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COMMONWEALTIT OF MASSACHUSETTS
HAMPSHIRIE, SS. HAMPSHIRE COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT
Civil Action No. 1580CV00134
\ coxnon RICHARDS, )
K&S Plaintiff )
SX
. UL 06 2016
C NROBERT WILLIAMS, )
J Defendant )
&
‘ DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO THE
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
NOW COMES the Defendant, Robert Williams, through his attorney, Michael P. Garrity,
ar requests this | fonorable Court allow him to amend his Answer to assert a sudden medical
emergency affirmative defense. Copy of the proposed Amended Answer to PlaintifPs Complaint is
attached hereto. In support of this Motion, the Defendant states as follows:
Pursuant to M.G.1.. 231, § 51, the court “may at any time . . . allow any other amendment in
matter of form or substance in any ... pleading... which may . . . enable the defendant to make a
legal defense.” Furthermore, “[i]t has always been the policy of [the S}C] to construe liberally the
statute as to amendments.” Maker v. Bouthier, 242 Mass. 20, 23 (1922). In addition, “(t]his statute as
amendments has been broadly interpreted for many years so as to accomplish as to form and
technical procedure whatever the justice of the case requires.” Attorney General v. Hlenry, 262 Mass.
127, 129 (1928) (citing Pizer v. Hunt, 253 Mass. 321, 331 (1925); Valentine v. Farnsworth, 38 Mass.
76, 184 (1838)).
Under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice
ofan the
thy Hotinr
so requires.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Generally, “[t]he decision whether to grant a motion to amend is
Jaya b29Kwithin the discretion of the judge.” Mathis v. Massachusetts Electric Co., 409 Mass. 256, 264 (1991).
However, Rule 15(a) “eliminated the once broad discretionary authority of a judge to deny a motion
to amend a pleading.” Castelluci v. US.
Accordingly, “leave should be granted unless there are good reasons for denying the motion.”
Mathis, 409 Mass. at 264; see also All Seasons Services, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hospitals
of Boston, 416 Mass. 269, 272 (1993); Goulet v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 399 Mass. at 547, 549
(1987). “Good reason,” according to the SJC, contemplates “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive ... repeated failure to cure deficiencies ... undue prejudice . . . futility of amendment, ete.”
Mathis, 409 Mass. at 264 (quoting Castelluci, 372 Mass. at 289-90).
Here, the Defendant wishes to amend his Answer to include an additional affirmative
defense of sudden medical emergency. As the SJC has held, “[b]y the great weight of authority a
sudden and unforeseeable [medical emergency] rendering an operator unable to control his motor
vehicle cannot be termed negligence.” Carroll v. Bouley, 338 Mass. 625, 627 (1959); see also
Ellingsgard v. Silver, 352 Mass. 34, 36 (1967); McGovern v. ‘Tinglof, 344 Mass. 114, 117 (1962)
(both affirming Carroll); Roa v. Roberts, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 114, *2 (2007) (“Massachusetts
courts have recognized the doctrine of sudden medical emergency as a defense to a negligence
claim”). Such is precisely the situation in this case.
The instant matter involves a two vehicle accident which occurred on July 5, 2013 on
Amherst Street in Granby, Massachusetts. Defendant states that while driving behind the Plaintiff's
vehicle, he started feeling light-headed and woozy. He rolled his window down to get some fresh air
and then blacked out. He woke up after the alleged accident occurred. ‘he dispositive issue in
sudden medical emergency cases is whether the defendant “was still a normal operator” or was
impaired prior fo the events leading up to the accident. Carroll, 352 Mass. at 627-28; McGovern, 344
Mass. at 116-17; Roa, 2007 Mass. App. Div. at *2; see also Lllingsgard, 352 Mass. at 689 (negligencemay only be found if defendant knew or should have known that he was likely to suffer the
impairment causing the emergency); Langland v. U.S., 2002 WL 225937, *3 (D. Mass. 2002)
(acknowledging both Carroll and Ellingsgard, as cited above). Accordingly, the affirmative defense
of sudden medical emergency is viable and should be permitted as part of the Defendant’s answer.
Additionally, the Defendant asserts that allowing the amendment of his Answer for the
addition of a sudden medical emergency affirmative defense will not prejudice any party or cause
undue delay. WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an
Order allowing the defendant to amend his Answer.
Respectfully Submitted,
The Defendant, Robert Williams,
By his Attorney:
Law Offices of Sherry, Black, Geller,
Cain & Vachereau
10 St. James Avenue, 5" Floor
Boston, MA 02116
‘Tel: (617) 867-4746
BBO No. 687791
Michacl.Garrity@Liberty Mutual.comCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1, Michael P. Garrity, [sq., attorney for the Defendant, Robert Williams, hereby certify that 1
have this day served a copy of the foregoing:
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO THE
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
by mailing a copy of the same, postage prepaid, directed to:
John J. McQuade, Esquire
Law Offices of Mark E. Salomone
175 State Street, Suite 200
Springfield, MA 01103
Dated: _bfily
Michael P. Garrity.
BBO No. 687791