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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF PLACER
Date: November 15,2019 Time: 8:30 AM
Judge: Michael W. Jones Dept.: LM
Reporter: Clerk:
Murphy, Anna M. vs.Smith, Charley D. et al [_] Present
[_] Present
(_]And related Cross Action(s) Case # S-CV-0040220
Law and Motion Minutes
Proceedings RE: Motion: Summary Judgment -
L] Dropped. _] Continued to C] by Plaintiff[.] by Defendant
(] by Stipulation [] by Court
[_]Matter argued and submitted.
(_]Submitted on points and authorities without (J argument (J appearance.
(] Motion/Petition granted. [] Motion/Petition denied.
(1 Demurrer [1]sustained [] overruled [] without [] with leave to [_]amend (_]answer.
(J Counsel appointed for:
(_]Taken under submission.
(_]Debtor issworn and retired with counsel for examination.
(J Stipulation to []Judge Pro Tem [_]Commissioner executed in open court.
[] Counsel for to prepare the written order and submit ittoopposing counsel for approval as
tocontent and form.
(J Other ‘
The tentative ruling isadopted asthe ruling of the court, towit:
ruling is issued by the Honorable Michael W. Jones. If oral
This tentative
requested, it shall be heard at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3,
argument is
located at the Historic Courthouse in Auburn.
Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Summary Adjudication
MAN 0 AA
~ a
Rulings on Request for Judicial Notice and Objections to Evidence
Plaintiff and cross-defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.
Defendant and cross-complainant’s objections to evidence are ruled on
as follows: Objection Nos. 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10 to the declaration of Michelle
Gallagher are sustained. Objection Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 to the declaration
of Anna Murphy are sustained. The remaining objections are overruled.
Ruling on Motion
Defendant and cross-complainant Charley Smith, individually and as
trustee of the Charley D. Smith Family Trust (“Smith”) moves for summary
judgment of plaintiff and cross-defendant Anna Murphy’s (“Murphy’s”) second
amended complaint, or alternatively summary adjudication of each cause of
action alleged by Murphy, and summary adjudication of Smith’s cross-claim for
judicial foreclosure.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing there is
triable issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment
no
of law. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
as a matter
party may also move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes
850. A
Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f) (1). The moving party has the burden of
of action.
by affidavit, facts establishing every element necessary to sustain
showing,
of the party. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91
a judgment in favor
468. If the moving party carries its initial burden of
Cal.App.4th 454,
a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of
production to make
burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie
material fact, the
~ —_
showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850. The pleadings serve as the
“outer measure of materiality” for a motion for summary judgment in addition
to determining the scope of the motion. Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.
Murphy’s second amended complaint alleges four separate causes of
action for breach of contract based on a Contract for Deed entered into by
the parties on or about April 23, 2013. (UMF 3.) The first cause of action
alleges that Smith breached the Contract for Deed “by engaging in commerce,
wrongfully and unlawfully entered into contract for financial gain by leasing
Murphy’s Easement to Ponderosa. Defendant Smith did not disclose the
easement in progress from the inception of the Lease signed December 2012 to
the Contract signed May 2013, nor at any time after, as the Easement Access
was not created and recorded until September 2014.” (Second Amended
(“SAC”), 4 38.) The second amended complaint does not identify what
Complaint
term was breached by Smith’s alleged failure to disclose an easement
contract
subject property, nor does the opposition explain how a breach of the
on the
has been stated. Further, Smith sets forth undisputed evidence
contract
Easement Access agreement affecting the subject property was
showing that the
S Ranch, LLC, and Anthem Telecom, LLC, and not by
entered into between Winged
or as trustee of the Charley D. Smith Family Trust.
Smith as an individual
to establish a triable issue of material fact with
(UMF 15.) Murphy fails
of action for breach of contract, and summary
respect to her first cause
adjudication is appropriate as to this claim.
~ ~
Murphy’s second cause of action alleges that Smith breached the
Contract for Deed by preventing her from accessing Nevada Irrigation District
(“N.I.D.”) water. (SAC, @I 41, 42.) The Contract for Deed states that the
“Property also includes 1/3 interest in the N.I.D. water box and existing
water line at 6770 McCourtney Road.” To the extent Smith prevented Murphy
from accessing the N.I.D water box which was expressly made part of the
Contract for Deed, this would constitute a breach of the contract. Smith
asserts that this claim fails because Murphy cannot establish that she was
damaged, and cannot enforce the Contract for Deed due to her own breaches.
In order to show that an element of a claim cannot be established,
Smith must either present affirmative evidence negating the element, or
present evidence that plaintiff “does not possess and cannot reasonably
obtain, needed evidence”. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25
Cal.4th at 854. Smith must do more than to simply argue that Murphy “has no
evidence”. Smith must produce affirmative evidence which establishes that
Murphy cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support the claim. Gaggero v.
Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891; Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 799, 808. In support of the assertion that Murphy was not
damaged by Smith’s actions, Smith generally cites to his own declaration.
However, that declaration does not address the issue of whether Murphy was
damaged by Smith’s alleged interference regarding the N.I.D. water box.
Further, Smith does not establish an absence of evidence by, for example,
admissions or other discovery responses by Murphy. See Union Bank v.
Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590. Accordingly, the burden does
not shift to Murphy to establish a triable issue of fact with respect to her
damages.
Smith does submit admissible evidence to support his contention that
Murphy has breached the Contract for Deed by failing to pay the balance of
the amount due on or before April 1, 2019. (UMF 8, 11.) However, in
opposition, Murphy establishes a triable issue of material fact regarding
whether her failure to perform was caused by Smith’s actions in recording
documents against the property claiming that Murphy was only a tenant,
informing third parties that Murphy had no ownership rights to the property,
actively attempting to prevent Murphy from obtaining financing by using the
property as security, and demanding a balloon payment exceeding the purchase
price by nearly $250,000, as the remaining amount due under the Contract for
Deed. (UMF 10, 11.) There is also a triable issue of fact regarding whether
Smith has continued to allow Murphy to perform under the Contract for Deed by
accepting monthly payments from her, despite his unilateral characterization
of such payments as “rent”. (Deposition of Charley Smith at 110:4-15.)
Based on the foregoing, Smith’s motion is denied as to the second cause of
action for breach of contract.
Murphy’s third cause of action alleges that “Murphy is not responsible
for the additional interest [on judgment liens recorded against the subject
property] as this would put the purchase price over the property value when
sold to Murphy.” (SAC, @ 44.) Murphy’s allegations do not describe any
breach of the Contract for Deed by Smith. Accordingly, summary adjudication
is granted as to Murphy’s third cause of action.
Murphy’s fourth cause of action alleges that Smith “is non-compliant in
participating in the Seller’s Escrow agreements and documents by returning
~ am
Stewart Title’s Sellers Opening package.” (SAC, @@ 46.) Murphy does not
identify any term of the Contract for Deed which requires Smith to
participate in Murphy’s attempts to sell the property or obtain a loan using
the property as security. Murphy further alleges that Smith “will not
fulfill his obligation under the Contract to deliver a clear title.” (SAC, @
48.) But as Murphy does not establish that Smith’s obligation to deliver
title has arisen under the Contract for Deed, she fails to state a breach of
contract claim based on this allegation. Summary adjudication is granted as
to Murphy’s fourth cause of action.
Murphy’s eighth cause of action, alleged solely against Smith as
trustee of the Smith Family Trust, alleges a confidential relationship arose
between herself and the trust. However, Murphy does not allege any actions
constituting a breach of this confidential relationship. Accordingly,
summary adjudication is granted as to Murphy’s eighth cause of action.
Murphy’s ninth cause of action alleges conspiracy to commit fraud by
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a
Smith.
wrongful act. City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
Further, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort, and requires
191, 212.
underlying wrongful act be committed. Id. Murphy does not independently
an
by Smith or any other person, and does not allege that any other
allege fraud
Smith's alleged actions. As Murphy fails to allege a
person was involved in
summary adjudication is granted as to the ninth cause of
conspiracy by Smith,
action.
~ -_
Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action alleges quiet title against
defendants Smith, ATC Ponderosa K LLC and American Tower Corporation,
regarding the Easement Access agreement between Winged S Ranch, LLC, and
Anthem Telecom, LLC. Plaintiff further seeks a declaration “that title to
the Property is vested in Plaintiff alone”. Plaintiff, as an owner of an
equitable interest in the subject property pursuant to the installment land
contract or real property sales contract, cannot maintain an action to quiet
title to the subject property. Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d
291, 292. This claim also fails as plaintiff does not assert a cognizable
legal basis for vesting title in herself, or tender or the ability to tender
the full amount owing on the underlying loan. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020;
Mix v. Sodd (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 386, 390; McElroy v. Chase Manhattan
Mortgage Corp. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 388, 391-395. Summary adjudication is
granted as to the tenth cause of action.
Plaintiff's eleventh cause of action seeks declaratory relief against
Smith, ATC Ponderosa K LLC and American Tower Corporation “as to the rights
of these parties in the Easement and the Property.” (SAC, I 73.) She seeks
of “the rights of each of the parties herein”, and an order
a determination
to enjoin the defendants from exercising rights relating to the Easement
(SAC, @@ 74.) As this cause of action encompasses a
Access agreement.
determination of the rights of the parties with respect to the subject
adjudication is not appropriate. As noted, there is a
property, summary
of facts regarding whether Smith has actively prevented Murphy from
dispute
the terms of the Contract for Deed. There is also a
performing under
dispute between the parties regarding the remaining amount owed
significant
the import of Smith’s continuing acceptance of monthly
by Murphy, and
~ ~~
payments from Murphy. Summary adjudication is denied as to the eleventh
cause of action.
Finally, Smith seeks summary adjudication of his cause of action for
judicial foreclosure. Again, there is a dispute of facts regarding whether
Smith actively prevented Murphy from performing under the terms of the
Contract for Deed, the amount claimed by Smith to be due as of April 1, 2019,
and the import of Smith’s acceptance of monthly payments from Murphy. For
this reason, summary adjudication is denied as to Smith’s claim for judicial
foreclosure.
In summary, Smith’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Smith’s
motion for summary adjudication is granted as to Murphy’s first, third,
fourth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action. Smith’s motion for
summary adjudication is denied as to Murphy’s second and eleventh causes of
action, and Smith’s cross-claim for judicial foreclosure.
Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Summary
Adjudication
Defendants ATC Ponderosa K LLC and American Tower Corporation's joinder
defendant and cross-complainant Charley D. Smith's motion for summary
to
or alternatively summary adjudication, is dropped in light of the
judgment,
dismissal of these defendants entered November 13, 2019.
Preview
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF PLACER Date: November 15,2019 Time: 8:30 AM Judge: Michael W. Jones Dept.: LM Reporter: Clerk: Murphy, Anna M. vs.Smith, Charley D. et al [_] Present [_] Present (_]And related Cross Action(s) Case # S-CV-0040220 Law and Motion Minutes Proceedings RE: Motion: Summary Judgment - L] Dropped. _] Continued to C] by Plaintiff[.] by Defendant (] by Stipulation [] by Court [_]Matter argued and submitted. (_]Submitted on points and authorities without (J argument (J appearance. (] Motion/Petition granted. [] Motion/Petition denied. (1 Demurrer [1]sustained [] overruled [] without [] with leave to [_]amend (_]answer. (J Counsel appointed for: (_]Taken under submission. (_]Debtor issworn and retired with counsel for examination. (J Stipulation to []Judge Pro Tem [_]Commissioner executed in open court. [] Counsel for to prepare the written order and submit ittoopposing counsel for approval as tocontent and form. (J Other ‘ The tentative ruling isadopted asthe ruling of the court, towit: ruling is issued by the Honorable Michael W. Jones. If oral This tentative requested, it shall be heard at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3, argument is located at the Historic Courthouse in Auburn. Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Summary Adjudication MAN 0 AA ~ a Rulings on Request for Judicial Notice and Objections to Evidence Plaintiff and cross-defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted. Defendant and cross-complainant’s objections to evidence are ruled on as follows: Objection Nos. 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10 to the declaration of Michelle Gallagher are sustained. Objection Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 to the declaration of Anna Murphy are sustained. The remaining objections are overruled. Ruling on Motion Defendant and cross-complainant Charley Smith, individually and as trustee of the Charley D. Smith Family Trust (“Smith”) moves for summary judgment of plaintiff and cross-defendant Anna Murphy’s (“Murphy’s”) second amended complaint, or alternatively summary adjudication of each cause of action alleged by Murphy, and summary adjudication of Smith’s cross-claim for judicial foreclosure. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing there is triable issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment no of law. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, as a matter party may also move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes 850. A Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f) (1). The moving party has the burden of of action. by affidavit, facts establishing every element necessary to sustain showing, of the party. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 a judgment in favor 468. If the moving party carries its initial burden of Cal.App.4th 454, a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of production to make burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie material fact, the ~ —_ showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850. The pleadings serve as the “outer measure of materiality” for a motion for summary judgment in addition to determining the scope of the motion. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258. Murphy’s second amended complaint alleges four separate causes of action for breach of contract based on a Contract for Deed entered into by the parties on or about April 23, 2013. (UMF 3.) The first cause of action alleges that Smith breached the Contract for Deed “by engaging in commerce, wrongfully and unlawfully entered into contract for financial gain by leasing Murphy’s Easement to Ponderosa. Defendant Smith did not disclose the easement in progress from the inception of the Lease signed December 2012 to the Contract signed May 2013, nor at any time after, as the Easement Access was not created and recorded until September 2014.” (Second Amended (“SAC”), 4 38.) The second amended complaint does not identify what Complaint term was breached by Smith’s alleged failure to disclose an easement contract subject property, nor does the opposition explain how a breach of the on the has been stated. Further, Smith sets forth undisputed evidence contract Easement Access agreement affecting the subject property was showing that the S Ranch, LLC, and Anthem Telecom, LLC, and not by entered into between Winged or as trustee of the Charley D. Smith Family Trust. Smith as an individual to establish a triable issue of material fact with (UMF 15.) Murphy fails of action for breach of contract, and summary respect to her first cause adjudication is appropriate as to this claim. ~ ~ Murphy’s second cause of action alleges that Smith breached the Contract for Deed by preventing her from accessing Nevada Irrigation District (“N.I.D.”) water. (SAC, @I 41, 42.) The Contract for Deed states that the “Property also includes 1/3 interest in the N.I.D. water box and existing water line at 6770 McCourtney Road.” To the extent Smith prevented Murphy from accessing the N.I.D water box which was expressly made part of the Contract for Deed, this would constitute a breach of the contract. Smith asserts that this claim fails because Murphy cannot establish that she was damaged, and cannot enforce the Contract for Deed due to her own breaches. In order to show that an element of a claim cannot be established, Smith must either present affirmative evidence negating the element, or present evidence that plaintiff “does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence”. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 854. Smith must do more than to simply argue that Murphy “has no evidence”. Smith must produce affirmative evidence which establishes that Murphy cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support the claim. Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891; Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 808. In support of the assertion that Murphy was not damaged by Smith’s actions, Smith generally cites to his own declaration. However, that declaration does not address the issue of whether Murphy was damaged by Smith’s alleged interference regarding the N.I.D. water box. Further, Smith does not establish an absence of evidence by, for example, admissions or other discovery responses by Murphy. See Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590. Accordingly, the burden does not shift to Murphy to establish a triable issue of fact with respect to her damages. Smith does submit admissible evidence to support his contention that Murphy has breached the Contract for Deed by failing to pay the balance of the amount due on or before April 1, 2019. (UMF 8, 11.) However, in opposition, Murphy establishes a triable issue of material fact regarding whether her failure to perform was caused by Smith’s actions in recording documents against the property claiming that Murphy was only a tenant, informing third parties that Murphy had no ownership rights to the property, actively attempting to prevent Murphy from obtaining financing by using the property as security, and demanding a balloon payment exceeding the purchase price by nearly $250,000, as the remaining amount due under the Contract for Deed. (UMF 10, 11.) There is also a triable issue of fact regarding whether Smith has continued to allow Murphy to perform under the Contract for Deed by accepting monthly payments from her, despite his unilateral characterization of such payments as “rent”. (Deposition of Charley Smith at 110:4-15.) Based on the foregoing, Smith’s motion is denied as to the second cause of action for breach of contract. Murphy’s third cause of action alleges that “Murphy is not responsible for the additional interest [on judgment liens recorded against the subject property] as this would put the purchase price over the property value when sold to Murphy.” (SAC, @ 44.) Murphy’s allegations do not describe any breach of the Contract for Deed by Smith. Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted as to Murphy’s third cause of action. Murphy’s fourth cause of action alleges that Smith “is non-compliant in participating in the Seller’s Escrow agreements and documents by returning ~ am Stewart Title’s Sellers Opening package.” (SAC, @@ 46.) Murphy does not identify any term of the Contract for Deed which requires Smith to participate in Murphy’s attempts to sell the property or obtain a loan using the property as security. Murphy further alleges that Smith “will not fulfill his obligation under the Contract to deliver a clear title.” (SAC, @ 48.) But as Murphy does not establish that Smith’s obligation to deliver title has arisen under the Contract for Deed, she fails to state a breach of contract claim based on this allegation. Summary adjudication is granted as to Murphy’s fourth cause of action. Murphy’s eighth cause of action, alleged solely against Smith as trustee of the Smith Family Trust, alleges a confidential relationship arose between herself and the trust. However, Murphy does not allege any actions constituting a breach of this confidential relationship. Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted as to Murphy’s eighth cause of action. Murphy’s ninth cause of action alleges conspiracy to commit fraud by A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a Smith. wrongful act. City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th Further, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort, and requires 191, 212. underlying wrongful act be committed. Id. Murphy does not independently an by Smith or any other person, and does not allege that any other allege fraud Smith's alleged actions. As Murphy fails to allege a person was involved in summary adjudication is granted as to the ninth cause of conspiracy by Smith, action. ~ -_ Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action alleges quiet title against defendants Smith, ATC Ponderosa K LLC and American Tower Corporation, regarding the Easement Access agreement between Winged S Ranch, LLC, and Anthem Telecom, LLC. Plaintiff further seeks a declaration “that title to the Property is vested in Plaintiff alone”. Plaintiff, as an owner of an equitable interest in the subject property pursuant to the installment land contract or real property sales contract, cannot maintain an action to quiet title to the subject property. Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 291, 292. This claim also fails as plaintiff does not assert a cognizable legal basis for vesting title in herself, or tender or the ability to tender the full amount owing on the underlying loan. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020; Mix v. Sodd (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 386, 390; McElroy v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 388, 391-395. Summary adjudication is granted as to the tenth cause of action. Plaintiff's eleventh cause of action seeks declaratory relief against Smith, ATC Ponderosa K LLC and American Tower Corporation “as to the rights of these parties in the Easement and the Property.” (SAC, I 73.) She seeks of “the rights of each of the parties herein”, and an order a determination to enjoin the defendants from exercising rights relating to the Easement (SAC, @@ 74.) As this cause of action encompasses a Access agreement. determination of the rights of the parties with respect to the subject adjudication is not appropriate. As noted, there is a property, summary of facts regarding whether Smith has actively prevented Murphy from dispute the terms of the Contract for Deed. There is also a performing under dispute between the parties regarding the remaining amount owed significant the import of Smith’s continuing acceptance of monthly by Murphy, and ~ ~~ payments from Murphy. Summary adjudication is denied as to the eleventh cause of action. Finally, Smith seeks summary adjudication of his cause of action for judicial foreclosure. Again, there is a dispute of facts regarding whether Smith actively prevented Murphy from performing under the terms of the Contract for Deed, the amount claimed by Smith to be due as of April 1, 2019, and the import of Smith’s acceptance of monthly payments from Murphy. For this reason, summary adjudication is denied as to Smith’s claim for judicial foreclosure. In summary, Smith’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Smith’s motion for summary adjudication is granted as to Murphy’s first, third, fourth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action. Smith’s motion for summary adjudication is denied as to Murphy’s second and eleventh causes of action, and Smith’s cross-claim for judicial foreclosure. Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Summary Adjudication Defendants ATC Ponderosa K LLC and American Tower Corporation's joinder defendant and cross-complainant Charley D. Smith's motion for summary to or alternatively summary adjudication, is dropped in light of the judgment, dismissal of these defendants entered November 13, 2019.