Preview
1 EXAVIER BECERRA Fee Exempt Under Gov. Code § 6103
Attorney General of California
2 DARRELL W. SPENCE
Supervising Deputy Attorney General E-FILED
3 LISA A. TILLMAN 2/11/2021 1:54 PM
Deputy Attorney General Superior Court of California
4 State Bar No. 126424 County of Fresno
1300 I Street, Suite 125 By: S. Mancinas, Deputy
5 P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
6 Telephone: (916) 210-7910
Fax: (916) 324-5567
7 E-mail: Lisa.Tillman@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Defendants
8 Brandon Price, Fuji Callie, Jack Carter, Sgt.
Gardenhire, Officer Guajardo
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10
COUNTY OF FRESNO
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14 EDWARD E. EVANS, Case No. 19CECL01586
15 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
16 v. SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
17
BRANDON PRICE, ET AL., Date: April 28, 2021
18 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Defendants. Dept: 404
19 Judge: Hon. Mark Cullers
Trial Date: Not Assigned
20 Action Filed: February 11, 2019
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Statement of the Case ...................................................................................................................... 7
4
I. DSH's Regulatory Action to Ban Patients' Possession of Certain Electronic
5 Devices. ................................................................................................................... 7
II. The Subject Action.................................................................................................. 8
6
Legal Standard .............................................................................................................................. 11
7 Legal Argument ............................................................................................................................ 12
8 I. The State Law Claims are Barred by the Limitations Period................................ 12
II. The Section 1983 Claims Cannot Proceed Against Defendants. .......................... 12
9
III. Plaintiff Cannot State a Viable Due Process Claim. ............................................. 13
10 A. No substantive due process claim can be stated........................................ 13
11 B. No procedural due process claim can be stated. ....................................... 14
IV. The Equal Protection Claim in Not Viable. .......................................................... 16
12
V. Evan's Negligence Claim Cannot Proceed. ........................................................... 16
13 A. The negligence claim cannot be amended into an intentional tort
claim. ......................................................................................................... 16
14
B. The immunity of Government Code section 821.6 bars any
15 negligence claim........................................................................................ 17
C. Evan's negligence claim is foreclosed by Government Code section
16 854.2. ......................................................................................................... 17
17 VI. Evan's Claim Under Section 52.1 is not Viable. ................................................... 18
A. The requisite coercion for a Bane Act claim is not stated......................... 18
18
B. Evan's governmental claim did not identify the Section 52.1 claim. ........ 19
19 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 20
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page
3 CASES
4 Albright v. Oliver (1994)
510 U.S. 266..............................................................................................................................13
5
6 Allen v. City of Sacramento
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41 .......................................................................................................16
7
Allen v. Mayberg
8 (9th Cir. 2014) 577 Fed.Appx. 728 ...........................................................................................13
9 Barnett v. Centoni
(9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 813.......................................................................................................15
10
Baughman v. State of Cal.
11
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182 .......................................................................................................17
12
Bd. of Regents v. Roth
13 (1972) 408 U.S. 564 ..................................................................................................................14
14 Blank v. Kirwin
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 ................................................................................................................11
15
Brown v. Merlo
16 (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 ..................................................................................................................16
17
Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co.
18 (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405.......................................................................................................17
19 Connelly v. State of Cal.
(1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 744...........................................................................................................19
20
Dominguez v. City of Alhambra
21 (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237.......................................................................................................12
22
Donahue v. State of Cal.
23 (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795.......................................................................................................19
24 Donovan v. Ritchie
(1995) 68 F.3d 14 ......................................................................................................................15
25
Fall River Jt. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct.
26 (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431.......................................................................................................19
27 Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2003)
28 324 F.3d 1130 ...........................................................................................................................16
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page
3 Gonzales v. County of Los Angeles
(1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 601.......................................................................................................12
4
Gonzales v. State of Cal.
5
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 621.........................................................................................................11
6
Hafer v. Melo
7 (1991) 502 U.S. 21 ....................................................................................................................12
8 Halverson v. Skagit Cty.
(9th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 1257.....................................................................................................15
9
Hata v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center
10 (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1791 .....................................................................................................19
11
Hudson v. Palmer
12 (1984) 468 U.S. 517 ............................................................................................................14, 15
13 In re Robinson
(2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 247 .......................................................................................................14
14
Johnson v. Alameda County Medical Ctr.
15 (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 521 .....................................................................................................18
16 Kabbe v. Miller
17 (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93.........................................................................................................11
18 Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc.
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336 .....................................................................................................11
19
McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
20 (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198 ...................................................................................................13
21 Parratt v. Taylor
22 (1981) 451 U.S. 527 ..................................................................................................................15
23 Quick v. Jones
(9th Cir. 1985) 754 F.2d 1521...................................................................................................14
24
Reno v. Flores
25 (1993) 507 U.S. 292 ..................................................................................................................13
26 Reynolds v. Bement
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075 .............................................................................................................11
27
28
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Type Footer Info Here 2 («Matter Primary Court Case #»)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page
3 Sanchez v. City of Fresno
(2012) 914 F.Supp.2d 1079.......................................................................................................13
4
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
5
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947 ...............................................................................................18, 19
6
Sirott v. Latts
7 (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 923 .........................................................................................................11
8 Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police
(1989) 491 U.S. 58 ....................................................................................................................12
9
Williams v. Horvath
10 (1976) 16 Cal.App.3d 834.........................................................................................................12
11
Wolff v. McDonell
12 (1974) 418 U.S. 539 ..................................................................................................................14
13 Womack v. Lovell
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 772 .....................................................................................................11
14
Youngberg v. Romeo
15 (1982) 457 U.S. 307 ..................................................................................................................13
16 STATUTES
17
42 United States Code
18 § 1983 ......................................................................................................................12, 13, 14, 15
19 Civil Code
§ 52.1 .........................................................................................................................9, 10, 18, 19
20 § 52.1, subd. (a) ...................................................................................................................18, 20
21 Code of Civil Procedure
22 § 430.10, subd. (e) .....................................................................................................................11
§ 430.30 .....................................................................................................................................11
23
Government Code
24 § 810.8 .......................................................................................................................................18
§ 815.2, subd. (b) ......................................................................................................................17
25 § 821.6 .......................................................................................................................................17
§ 854.2 .................................................................................................................................17, 18
26
§ 854.8, subd. (a)(2) ..................................................................................................................18
27 § 913, subd. (b) .........................................................................................................................12
§ 945.6, subd. (a)(1) ..................................................................................................................12
28
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Type Footer Info Here 2 («Matter Primary Court Case #»)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page
3 Welfare and Institutions Code
§§ 6600 et seq. ............................................................................................................................7
4 § 7295, subd. (i) ..........................................................................................................................7
5 § 7295, subd. (a) ..........................................................................................................................7
§ 7295 subd. (b) ..........................................................................................................................7
6 § 7295 subd. (g) ..........................................................................................................................7
§ 7295 subd. (h) ..........................................................................................................................7
7
Government Claims Act ..................................................................................................................17
8
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act ..............................................................................................................7
9
Sexually Violent Predators Act .........................................................................................................7
10
11 Tom Bane Civil Rights Act .................................................................................................18, 19, 20
12 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
13 California Constitution ............................................................................................................7, 9, 10
14 United States Constitution Fourth Amendment ................................................................................9
15 United States Constitution Fifth Amendment ...................................................................................9
16 United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment ...........................................................10, 13, 14
17 OTHER AUTHORITIES
18
California Code of Regulations, Title 9
19 § 891 ........................................................................................................................................7, 8
§ 4350 ................................................................................................................................ passim
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Type Footer Info Here 2 («Matter Primary Court Case #»)
1 INTRODUCTION
2 In response to this Court’s decision sustaining defendants’ motion for judgment on the
3 pleadings with leave to amend, plaintiff Edward Evans, a civil detainee housed at the Department
4 of State Hospitals, Coalinga (DSH-Coalinga) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predators Act,
5 filed this second amended complaint reiterating the defects of the first amended complaint. The
6 second amended complaint alleges violation of federal and state law by defendants’ alleged
7 confiscation, retention and/or damage to Evans’s property following a hospital-wide a search for
8 electronic contraband. This action is foreclosed on several grounds. First, Evans failed to file the
9 initial complaint within six months of the rejection of his government claim; hence, his state law
10 claims for negligence and violations of the California Constitution cannot proceed. Second, state
11 law immunities bar the negligence claim. Third, Evans improperly brings his federal claims
12 against defendants in their official capacities. Fourth, Evans’s federal and state constitutional
13 claims for alleged violation of due process and equal protection are not viable. For all these
14 reasons, this Court should sustain the demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to
15 amend.
16 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
17 I. DSH'S REGULATORY ACTION TO BAN PATIENTS' POSSESSION OF CERTAIN
ELECTRONIC DEVICES.
18
19 Civil detainees confined to DSH are subject to restrictions as to the property they may
20 possess. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7295, subd. (a).) By statute, DSH maintains a list of items
21 deemed contraband at every state hospital, with the list posted in hospital units and on its website.
22 (Id., subds. (b), (g), (h).) “Contraband” is defined as items a patient is prohibited from possessing
23 because the items pose a risk to the safety and security of the facility. (Id., subd. (i).)
24 In 2003, DSH adopted a statewide regulation stating, “Non-LPS patients shall not have
25 access to the internet.” (Exh. A, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 891.) 1
26
27 1
LPS is an abbreviation for the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Because plaintiff is detained
under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600 et seq.), plaintiff is subject
28 to section 891 of title 9 of the California Code of Regulations.
7
Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 In 2009, DSH enacted a statewide regulation, section 4350 of title 9 of the California Code
2 of Regulations (Section 4350), prohibiting patients from possessing internet-capable electronic
3 devices. (Exh. B, Former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4350; Req. J. Not.)
4 DSH issued a Notice of Proposed Emergency Amendments to Section 4350, with one
5 notice issuing on January 10, 2018. (Exh. C, DSH Not. Emergency Regs.; Req. J. Not.) Plaintiff
6 received a copy of the proposed amendments. (Second Am. Complaint [SAC], p. 5.) The
7 amendments prohibit DSH’s residents from possessing certain electronic devices. (Ibid.) The
8 amendments were approved by the Office of Administrative Law on an interim basis on January
9 12, 2018, with subsequent re-adoptions culminating in final approval on February 5, 2019. (Exh.
10 D, OAL Approval; Req. J. Not.)
11 On January 12, 2018, DSH-Coalinga Executive Director Brandon Price notified patients
12 and staff of the approval of the amended Section 4350 and listed the electronic devices designated
13 as contraband. (Exh. E, Price Memo, dated Jan. 12, 2018; Req. J. Not.) In memoranda dated
14 January 16 and January 18, 2018, the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office and Brandon
15 Price, respectively, informed patients of the timeline for implementation of the amended Section
16 4350. (Exh. F, Fresno County DA Memo; see also Exh. G, Price Memo, dated Jan. 18, 2018;
17 Req. J. Not.) The ‘amnesty/grace period’ for patients to voluntarily relinquish the prohibited
18 computers and other electronic devices, without fear of prosecution, was from 9:00 a.m. on
19 Friday, January 19, 2018 through 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, January 28, 2018. (Ibid.) After 4:00 p.m.
20 on Sunday, January 28, 2018, such items were deemed contraband and subject to confiscation.
21 (Ibid.)
22 In or about the week of January 29, 2018, DSH-Coalinga patients’ rooms were searched for
23 electronic devices prohibited under the amendments to Section 4350. (SAC, p. 6.)
24 II. THE SUBJECT ACTION.
25 On January 29, 2018, certain electronic devices and other property possessed by plaintiff
26 was seized by DSH personnel during a search. (SAC, p. 6.)
27 On or about April 24, 2018, plaintiff filed a government claim concerning the property that
28 was seized on January 29, 2018, and not returned to him. (SAC, pp. 10-11 & Exh. 3.) In a letter
8
Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 dated June 13, 2018, the Department of General Services informed plaintiff that the claim was
2 referred to the Department of State Hospitals. (SAC, p. 12 & Exh. 5.) The Department of
3 General Services’ letter admonished plaintiff:
4 If you are not satisfied with the action taken on your claim by the involved State
agency, you will have six months from the date of the agency’s notice to file a lawsuit
5 in the appropriate court of law.
6 (SAC, Exh. 5.)
7 In a letter dated August 7, 2018, DSH informed Evans of the rejection of his claim. (SAC,
8 p. 12 & Exh. 6.) The letter contained the following warning:
9 Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six months from the date this notice was
personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on this claim. See
10 Government Code, Section 945.6. You may seek the advice of an attorney of your
choice in connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should
11 do so immediately.
12 (SAC, Exh. 6.)
13 On February 11, 2019, plaintiff filed this limited civil action. (Ct. Docket.) Plaintiff then
14 filed a first amended complaint for negligence and violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
15 Amendments of the federal constitution (due process, self-incrimination, and equal protection);
16 violation of article 1, sections 7 (due process) and 15 (self-incrimination) of the California
17 Constitution; and violation of Civil Code section 52.1. (Exh. H, Excerpted First Am. Complaint
18 [FAC], pp. 2, 6-9.) The first amended complaint alleged the defendants acted in their “official
19 and unofficial personal and individual capacities.” (Id., p. 2.)
20 On August 13, 2020, this Court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the
21 pleadings, and provided plaintiff 30 days leave to file an amended complaint indicating:
22 (1) why his state law claims are not barred by plaintiff’s failure to institute this action
within six months of the rejection of his claim on August 6, 2018;
23
(2) why an action against defendants in their official capacity can proceed under 42
24 U.S.C. § 1983;
25 (3) as civil detainee at DSH-Coalinga, why he has reasonable expectation of privacy
in his room and computer under the Fourth Amendment;
26
(4) how his procedural and substantive due process rights under the U.S. Constitution
27 have been violated in light of In re Robinson (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 247 and Hudson
v. Palmer (1984) 468 U.S. 517;
28
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 (5) how section 4350 was improperly promulgated and violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied in this case;
2
(6) why Government Code 821.6 does not foreclose plaintiff’s claim for negligence
3 against each defendant;
4 (7) why plaintiff’s Bane Civil Rights claim under section 52.1 is not barred; and
5 (8) why plaintiff’s claims under Article l, section 7 and 13 of the California
Constitution are not barred.
6
7 (Exh. I, Ct. Order on MJP.)
8 The order further stated that Evans could amend his complaint only as authorized by, and
9 consistent with, the order. (Exh. I, Ct. Order on MJP.) No new causes of action were permitted.
10 (Ibid.)
11 Plaintiff filed the instant second amended complaint, alleging the destruction of his
12 property violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal
13 constitution, his rights under Article 1, sections 7 and 15, of the California Constitution, and
14 section 52.1 of the California Civil Code. The second amended complaint alleges the following
15 causes of action: 2
16 First: Compliance with Government Code section 900 et seq.
17 Second: Violation of substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment by retention of property
18
Third: Violation of right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment and under
19 California Government Code sections 880 through 884.
20 Fourth: Violation of substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment by retention of property
21
Fifth: Violation of equal protection by payment of property damages to other patients
22
Sixth: Lack of immunity under Government Code section 821.6 for the intentional
23 deprivation of property
24 Seventh: Violation of California Civil Code section 52.1
25
26
27
2
The eighth cause of action for violation of article 1, sections 7 and 15 of the California
28 Constitution is withdrawn. (SAC, pp. 53, 54.)
10
Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 LEGAL STANDARD
2 A demurrer is used to challenge defects that appear on the face of the complaint or from
3 matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Sirott v. Latts (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th
4 923, 928; Blank v. Kirwin (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; see also, Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30.)
5 Where a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as against the
6 defendant, a demurrer is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
7 “Under the sham pleading doctrine, a pleader cannot circumvent prior admissions by the
8 easy device of amending a pleading without explanation.” (Womack v. Lovell (2015) 237
9 Cal.App.4th 772, 787.) “Generally, after an amended pleading has been filed, courts will
10 disregard the original pleading.” (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
11 336, 343 (internal citation omitted). However, the sham pleading doctrine is an exception to this
12 rule “where an amended complaint attempts to avoid defects set forth in a prior complaint by
13 ignoring them.” (Ibid.)
14 “It is the rule that when a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his complaint and
15 elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is required and it must be presumed that
16 the plaintiff has stated as strong a case as he can.” (Gonzales v. State of Cal. (1977) 68
17 Cal.App.3d 621, 635; Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1091.) Indeed, a plaintiff’s
18 refusal to amend is “deemed an admission” that there are “no facts that could be alleged to cure
19 the defect.” (Exh. J, Excerpted Rutter Group, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (2019)
20 Ch. 7:149.1.)
21 Under California law, “a litigant appearing in propria persona is generally held to the same
22 restrictive rules and procedures as an attorney.” (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93, 98.)
23 Where a demurrer is sustained for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff has the burden of
24 proving there is a “reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Blank v.
25 Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
26
27
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 LEGAL ARGUMENT
2 I. THE STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD.
3 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not cure a key defect: the failure to timely file
4 suit. A plaintiff has six months from the date of the letter rejecting their government claim to file
5 suit on state law claims. (Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1); Dominguez v. City of Alhambra
6 (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 244.) 3 The “6-month period” consists of 6 calendar months or 182
7 days, whichever is longer. (Gonzales v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 601, 604.)
8 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint asserts compliance with the government claim
9 presentation requirement, but does not establish any compliance with the statute of limitations for
10 bringing this action. (SAC, pp. 19-23 & Exh. 5.) In a letter dated August 7, 2018, DSH
11 specifically admonished Evans of the six-month deadline to bring suit on state law claims. (SAC,
12 Exh. 6; see Gov. Code, § 913, subd. (b).) The six-month period for filing a complaint asserting
13 state law claims expired 182 days after the August 7, 2018 letter, on February 5, 2019. Yet,
14 Evans did not file this action asserting state law claims until February 11, 2019. (Ct. Docket.)
15 Hence, this Court should find Evans’s failure to meet the six-month limitations period for filing
16 this action bars his state law claims.
17 II. THE SECTION 1983 CLAIMS CANNOT PROCEED AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
18 Both the first and second amended complaints allege that defendants acted in their “official
19 and unofficial personal and individual capacities.” (SAC, p. 2; Exh. H, Excerpted FAC, pp. 2, 5.)
20 A state official is not a person subject to suit in their official capacity for damages under 42 U.S.C
21 § 1983 (Section 1983). (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71; Hafer v.
22 Melo (1991) 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 [the phrase “acting in their official capacities” is best understood
23 as a reference to the capacity in which the state official is sued, not the capacity in which the
24 official inflicts the alleged injury].) In contrast, state officials sued for damages in their personal
25 capacity come to court as individuals. (Hafer, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 27.) While a plaintiff may
26 sue a state official in his individual capacity for acts under the official authority, a plaintiff may
27
3
The statutory requirement of claim presentation does not apply to federal civil rights
28 causes of actions. (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.App.3d 834, 838.)
12
Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 not “circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading device.” (McAllister v. Los Angeles
2 Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1208, citing Will, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71.)
3 Because a Section 1983 claim cannot be brought against state defendants in their official
4 capacities, this Court should grant defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims.
5 III. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A VIABLE DUE PROCESS CLAIM.
6 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint repeats the flawed due process claim stated in his
7 first amended complaint. Plaintiff’s second claim alleges that the seizure of his property, without
8 any provision for mailing the seized property to an outside person absent a consensual search,
9 violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (SAC, pp. 24-
10 25.)
11 A. No substantive due process claim can be stated.
12 Under substantive due process jurisprudence, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
13 clause encompasses certain “fundamental” rights. (Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 301–
14 302.) “The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters
15 relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.” (Albright v. Oliver
16 (1994) 510 U.S. 266, 272.) “Courts are instructed to resist the temptation to augment
17 the substantive reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Sanchez v. City of Fresno (2012) 914
18 F.Supp.2d 1079, citing Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 478 U.S. 186, 195, overruled on other
19 grounds, Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558.)
20 “Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment
21 and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
22 punish.” (Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) 457 U.S. 307, 321-322.) In accord, civil detainees in a
23 state institution “have a substantive due process right to be free from restrictions that amount to
24 punishment.” (Allen v. Mayberg (9th Cir. 2014) 577 Fed.Appx. 728, 732.) However, such
25 detainees may properly be subject to institutional regulations. “[R]estrictions that have a
26 legitimate, non-punitive government purpose and that do not appear excessive in relation to that
27 purpose are permissible.” (Ibid.) In accord, the Fifth Appellate District ruled a civil detainee
28 housed at DSH-Coalinga did not have a right to the return of his seized electronic devices
13
Memorandum of Points and Authorities ISO Demurrer to SAC (19CECL01586)
1 (contraband) nor the right have such devices cleansed of pornography and returned to him. (In re
2 Robinson (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 247, 256.)
3 Here, Evans apparently contests the DSH-Coalinga policy requiring the voluntary
4 relinquishment of contraband devices in order for the devices to be searched prior to being mailed
5 to an outside location. (SAC, p. 26.) Because Evans cannot establish a right to possess the
6 devices seized by Department personnel, he cannot state a substantive due process claim for the
7 Department’s decision to not return the seized property for mailing to persons outside the
8 institution without a search of their contents for illicit material. (Ibid.) Therefore, his second
9 amended complaint cannot state a substantive due process claim.
10 B. No procedural due process claim can be stated.
11 To the extent Evans alleges a violation of procedural due process, the claim is not viable.
12 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
13 plaintiff from being deprived of property without due process of law. (Wolff v. McDonell (1974)