despicable - 2! - PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 1 and subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in knowing disregard of that person’s rights. 2 Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2); CACI 3115. As used in these definitions, “despicable conduct” is 3 conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by 4 reasonable people. CACI 3114, 3115. 5 In addition to showing recklessness, malice, oppression or fraud, plaintiffs must 6 demonstrate that this conduct was engaged in, approved of, or ratified by a “managing agent” of 7 the defendant. Authorization and ratification may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Fisher v. 8 San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 621 (1989). Authorization can be inferred 9 from the fact that a defendant’s employees were following usual company procedures, since these 10 had to be known and authorized by those who dictated company policies. Hale v. Farmers 11 Insurance Exchange, 42 Cal.App.3d 681, 691-692 (1974). Ratification can be inferred from the 12 fact that conduct of the employees became known to the corporation through review by higher 13 level management. Id. 14 Ratification occurs whenever an employer or one of its managing agents fails to intercede 15 in a known pattern of neglect, or fails to investigate or discipline the errant employee once such 16 misconduct becomes known. College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.4th 704, 726 (1994). 17 California courts have made clear that the standard set forth in Civil Code Section 3294 18 does not require that plaintiffs identify one particular “managing agent” who acted individually 19 with malice, recklessness, oppression, or fraud. Romo v. Ford Motor Company, 99 Cal.App.4th 20 1115, 1139-40 (2002). This would merely invite companies to shield themselves from liability by 21 dividing responsibility among layers and layers of management. Id. Rather, Civil Code Section 22 3294 is satisfied if the pervasive culture of the enterprise gave rise to the wrongful conduct: 23 When the entire organization is involved in the acts that constitute malice, there is no danger a blameless corporation will be punished for bad acts over which it had no control, 24 the primary goal of the ‘managing agent’ requirement. 25 Romo, 99 Cal.App.4th at 1140-41 (emphasis added); see also Roberts v. Ford Aerospace and 26 Communications Corporation, 224 Cal.App.3d 793, 801 (1990)(noting that the jury could impose 27 punitive damages based on the finding that “the corporate consciousness of Ford fostered tolerance 28 of discrimination”). - 3! - PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 1 In sum, to secure enhanced remedies under the Elder Abuse Act, plaintiffs must make a 2 showing that is “essentially equivalent” to the showing necessary to recover punitive damages. 3 Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 771, 789 (2004)(“In order to obtain the Act’s 4 heightened remedies, a plaintiff must allege conduct essentially equivalent to conduct that would 5 support recovery of punitive damages.”). Given this, the well-developed body of law regarding the 6 permissible scope of evidence in punitive damage trials should guide the Court in determining the 7 nature and extent of evidence that should be allowed in this trial. Including those arguments 8 allowed, the evidence permitted to show “reckless, malice, oppression and fraud.” 9 B. Given Plaintiffs’ Burden Of Proof In This Elder Abuse Case, Plaintiffs Are Entitled To 10 Present Evidence And Argument That Mrs. Newton’s Neglect Was The Product Of 11 Defendants’ Scheme To Maximize Profits At The Expense Of Patient Care 12 Given the significant showing that plaintiffs must make to secure punitive damages (or, in 13 this case, enhanced remedies under the Elder Abuse Act), California courts not surprisingly have 14 given plaintiffs broad leeway to prevent relevant evidence. This leeway includes the ability to 15 present evidence and argument that a plaintiff’s injury was the product of a corporate plan to 16 maximize profits at the expense of safety. 17 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981) is directly on point. In 18 Grimshaw, plaintiffs sued Ford Motor Company for general and punitive damages relating to 19 Ford’s Pinto automobile. In the punitive damages phase of the case, the trial court allowed 20 evidence regarding the decision by corporate to not install a safety device because of the cost. The 21 Court explained: 22 A reasonable inference may be drawn from the evidence that despite management’s 23 knowledge that the Pinto’s fuel system could be made safe at a cost of $4 to $8 per car, it decided to defer corrective measures to save money and enhance profits. The evidence 24 was thus highly relevant and properly received. 25 Id. at 790 (emphasis supplied). 26 Grimshaw went on to reaffirm that malice can be shown not only by a malicious intention 27 to injure the specific person harmed but also by “conduct evincing a conscious disregard of the 28 - 4! - PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 1 probability that the actor’s conduct will result in injury to others.” Id. at 808 (internal citations 2 omitted)(collecting numerous cases for the same proposition). 3 Notably, the primary basis upon which the Court of Appeal found sufficient the evidence 4 supporting the jury’s punitive damages award was the evidence demonstrating a decision by the 5 corporate overseers to maximize profits at the expense of consumer safety: 6 There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost- 7 benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits. Ford’s 8 institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford’s conduct constituted “conscious disregard” of the 9 probability of injury to members of the consuming public. 10 Id. at 813. As the court later explained: 11 [T]he conduct of Ford’s management was reprehensible in the extreme. It exhibited a 12 conscious and callous disregard of public safety in order to maximize profits. 13 Id. at 819. 14 15 The Court reached a similar result in Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, 95 Cal. App. 3d 16 279 (1979). In Nolin, plaintiff sued National Convenience Stores, Inc. for a fall she suffered on the 17 premises of one their stores. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded compensatory and 18 punitive damages. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support 19 an instruction about, and an award of, punitive damages. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found 20 that evidence of defendant’s running of its operations to maximize its profits supported an award of 21 punitive damages: 22 The entire nature of defendant’s operation, as it was presented to the jury, reflected defendant’s overriding concern for a minimum expense operation, regardless of the peril 23 involved. This concern was evidenced by the method of deployment of clerks, the 24 absence of maintenance personnel, and the absence of necessary equipment for handling oil sold to customers. 25 26 Id. At 288; see also Steward v. Union Carbide Corp., 190 Cal. App. 4th 23, 37 (2010)(punitive 27 damages appropriate where plaintiff showed that “Union Carbide profited from the sale of a 28 - 5! - PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 1 dangerous substance, that it knew the dangers of the product, that it failed to warn customers of 2 those dangers, and Larry Stewart developed a fatal cancer as a result.”). 3 Here plaintiff will prove through the testimony of Enloe Medical Center’s own employees, 4 supervisors, and documentation that they made a series of choices and took specific actions that 5 assured their focus would maximize profits at the expense of ensuring that the patients under its 6 control received appropriate care. Line-item costs regarding labor, payment of overtime and 7 limitations of the same are relevant to these facts, especially at a time when caregivers were feeling 8 “overwhelmed” working on the floor where Mrs. Newton sustained this horrific injury. In fact, 9 defendants continued in this pattern, knowing the dangers, after being put on clear notice by the 10 Department of Public Heath that they needed to take action to address the very type of injury that 11 occurred to Mrs. Newton. Clearly, a fact-finder is entitled to consider plaintiff’s evidence of 12 defendant’s plan to sacrifice patient safety for the almighty dollar, in determining whether the 13 neglect Mrs. Newton suffered was reckless, malicious, oppressive and fraudulent. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 16 Given the above, plaintiffs request that the Court deny defendants’ Motion In Limine 17 number 4 to preclude evidence that plaintiff was neglected for financial reasons. 18 Dated: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 The Law Firm of Sean R. Laird 19 _________ 20 Sean R. Laird 21 ________________________ 22 Sean R. Laird Attorney for Plaintiffs 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 6! - PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT OF ALLEGED “PROFIT OVER PATIENT CARE” AND PRECLUSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.