Preview
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF FRESNO Entered by:
Civil Department - Non-Limited
TITLE 0F CASE:
Richard Best Transfer, Inc vs. Archer Daniels Midland Company
Case Number:
LAW AND MOTION MINUTE ORDER 17CECG01022
Motion -
‘
Hearing Date: February 22, 2018 Hearing Type: Demurrel' (x2). Strike.Motion - Quash
Department: 503 (Chambers) JudgelTemp. Judge: Simpson, Alan
Court Clerk: Faulkner, Marvel Reporter/Tape: NIA
Appearing Parties: No Appearances
Plaintiff: Defendant:
Counsel: Counsel:
[ ]
Off Calendar
[
]Continuedto [
]Setfor _ at _ Dept. _ for _
[
]Submitted on points and authorities with/without argument. [ ]
Matter is argued and submitted.
[ ]
Upon filingof points and authorities.
[
]Motion isgranted [ ]in part and denied in part. [
]Motion is denied [
]with/withoutprejudice.
[x] Taken out from under submissionladvisement.
[
]Demurrer [
]overruled [
]sustained with _ daysto [
]answer [
]amend
[x] Tentative ruling becomesfithe order of the court. No further order isnecessary.
[x] Pursuant to CRC 391(a) and CCP section 101 9.5(a), no further order is necessary. The minute order
adopting the tentative ruling serves as the order of the court.
[x] Service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
[x] See attached copy of the Tentative Ruling.
[ ]
Judgment debtor _ sworn and examined.
[ ]
Judgment debtor _ failed toappear.
Bench warrant issued inthe amount of $_
JUDGMENT:
[ ]Money damages [
]Default [
]Other _ entered in the amountof:
Principal $_ interest$_ Costs $_ Attorney fees $_ Total $_
[
]Claim of exemption [
]granted [
]denied. Court orders withholdings modified to $__ per_
FURTHER. COURT ORDERS:
]Monies held bylevying officerto be [
]released tojudgmentcreditor. [
]returnedtojudgmentdebtor.
[
[ ]$_ to be released tojudgment creditor and balance returned tojudgment debtor.
[ ] Levying Officer, County of _, notified. [
]Writto issue
Noticeto be filed within 15 days. [ ]
Restitution of Premises
[ ]
[
]Other: _
cv-14b E04-16 LAW AND MOTION MINUTE ORDER
||--A-A-_. I-____
(1 7)
~
Tentative Ruling
Re: Richard Best Transfer, Inc. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company, ef
al.
Coun‘ Cose No. 17 CECG 01022
Hearing Do’re: January 30, 2018 (Dept. 503) -
MoTion: Richard Best's, Wyofi Bes’r's and PorT of Ivory’s Mofion To Quosh
Tentative Ruling:
To deny.
Explanation:
The Civil Discovery ACT provides ’rho’r o personal service of a deposi’rion
subpoena may command o Third por’ry deponen’r ’ro produce business records on
reques’r. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020, subd. (c).) Code of Civil Procedure sec’rion
1987.1 provides, in relevon’r port: “If o subpoena requires The oT’rendonce of o wiTness
or The producfion of books, documents, electronically s’rored information, or other
Things o’r The Taking of o deposiTion, The courT, Upon moTion reasonably mode by ony
person described in subdivision (b) may moke on order direcTing compliance wiTh
iTupon Those Terms or condiTions os The courT sholl declare, including proTecTive orders."
(Code Civ. Proc.,§ 1987.1 ,subd. (0).)
The MoTion is NoT UnTimer
ADM conTends This moTion isunTimer os iT wos filed six monThs ofTer The doTe seT
for producTion. However, This focT does hoT deprive The courT of jurisdicTion To rule on
The moTion. (Inre RR. (2010) 187 Col.App.4Th T264, T278; Slogle v. Superior CourT (T989)
2H Col.App.3d 1309, 1312.)
The MoTion Does NOT Require o SeporoTe SToTemenT
ADM argues The moTion should be denied because 1T conTGins ho seporGTe
sToTemenT seTTing forTh The porTiculor documenTs or demands 0T issue 0nd The focTuol
0nd legal reasons why producTion should noT be compelled. (Col. Rule of CourT, rule
3.1345(0)(5).) However, because Rule of CourT 3.1345 does hoT require 0 seporoTe
sToTemenT on o moTion To quash 0 subpoena, The courT would be remiss in denying The
moTion for failure To include one.
The Subpoena Will NOT be Quoshed
Cross—defendOhTs claim Their Richard BesT's 0nd Richard BesT Tronsfer's financial
informoTion isprivoTe, 0nd noT relevonT To The claims 0nd defenses 1n This ocTion.
In Williams v. Superior Courf (201 7) 3 COLSTh 531 (Williams), the California Supreme Coun‘
reaffirmed The TesT for evoluofing potenfiol invasions of privacy expressed in Hill v.
Notional Collegiofe Afhlefic Assn. (1994) 7 Col.4Th I (Hill). Firs’r,The porTy osser’ring o
privacy righ’r mus’r establish o legally pro’rec’red privacy inferes’r, on objectively
reasonable expec’rofion of privacy in ’rhe given circums’ronces, 0nd 0 Threatened
in’rrusion That isserious. (Id. cn‘ pp. 35—37.) Second, The porTy seeking informoTion moy
roise in response whoTever legiTimoTe 0nd imporTonT counTervoiling ihTeresTs disclosure
serves, while The porTy seeking proTecTion moy idenTify feasible olTernoTives ThoT serve
The some inTeresTs or proTecTive measures ThoT would diminish The loss of privacy.
Finally, The courT musT Then bolcmce These compeTing consideroTions. (Id. 0T pp. 37—40;
see Williams, supra, 0T p. 553.)
Generally, financial informoTion is privoTe. (Volley Bonk of Nevada v. Superior
CourT (1975) 15 Col.3d 652, 656.) Cross—defendonTs do noT ciTe, or oTTempT To apply The
Hill or Williams TesT. However, cross-defendonTs‘ expecToTion of privacy in Their bank
records is objecTiver reasonable 0nd The proposed inTrusion is serious. (Id. 0T p. 656—
657.)
However, The records ore highly relevonT To The IiTigoTion. ADM claims RBT,
Through iTs direcTors/officers Richard BesT, WyoTT BesT, 0nd Charles LiTTIefieId, used iTs pUT—
Through agreemenT wiTh ADM To induce ADM To provide feed peIIeT invehTory To wiTh
The folse preTense 0nd inTenTion To diverT significonT porTs of iT To unoUThorized 0nd
froudulenT soles 0nd To ollow RBT To reToin The proceeds of Those soles and spliT Them
wiTh oTher defendonTs, oilThe Time concealing from ADM and misreporTing To ADM The
True sToTe of soles of iTs producT.
ADM alleges ThoT RBT perpeTroTed The fraud 0nd concealmenT 0nd The
predicoTe GcTs of rockeTeering ocTiviTy Through The deToiled allegoTions of ocTions of
RBT's officers/direcTors Richard BesT, WyoTT BesT, 0nd LiTTIefieId, Gs well Gs former ADM
employees Shown Sowci cmd NoTosho Dukes, which included paying illegal kickbacks
To Sowo 0nd Dukes for Their roles in The scheme, and uTiIizing Thomas Scoife 0nd his
company To broker 0nd manage illegally diverTed soles of ADM producT, oil To on
esTimoTed loss of revenue of in excess of $3.5 million.
Here, The subpoena is direchy relevonT To The allegoTions of The cross—compioinT.
MoTTer is“direchy relevonT” where iTisessenTioI To deTermining The TruTh of The moTTers in
dispUTe. (BriTT v.Superior CourT (i 978) 2O Col.3d 844, 859-862.) There is no beTTer way To
prove wheTher, 0nd To whoT degree, one's cross—defendonTs did business wiTh each
oTher Thon To subpoena The records from The accounTs wiTh which They did business
wiTh eoch oTher.
Cross—defendonTs roise o cursory objecTion regarding Third porTy privacy inTeresTs
regarding Their cusTomers 0nd business porTners, bUT foil To orTiculoTe how incidenToI
informoTion regarding poymenTs by cusTomers 0nd or poymenTs To vendors in The
ordinary course of business could be sufficienTiy privoTe To prevenT iTs discovery where
The CQTegory of discovery is direcTIy relevonT.
The subpoena is nei’rher over brood nor vogue. To The con’rrory, H specifies Tho’r
only documents relo’ring To occoum‘s connected To co—defendon’rs should be
produced. l’r
is n01 0 fishing expedh‘ion for every financial document relo’red ’ro Richard
Best or Richard Bes’r Transfer, or every paper possessed by The deponen’r, os in The
manner of The subpoena in Colcor Space FociliTy, Inc. v. Superior CourT (1997) 53
Col.App.4Th 216. The Calcor courT Then found ThoT ”0 blonkeT demand hardly
consTiTUTes ‘reosonoble' porTicquriTy.” (Ibid.) Because The Colcor subpoena could be
read To simply require The producing porTy To produce everyThing in iTs possession which
in any woy reloTed To The subjeCT of The IiTigoTion, There wos no ihdicoTion Tth The
coTegories bore any reloTion To The manner which The Third porTy kepT iTs records. Here,
The deponenT did noT indicoTe iThod any difficuITy complying wiTh The subpoena 0nd
sToTed iT would produce records unless o moTion was broughT. (Mosquedo Decl. ‘fl5; Ex.
C.) There isno Coicor problem wiTh This subpoena.
PursuonT To California Rules of CourT, rule 3.i312(0) and Code of Civil Procedure
secTion 1019.5, subdivision (o), no furTher wriTTen order is necessary. The minUTe order
odopTing This TenToTive ruling will serve os The order of The courT ond service by The clerk
WM
will consTiTUTe
issued By:
noTice of The order.
on Vfi/M -
(
giniiiols) (Date)
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF FRESNO FOR COURTUSE ONLY
Civil Department, Central Division
1130 “O“ Street
Fresno,California 93724-0002
(559) 457-2000
TITLE OF CASE:
Richard Best Transfer, Inc vs. Archer Daniels Midland Company
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 0F MAILING Cfisyi'égggfifiéz
I certify thatIam not a party to this cause and that a true copy of the:
Minute Order dated February 22, 2018
was placed in a sealed envelope and placed for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown below
following our ordinary business practice. lam readily familiar with this court‘s practice for collecting and processing
correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited
in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid.
Place of mailing: Fresno,California 93724-0002
W
0n Date: 02/23/2018 Clerk, by
'
M. Faulkner
C. Russell Georgeson Timothy L. Thompson
Georgeson and Belardinelli McCormick, Barstow
7060 N. Fresno Street, #250 7674 N Fresno ST
Fresno, CA 93720 Fresno, CA 93720
Phillip A.Baker RogerT. Nuttall
Baker, Keener & Nahra, LLP 2333 Merced ST
633 West 5th Street, Suite 5500 Fresno, CA 93721
Library Tower
Los Angeles, CA 90071
James S. Rummonds Anthony P Capozzi
Rummonds Law Firm 1233 W. Shaw Ave., Ste 102
311 Bonita Drive Fresno, CA 93711
Aptos, CA 95003
E Clerk's Certificate of Mailing Additional Address Page Attached
TGN—06b R08-06 CLERK‘S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING