Motion to Compel Arbitration in SARAH FRANCO vs. LAND ROVER DALLAS, INC. ET, AL, et al| Trellis.Law

On April 06, 2020 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between Franco, Sarah, and Automotive Warranty Services, Inc, Land Rover Austin, Llc, Land Rover Dallas, Llc, Snell Motor Company Inc, Tt Flagger Inc, for CNTR CNSMR COM DEBT in the District Court of Dallas County.

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FILED
5/6/2020 9:08AM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Treva Parker—Ayodele DEPUTY

CAUSE NO DC-20-05273

SARAH FRANCO, IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff

V. 116TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

LAND ROVER DALLAS, INC., LAND mwmmwmmwmmwmm

ROVER AUSTIN, LLC, SNELL MOTOR
COMPANY, INC. AND TT FLAGLER,
INC. D/B/A AUTOMOTIVE WARRANTY
SERVICES, INC.

Defendants DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
AGREED MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, TT of Flagler, Inc. d/b/a Total Warranty Services (“TWS” 0r

“Defendant”), Defendant in the above-numbered and styled cause, and ﬁles itsAgreed Motion t0

Compel Arbitration (“Motion”) of the claims asserted by Plaintiff, Sarah Franco (“Plaintiff’ or

“Franco”) in Plaintiff’s Original Petition (the “Petition”), and in support hereof would show the

Court as follows:

STATEMENT 0F RELEVANT FACTS

1. In support 0f this Motion, Defendant attaches the Declaration of Matt Joffee as

Exhibit “1” and incorporates itherein t0 verify the following factual allegations and authenticate

the attached exhibits.1 Joffee is the Secretary 0f TWS.

2. On 0r about June 8, 2018, Plaintiff and Jarrod Becak (“Becak”) entered into an

agreement With Defendant Land Rover Dallas, LLC f/k/a Land Rover Dallas L.P. d/b/a Jaguar

Land Rover Dallas (“Land Rover Dallas”) t0 purchase that certain 2012 Land Rover Range Rover

1
Ex. 1.
HSE Lux VIN: SALMF1D4XCA377462 (the “Vehicle”). In connection with her purchase 0f the

Vehicle, Plaintiff also purchased a First Mile Vehicle Service Contract (the “Service Contract”)?

Plaintiff selected “Gold Plus” coverage under the Service Contract.3 The price 0f the Service

Contract was $8,932,004

3. Becak as “buyer,” Plaintiff as “co-buyer” and Land Rover Dallas are signatories t0

the instruments documenting the single transaction of purchasing of the Vehicle (the “Deal

Documents”). The Deal Documents include the Service Contract.

4. Under the terms 0f the Service Contract, the terms “Provider,” “We,” “Us,” and

“Our” refer t0 Defendant Automotive Warranty Services, Inc. (“AWS”). The term

“Administrator” refers t0 TWS. While not a signatory, TWS is a third-party beneﬁciary t0 the

Service Contracts

5. The Service Contract included an arbitration provision governed by the Federal

Arbitration Act (“FAA”).6

6. On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff ﬁled the Petition (the “Petition”) against TWS, AWS,

Land Rover Dallas, Land Rover Austin, LLC (“Land Rover Austin”) and Snell Motor Company,

Inc. (“Snell,” and with TWS, AWS, Land Rover Dallas and Land Rover Austin, collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendants denied a claim under the Service

Contract for coverage 0f engine repairs to the Vehicle. In the Petition, Plaintiff asserts the

2
A true and correct copy of the Service Contract isattached as Exhibit “l-A” and isincorporated herein by
reference.
3
EX. l-A.
4
Id.
5
See In re Palm Harbor Homes, Ina, 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006) (“A third-party beneﬁciary may
enforce a contract t0 Which it is not a party
if the parties t0 the contract intended t0 secure a beneﬁt t0 that third party
and entered into the contract directly for the third party's beneﬁt.” citing Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 589, 45 TeX.
Sup. Ct. J. 966 (Tex. 2002) and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.Tex. C0., 995
Utils. Elec. S.W.Zd 647, 651, 42 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 656 (Tex.1999)).
6
9 U.S.C. §§ 1et seq.
following causes 0f action against TWS: (1) breach of contract and (2) alleged Violations of the

Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”).7 TWS timely ﬁled an answer that denies all 0f

Plaintiff’s claims and causes 0f action.

7. This matter should be compelled to arbitration and the litigation should be stayed

because Plaintiff’s claims and underlying allegations against TWS fall Within the scope 0f the

arbitration provision contained in the Service Contract. Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope 0f

the arbitration provision because Plaintiff and TWS agreed to arbitrate claims between Plaintiff

and TWS. Because a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement exists and Plaintiff’s claims fall

within the scope of that agreement, the Court must grant this Motion and stay the litigation pending

arbitration.

II.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. The Federal Arbitration Act Governs the Arbitration Provision.

8. Federal and state law strongly favors arbitrationg Indeed, a presumption exists in

favor 0f agreements to arbitrate under the FAA.9 The FAA applies to all contracts involving

interstate commerce and was enacted t0 overcome courts’ reluctance t0 enforce arbitration

agreements.” Courts must resolve any doubts about an agreement to arbitrate in favor of

arbitration.1
1
A party opposing arbitration bears the burden 0f defeating i
t12

7
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 17.41 et seq.
8
In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001); EZPawn Corp. v.Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 9O (TeX.
1996); Cantella & C0., Inc.v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (TeX. 1996).
9
Id.
10
Allied—Bruce Terminix C0s., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995).
11
Id.
12
Id.
9. An arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable if an arbitration agreement exists

and the claims asserted are Within the scope 0f the agreement.” Once a party seeking t0 compel

arbitration establishes that an arbitration agreement exists and that the claims are Within the scope

of the arbitration agreement, the court has no discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its

proceedings pending arbitration.”

10. The terms of the Service Contract provide that the FAA governs all questions

concerning the arbitrability 0f claims (e.g.,the scope of the arbitration clauses)” Speciﬁcally, the

Arbitration Agreement expressly provides: “The arbitration shall be governed by the Federal

Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.”16 Parties

may specify the law governing an arbitration provision, and courts are obligated respect that

choice.”

11. The FAA” “mandates that district courts shall direct the parties t0 proceed t0

arbitration on issues as to Which an arbitration agreement has been signed?” The evidence

conclusively establishes that Plaintiff entered into the Service Contract containing an arbitration

provision, which isgoverned by the FAA, in connection with Plaintiff” s purchase 0f the Vehicle.”

Because a valid arbitration agreement exists and Plaintiff’s claims against TWS fall Within the

13
Texas Petrochemicals LP v. ISP Water Management Services LLC, 301 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—
Beaurnont 2009, no pet).
14
Cantella, 924 S.W.2d at 944.
15
EX. l-A
16
EX. l-A
17
See Pedcor Mgmt. C0. Welfare Beneﬁt Plan v. Nat’l Pers. 0f Tex., Ina, 343 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2003);
see also In re Big 8 Food Services, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869, 879 (TeX.App.—El Paso 2005, n0 pet.)(“an express
agreement to be governed by the FAA is controlling”); In re Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp, 19 S.W.3d 562, 567 (TeX.
App.—Waco 2000, n0 pet).
18
9 U.S.C. §§ 1et seq.
19
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (emphasis in original; “[b]y itsterms, theAct
leaves n0 place for the exercise 0f discretion
by a district court”).
20
Ex. l-A.
scope of that agreement, the Court should grant this Motion, compel Plaintiff’s claims against

TWS t0 arbitration and stay this proceeding pending the outcome 0f the arbitration.

B. The Parties Expressly Agreed t0 Arbitrate.

12. Ordinary principals of state contract law determine whether there is a valid

agreement to arbitrate.” The elements 0f a valid contract are (1) an offer, (2) an acceptance, (3)

a meeting 0f the minds, (4) each party’s consent t0 the terms, and (5) execution and delivery 0f the

contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding.” “Under generally accepted principles 0f

contract interpretation, all writings that pertain t0 the same transaction Will be considered together,

even ifthey were executed at different times and d0 not expressly refer t0 one another.”23 As c0-

purchaser 0f the Vehicle, Plaintiff is a party t0 the Deal Documents and the Service Contract.

Speciﬁcally, Plaintiff agreed t0 resolve any dispute arising from the Service Contract in an arbital

forum and not a judicial f0rum.24 Such disputes include, without limitation, “the Cost of, lack of

0r actual repair 0r replacement arising from a Breakdown?”

13. As Administrator of the Service Contract, TWS is a third-party beneﬁciary to the

Service Contract.26 It iswell-established under Texas law that a third-party beneﬁciary can enforce

an arbitration agreement.”

21
Cleveland C0nst., Inc. v.Levco C0nst., Ina, 359 S.W.3d 843, 852 (TexApp. — Houston [1“ Dist.]2012, pet.
dism’d).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 853.
24
EX. l-A.
25
EX. l-A.
26
See In re Palm Harbor Homes, Ina, 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006) (“A third-party beneﬁciary may
enforce a contract t0 Which it is not a party
ifthe parties to the contract intended to secure a beneﬁt t0 that third party
and entered into the contract directly for the third party's beneﬁt.” citing Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 589, 45 TeX.
Sup. Ct. J. 966 (Tex. 2002) and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.Tex. C0., 995
Utils. Elec. S.W.Zd 647, 651, 42 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 656 (Tex.1999)).
27
Id..
14. Even if Plaintiffwere a non-signatory to the Service Contract, which TWS disputes,

the arbitration agreement is stillenforceable as t0 her claims in this case. According t0 principles

of contract and agency law, arbitration agreements may bind non-signatories under any of six

theories: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) equitable

estoppel, and (6) third party beneﬁciary.” Non-signatories t0 a contract containing an arbitration

clause may be bound by the arbitration requirement under the “direct beneﬁts estoppel” theory.”

15. In In re Weekley Homes, L.P., the Court ruled that a party t0 a contract containing

an arbitration clause could compel arbitration 0f a personal injury claim brought by a nonparty

because the nonparty obtained beneﬁts from the contract.” In In re Ford Motor C0., the Court

held that Where a claim from a nonparty to a contract isbased 0n a contract and is subject t0 the

contract’s arbitration provisions if the nonparty seeks, through the claim, t0 derive a beneﬁt from

the contrac t.31 In this case, Plaintiff seeks to derive beneﬁts from the Service Contract because

she alleges that repairs t0 the Vehicle were covered under it. She claims that Defendants breached

the Service Contract and violated the DTPA in connection with the Service Contract. Under

Weekly Homes, Plaintiff is estopped from avoiding the arbitration provision in the Service

Contract. For these reasons, Plaintiff’ s claims should be compelled t0 arbitration.

C. All 0fPlaintiff’s Claims Fall Within the Scope 0fthe Arbitration Provision.

28
See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Ina, 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (TeX. 2005).
29
Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 305—08 (Tex. 2006); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d
127, 132—35 (Tex. 2005); LDF Const. Inc. v. Bryan, 324 S.W.3d 137, 148 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet); In re
James E. Bashaw & C0., 305 S.W.3d 44, 53—56 (Tex. App.—Houst0n [lst Dist] 2009, orig. proceeding); PER Group,
L.P. v.Dava Oncology, L.P., 294 S.W.3d 378, 387 (TeX. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet); Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC
Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129, 147—48 (TeX. App.—Tyler 2008, n0 pet); but see Van Zanten v. Energy Transfer
Partners, L.P., 320 S.W.3d 845, 848—49 (TeX. App.—Houst0n [lst Dist.]2010, n0 pet.) (n0 estoppel When party
resisting arbitration engaged in n0 conduct 0n Which other party relied); In re Advance Payroll Funding, Ltd, 254
S.W.3d 710, 712—14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) (nonparty not compelled t0 arbitrateWhen dispute
did not arise from agreement requiring arbitration).
30
In re Weekley Homes L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 131—35 (Tex. 2005).
31
In re Ford Motor C0., 220 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet).

6
15. The broad scope of the Arbitration Agreement encompasses all of Plaintiff’s

claims against TWS and requires that they be arbitrated. Plaintiffs’ claims fall well Within the

broad scope of the arbitration provision. Contract claims, tort claims, and statutory claims,

including but not limited t0 alleged DTPA Violations, are routinely held t0 fall within the scope 0f

contractual arbitration clauses.32

16. Indeed, arbitration provisions containing language similar to that used here —

alldisputes “arising out 0f 0r relating t0” a contract 0r transaction — have been held t0 be “broad

arbitration clauses capable 0f expansive reach.”33 Under such broad arbitration clauses, “it is only

necessary that the dispute ‘touch’ matters covered by” the contract containing the arbitration

provision “t0 be arbitrable.”34

17. Plaintiff bears the burden 0f overcoming a heavy presumption in favor 0f

arbitration. The Fifth Circuit holds that “arbitration should not be denied unless itcan be said

with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is n_ot susceptible 0f an interpretation Which

”935
would cover the dispute at issue. The Court “resolve[s] doubts concerning the scope of

36
coverage of an arbitration clause in a contract in favor 0f arbitration.” When parties choose

broad language for an arbitration provision, “only the .. .most forceful evidence 0f a purpose t0

exclude the claim from arbitration would render the dispute non-arbitrable.”37

32
See, e.g.,Ommani v. Doctor’s Assocs., 789 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding DTPA claims arbitrable);
Jack B. Anglin C0. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 270-71 (Tex. 1992) (same).
33
Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. C0. v. Ramco Energy Ltd., 139 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
Saturn Distrib. Corp. v.Paramount Saturn, Ltd., 326 F.3d 684, 687 (5th Cir. 2003).
34
Pennzoil, 139 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler—Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625 n.13 (1985)).
35
Neal v. Hardee ’s Food Systems, Ina, 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted; emphasis added).
36
Under Texas law, as under the FAA, courts “accept every reasonable presumption Which favors arbitration
When deciding Whether arbitration isrequired,” and “resolve any doubts concerning the scope 0f the agreement in
favor 0f arbitration.”Nationwide ofFort Worth, Inc. v. Wigington, 945 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997,
writ dism’d W.0.j.).
37
Saturn, 326 F.3d at 687 (quotations omitted).
D. Arbitration Takes Priority Over Litigation

18. As demonstrated above, Plaintiff” s claims against TWS are arbitrable. Under

binding precedent from the Supreme Court ofthe United States, the FAA requires arbitrable claims

to be compelled to arbitration.” The Texas Supreme Court in In re Merrill Lynch Trust Company,

FSB39 held that arbitration takes priority over litigation. “Trial judges cannot deny a party its day

in court, but they have always had wide discretion t0 say when that day will be.”40 Both the Federal

and Texas Arbitration Acts require courts t0 stay litigation 0f issues that are subj ect t0 arbitration.“

Without such a stay, arbitration would n0 longer be the “rapid, inexpensive alternative t0

traditional litigation itwas intended to be, so long as one could ﬁnd a trial judge Willing to letthe

litigation proceed for a While.” The FAA was passed precisely t0 overcome such judicial

hostility.“

19. When an issue is pending in both arbitration and litigation, the FAA generally

requires the arbitration to go forward ﬁrst.“ Arbitration “should be given priority t0 the extent it

is likely to resolve issues material to this lawsuit.”45 There are many circumstances in which

litigation must be abated t0 ensure that an issue two parties have agreed t0 arbitrate is not decided

instead in collateral litigation.“

38
Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 217.
39
235 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2007) (“Merrill Lynch I”)
4°
Merrill Lynch I, 235 S.W.3d at 195.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Merrill Lynch I, 235 S.W.3d at 195.
45
Id. AgGrow
(citing Oils, L.L.C.v. Nat’lUnion Fire Ins. C0.,242 F.3d 777, 783 (8th Cir.
2001).
46
Id.;see also In re Kellog Brown & Root, Inc, 166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005) (holding that nonsignatory’s
litigationof a lien claim was abated While arbitratorsdecided Who owned the equipment to Which the lien claim
attached).
20. The Texas Supreme Court reiterated itsholding that arbitration takes priority over

litigation in a subsequent case involving Merrill Lynch.“ The Supreme Court held in Merrill

Lynch II that parallel litigation involving non-signatories that threatens t0 undermine 0r moot

arbitration, thereby negating the parties’ agreement and bargained-for arbitration, must be abated

pending the outcome 0f arbitration.“

21. In Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Residuos Industriales Multiquim, S.A. de C. V.,49 the Fifth

Circuit held that the FAA’S mandatory stay applies t0 a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement

if (1) the arbitrated and litigated disputes involve the same operative facts, (2) the claims asserted

in the arbitration and litigation are “inherently inseparable” and (3) the litigation has a “critical

impact” 0n the arbitration. The First Court 0f Appeals followed Waste Mgmt. in In re Devon

Energy Corp,” reasoning that “courts must focus 0n preserving the right t0 meaningful arbitration

rather than addressing potential harm to the rights of a non-signatory.”

22. Because Plaintiff’s claims against TWS fall within the scope 0f the arbitration

provision contained in the Service Contract, the parties should be “direct[ed] .. . t0 proceed t0

”51
arbitration. For these reasons, the Court should grant this Motion, compel Plaintiff’s claims

against TWS to arbitration and stay the litigation pending arbitration.52

47
In re Merrill Lynch and C0. Ina, 315 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. 2010) (“Merrill Lynch II”).
48
Merrill Lynch II, 315 S.W.3d at 891; see also Greystone Multi-Family Builders Inc. v. TES Electric LP, No.
01-15-00640-CV, 2016 WL 3362208, at *6 (TeX. App.—H0uston [1“ Dist] June 16, 2016, n0 pet. h) (memo. opinion)
(following Merrill Lynch I and Merrill Lynch II in holding that litigation with non-signatories must be stayed pending
arbitration); In re Helix Energy Solutions Group, Ina, 303 S.W.3d 386 (TeX. App.—H0ust0n [14th Dist] 2010, orig.
proceeding) (following Merrill Lynch I in holding that even When a party has brought arbitrable claims against one
party and claims not subject t0 arbitration against another party in the same lawsuit, courts should stay all litigation.)
49
372 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 2004).
50
332 S.W.3d 543, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [1“ Dist] 2009, no pet.)
51
Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at218.
52
See Alford v.Dean Witter Reynolds, Ina, 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992)

9
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant TWS respectfully prays that the

Court grant itsMotion t0 Compel Arbitration and Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Arbitration

and t0 stay this action pending such arbitration and for such and further relief, both at law and in

equity, t0 which TWS may show itself t0 be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHNSON DELUCA KURISKY & GOULD
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

By: //s// George A. Kuriskv, Jr.

GEORGE A. KURISKY, JR.
SBT N0: 11767700
gkurisky@jdkglaw.com
MARK ALLAN BANKSTON
SBT No. 2400 1430
mbankston@idkglaw.com
4 Houston Center
1221 Lamar Street, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77010
(713) 652-2525 - Telephone
(7 1 3)652-5 1 30 — Facsimile

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
TT OF FLAGLER, INC. D/B/A TOTAL WARRANTY
SERVICES

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
Ihereby certify as follows:

A conference was held on April 27, 2020, with Melissa Simpson by e-mail 0n the merits
of this motion. Ms. Simpson advised that Plaintiff is not opposed to the Motion.

//s//MarkAllan Bankston
MARK ALLAN BANKSTON

10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument was served 0n Plaintiff via electronic mail,
compliance with Texas Rule 0f Civil Procedure on 6th of May,
in 213(2), this the day 2020, as

follows:

Alex R. Hernandez, Jr.
Melissa Simpson
The Law Ofﬁces 0f Alex R. Hernandez, Jr. PLLC
100 Congress Avenue, Suite 2000
Austin, Texas 78701
arh@alexhemandezcase.com

//s//MarkAllan Bankston
MARK ALLAN BANKSTON

11
CAUSE NO DC-20-05273
DC—20—05273

SARAH FRANCO, §
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
§
Plaintiff
Plaintiff §§
§§
v.
V. §
§ 116™
116T” JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§§
LAND ROVER DALLAS, INC, INC., LAND §
§
ROVER AUSTIN, LLC, SNELL MOTOR §
§
COMPANY, INC. AND TT FLAGLER, §
§
INC. D/B/A
DIBIA AUTOMOTIVE WARRANTY §
§
SERVICES, INC. §§
§
§
Defendants
Defendants §
§ DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

DECLARATION
DECLARATION IN SUPP ORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
IN SUPPORT ARBFTRATION
STA
STATETE OF0F FLORIDA §
§
§
§
COUNTY OF 0F PALM BEACH §§

I,
I, Matt Joffe,
Joffe, pursuant to TEX.
pursuant to TEX. CIV.
CIV. PRAC. & 6c REM. CODE§§
CODE §§ 132.001
132.001 etseq., declare
er seq, declare under
under
penalty of
penalty perjury that
of perjmy that the
the following
following statements
statements are
are true
true and
and correct.
correct.

1.
1. My name is is Matt Joffe.
Joffe. II am over
over the
the age of eighteen
eighteen (18)
(18) years
years old
old and
and
am duly
duly qualified
qualiﬁed and authorized
authorized toto make this
this Affidavit
Afﬁdavit on behalf of
0n behalf of TT ofof
Flagler,
Flagler, Inc.
Inc. d/b/a
dfb/a Total
Total Warranty
Wannnty Services
Services ("TWS'').
(“TWS”). The
The following
following
statements
statements are within my knowledge
are within knowledge andand are
are true
true and
and correct.
correct.

2.
2. IIam aasecretary
secretary for
for TWS and
and IIam a
a custodian of records
custodian records concerning
concerning aa
First
First Mile
Mile Vehicle
Vehicle Service
Service Contract
Contract (the
(the "Service
“Service Contract")
Contract”) dated June 8,
dated June 8,
2018
2018 in
in connection
connection with
with the
the purchase
purchase by
by Jarrod
Jarrod Becak ("Becak")
(“Becak”) and
and
Sarah
Sarah Franco
Franco ("Franco»
(“Franco” or
or "Plaintiff')
“Plaintiff? of that
of that certain 2012
certain 2012 Land Rover
Rover
Range
Range Rover
RoVer HSE Lux VIN: SALMF1D4XCA377462
SALMF1D4XCA37?462 (the
(the ''Vehicle")
“Vehicle“?
from
from Land
Land Rover Dallas,
Dallas, LLC f/k/a
ﬂkr’a Land Rover Dallas
Dallas L.P.
LP. d/b/a
dfbfa Jaguar
Jaguar
Land Rover Dallas (''Land
Rover Dallas (“Land Rover Dallas").
Dallas”). II am familiar
familiar with
with the
the manner
manner
in which
in TWS’
which TWS' records are created
records are created and
and maintained
maintained byby virtue of my
virtue of my duties
duties
and
and responsibilities.
responsibilities.

3.
3. The statements
statements made in
in this
this Declaration
Declaration are
are based upon my personal
personal
knowledge acquired
acquired by
by virtue
virtue of my
of position
position as
as the
the custodian
custodian of
0f these
these
records
records and
and my review
review of
of the
the records.
records.

4.
4. The
The document
document attached

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Motion,Ex Parte: SARAH FRANCO vs. LAND ROVER DALLAS, INC. ET, AL, et al

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